

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

**DAVID AND GOLIATH IN THE OCEAN OF PEACE:
CASE STUDIES OF
"NUCLEARISM," "NUCLEAR ALLERGY" AND "THE KIWI DISEASE"**

**A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology**

by

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To the people of the New Zealand/Aotearoa peace movement, and to
Jessie, Annie and Lucy Boanas, peace people of the future.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page -----	iii
Dedication Page -----	iv
Table of Contents -----	v
Acknowledgements -----	viii
Vita, Publications and Fields of Study -----	xi
Abstract -----	xii
Chapter 1 The Nuclear Dilemma -----	1
The Absolute Weapon -----	1
The Case Studies -----	11
Concepts and Metaphors -----	14
The Theoretical Perspective -----	29
PART ONE: NUCLEARISM	
Chapter 2 The Nuclear Family -----	41
The U.S.T.T.P.I. and the C.F.A -----	41
Nuclear Nomads -----	47
Atomic Legacy -----	54
Pacific Apartheid -----	62
Chapter 3 Palauan Odyssey, 1979-90 -----	71
The Constitution and the Compact -----	71
Drama and Melodrama -----	76
Country in Crisis -----	82
Analysis and Conclusions -----	94
Chapter 4 Sea-borne Nuclearism -----	100
Nuclear Navies -----	100
Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Navy -----	108
'Changing the Nuclear Game' -----	118
A Power/Knowledge Truth Regime -----	126
PART TWO: ODYSSEY OF A NUCLEAR FREE NATION, 1975-87	
Chapter 5 The Peace Squadron -----	136
Setting and Scene -----	137
Genesis and Conception -----	148
Gestation and Birth -----	151
Baptism -----	156

Chapter 6 Sea-borne Anti-Nuclearism	162
The Peace Armada	162
'War' on Waitemata Harbour	170
Waiting for <i>Haddo</i>	178
Close Encounters of the Nuclear Kind	190
Chapter 7 Spreading Nuclear Allergy	198
Rugby, Racism and Radicalism	198
The Visit of the USS <i>Texas</i>	207
Politicians, Parties and 'Women Power'	215
A Snap Election	218
Chapter 8 The Kiwi Disease	224
The Fourth Labour Government and ANZUS	224
The Affair of the USS <i>Buchanan</i>	233
Stormclouds	239
Nuclear Free New Zealand	246
PART THREE: THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF PMNZ/AOTEAROA	
Chapter 9 Networks of Empowerment	252
The Peace Networks	253
The Peace Squadron	254
The 1980's Peace Movement	267
The Peace Umbrella	273
Chapter 10 The Semiotic System	283
Myths and Symbols	283
Rituals	289
Forms of Discourse	295
Communication and Resources	301
Chapter 11 Modes of Persuasion	307
Non-Violent Principles and Pre-Figurative Practices	308
Tasks and Goals	316
Direct-Action Protest and Symbolic Demonstrations	320
Peace Education and Pressure Politics	332
Chapter 12 Problems and Problematics	340
External Problems and Dilemmas	340
Internal Conflicts and Tensions	348
Green Politics	361

Chapter 13 Peace People	366
Women	367
Men	378
Children	389
 PART FOUR: POSTSCRIPT, CONCLUSIONS	
Chapter 14 'Post-Nuclear' Politics 1987-1990	394
The Ultimate Dilemma	394
The Battle of the Frigates	400
The Trouble with ANZUS	405
New Leaders, Old Decisions and 'People Power'	411
Chapter 15 Why the Kiwi Disease? (And Why Not the Aussie?)	423
Appendix 1	453
Appendix 2	461
Appendix 3	462
Appendix 4	466
References	473
Bibliography	485



ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

David and Goliath in the Ocean of Peace: Case Studies of
"Nuclearism," "Nuclear Allergy" and the "Kiwi Disease"

by

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The dissertation addresses the dialectic between the competing reality systems of anti-nuclearism and nuclearism, and considers some of the consequences of these polar responses to the nuclear dilemma through four empirical case studies. The focus is on the New Zealand/Aotearoa peace movement, the anti-nuclear actions of the Fourth Labour Government and the so far unique success of peace activism in that country. PART ONE consists of three short studies, two of them concerned with Pacific Island micro-states. The first examines nuclear conflicts in the Marshall Islands; the second examines the struggle in Palau to retain the 1979 Nuclear Free Constitution in entering into a Compact of Free Association with the United States; the third examines the U.S. Navy as one manifestation of the doctrine, strategies and practice of offensive nuclear deterrence.

PART TWO tells the story of the birth and growth of the N.Z. Peace Squadron in the 1970's, the battles between 'sea-borne nuclearism' and 'sea-borne anti-nuclearism,' the spread of 'nuclear allergy' in the 1980's and the Government's rejection in February 1985 of the U.S. Navy's request for a port call by the nuclear-capable USS *Buchanan*, the so-called 'Kiwi disease.' PART THREE is an analysis of the N.Z./Aotearoa peace movement within the paradigm of new social movement theory in which anti-nuclearism is regarded as

a socio-cultural reality system actively engaged in challenging the power/knowledge truth regime of nuclearism through a process of knowledge/empowerment. The means whereby the alternative truth of anti-nuclearism/militarism is generated, transmitted and sustained in the attempt to take control of historicity is explored through examining the networks of the New Zealand 'peace umbrella', the peace movement semiotic system, the forms of protest, the problems of peace activism and activists' statements of motivation and belief.

PART FOUR examines the 'post-nuclear' situation in New Zealand from the passing of the Nuclear Free Zone legislation on June 4, 1987 to the adoption by the conservative opposition party on March 8, 1990 of the Government's anti-nuclear policies. The peace movement's unsuccessful attempt to prevent the strengthening of conventional military ties with Australia is considered in the context of the general anti-nuclear dilemma of what comes after the rejection of nuclear deterrence. The final chapter addresses the question of why anti-nuclearism is strong in New Zealand but not in Australia, and why, in contrast to New Zealand, Australia's major political parties have bi-lateral pro-nuclear deterrence policies. Underlying the whole of the work is the hermeneutical question of the meaning of 'the Kiwi disease' and 'nuclear allergy' if they are regarded not as phenomena to be explained but as texts to be interpreted.

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The sociology department of UCSD has provided a satisfying and stimulating milieu for this visitor from down under, and I am grateful for the financial and intellectual support I have received during my time here. I have been blessed in having Dr. Bennett Berger as my supervisor. He combines in exactly the right proportions a tough mind with a tender heart, and I have learned much from his erudition, wit and gently ironic view of the human condition. Bennett has led me kindly but firmly along the stony way of thesis writing, and I thank him for his friendship, trust and patience. I have also been privileged to have as departmental members of my Committee Dr. Dick Madsen and Dr. Joe Gusfield. I have sat at the feet of both, and gained much from their knowledge and wisdom. Dr. Roy D'Andrade has been an exemplary external Committee member, and I am personally indebted to him for his friendship, help and sustained encouragement. My thanks, too, to Dr. Mel Spiro and Dr. H. Stuart Hughes who were unable to continue in their capacity as external Committee members. I also remember with affection and gratitude former departmental committee member Cesar Grána, who died in a car accident while visiting his

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CHAPTER 1

THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA

..... somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

- W. B. Yeats, *Second Coming*

The Absolute Weapon

The First Coming

The world's first nuclear test, code-name "Trinity," took place just before sunrise on the morning of July 16, 1945 in the deserts of New Mexico, U.S.A. The message dispatched from Alamogordo by the scientists who had successfully birthed the bomb declared "It's a boy!" Had the bomb been a fizzle the message would have read: "It's a girl." Physicist Robert Oppenheimer, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory where the bomb was built, said of the small group of people who witnessed the explosion on that early summer morn, "Some wept. A few cheered. Most stood silent."¹ The cradle of the nuclear-age had been rocking throughout the century but the momentum increased sharply in the latter half of 1942 with the creation of the U.S. bomb-building Manhattan Project, "[t]he largest scientific project by far in the history of the world" (York, 1987: 6). Now the fruit of that effort was manifest; the swinging cradle had overturned.²

¹ Unless otherwise indicated quotes of those present at the test site are from Gregg Herken, *Counsels of War* (1985: Ch.1).

² In 1896 French physicist Antoine Henri Becquerel accidentally discovered the phenomenon of radioactivity. In 1897 English physicist Sir Joseph Thomson working with New Zealand physicist Sir

For some of those gathered at Alamogordo the moment was epiphanic. Robert Oppenheimer's immediate response was "Now I have become Death, the destroyer of worlds;" a passage from the *Bhagavad Gita* where Krishna, the source and giver of all life in the Hindu scriptures, takes on his multi-armed form and reveals his full nature to Prince Arjuna, the representative human being.³ The physicist in charge of the test, Kenneth Bainbridge, expressed a similar idea in more secular terms when he turned to the Director and said, "Well, Oppie, now we're all sons of bitches." Another witness to the explosion wrote, "It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the near-by mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the

Ernest Rutherford at Manchester University discovered the electron and inferred that there were smaller particles than the atom. At the turn of the century, Becquerel's associates, Marie (who coined the word 'radioactivity') and Pierre Curie, helped overturn the orthodox view that the chemical elements were immutable and the atom indivisible. Their search for elements displaying the atomic property of radioactivity led to the discovery of polonium and radium. Rutherford demonstrated Thomson's hypothesis in 1902, thereby discovering that the nucleus itself was a composite structure. In 1903 he published a general theory of radioactivity. In 1911 he drew conclusions about the structure of the atom and in 1919, with Sir James Chadwick, began his 'atom-smashing' activities. In 1922, Danish physicist Niels Bohr, a student of Rutherford's, published the current model of atomic structure and radiation. In 1932 Chadwick discovered the neutron. In 1933 a French team headed by Frédéric and Irène Joliot-Curie discovered artificial radioactivity. In 1934 Leo Szilard, a Nazi refugee, conceived the idea of a chain reaction and took out two British patents: one outlining his ideas for what we now call a nuclear reactor and a secret one outlining a possible way for producing an extremely powerful bomb. In 1938, German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered that a uranium nucleus struck by a neutron split into two, thereby releasing large amounts of energy and - possibly- a chain reaction. During 1939, scientists in many countries - including Japan - experimented with refining the fission process and elucidating its potential. In the U.S., Albert Einstein, at the urging of fellow refugees Leo Szilard, Edward Teller and Eugene Wigner, wrote to President Roosevelt informing him of the process and its potential. Secret experiments in Britain and the United States continued throughout 1940-41. In 1942 the Los Alamos Laboratory was created specifically for research into bomb design, U-235 and plutonium while U.C. Berkeley, the Univ. of Chicago and Columbia Univ. became major centres for their research and production. Enrico Fermi built the first successful nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago, producing an artificial chain reaction in December 1942. (Sources: *The Harper Encyclopedia of Science*. N.Y.: Harper & Row (1967) and Herbert F. York, *Making Weapons, Talking Peace. A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva*. (1987:3-5, 33).

³ The analogy appears apt. The atom was always the origin and shatterer of worlds but only now was this totality fully revealed.

mission that it always be used for good and never for evil" (quoted Manoff, 1983:19).⁴

In his report to Washington, Brigadier General Thomas Fawcett, deputy to General Leslie Groves (the Army's Director of the Manhattan Project) described the explosion as "... unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. It was that beauty that great poets dream about but describe most poorly." Los Alamos physicist Robert Wilson recalls speeding with a jeepload of scientists to inspect the crater a few hours after the event and making "rude Italian gestures" as they passed more cautious colleagues proceeding in a lead-lined tank. The jeep stopped at what seemed to be the shore of a miniature sea of green glass - the desert sand fused by the million degree heat of the explosion. Said Wilson, "I was overwhelmed by that."⁵

The Second coming

The new-born had no need to slouch towards its Bethlehem. Twenty-one days after Trinity at 8.15 a.m. Japanese time, 'Little Boy', a 13 kt. uranium (U-235) bomb once again manifested the awful beauty and power of the absolute weapon - but this time not to a select few and not in an empty desert. On August 6, President Harry Truman informed the world that a bomb with more power than 20,000 tons of TNT had been dropped from an American airplane⁶ onto the Japanese army base of Hiroshima, population 318,000.⁷ "It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its powers has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East ... And the end is not yet."⁸ Three months earlier, *The New York Times* science writer, Ernest Laurence, had been recruited to the Manhattan Project to "EXPLAIN BOMB'S INTRICACIES TO PUBLIC" as the paper later stated. As a consequence of this

⁴ Robert Manoff is Co-Director of the *Center for War, Peace and the News Media*, New York University.

⁵ The phenomenon has been noted before. In St. John's vision of the Lamb upon the throne in the Book of Revelations "... there was a rainbow round about the throne ... and before the throne there was a sea of glass like unto crystal."

⁶ The bomb was dropped from the "Enola Gay," a B-29 bomber named after the pilot's mother.

⁷ Hiroshima contained a number of U.S. Prisoners of War. Those who survived the attack were immediately tortured and massacred in reprisal for the bombing.

⁸ *The New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1945: 1).

secret arrangement the *Times* received a War Department briefing a few hours in advance of the attack - "A little edge because we've taken your science man away," as General Groves put it (quoted Manoff: 1983, p.20). On the morning of August 7 the paper's headlines declared: "FIRST ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED ON JAPAN TRUMAN WARNS FOE OF A 'RAIN OF RUIN'" followed by the sub-headings: "NEW AGE USHERED" and "Steel Tower 'Vaporized' In Trial of Mighty Bomb." Front page news included the War Department report of the 'Manhattan Project' ("How three 'hidden cities' with a total population of 100,000 inhabitants sprang into being"; "the biggest secret of the war ..."), Truman's report of the triumph over the Reich ("Germany started the experiments but we finished them") and the triumph of scientists ("We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history - and won"); the report of "terrific damage" from Osaka Radio,⁹ and Churchill's reference to the part played by His Majesty's Government ("By God's mercy British and American science outpaced all German efforts ...").

On August 9, 1945 at 11 a.m. Japanese time, a hole finally opened up in the clouds over the west coast of Japan and 'Fat Man', a 22 kt. plutonium bomb, dropped onto the port of Nagasaki.¹⁰ On the same day the components of a second Pu-239 bomb left Los Alamos for final assembly at Tinian. America's "rain of ruin" appeared to be underway, although in fact the existing world nuclear arsenal had just been consumed. The *Times* headlines reported the Soviet declaration of war on Japan and the dropping of the second atomic bomb, stating that crew members reported "good results." The editorial declared: "The fundamental power of the universe, the power manifested in the sunshine that has been recognized from the remotest ages as the sustaining force of earthly life is at last entrusted to human hands."

⁹ No doubt reassuring to the U.S. authorities as a dense black cloud obscured all visibility after the bomb's impact.

¹⁰ Although the explosive force was greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb, damage was less because of the hilly terrain and the smaller size of the city. In both Hiroshima and Nagasaki 50 percent of those within 1.2 k. of the epicenter died on the day of the explosion. Within 5 months, the total number of deaths was approximately 140,000 out of Hiroshmia's population of 350,000 and 70,000 out of Nagasaki's population of 270,000.

The Rough Beast

Soon after the bombings, American writer John Hersey went to Hiroshima to talk with some of the people who had brought war to the Far East. One was a Methodist missionary who was away from the city when the bomb fell and who immediately returned to it. Hersey writes:

He was the only person making his way into the city; he met hundreds and hundreds who were fleeing, and every one of them seemed to be hurt in some way. The eyebrows of some were burned off and skin hung from their faces and hands. Others, because of pain, held their arms up as if carrying something in both hands. Some were vomiting as they walked. Many were naked or in shreds of clothing. Almost all had their heads bowed, looked straight ahead, were silent, and showed no expression whatever.¹¹ (Hersey, 1946:39-40).

A woman survivor tells a similar story:

It was as if the sun had crashed and exploded. Yellow fireballs were crashing down. [Afterwards, on the riverbank], there were so many injured people that there was almost no room to walk. ... People's clothes had been blown off and their bodies burned by the heat rays. They looked as if they had strips of rags hanging from them. ... I saw people whose intestines were hanging out of their bodies. Some had lost their eyes. Some had their backs torn open so you could see their backbones inside. They were all asking for water. (Quoted Dyer, 1985:96).

Whether or not the desert birds of Alamagordo reeled in indignation when "the basic power of the universe" exploded into their world has not been noted. Had they foreseen the fate of some of their kind a few years later they may well have experienced another kind of emotion. A U.S. Army observer of a 1957 British bomb test on Christmas Island said of the albatrosses in the lagoon:

The birds were the things we could see all the time. They were superb specimens of life - really quite exquisite - phenomenal creatures. Albatrosses will fly for days skimming a few inches above the surface of the water... they are just beautiful creatures. Watching them is a wonder. That is what I didn't expect. We were standing around waiting for this bomb to go off - which we had been told was a very small one, so no-one was particularly upset. Even though I'd never seen one I figured, well, these guys know what is going to happen. They know what the dangers are, and

¹¹ People walked with hands outspread because the burns made their fingers rigid.

we've been adequately briefed and we all have radiation metres on No worry

Anyway, we were standing around and the count-down came in over the radio. And suddenly I could see all these birds, I could see the birds that I'd been watching for days before. They were now suddenly visible through the opaque visor of my helmet. And they were smoking. Their feathers were on fire. And they were doing cartwheels. The light persisted for some time, ... long enough for me to see the birds crash into the water. They were sizzling, smoking. They weren't vaporized; it's just that they were absorbing such intense radiation that they were being consumed by the heat. They were blinded. ... And so far there had been no shock, none of the blast damage we talk about when we discuss the effects of nuclear weapons. Instead there were just these smoking, twisting, hideously contorted birds crashing into things. (Quoted Lifton and Humphrey, 1984:78-79).

"For an entire generation," writes historian Gregg Herken, "the atomic bomb was the cause of a revelation... Most Americans learned of the bomb from Hiroshima. For the scientists who had built the weapons, however, Hiroshima was the second coming. They had been present at the creation" (Herken, 1985:3). With the birth of the absolute weapon, it seems, the long divorce between science and religion was over, the cherished ideal of the apolitical pursuit of pure knowledge exploded with the bomb. A moment of apocalyptic clarity in a desert dawn had revealed physics entwined with metaphysics, scientific endeavour inseparable from concepts of power and domination, good and evil, love and hate. To quote the much-quoted statement of Robert Oppenheimer, "In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humour, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose (Oppenheimer, 1948:66).

The Time of the Question Mark

Edward Teller, the physicist who became known as the 'Father of the H-Bomb', was present at the Trinity test and while not particularly moved by it he thought it significant that the desert winds almost immediately began shaping the mushroom cloud into a giant question-mark. The perception was prescient. "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" had been used as part of the general U.S. war strategy for defeating the Japanese as quickly and economically as possible; what was not considered was the strategy of the future. Once the extent of the damage became clear and when (in spite of censorship by the occupying

authorities) word began filtering through of apparently uninjured survivors dying of some mysterious sickness (initially dismissed by Laurence as "Japanese propaganda"), humankind was confronted with a qualitatively-different kind of weapon and the question of what to do with it.

While the Cabinet disputed and the President pondered over the proper course to pursue two different perspectives on the bombings shared space in the *Times*. While the major sentiments expressed at the time of the bombing were of awe, achievement or national pride, there were also some expressions of fear, moral condemnation or humanitarian concern. A staff reporter asked: "What is this terrible new weapon which the War Department also calls the 'Cosmic Bomb'?" while the paper's military affairs analyst, Hanson W. Baldwin, wrote: "Americans have become a synonym for destruction. Now we have been the first to introduce a new weapon of unknowable effects which may bring us victory quickly but which will sow the seeds of hate more widely than ever. We may yet reap the whirlwind".

On August 9 there was a statement from the head of ICI in London (who had been involved in the Manhattan Project) that within measureable time "the Queen Mary would cross the Atlantic on a teacupful of fuel and all the houses in Britain ... be heated for virtually nothing as a result of the discovery of the method of releasing nuclear energy," but there were also reports that a representative from the British Bombing Restriction Council had sent a telegraph to President Truman saying that the bomb's "Unparalleled terrorism disgraces the United Nations." Letters to the Editor columns in British newspapers were said to be full of protests at the bombings: "BRITAINS (*sic*) REVOLTED BY USE OF ATOM-BOMB" and a message from the Vatican Press declared: "The use of the atomic bombs in Japan have created an unfavourable impression on the Vatican," noting that "Leonardo da Vinci had destroyed his plans for the submarine because he feared that man would apply it to the ruin of civilization." Lord Geoffrey Fisher, Primate of the Church of England, had a different kind of worry, based apparently on the notion that Satan makes mischief for idle hands to do. The paper reported that the Archbishop of Canterbury had

"expressed the fear that the real danger of the atomic bomb lay not in endless destruction, but in the increased leisure it offered mankind."

On August 10 the longest article in the paper was headed "SCIENCE FOR LIFE OR DEATH' DISCUSSED BY SARNOFF," and inside pages carried a call to the conscience of the nation by the president of RCA to reject the use of the bomb; an appeal from the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (co-signed by John Foster Dulles) that "use of the bomb be temporarily suspended to give the Japanese time to react;" a statement by the *Catholic World* that the use of the bomb was absolutely and utterly indefensible "and lights up for us all the immorality of the path we have been treading" and a statement from London by Sir James Chadwick that "some of his colleagues refused to help work on an atomic bomb for fear they might be creating a planet-destroying monster. "For weeks," states Robert Manoff, "the paper was awash with British bishops, worried scientist and earnest educators addressing their consciences and the future of the world" (Manoff, 1983: 21).

At the same time, the *Times* was running a ten-part series by Ernest Laurence which, to again quote Manoff, "... was an emotional celebration of the science, engineering and industry behind the bomb, couched in superlatives that left the dilemmas favored by civil journalism far behind." The beauty of the explosion was equated with the grand finale of a mighty symphony, the mushroom cloud with the Statue of Liberty. Of a nuclear reactor Laurence wrote: "One stands before it as though beholding the realization of a vision such as Michelangelo might have had of a world yet to be, as indescribable as the Grand Canyon of Arizona, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony ..." (quoted Manoff, 1983:22). The series, together with a piece on the Nagasaki bombing, earned for Laurence a War Department Citation and the Pulitzer Prize from his colleagues.

Meanwhile the world-which-would-be was taking shape. On September 4 the *Times* announced: "SOVIET HINTS RACE FOR ATOM BOMB." On September 23 a long article cited the views of Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, that development of the bomb by the Soviet

Union, which he predicted within five years, would destroy the existing military parity between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The next day a presidential statement appeared on the front page - a response to a Cabinet leak - asserting that Truman alone would make atomic policy. Two weeks later the announcement came: "U.S. WILL NOT SHARE ATOM BOMB SECRET." The moment of equivocation had passed and with it the prominence given to the moral debate. In the decades to come the voice of radical dissent from the nuclear policies of Western governments would, with one small exception, be confined to the domains of fringe politics and marginal media.

The stage was set for the Cold War scenario to unfold and waiting in the wings was the doctrine of deterrence; the eventual official answer to the question of what to do with nuclear weapons.¹² Henceforth, they would be used not to wage wars but to prevent them. In the words of Bernard Brodie, the young Yale scholar who was one of the first to recognize the implications of the bomb and who became known as 'the father of deterrence':

The writer ... is not for the moment concerned about who will *win* the next war in which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose (Brodie, 1946:76).

That 'almost' however, proved salient. In the next forty-five years of the century while the world's leaders pursued the dual goal of preventing WW3 and preparing for it if it occurred the nuclear arsenal would go from zero to around fifty thousand as the unusable

¹² This may be overstating the case. Perhaps Edna St. Vincent Millay is closer to describing the decision-making process of governments when she states:

... we have no sense of direction: impetus
 Is all we have, we do not proceed, we only
 Roll down the mountain,
 Like disbalanced boulders, crushing before us many
 Delicate springing things, whose plan it was to grow.
 ...we decide nothing: the bland Opportunity
 Presents itself, and we embrace it ...

(*Collected Poems*, (ed. Norma Millay) N.Y.: Harpers, 1956; p.427-8

weapons became a measure of status - the greater the arsenal, the greater the prestige (though not necessarily the power) - and a tool for maintaining the post-war *status quo* without recourse to internecine or major wars. Four of the five victor nations would form the exclusive 'Nuclear Club' and membership would be denied to the defeated, lesser white nations and all non-white nations, although the fifth victor, the world's most populous nation, would successfully storm the barricades. The venerable institutions of war would continue to survive - indeed thrive - in the permanent war-emergency economies of nuclear states fighting a paper war, their conventional surrogate wars and endemic conflict between or within the non-nuclear states.

The birth of the nuclear age is a modern creation story but perhaps its roots lie in the ancient Judeo/Christian myth. In the Genesis account not one but two taboo trees grow in Eden: the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and the Tree of Life. Adam and Eve were turned out of the Garden not only because they ate the fruit of the first tree but, says the narrator, "lest [Adam] put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever;" or, in other words, become a god. "So [the Lord God] drove out the man and ... placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubims [*sic*], and a flaming sword which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life" (Genesis, Ch. 4). In the 20th. century the fallen progeny appear to be adding a further, perhaps final, installment to the myth. Clever Adam has created his own flaming sword, invaded the Garden, split the tree of life asunder, tasted the forbidden fruit - ahead of Eve this time - and bestowed upon humanity seemingly godlike powers. Whether they will be used to enhance, disfigure or destroy what remains of Eden is the part of the story yet to be written.

As the Western world nears the century of its coming-of-age the outcome suddenly appears more hopeful. Change is in the air and the thunderclouds of the Cold War are dissipating. The weapons, however, are not, and neither is the giant question-mark. Rather, it has grown larger. Now the question is no longer just what to do with nuclear weapons in a new political climate but also, "What have we done with nuclear weapons and what might they do, or already be doing, with us?" This dissertation is

mostly about people who fear the answer to that question and who act on that fear; people who are convinced that unless the rough beast of nuclearism is rapidly dethroned sooner or later (and probably sooner) much of life on earth, perhaps all of it, will share the fate of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki victims and the albatrosses of Christmas Island. To a lesser extent it is also about people who believe and act quite otherwise.

The Case Studies

The studies presented here are explorations of some of the immediate or long-term consequences of the nuclear decisions. The linking theme is, as my title suggests, a situation of asymmetrical conflict between two opposing forces. The work as a whole contains four distinct sections, the first mainly providing a context for the remainder. Part One consists of three short studies. The first two are about the Marshall Islands and Palau, two micro-states of the Pacific, while the third examines sea-borne nuclearism as one manifestation - or one 'leg'¹³ - of the nuclear Goliath. The focus is on the U.S. Navy and although the study is mainly-quantitative, it is nevertheless intended as a kind of 'character study' of a major protagonist in the events described in the next section.

Part Two is the centrepiece of the dissertation. It tells the story of the emergence of New Zealand as the world's first officially nuclear free nation, the single exception to the marginality of anti-nuclearism noted above, and can be read as a four-act drama set within the time period 1975-1987. In Part Three I turn from dramatic narrative to sociological analysis, regarding the New Zealand peace movement as both a contemporary social movement and a *Weltanschauung* in competition with the dominant reality construction. The final section begins with an 'update' of events in 'post-nuclear' New Zealand between 1987 and 1989. Next I suggest some reasons for the so far unique phenomenon of New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation, and, to a limited extent, compare the situation with 'non-nuclear free' Australia. In the final chapter I offer some thoughts about what these case

¹³ The strategic submarines of the U.S. Navy and the long-range bombers and land-based missiles of the Air Force's Strategic Air Command are collectively known as the Triad of strategic forces. (called by Ret'd. Admiral Gene La Rocque, "the Holy Trinity"). Gwynne Dyer states, "If the Army had succeeded in keeping its own ballistic missiles, the Triad would presumably be known as the Rectangle (or the Quadruped)" (1985: p.16).

studies might be 'saying' if, as the post-modernists say, they are regarded not just as phenomena to be explained but as texts to be read.

The text as a whole is largely an account of accounts; accounts given by people, drawn from the media, selected from scholarly works or expert analyses, culled from the grassroots press and woven together to make, or such was my hope and intention, coherent stories and a coherent theme. My concern was not with accuracy but with perception, for it is not the situation *per se* but the definition of the situation which is pertinent to the perennial sociological question of why people and social groups are behaving this way and not that. As Vico argued long ago, how we articulate our world determines how we arrive at what we call reality. Newspapers, for example, are an important source of data; not because I believe them to be objective conveyors of information - *au contraire* - but because I believe them to be major shapers and indicators of public perceptions.

Data for the Pacific Island studies come exclusively from scholarly sources and peace movement publications with the focus on the writings or statements of indigeneous people and regional activists. Main research venues were the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University and the Center for Pacific Island Studies, University of Hawaii. Although a good deal has been written or said at both the scholarly and the grassroots levels about nuclear issues in the Pacific Islands my aim here is to synthesize the two. Data for the naval study come mainly from scholarly or expert writings, newspaper reports, publications of the 'Disarm the Seas Campaign.' and interviews conducted with five active or retired naval officials: the Assistant Chief of the N.Z. Defence Staff, a retired RAN lieutenant-commander who was responsible for berthing visiting nuclear submarines in Perth, Australia (and now an anti-nuclear activist), a retired U.S. admiral, a retired U.S. submarine commander (one-time Commander of USS *Nautilus*, the first nuclear submarine) and an ex-member of a U.S. Navy submarine crew.

While all the data sources named above are drawn on for the New Zealand study the most important is the material from the thirty-five formal interviews (and many informal conversations) recorded during three months fieldwork in that country. The majority of the

interviewees are or were active members of the N.Z. peace movement, but the sample - one of the snowball variety - includes diplomats, politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, academics, business men, adolescents, trade unionists and one newspaper editor. I also talked with many people as I travelled around the country. Major cities visited were Dunedin (where I attended a University of Otago conference on Canada-U.S.-N.Z. relations), Christchurch and Palmerston North in the South Island, and Wellington (the capital city) and Auckland (the largest city) in the North Island. Library research was done mainly at Auckland University. The Boanas family house in Christchurch and Peace House in Wellington were the major venues for peace movement archival research.

My aims in undertaking this project were several. At one level I simply wished to tell stories which seemed to me worth telling. At a more theoretical level I aimed to study reality constructions and power relations and explore Lenin's claim that dialectics is "... the study of how there can be and are ... identical opposites" (quoted Read, 1947:43). At the empirical level I wanted to carry out a sociologically-oriented, mainly-qualitative, in-depth study of a national peace movement and Peace Movement NZ/Aotearoa seemed the ideal choice. To my knowledge no such study exists, although there are some accounts of specific anti-nuclear actions such as the European campaigns against nuclear power and the women's camp at Greenham Common.

Frank Parkin's *Middle Class Radicalism* (1968), one of the few book-length studies of the peace movement, is an analysis of the social bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament but is based solely on questionnaire data obtained from participants in the 1965 Aldermaston Easter March. Stuart McMillan refers briefly to the role of the N.Z. peace movement in *Neither Confirm Nor Deny* (1987) and Kevin Clements devotes a full chapter to New Zealand's history of war resistance and the actions of peace groups in *Back from the Brink: the Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand* (1988). In neither case, however, is the peace movement the focus of the work. It is my hope that an interview-based study of the kind I have undertaken will not only contribute to the current stock of knowledge about an important contemporary social movement but help fill an existing gap in the peace-war literature as well. Because I also wish to communicate

something of the feel, flavour and passion of Peace Movement NZ/Atearoa, the text includes many *verbatim* statements of past or present key activists.

At the empirical level I ask the classic what, who, how and why questions of sociological research: "What was the conflict about?"; "Who was involved?"; "How was the battle fought?" and "Why this outcome?" In the case of the New Zealand conflict, the only one involving the peace movement, I also ask: "What is the anatomy of a peace movement?"; "Whom does it comprise?"; "How is the *Weltanschauung* created and maintained and the political theory expressed?"; "Why did the competing and generally derogated discourse of anti-nuclearism succeed in its challenge to the dominant discourse of deterrence (if success is equated with the achievement of major goals) and how much is this (so far) unique success due to fortuitous circumstances and unique conditions?" At the semiotic level the question for all three conflict studies is whether these small societies may be signposts to the future of larger societies, and underlying the whole of the work is the hermeneutical question of the meaning of 'nuclear allergy' and 'the Kiwi disease' if they are regarded not as phenomenon to be explained, but as texts to be read and interpreted.

Joseph Gusfield describes two different perspectives for studying social movements: 'linearity' and 'fluidity' (Gusfield, 1981a). It is not, he states, that one perspective is better than another but that one does some things the other cannot do and *vice versa*. In this study I have attempted to do both, adopting first the perspective of 'linearity' in describing the sequence of events in New Zealand, and then 'fluidity' in regarding the peace movement as a socio-cultural system. Although I have taken part in peace group actions elsewhere, my method was not participant observation in New Zealand. Before turning to the subject of the theoretical paradigm in which I pursued answers to my questions it is necessary to define and discuss several terms important to this work - particularly as some have already made their appearance in the text or the title.

Concepts and Metaphors

The Ocean of Peace

This is, of course, the Pacific Ocean and irony is intended. The region has been a prime target for imperial expansion and colonial rivalry and was a major battleground of

WW2. The B 29 bombers carrying 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' took off from Saipan in the Marianas and the Pacific has continued to be an arena for nuclear experimentation. Over 200 devices have been exploded, 63 of them in the atmosphere. Britain and the U.S. carried out bomb tests in their colonies or newly-acquired territories until 1962, and France continues its underground nuclear-testing programme at Mururoa and Fangatafu atolls in French Polynesia. American unarmed missiles fly from California to Kwajalein over the Western Test Range, while Soviet missiles fly from western Siberia to the North Pacific over the East-West Test Range. In Siberia, SS-20 nuclear missiles aim at military targets throughout the region. U.S. chemical weapons are stored on Johnson Atoll, an uninhabited island in the Pacific and the chosen site for incinerating those already on the island and possibly those currently in Europe; a project due to commence in 1990. The Army insists that the incinerator is safe and is proposing an environmental impact study; regional critics argue that hazardous chemicals will be released into the environment and the food chain.

The Pacific is home to the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the scene of regular allied exercises. Naval vessels carry thousands of nuclear warheads across or under the surface of the sea, and more are stored around the Rim. Radio-active waste from nuclear reactors has been dumped in at least 20 ocean sites, mostly by Japan. In the Rim countries, the U.S. has 350 military bases or installations, Britain 13 and the Soviet Union 10. In the Pacific Basin, France has 15 and the U.S. 167. Australia is host to 3 U.S. bases, all elements of the nuclear infrastructure. Ninety-five percent of all micro-electronics are assembled and tested in the Pacific rimlands and according to a past Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), "[the new technologies] being spawned on the far side of the Pacific basin .. will form the basis of our next generation of weaponry: the smart weapons we depend on to make the difference in conflict" (Lyons, 1987:46).

For people everywhere, the words 'Pacific Island' or 'South Pacific' tend to conjure up romantic images of a tropical paradise complete with coconut palms, golden sands, blue lagoons and simple, happy, friendly inhabitants. For those who are familiar with the region, however, the words increasingly are evoking very different images and

emotions from those of the tourist brochure. The titles of some of the books, articles, pamphlets and films appearing in the last decade are indicative of this new perception and also of its cause, as for instance: "Trouble in Paradise"... "Nuclear Playground" ... "Pacific Paradise in Pain" ... Nuclear Nightmare in the South Pacific" ... "Pacific Alert: Nuclear Arms and the New Militarism" ... "Islands of Fire" ... "The Dark Side of Paradise: Hawai'i in a Nuclear World" ... "A Call to a New Exodus: an Anti-Nuclear Primer for Pacific People" ... "Half Life," "*Mururoa mon amour*" and so forth.

As the titles also suggest, the changed perception has resulted in the growth of grassroots' anti-nuclear and anti-colonial groups - for instance, the Fijian Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG), the Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC) based in New Zealand, the (mainly American and Canadian) Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas (an arm of the North Atlantic Nuclear Free Seas Network) and the regional umbrella organization, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement. There are anti-colonial/liberation struggles in Kanaky (the people's name for New Caledonia) and East Timor (invaded and occupied by Indonesia three months after gaining independence), and two small independence parties in French Polynesia, the 'Polynesian Liberation Front' and '*la mana te nunua*' (let the people have the power). The issue of French testing is particularly important for the countries of the South Pacific and the direct cause of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (SPNFZ or 'Spin-fizz'). As it is also highly pertinent to the New Zealand case study it is discussed more fully in that section. The metaphor that goes with 'The Ocean of Peace' in my title is discussed at the close of this chapter.

Nuclearism and Anti-Nuclearism/Militarism

By this I mean the two polar and competing ideologies in the West which eventually evolved from the conflicting response to the question of what should be done with the bomb. On the one hand, people like Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell believed that as nuclear weapons would be used in future wars the only way to prevent annihilation was through disarmament, the immediate and total abolition of the arsenal and world government; on the other hand was the belief that the history of international politics

demonstrated the difficulty of achieving disarmament and the latest war had demonstrated the danger of doing so. World government may be the long term answer to war, but meanwhile the horror of the bomb must act as a deterrent to its use. As Winston Churchill put it, lasting peace will be the robust child of terror.

By 'nuclearism' I mean the extreme expression of the latter belief: namely, all that now supports and furthers a strategy of offensive forward nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting capability. Although a policy-trend through successive post-war Administrations, it reached a peak during the Reagan years and continues on this impetus. By 'anti-nuclearism/militarism' I mean the counter policy: not only the abolition of nuclear weapons but of the institutions of war. The most forceful contemporary expression of this ideology is found in the beliefs and disparate actions of core members of the Western peace movement; people who are often called (and often call themselves) the 'peace-niks.' (It must be noted that while opposition to militarism necessarily includes anti-nuclearism, the reverse need not be the case).

Each of these competing ideologies is a type of socio-cultural system, a *Weltanschauung*, which is, or so I will argue, a mirror image of the other - though vastly asymmetrical in terms of political power, resources and influence. Both are equally structured through myth, symbol, discourse, ritual and rhetoric and both have global institutions and/or networks of communication. Each has charismatic leaders, dedicated adherents, experts, intellectuals, media, a lexicon and an ever-growing literature. Both *Weltanschauungen* have internal logic and rationality but as each contains a root metaphor based on sharply-differing perceptions of the nature of the threat, each regards the other as irrational.¹⁴

The image within nuclearism is (or has been) of a ruthless, cruel and cunning beast poised to spring and attack the free democratic societies of the West at the first sign of weakness or vulnerability. As the nuclear threat is all that is keeping the beast of

¹⁴ See Stephen Pepper's *World Hypotheses* (1942) for an argument about the importance of root metaphors in belief systems.

aggressive world communism at bay, a powerful and superior arsenal is essential. Thus modernization and testing of nuclear weapons and weapons systems must proceed until adequate security and/or adequate defence against the threat is achieved. To adherents of the counter-doctrine the beast which threatens is not so much ruthless, cruel and cunning as monstrous, stupid and obscene. It is neither communism nor capitalism but nuclearism, and to defend against it is illusion. If it is loosed in the name of national security or through madness or mishap on the part of its keepers doom is certain. Thus it is both rational and urgent to eliminate the means which make the holocaust not only possible but ultimately inevitable. The fetish of national or bloc security must be replaced by the concept of global security and human energy redirected towards solving the real dangers confronting the world.

Each set of protagonists believes its definition of the situation to be true, real and congruent with the facts, and each views the conflicting interpretation as not only false but dangerous. Both have as their fundamental *raison d'être* the prevention of nuclear war, but while the survival of life is the supreme value for one, for the other it is the survival of a way of life. "Peace through (military) strength" is the watchword of nuclearism, and political negotiations must begin from this posture. To their opponents, arms control is a tool of the arms race while preparing for war to prevent war simply fosters the conditions which make it more likely. As nuclear knowledge cannot be eliminated war must be eliminated, and replaced by strategies of negotiation, compromise, co-operation and, if necessary, political sanctions or non-violent resistance.

While the mass of people in Western societies stand - if they stand anywhere - around the mid-point of these two extreme responses to the nuclear dilemma, so far the clustering has been all on the side of nuclearism. Its adherents describe themselves and are described by others as 'realists' (those who accept the concepts of *real politik* concerning the primary role of power in international relations, who deal with existing givens and aim at apparently realizable goals) while labelling the proponents of disarmament and non-violence 'idealists' (those who reject the concepts of *real politik*, engage in so-called

wishful thinking and aim at seemingly Utopian goals). Anti-nuclearists regard themselves as realists and nuclearism as a prime example of 'crackpot realism'¹⁵ based neither on political reality nor the rational pursuit of goals but on irrational wishes, unconscious desires and the paradox of destroying something in order to save it.

Nevertheless, both theories about the way to prevent a nuclear war remain untested, although there has been no day free of war in the postwar period and the number of people who have died in or as a result of them exceeds the total casualties of WW2. The fact that there has been no major war in fortress Europe for forty-five years is often advanced as proof for the truth of nuclearism but, as Karl Popper reminds us, hypotheses can be proved false but not true and it cannot be demonstrated that without deterrence or with disarmament a major war would have occurred or will occur in the future.

Nuclear Deterrence

The concept of deterring communist or capitalist aggression by threatening to use the unusable nuclear weapons takes two forms: deterrence through the threat of retaliation or 'minimum deterrence', and 'deterrence through denial,' that is, the denial of victory to an aggressor through superior war-fighting capability. While both types have common elements, they are nevertheless mutually exclusive. The first describes the early policies of the superpowers and it largely remains the policy of the other nuclear states (although both the U.K. and France are moving toward the second form); the second became the official policy of the United States and (or was) the unofficial policy of the Soviet Union. Deterrence began with the policy of 'massive retaliation' during the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons, and continued into the 1950's while the Soviet Union possessed few bombs and a limited ability to deliver them to the North American continent. The policy was formally enshrined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech of January, 1954, in which he announced that the United States would "depend primarily upon a great

¹⁵ In the 1950's C. Wright Mills wrote: "In the American white-collar hierarchies and in the middle level of the Soviet intelligentsia - in quite differing ways but often with frightening convergence - there is coming about the rise of the cheerful robot, of the technological idiot, of the crackpot realist. All these types embody a common ethos; rationality without reason." ("The Complacent Young Men" in *Problems, Politics and People: Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*; ed. I.L. Horowitz, N.Y.: Ballantyne; 1963).

capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." As Richard Nixon put it a few weeks later, "Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we would use at our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we could choose."

When the Russians achieved adequate retaliatory capability, however, the policy was no longer viable. 'Mutual deterrence' or 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (MAD) took its place; a strategy which can be summed up, to quote Gwynne Dyer, as "Don't do that, or I'll kill us both!" (Dyer, 1985:81). Not that the former policy disappeared altogether. In 1957, for instance, General Curtis Le May of Strategic Air Command was flying secret reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory 24 hours a day and stating: "If I see the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack, I'm going to knock the shit out of them before they take off the ground. I don't care [if it's not national policy]. It's my policy. That's what I'm going to do" (quoted Kaplan, 1983:133-4). Nevertheless, a rough parity in strategic weapons eventually ushered in the era of *détenté* and attempts to codify the policy through agreements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

From 1960 onwards, however, both sides were modernizing conventionally-armed forces and working out theories for how tactical nuclear weapons might be used to avoid an all-out nuclear war. The result was the theory of 'flexible response' - the threat and the capability for meeting aggression by escalating from conventional weapons to battlefield nuclear weapons to strategic weapons. It became official NATO strategy in 1967 and although not formally adopted by the Warsaw Pact, the dominant policy of the Soviet Union.¹⁶ While NATO also increased its conventional arsenal, nuclear superiority and the threat of a first strike was (and is) said to be necessary to counter Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, although this latter judgement is often challenged by experts. Nuclear weapons - particularly those with "more bang for the buck" - also help solve the

¹⁶ There is no military logic in a losing side initiating nuclear battlefield weapons as their forces would be locked into defensive positions and thus more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the mobile units of the attacker. Their use is rather intended to signal that the losing side will escalate to strategic weapons rather than accept defeat.

political problem for Western elites of voters who consistently favour a strong defence force but will not pay the social and economic costs of maintaining large conventional forces.

Minimum deterrence or deterrence through threat of punishment requires second-strike or retaliatory capability, while deterrence by denial requires both first and second-strike capability and, ideally, protection against what is left of the enemy's strategic arsenal after inflicting a strategic first-strike upon it. Minimum deterrence is a counter-value strategy, that is, nuclear weapons target what a country presumably values most, its cities. Thus it is frequently said by proponents of deterrence through denial to be a less moral policy than one based on counter-force strategy, that is, targeting not people but the enemy's nuclear arsenal, infrastructure, military bases and war-related facilities and industries. This requires large numbers of highly accurate long-range weapons, some with sufficient power to penetrate hardened silos, and achieving or matching technological innovation through continued testing is a necessity. As most strategic missiles carry an average of eight warheads (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles or MIRVs) the opponent who strikes first in principle gains an eight-to-one advantage.

Mutual deterrence, on the other hand, is based on the concept of each side being equally vulnerable to a nuclear attack but as the second-strike arsenal would remain largely intact each has the capacity to inflict equal or more damage in return. Thus fear of retaliation in kind or worse will constrain a rational enemy's tendencies towards aggression. This policy logically requires only a small number of single warhead strategic missiles not accurate enough to destroy the second-strike missile force which is on unprotected platforms; ideally, on submarines somewhere, anywhere at sea. Retribution may be slow or swift, but it will be sure. As the idea of deliberately leaving a country open to enemy attack is abhorrent to elites and citizens alike, and an anathema to those charged with the responsibility of defending the nation (many of whose careers would come to a sudden end) the continual thrust towards the second form of deterrence is hardly surprising - particularly in a political climate of mutual fear and distrust. Not seeking protection

through bigger and better weapons reverses all history and all military training, and is equally abhorrent to the large segments of the population whose interests are served in creating or maintaining a national war-fighting capability.

Even without these driving forces, however, the inherent contradiction of minimum deterrence - threatening to respond to any act of aggression with a weapon whose use would result in suicide - together with the dynamics of the violent threat system itself, work inexorably in the direction of weapon proliferation and threat escalation. All threats tend towards entropy over time and grow weaker with distance from the point of origin. Thus they must be either demonstrated or continually reinforced and the physical gap between the parties continually bridged or narrowed. The more effective this process, the more likely the threatened party will perceive the threat as real and likely and strive to achieve a similar or superior threat capacity. The threat of punishment is not credible when the aggressor can retaliate in kind, but the threat of inflicting more damage with more powerful forces is. Thus the enemy must not be permitted to achieve an equal or superior war capability or acquire an adequate means of defence. Hence the quest for the technological breakthrough will continue and the arms race spiral upwards until one party (or both) breaks out of the threat paradigm. The fact that thus far, with the possible exception of the INF Treaty, all weapons-control agreements (which have mainly removed unnecessary or obsolete weapons or systems) have been followed by new waves of modernization resulting in greater power, usability or accuracy of the arsenal suggests the force of the internal dynamic, as does the push on both sides towards violation of the ABM Treaty.

The human consequences of this action-reaction process are summed up in a story told by Jacques-Yves Cousteau, the Director of the Musée Océanographique of Monaco between 1957 and 1988. The U.S. tested thermonuclear megaton bombs in the atmosphere at the beginning of the 1950's and soon after the USSR did likewise. Cousteau states that in 1965 he invited Professor Zenkevitch, the President of the National Academy of Sciences of the USSR, to lunch with him at UNESCO.

He was a fine gentleman, fluent in several languages. Four of us had lunch and we spoke about

many things, mainly oceanography. After cheese, we had ice-cream. I couldn't wait anymore and asked Zenkvitch, "Why did you do those tests? Did the Academy of Sciences make the government aware of the consequences of those tests?" He looked at his ice-cream and answered, "Yes, the government asked the opinion of the Academy of Sciences. We worked on the project and warned the Russian government that it would probably cost the lives of 50,000 children in the USSR alone. The government answered that if they did not make the tests, it would possibly cost many more lives." And then he wept, and I saw and still see his tears falling in his ice cream.¹⁷

Physicist Herbert York has described the arms race as the "race to oblivion" (York: 1970), while British socialist historian and peace activist Edward Thompson calls deterrence "the logic of exterminism." In a much quoted passage from an essay on the Cold War Thompson writes:

... [I]ncreasingly, what is being produced by both the United States and the USSR is the means of war, just as, increasingly, what is being exported, with competitive rivalry, by both powers to the Third World are war materials and attendant militarist systems, infrastructures and technologies.

There is an internal dynamic and reciprocal logic here which requires a new category for its analysis. If 'the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist' what are we given by those Satanic mills which are now at work, grinding out the means of human extermination? I have reached this point of thought more than once before, but have turned my head away in despair. Now, when I look at it directly, I know that the category which we need is that of 'exterminism' (Thompson, 1982:189-90).

Nevertheless, the "Satanic mills" have their own problems and paradoxes, not the least being that the more they produce in the name of national security, the more they engender a sense of national and global insecurity. Undoubtedly the greatest problem for deterrence through denial, however, is the immense and escalating cost of modern war technology along with changes in the political environment which make the sacrifices entailed in meeting these costs appear unnecessary. The latter are due in large part to the arbitrary determination of value (as the use-value of nuclear weapons cannot be tested) in a situation of a single consumer demand and increasing corporate or condominium

¹⁷ Extract from a speech given by Costeau at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, California when presented with the Foundation's *1989 Distinguished Peace Leadership Award*, April, 1989.

monopolies on supply. While removal from the normal workings of the free market has permitted the emergence of a military leviathan and provided some control over capitalism's runaway tendencies, the system it purports to protect is beginning to crack under its weight. This is even more the case in the Soviet Union where the free market is missing altogether (or was), although competition with the Western superpower likewise has supplied a missing ingredient in the economic system. There are indications that the edifice can no longer stand the strain, and that the communist bloc both needs and wishes to withdraw from the threat paradigm (although according to the CIA, research and modernization of Soviet strategic weapons is continuing). What impact this would have upon both superpowers, their allies and the rest of the world remains to be seen, as do the consequences of the communist domino-in-reverse phenomenon already underway in Eastern Europe.

Nuclear Allergy

The term, 'nuclear weapons allergy' is first thought to have been used about the Japanese people by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in private correspondence during the early 1950's. The metaphor seems to have made its first known public appearance in an article by the Washington correspondent for the *Asahi Shimbun* (evening edition) of August 29, 1964; the time of the uproar in Japan about the Government's decision to permit the port call of a U.S. Nautilus-class nuclear-powered submarine able to carry nuclear depth-charges. The correspondent writes:

... As the American government is fully aware of the extreme sensitivity of the Japanese people to the expression 'nuclear weapons,' it adopted a prudent attitude towards this problem throughout, taking great pains not to give the impression of having, in a word, 'put pressure' on the Japanese government. ... [T]he State Department would only comment that 'we have heard nothing about Subroc'. In the background seems to be the American government's desire for the Japanese to put greater trust in them expecting that, if enough time goes by, Japan's 'nuclear weapons allergy' will be eliminated (quoted Hook, 1986:68).

'Nuclear-weapons allergy' however, was not eliminated and the term eventually entered the peace-war lexicon in its abbreviated form as denoting grassroots opposition in

alliance countries to some or all elements of nuclear-deterrence strategy, particularly port calls of nuclear-capable naval vessels. As the term was invented by the supporters of deterrence, the connotation was negative: acceptance of nuclear weapons or their carriers was the normal and healthy reaction, opposition was pathological. As in the case of physical allergies, the cure was a process of de-sensitization to the allergen, that is, gradually increasing the military presence until it ceases to cause a reaction (in the military jargon, 'Psych Ops' or psychological operations). While to those who make or support nuclear policy or have the task of carrying it out nuclear allergy is regrettable and can be irritating - as, for instance, if naval vessels are harrassed by peace fleets or women block gateways at Greenham Common - it nevertheless affects only a small number of citizens and is easily controlled by the domestic political elites.

If, however, antipathy to nuclear weapons should spread and infect the decision-makers as well, the condition becomes an illness threatening the health of the whole body. While nuclear allergy is a nuisance, 'Kiwi disease', the disease of governments, is dangerous. Decisive and possibly painful treatment administered immediately by the superpower itself is necessary if the disease is to be prevented from spreading and infecting other members of the alliance. Such a response is both rational and reasonable within the paradigm of nuclearism. Deterrence is at base a psychological concept depending for its effectiveness on the perception that the nuclear threat is both credible and possible. Hence anything which undermines the impression of alliance solidarity and firmness of purpose makes aggression and thus nuclear war more, not less, likely to occur. Medical metaphors evoke strong emotional responses and hence make excellent political weapons (see, for instance, Hook 1986). This one, however, unlike the TB and cancer metaphors Susan Sontag discusses in her seminal work on the subject (Sontag, 1977), permits some ambiguity of interpretation; an allergic reaction can be a healthy reaction if the allergen itself is pathological. The result has been a struggle for ownership of the term between those who coined it and the groups at whom it was aimed. The peace groups appear to be winning. 'SPREAD NUCLEAR ALLERGY' and 'SPREAD KIWI DISEASE' now appear on banners around the world.

Nuclear-Free Zones

It has been said that "The official person contemplates nuclear danger in front of a map of the world, but a private person tends to experience it locally."¹⁸ One of the most common expressions of nuclear allergy is the creation of local nuclear-free zones and occasionally some do end up on a map. Proposals for nuclear-free zones (NFZs) or nuclear-weapon free zones (NWFZs) began being submitted to the United Nations in the early 1950's (the first being a proposal for Central Europe). So far five have been formalized while many others remain as regional initiatives and/or resolutions before the U.N. There have been intermittent efforts (particularly from Finland) to formalize the *de facto* five-states Nordic Nuclear Free Zone¹⁹ and some moves at state level towards declaring the Mediterranean and South East Asia NFZs, and the Indian Ocean a 'Zone of Peace' (whether this is more or less than a NFZ is unclear). The Upper House of the Phillipines parliament voted to declare a national NFZ in 1988, but the motion did not pass in the Lower House.

Proclamations occur at five levels: citizen (homes, churches, schools, streets, the 1987 People's Charter for a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific, etc.), semi-official (towns, cities, districts, local councils, ports, harbours, etc.), national (New Zealand 1987, Vanuatu 1982, Fiji 1971-1983), regional and international.²⁰ Of these, only those at the

¹⁸ Editorial, "The Talk of the Town," *The New Yorker*, March 20, 1989.

¹⁹ Sweden and Finland have prohibitions on nuclear weapons in peacetime and wartime; NATO countries Denmark, Norway and Iceland prohibit nuclear weapons in peacetime but retain the option of revising the policy in a time of war or crisis.

²⁰ The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 prohibits the deployment or testing of nuclear weapons and disposal of nuclear waste on the Antarctic continent (signed by the U.S, the S.U. and 19 states); the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space prohibits emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies; the 1971 Seabed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor. The 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed by most Central and South American nations and guaranteed by the nuclear states. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPFNZ or Spin-fizz) or Treaty of Raratonga came into being at the South Pacific Forum meeting on August 6 (Hiroshima Day), 1985. The Soviet Union and China signed the relevant protocols in 1986; the United States, the U.K. and France refused to sign. The Bush Administration announced in December, 1989 that the U.S. would withdraw its opposition at the coming

international, regional or national level are enforceable, although this does not mean they are necessarily recognized as legitimate or that they are necessarily effective. Nor does it mean, as will be seen in the New Zealand study, that grassroots or semi-official zones cannot have real consequences. What ends up on a map often began life as a small sticker. While all nuclear-free zones are political measures aimed at preventing or limiting the presence or proliferation of nuclear weapons in certain areas, all those which concern the habitable areas of the earth are also to a greater or lesser degree symbolic gestures. If WW3 should occur it is unlikely that the zones would be observed and in any case radioactivity recognizes no boundaries. They are, at base, messages to the nuclear states or to a national government conveying feelings about nuclear-related policies or actions ranging from discomfort to detestation (see Appendix 1).

NWFZs or NFZs at the international level result from initiatives taken by the nuclear states and all three existing treaties concern the extremities of space or climate: Antarctica, outer space and celestial bodies, the sea bed and the ocean floor; areas not easily claimed, penetrated or policed and not - or not yet - perceived by either superpower as a necessary area of activity. Nor has it been in the interests of either to initiate new and costly areas of competition. By contrast, regional or national zones result from actions taken by non-nuclear states, and thus are another matter. While the Soviet Union is above all a conventional power and a land power and so not only supports such zones but actively encourages them, the United States is above all a nuclear power and a maritime power and thus views (or has viewed) with alarm anything that might upset the so-called strategic balance, or impede the free movement of forces within its much larger sphere of activity. The earliest such treaty was accepted, but those making an appearance during the era of offensive forward deterrence have not been so fortunate.

Nuclear-free zones raise the interesting question of what exactly constitutes a nuclear weapon. Is it the warhead, the warhead plus the delivery vehicle, both plus the system which makes the launch possible, or all of these plus the nuclear infrastructure? The answers have changed over time as the following extracts show:

U.N. session. (See Appendix 1 for details and a comparison of these two treaties).

The Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967

Article 5

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

Treaty of Raratonga 1985

Article 1

(c) "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.

New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1986

Article 2: 35

(As for the Treaty of Raratonga).

Philippines Nuclear Free State Act 1988

Section 4: 1

(1) The following terms are herein defined for purposes of this Act:

"Nuclear weapon" is any device or weapon, or any of its nuclear parts or components, which uses the fission or fusion process, or a combination of both, to cause an explosion, including, but not limited to the carriers thereof, the nuclear weapon delivery systems, platforms such as the nuclear launching system, and the nuclear infrastructure which is an integral part of the command, control and communications system for nuclear weapons.

Thus the major difference between the existing regional or national treaties is that the Treaty of Tlatelolco allows for peaceful uses of nuclear energy while the SPNFZ Treaty and the N.Z. Act do not. All three, however, exclude delivery systems from the prohibition. The Latin American Treaty permits the transit of nuclear-capable ships and aircraft, while the SPNFZ Treaty leaves the decision in the hands of the signatories. The Philippines' Act is by far the strongest of the four but as it has been passed only in the Senate it does not, or not yet, exist and a successful passage seems unlikely - at least in the

near future. Nevertheless, the appearance of the legislation must have confirmed Washington's worst fears about the pernicious domino-effect of nuclear-allergy.

The Nuclear Dilemma

By this I mean the seeming impossibility of living permanently with or without nuclear weapons, a notion explored more fully in the final section of this work. The paradox stems from the Janus face of the absolute weapon which seems to offer, on the one hand, the blessing of finally ending humankind's history of genocide, and, on the other, the curse of species extermination or untold suffering. Some people see more of one side, others more of the other, but all of us know we ride a tiger whose destination is unknown and frightening. Yet if we dismount, other tigers await us. Furthermore, it seems impossible to dismount. To shift the metaphor, the nuclear genie cannot be put back in the bottle. Innocence once lost is lost forever, even if it was the terrible innocence of the pre-atomic age.

The Theoretical Perspective

Social movement theory has as its great divide the late 1960's eruptions occurring throughout the West. The predominant model in American sociology until this time was the *classical or collective behaviour model* based on pluralist theories of power and emerging from the functionalist view of society. Social movements were regarded as aberrations resulting from temporary structural strains within a normally stable society, affecting alienated individuals or marginal groups (see, for instance, Hoffer, 1951). As the political arena was assumed to be open to all, the model drew a sharp distinction between the rational pursuit of goals by interest groups or organizations, and the irrational, extra-institutional behaviour of frustrated individuals in social movements (see, for instance, Smelzer, 1963). The focus of analysis was on the causes of social pathology or alienation and the decline of a movement was explained in terms of the disappearance of the problem. In Europe, the *orthodox Marxist model* dominated. Given the assumption of class struggle as the motor of change, protest activity in capitalist societies was regarded either as the expression of the proletariat/bourgeois struggle or as a reformist movement, and deciding to which category a given struggle belonged was the central preoccupation of the

analysis. Conflicts engaging other classes or those not directly concerned with the relations of production were not only unexplained but unexplainable within the model.

The sixties' upheavals brought about paradigmatic shifts in both continents' theoretical assumptions. In the United States, concepts of relative deprivation or psychological maladjustment were clearly inadequate explanations for the new movements (particularly as many academics had themselves been involved) and furthermore, it was argued, social movement formation could not be explained in terms of intermittent strain as social discontents were constant. The major theory to emerge was that of *resource mobilization*, based not on concepts of pluralism but on elite political theory. What turns social discontent into a social movement is a sudden influx of resources as a result of political or economic shifts. Participants are regarded as rational actors rationally pursuing their own interests, and success or failure is defined in terms of resource management and organizational skills (see, for instance, Oberschall, 1973 and Tilly, 1974).

Although the perspective is social and political rather than psychological, the assumption that powerful external groups are the crucial catalyst for organized social protest focuses the analysis not on the movement but on changes in the socio-political context. The emphasis on leadership and organization, too, obscures the mass base. The model also assumes (wrongly I believe) that powerless groups have no resources of their own, and fails to differentiate between politically excluded groups and groups with access to institutional power. The *political process model* of Douglas McAdam is an attempt to amend some of these defects and to bridge the macro/micro-levels of analysis: rather than elites shifting resources around some disruption of the *status quo* makes the system vulnerable to assaults by excluded groups. Two further necessary ingredients for social movement formation he cites are the existence of indigeneous resources - members, a structure of incentives, a communication network, leaders - and a consciousness of political opportunity (McAdam, 1982).

The major post-sixties paradigm to emerge in Western Europe was the so-called *new social movement theory* stimulated not only by the events of May, 1968, but, even

more, by movements like feminism and anti-nuclear protest. Based on a post-Marxist, post-modern theory of power, new social movement theory posits the creation of a "new middle class" or "new working class" not primarily involved in commodity production but in the growing services sector and the information industry. The post-war restructuring of liberal-democratic societies involving the increasing penetration of the state into once private areas and changes in the forces of production has shifted, it is argued, the locus of protest away from the workplace to areas central to the functioning and control of the state.

Claus Offe describes this type of political protest activity as "non-institutionalized politics" and argues that it is occurring in the newly-opened up space "between ... private pursuits and concerns on the one hand, and institutionalized state-sanctioned modes of politics on the other; a space not provided for in the doctrines and practices of liberal democracy and the welfare state which assumes that all citizen's actions can be categorized as private or public" (Offe, 1985:820). Forms of non-institutionalized action can be recognized as legitimate (e.g. peaceful protest) or illegitimate (e.g. terrorist activities) and objectives can be limited to the interests of the group, which Offe labels socio-cultural movements, or aim at binding the total society (or the global society) which he labels socio-political movements. Offe identifies four major socio-political forms of struggle in Western societies: environmental/ecological, human rights (identity, dignity, equality with respect to gender, age, race, sex, ethnicity, disability, etc.), peace/anti-nuclear and communitarian.

Alain Touraine (reputedly the inventor of the term 'post-modern') argues that modern societies are undergoing another great transformation as they shift from industrial societies based on the organization of work to post-industrial or "programmed societies" where the major investments are no longer at the level of the factory floor but of management and data-processing, and the major social struggles are not between capitalist and worker, but between the managers of the great apparatuses which shape and control social and cultural life and groups resisting domination. Hence the decline in older types of class relations and conflicts and the emergence of a new generation of social movements.

Touraine defines a society as "a system of action, that is, of actors defined by cultural orientations and social relations" and regards all social relations as relations of power. Individuals are always "inside power", never outside it. Societies have only two fundamental components: "historicity, that is, a society's capacity to produce the models by which it functions, and the class relations through which these orientations become social practices, still marked by a form of social domination." (By 'class' Touraine appears to mean not unequal relations to the means of production but unequal access to the production of historicity). In his view, any given societal type has only one central pair of opponents no matter how diverse the manifestations (holders of economic or political power being also defined as a social movement). In this respect, his model resembles orthodox Marxism, but it stresses the separation between the State and civil society, and the central conflict is not class struggle but the various attempts of "society" to liberate itself from "power" (Touraine, 1983:2-33).²¹

Touraine rejects all economic, evolutionist, structuralist, naturalistic and functionalist conceptions of society which, he argues, has "neither nature nor foundation; it is neither a machine nor an organization; it is action and social relations". While earlier societies felt themselves to be bound by some metasocial principle - divine rule, natural law, historical evolution - in our time "we feel that our capacity for self-production, self-transformation and self-destruction is boundless" (Touraine, 1985:778). Thus social movements extend to all fields of social and cultural life. They are not exceptional and dramatic events but lie permanently at the heart of social life, the outward sign of the production of society by itself. To quote the opening lines of *The Voice and the Eye*, "Men make their own history; social life is produced by cultural achievements and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements."

Social movements are defined as: "*the collective organized action through which a class actor battles for the social control of historicity in a given and identifiable context*" and are said to be now, more than ever before, the principal agents of social transformation. They emerge only when one social group defines its opponent, and

²¹ Touraine deliberately uses here the exact words by which Solidarity defined its action against the party-state in Poland.

antagonists enter into conflict only because they share the same cultural field and have the same cultural models. Rather than analyzing the social system as transformations of cultural patterns into sets of institutional norms and forms of social and cultural organization, says Touraine, the task of sociology today is to "... strip society bare, expose its turbulent life, and learn to understand how society produces itself, materially and morally, through its conflicts and normative orientations" (Touraine, 1983: 27-39).

Alberto Melucci is perhaps the most influential of the European new social movement theorists. He emphasises the distinction between conflict-based collective action and a social movement, the first being defined as: *the ensemble of the various types of conflict-based behaviour in a social system. A collective action implies the existence of a struggle between two actors for the appropriation and orientation of social values and resources, each of the actors being characterized by a specific solidarity. A social movement requires a further condition of collective action, namely: ... behaviour which transgresses the norms that have been institutionalized in social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system and/or which attack the structure of a society's class relations* (Melucci, 1980:202). In other words, the type of non-institutionalized politics described by Offe. Melucci also aims to transcend the macro-micro gap in new social movement theory by including in the analytic field the notion of *collective identity* (defined as "the shared definition of the field of opportunities and constraints offered to collective action" (Melucci, 1985:793)), and by attempts to analyze the *meanings* produced by organizational forms rather than treating them as formal or instrumental phenomena

While all the post-sixties models contain elements relevant to understanding the social movement known as the peace movement, I find the European theories most useful. The loose coalition of groups which comprise the movement - environmental/ecological, feminist, anti-nuclear/war, anarchist/communitarian - do define the "managers of the great apparatuses of social production" as the opponent, and the struggle is indeed over the contested production of "historicity." While the distribution and redistribution of wealth and resources is a concern, it is not the major focus. The objective is not the overthrow of

the state (although a few individuals may have this goal) but its transformation. While members are conscious of class (and recognize the movement as primarily middle-class) they are not acting *on behalf* of a class. While the broad coalition includes all classes and virtually all status groups, the categories least represented are male owners/managers and unionized workers (although, as will be seen, this is less the case in New Zealand). Thus far from being a proletariat-capitalist struggle, the principal antagonists of the Marxist model have a common interest in maintaining the *status quo* of a war economy.

The least useful is the classical model, although it is the most relevant for understanding the actions of the movement's opponents. While protestors can certainly be said to be acting out of psychological stress or frustration they cannot be labelled deprived, alienated individuals or members of marginal or excluded groups. The backbone of the movement everywhere is middle-class women - many of them non-waged - and while they comprise a group largely excluded from the decision-making process, as individuals most enjoy the rewards and benefits of mainstream society. Rather, the peace movement is an *excluded politics*. Historically, the agenda of disarmament and non-violence has been organized out of every country's political system, pluralist or otherwise, and thus action must necessarily occur outside the realm of institutionalized politics.²² (This does not mean that peace groups do not also use conventional methods in attempting to penetrate the system).

Joseph Gusfield is an American social movement theorist who shares many of the views of the European school, and, like Touraine, emphasises the modernity of social movement formation which requires, among other things, "... the development of society as an object of change - an object understood as a source of change and an object to be thought about, changed, or cherished" (Gusfield, 1979:292). In discussing the culture of public problems, Gusfield introduces into social movement analysis the concept of "ownership" defined as "the ability to create and influence the public definition of a problem" (Gusfield, 1981b:10). The structure of public problems is described as:

²² This is hardly remarkable as the fundamental *raison d'etre* for the state is the contract for national security and the fundamental characteristic monopoly of the means of violence.

... an arena of conflict in which a set of groups and institutions compete and struggle over ownership and disownership, the acceptance of causal theories, and the fixation of responsibility. It is here that knowledge and politics come into contact. Knowledge is part of the process. ... Whatever its source, the appeal to a basis in "fact" has implications for the practical solutions sought to public problems (Gusfield, 1981b:15).

In the nuclear/anti-nuclear field of conflict within the United States, for instance, the Pentagon owns the problem of resisting or containing world communism, while the Administration owns the problem of supplying the resources, interpreting the political scenario, maintaining the public will, managing political relations and suppressing nuclear allergy.²³ The global peace movement has claimed ownership of the problem of militarism and/or nuclearism as well as the problem of finding the resources, reinterpreting the scenario, changing the public will and transforming political relations. Hence the importance for both sides of legitimation through the production of knowledge and truth based on "facts." Hence too, as Gusfield argues, the importance for the analyst of regarding public acts as cultural forms and dramatic performances, for "[acts] are the raw data of existence ... which we, as human beings, cast into types in order to think about them" (Gusfield, 1981b:17).

Michel Foucault's concept of 'truth regimes' and the battle 'for' or 'about' truth is an important one for this work. He writes:

... by truth I do not mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and given acceptance' but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to which true and false are separated and specific effects attached to the true' ... [it is] not a question of a battle 'in favor' of truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic/political role which it plays (Foucault, 1979:46).

Foucault argues that in western societies the 'political economy' of truth is characterized by

²³ The situation is similar in alliance countries where, to quote N.Z. MP Helen Clark (now Deputy Prime Minister) "There seems to be a tacit expectation on the part of the United States that when a new allied government takes office it will 'talk down' its peace movement." (Speech at Denver University, Colorado, Nov. 23, 1986). Clark was Chair of the Select Committee responsible for drawing up the 1987 nuclear-free legislation.

five historically important traits: (1) "it is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it"; (2) "it is subject to constant economic and political incitation, as much for economic production as for political power"; (3) "it is the object of an immense diffusion and consumption"; (4) "it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political or economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media, etc.)"; and (5) it is the stake of a whole political debate and social confrontation ("ideological struggles")" (Foucault, 1979:47).

Foucault inverts Clausewitz's famous aphorism when he asserts that politics is war continued by other means. The history of peace and its institutions "is always the history of this war." In any society,

... manifold relations of power .. permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth (Foucault, 1980:93).

Whereas for Max Weber power is the ability of an individual to enforce his/her will against the will of others, and for Talcott Parsons it is a property possessed not by the individual but by the group, Foucault insists that power is not something which can be possessed, exchanged, transferred, abused etc. (the juridical concept), nor is it to be conceived of primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance of the relations of production and of class domination (the Marxist view). Rather,

... power must be analyzed as something which circulates, ... something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. Not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power (Foucault, 1980:98).

Thus in studying power the analyst does not start from its centre and aim at discovering the extent to which it permeates into the base and reproduces itself "to the most molecular

elements of society." Rather, says Foucault,

One must ... conduct an *ascending* analysis of power, starting ... from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been - and continue to be - invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination" (Foucault, 1980:93).

British social theorist Anthony Giddens similarly argues that power is always and inevitably present in every social relation. It is not a type of act; it is instantiated in action. Neither is power itself a resource. Resources are the media through which power is exercised and structures of domination produced or reproduced. Normative sanctions are a generic type of resource drawn upon in power relations but norms have at every moment to be sustained and reproduced in the flow of social encounters. In Giddens' theory of 'structuration' rules and resources are structural properties (and in his view social structure exists *only* as a set of virtual properties) drawn upon by actors in the production of social life (and, I would add, of the self) which are *at the same time* reconstituted through action (see Giddens, 1979 and 1982). All of which seems particularly pertinent to the case studies presented below.

The Nature of the Dialectic

In a chapter entitled "Nation-states and Violence" Anthony Giddens writes:

Marx thought he discerned a real movement of change - the labour movement - that would provide history's solution to the anarchy of the capitalist movement and the degradation of work. But where is the dialectic process that will transcend the political anarchy that threatens us all with imminent destruction? So far as I can see, there is none in view. Every existing form of world organization at the moment seems impotent in the face of the monopoly of violence in the hands of the nation-states. After half a million years of human history, we are the first human beings whose individual lifespans might terminate with that of the whole of humankind. Has the cunning of reason here deserted us? (Giddens, 1987:182).

E. P. Thompson similarly argues in that the logic of the Cold War is a non-dialectical

contradiction; a state of absolute antagonism in which both powers grow through confrontation. "Exterminism simply confronts itself, it does not exploit a victim: it confronts an equal" (Thompson, 1982:20).

The basic thesis of this work is that a Cold War dialectic *does* exist and that it does involve what Lenin calls "identical opposites" but it is largely unrecognized or devalued because it is occurring not at the level of institutionalized politics or in the halls of Geneva but in the derogated realm of grassroots politics. While the anti-war movement is, as it has always been, small, flawed, vulnerable and frequently exhausted, it is also fluid, flexible, persistent and, for the first time in history, widespread. It is radical in the sense that it is directed against the political practices of the nuclear state, and aims at systemic changes in the political structure and in social relations. Rather than taking over the state, the goal of the 'revolution' is transformation at all political levels: "think globally; act locally!" (and some add to this "be spiritually"). Militarism and capitalism have already established the outlines of a global culture; the loose coalitions within the peace movement aim at a very different production of 'historicity.'

One last thing remains to be said before turning to the case studies. The first metaphor of my title, 'David and Goliath' is the dominant metaphor in Western societies for describing not only unequal struggle but the triumph of right over might. Thus in choosing to use it I could be accused of ranging myself on the side of the peace movement in a manner unacceptable to scholarly research. The first assumption is correct; I am on the side of the peace movement. I count myself as one of its members and have taken part in protest actions in the United States, Australia and, briefly, Japan. Let me declare myself. I detest violence, and believe that all violent actions lead sooner or later to more violent actions. I believe that when a government declares war on its enemy in the era of total war it is also declaring war on its own people, for, unless the contest is very unequal, they will suffer just as much, perhaps more, death and destruction. Thus I would gladly see every army disbanded and all institutions of war abolished - particularly as armies today are increasingly being used not for defence but as instruments of political oppression. Let me add, however, that my antagonism to militarism does not extend to the people who support

it or are part of it - most of whom I respect as people of honour and integrity. Moreover, my personal belief system does not permit me the luxury of hating the doer as well as the deed.

Nevertheless, given the above declaration, the charge of bias is highly-relevant and must be answered. While I am not one who believes in the possibility of value-free science I do believe that scientific research should be as objective and dispassionate as possible. I regard all polemical writings as forms of psychological violence, and particularly dislike those presented under the cloak of academia. While recognition of one's values and prejudices can help prevent seduction, the will is at best a dubious policeman and the forces of the unconscious are powerful. Hence I have built into my writing two structural mechanisms aimed at keeping my biases in check. One is the avoidance of what Michel Foucault calls "the politics of inverted commas."²⁴ This means using them only where grammatically correct (that is, where words are used in an abnormal context or are themselves the focus of meaning). The second is to eschew the use of adjectives except where they seem (relatively) neutral or necessary for the sense of the noun for, to again quote Foucault, "adjectives are always violent", subtly or not-so-subtly coercing the reader into adopting the perspective or judgement of the writer. This proved more difficult. Emotive adjectives, like biases, tend to slip in unawares - as my readers will no doubt discover for themselves.

²⁴ Foucault uses as an example the tendency of left intellectuals to put quote marks around 'socialism' in the Soviet Union, thereby implying that there is some ideal state of socialism of which this is a travesty. For Foucault, what you see is what you have. Social scientists similarly tend to put quote marks around such words as 'truth' or 'reality', thereby implying either that there is no such thing - a Godlike judgement, indeed - or that there is, but the people in question don't know it.



PART ONE

NUCLEARISM

The bomb was first of all our weapon; then it became our diplomacy; then it became our economy. Now it has become our culture. We are the people of the bomb.

- E. L. Doctorow, 1988

There is nothing in Man's industrial machinery but his greed and sloth: his heart is in his weapons.

- George Bernard Shaw

The Trident 11 is an extraordinarily capable missile whose maturity and role as a guarantor of world peace is imminent.

- Adm. Carlisle A. Trost, 1989
(Chief of U.S. Naval Operations)

CHAPTER 2

THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

The group of irradiated Marshallese people offer a most valuable source of data on human beings who have sustained injury from all possible modes of exposure It is possibly the best available source for evaluating the transfer of plutonium across the gut wall after being incorporated into biological systems.

-Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Study Report, 1977

The history of the Marshall Islands during the three decades of American rule has been the saddest history we can remember. History will show that it was we Marshallese who had the 'trust' while America had the 'territory.'

- Hon. Ataji Balos, Micronesian Congress, 1976

The U.S.T.T.P.I. and the C.F.A.

The group of islands Western people call Micronesia lie just north of the equator in 3 million square miles of the western Pacific. The territory has a long history of colonization. A Spanish possession from 1520 to 1898, the United States took control of Guam after the Spanish-American War and Germany purchased the rest. In 1914 Germany lost control of the territory to Japan and the Japanese occupation continued under a League of Nations mandate. By the mid-1930's, the islands were the Strategic Command Centre for Japan's Pacific empire and home to thousands of soldiers and civilians. When the United States invaded Japanese Mironesia in 1944, approximately 7,000 Americans were killed and 25,000 wounded, while the number of Japanese casualties was much higher. When the battle ended in victory for the invaders, the territory was placed under U.S. Navy Administration.

While there was general agreement in Washington after the war that the islands must remain under American control, there were conflicting views about just how to achieve this. The Departments of the U.S. Navy and War (later Defense) and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff wanted exclusive control for an indefinite period. In the view of Secretary of War Henry Stimson this did not represent "an attempt at colonialization or exploitation"; it was "merely the acquisition by the U.S. of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts" (quoted Dorrance, 1975:37). Most civilian officials, however, argued that the United States could hardly preach anti-colonialism to the rest of the world while annexing Micronesia for military purposes. Like the other new trust territories, it should come under the trusteeship system embodied in the new United Nations Charter.

The clash of opinion led to a compromise. President Truman announced that the territory would be part of the trusteeship system and be administered by the Department of the Interior but the Pentagon would participate in drawing up the agreement. Thus was born in 1947 the United States' Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (USTTPI), the world's first and so far only strategic trust territory; a unique form of trusteeship permitting the United States to close off areas of the territory for security reasons. While the ten other trust territories were placed under the jurisdiction of the U.N. General Assembly (which approved the original agreements and would pass resolutions to end them at the point of independence), the USTTPI was placed under the jurisdiction of the U.N. Security Council. This ensured a double veto on any attempts in the U.N. to change or end the strategic trusteeship; one through the U.S. vote in the Security Council and the other through Article 15 of the agreement which states that it may not be "altered, amended or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority". Nevertheless, the United States was obligated, like other trust holders, to

... foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the trust territory and ... promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples ... to promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and ... to promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants.¹

¹ Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement (quoted Kiste, 1986:127). The major scholarly data for this and the following chapter come from interviews with and/or the writings of Dr. Robert Kiste, Director of the Center for Pacific and Asian Studies at the University of Hawai'i; Dr. Stewart Firth, School of History,

Robert Kiste states that three themes run through all the various stages of the U.S. administration: the dominance of strategic interests, the imposition of American values and assumptions and the lack of any integrated plan in the actions taken. From the end of the war to the early 1960's, military activities dominated. The islands were cordoned off and a security clearance was needed to enter the area. The Northern Marianas reverted to Navy rule, Kwajalein Atoll was developed as a Navy base, atomic bomb tests were conducted between 1946 and 1956 at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls, and the CIA trained Nationalist Chinese troops in Saipan. The civil budget was meagre. War-devastated areas were left untouched, and programs in health and education were modest. The six districts established by the Japanese were retained and legislatures with limited powers created, but no steps were taken towards promoting political independence.

The 1960's brought change. In 1961 President Kennedy gave the opening address at the U.N. General Assembly and condemned all forms of colonialism. A few months later a U.N. Mission visited the USTTPI for the first time and was critical of almost every facet of U.S. administration. In 1962, the Kennedy Administration launched the first of a series of federal programmes and large budget increases for the territory, and ordered an investigation of conditions. The resulting Solomon Report criticized the lack of progress and development, stating that if the U.S. wanted to keep its trust territory within its sphere of influence improvements must be made to ensure that the people would opt for a permanent association at the time of independence. The Johnson Administration appeared to assume that increased expenditure would automatically bring progress and improvement to the Islands. By the late 1970's, 166 separate and uncoordinated programs had been undertaken at an annual cost of \$30 million. Many of these were crash programs yielding little tangible results, and new plants and projects frequently fell into disrepair through lack of maintenance or parts. Welfare-type programs designed for America's poor such as large-scale food subsidy schemes (with a subsistence economy most Micronesians were

Philosophy and Politics, Macquarie University, Sydney and Dr. David Hegarty, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. Major sources of data for grassroots organizations and actions are *Pacific Women Speak* (1987); *Pacific News Bulletin* and *Pacific Issues* (see Bibliography).

below the U.S. poverty line) mostly had the effect of encouraging the islanders to cease farming and fishing and move to the towns where the money was raining in. A large and elaborate bureaucracy came into being, due in part to increased government activity and in part to the influx of aid money - the so-called 'Dutch disease' syndrome.²

The increased availability of employment, an expanding civil service and greater educational opportunities continued to draw large numbers of islanders away from rural areas to the urban centres, and rapid urbanization has created the usual problems of unemployment, housing shortages, overcrowding, shanty towns, inadequate recreation and sanitation facilities and water supplies. By the end of the 1980's, states Kiste, "... problems of social control, nutrition and alcohol abuse are being experienced on a scale greater than ever before. The education effort, while massive, has generally been poor in quality. It has produced a plethora of liberal arts majors, but few individuals with the skills to maintain public services" (Kiste, 1986:130-31).

The Journey Towards Self-Government

Micronesia is a political entity only as a consequence of its colonial history. Its approximately 150,000 people of mainly Polynesian-Malaysian descent are divided among

² The term refers to the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960's petroleum export boom as the inflow of aid money is analogous to a rise in exports. The progress of 'Dutch disease' is as follows. An increase in income from aid leads to an increase in domestic demand which in turn leads to a change in relative prices between 'tradeables' and 'non-tradeables'. Prices for tradeables (exports and import-competing goods) generally do not rise because they are determined by international markets but prices of non-tradeable goods (which include the government sector) rise because of the increased demand. At the same time, rises in the costs of factors of production (wages, rents etc.) in the government sector move resources towards the non-tradeable sector (especially government). The traded goods sector is squeezed, leading to a further downward pressure on exports and the import-competing sector. The balance of payments and government revenue become even more dependent on aid, and the relative size of the government sector increases.

By 1980, the number of Micronesian government employees was about half the total labour force and government salaries accounted for two-thirds of the budget. Low economic growth combined with high population growth has produced a negative GNP *per capita* in almost all Pacific Island countries over the last decade - in spite of large injections of foreign aid. ("Australia's Relations with the South Pacific"; Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB). *Submission to Parl. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence*; March 1987, Canberra.

six cultures and speak nine or more different languages. Districts are separated by ethnocentrism and mutual suspicion and there is a long history of combativeness and competition. Nevertheless, during the 1950's, heads of the six district legislatures participated in inter-district conferences designed to advise the High Commissioner, and in 1958 decided to call themselves the 'Interdistrict Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner.' Three years later they reconstituted themselves as the 'Council of Micronesia' with the goal of creating a territory-wide legislature. In 1965, the Congress of Micronesia (COM) was born and its leaders petitioned President Johnson to establish a commission to determine the future status of the territory. When this produced no response the COM established its own 'Micronesian Political Status Commission.'

Four options for the future were possible: (1) full sovereignty, (2) self-government in free association with the former trustee along the lines of the recent New Zealand arrangement with the Cook Islands and Nuie, (3) integration with a sovereign nation or (4) continuing as a trust territory. In 1969 the Commission recommended that the territory become a self-governing state and negotiate for a status of free association with the United States; a status"indissolubly linked to our desire for ...a democratic, representative constitutional government brought to us by America and which we have come to know as an essentially American system" (quoted Kiste, 1986:131). Once the Compact negotiations began, however, interest groups within the Congress began pursuing their own goals. By the mid-1970's, Micronesia had split into four political entities: the Northern Marianas, the Republic of Palau (also known as Belau) in the west, the Republic of the Marshall Islands in the east and between them the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Northern Marianas accepted the offer of U.S. citizenship and Commonwealth status, but the other three continued to opt for free association and each drew up a constitution in preparation for self-government. While the United States attempted to negotiate a single draft of the Compact of Free Association (CFA) with all three political entities, each eventually requested separate negotiations.

The Compact of Free Association (CFA)

The United States was obliged by the original U.N. agreement to terminate its trusteeship as soon as the territory was capable of independence. The Pentagon, however,

had no wish to surrender strategic control of the millions of square miles encompassed by the USTTPI.³ Thus from 1969 onwards the Defense Department and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again participated in the discussions over Micronesia's future political status. In the words of Admiral William Crowe, Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific in the early 1980's, "the security aspects of the Compact are of great importance to our posture in the Pacific" (quoted Firth, 1986b). As in the initial trust territory decisions, the participation of the military shaped the form of the agreement. In the final draft of the Compact, the three Micronesian states grant the United States a number of strategic concessions in exchange for financial subsidies and certain services and access to the United States. The concessions are: (1) permanent denial of the islands to military use by any other country; (2) unhindered transit by American military forces through Micronesia with whatever weapons they might be carrying; (3) the right to establish military bases in the islands in the future, either in areas already determined or elsewhere after consultation, and (4) unhampered use for the next 30 years of the Kwajalein Missile Range.

Under the agreement, the U.S. decides what constitutes a defence matter and has the right to invite the armed forces of other countries to use military areas and facilities. While the Compact can be terminated by any one of the three Micronesian states or the United States with six months notice, this would probably (though not necessarily) mean the end of U.S. support. Along with the continuing military presence, the services and subsidies to be rendered by the United States will ensure continuing American influence. All services must be contracted through U.S. federal agencies, relatively free from the control of the governments, and the latter are required to report annually to the U.S. President on the expenditure of funds. Although the terms of the Compact clearly limit the sovereignty of the Micronesian states, the large financial subsidies and the support services the Compact provides will ensure a standard of living far above that of the other independent states of the region. Micronesians are now among the most educated and urbanized of Pacific people. Their raised aspirations and higher living standards can only

³ Then U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is said to have remarked at the beginning of the negotiations: "There's only 90,000 people out there, who gives a damn?" (Quoted Donald McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975:98).

be sustained through the money attaching to the Compact agreement. The natural resources of most islands are meagre, the economic base has largely disappeared and many people have become alienated from rural subsistence life.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the ten other U.N. trust territories, termination of this one strategic trust territory has been a long time coming. Separate Compact agreements with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia did not come into force until 1986 - seventeen years after the Status Commission recommended the relationship of free association - while the future of the Palau-U.S. Compact remains undecided at this time (April, 1990). One reason for the long delay in terminating the trusteeship has been the problem for the U.S. of fulfilling its obligation to grant independence while retaining strategic control of the territory; another is various nuclear-related conflicts. Those in the Marshall Islands are the subject of the rest of this chapter; those in Palau the subject of the next.

Nuclear Nomads

At the end of WW2, the forward march of aggressive communism appeared to allied leaders as a distinct possibility. Their trump card was the atomic bomb, but what would an atomic war be like? It seemed necessary to find out. By the end of 1945, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had plans for a test aimed at discovering the effect of atomic explosions on ships at sea. The specifications called for, among other things, a protected anchorage in a warm climate either uninhabited or with a small population which could be evacuated. The vast and thinly populated Pacific Basin was the obvious choice, and the site chosen by the commander of Joint Task Force One, the joint military organization established for the tests, was Bikini atoll in the northern Marshalls. On January 10, 1946 President Truman gave approval for the tests to proceed. "We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us."

The military governor of the Marshall Islands came to Bikini in February 1946. He compared the Bikinians to the children of Israel whom God had led into the Promised

Land, and told Chief Juda that the tests were "for the good of all mankind and to end all world wars." Chief Juda reportedly replied: "If the U.S. Government and the scientists of the world want to use our island and atoll for furthering development, which with God's blessing will result in kindness and benefit to all mankind, my people will be pleased to go elsewhere." The people were moved to a new settlement on Rongerik Island described by the Navy (who had partly built it) as a model village. A Navy press release informed the world that "...the natives are delighted; enthusiastic about the atomic bomb which has already brought them prosperity and a new promising future" (quoted Firth, 1987: 27-8).

Two 21 kt. bombs were exploded during 'Operation Crossroads': one an airdrop on July 1, (Pacific time), the other an underwater explosion on July 25. While later tests have been held under conditions of comparative secrecy, this first test of the post-war age was a military, scientific and political bonanza which the world was invited to hear and observe. Forty-two thousand people came to Bikini, almost all of them men. The contingent included Navy and other military personnel, scientists, Congressmen, civil officials, international observers, the press, camera crews, film-makers, a few women, animals for experimental purposes and one pet dog. It also included a number of obsolete U.S. Navy vessels on whose decks the goats were secured in order to measure scientifically the effect of the explosion on living creatures.

In 1987, Darlene Keju-Johnson, a Marshallese woman social worker, said of these events:

One important date that I never forget was in the year 1946. In that year, the navy official from the U.S. Government came to Bikini Island. He came and told the chief Juda ... "We are testing these bombs for the good of mankind, and to end all world wars." In 1946 very few of us Marshallese spoke English, or even understood it. The chief could not understand what it all meant, but there was one word that stuck in his mind, and that was 'mankind'. The only reason why he knew the word 'mankind' is because it is in the bible. So he looked at the man... and he says, "If it is in the name of God, I am willing to let my people go."

When the navy official came it was too late. There were already thousands of soldiers and scientists on the atoll, and hundreds of airplanes and ships in the lagoon. They were ready to

conduct the tests. The Bikinians had no choice but to leave their islands, and they have never returned. The navy official did not tell the chief that the Bikinians would not see their home again. The Bikinians were promised that the United States only wanted their islands for a short time. The chief thought maybe a short time is next week, maybe next month. So they moved to Rongerik.⁴

In 1988 Kilon Bauno, the present chief of the Bikinians, said in a television documentary, "It is difficult for me to say how sad I was when I looked back and saw our houses burning. They burned everything, even the outriggers we left behind. A great sadness came over us all. We were silent; no one talked or ate anything." Later he said: "There is nothing in the world I want more than to go back to my island; to die there."⁵ Rongerik was an uninhabited sandbar island with few natural resources. By mid-1947 food shortages were becoming a problem. When anthropologist Leonard Mason visited the Island in January 1948 he found a community in crisis. A U.S. medical officer arrived soon after to check conditions and reported malnourishment and near-starvation. The people were removed and settled temporarily in a tent village at Kwajalein military base. The Bikinians have now been relocated three times. By the late 1980's, most had dispersed onto the reefless island of Kili, Kwajalein Atoll or Majuro, the urban center of the Marshall islands. To again quote Keju-Johnson, "You cannot imagine the psychological problems that people have to go through because of relocation."

Soon after the Bikini tests the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) approved the setting-up of the 'Pacific Proving Ground' for further bomb testing. Enewetak, an atoll 350 kilometres west of Bikini, was the chosen site and three secret tests were conducted there in April and May of 1948. The people of Enewetak were moved to Ujelang, the most western of the Marshall islands, but have since been relocated. In 1950, work began on turning Enewetak into a permanent test site and creating an American-style town for the hundreds of U.S. engineers, construction workers, scientists and military personnel living on the atoll. In 1951, testing began at the Nevada test site in mainland U.S.A. and

⁴ Darlene Keju-Johnson, *Pacific Women Speak* (1987:6).

⁵ "Radio Bikini"; television documentary in "*The American Experience*" series. PBS. San Diego, October 11, 1988.

continued at both sites until November 1, 1958 when President Eisenhower announced a unilateral moratorium on the tests with the understanding that the Soviet Union would do likewise. When the latter broke the moratorium in September 1961, British and American tests resumed at Nevada and remained there. A total of 106 nuclear devices had been exploded in the Pacific between July 1946 and August 18, 1958, the date of the last test on Enewetak (see Appendix 2 for details of Pacific tests). The reason for the permanent move to Nevada is said to have been partly due to the difficulty of carrying out island tests and partly because of the close proximity of China and the Soviet Union to the Pacific sites.⁶

In 1968, Department of Energy (DoE) scientists declared that it was safe to return to Bikini and a small community was established there. In 1978, however, U.S. medical examinations of the islanders revealed "significant body burdens" of cesium 137, a radioactive substance which finds its way in concentrated amounts into growing plants.⁷ Once more Bikini was evacuated. In 1974, the Enewetakese requested that they return to their island and U.S. authorities agreed to make it fit for habitation. Soldiers and civilians wearing protective clothing removed thousands of cubic meters of the radioactive topsoil, scrap metal, concrete and other materials. Some of this went into the ocean but most was dumped in a nuclear crater on Runit Island, capped with an 18 inch-thick concrete dome and declared off-limits. A news release by a U.S. Army press officer described the Runit dome as "a monument to America's concern for humanity" (quoted Firth, 1987:212). The clean-up operation lasted from 1977 to 1980 and cost \$100 million. In 1981 about 500 Enewetakese returned to the three out of the forty atolls declared safe, although about a fifth returned almost immediately to Ujelang. Food-gathering and visits to other islands continue to be restricted, and the people are mainly dependent on food supplied under a U.S. Government programme.

The Bikinians agitated for a similar clean-up of their homeland, and the U.S.

⁶ From a personal interview with Dr. Gerald Johnson, director of the early Pacific tests.

⁷ Although there is as much radioactive strontium-90 in the soil of the atoll as there is cesium-137, only negligible amounts get into plants because it remains locked in the calcium-carbonate matrix. In the clay soils of continents the problem is reversed.

Congress set up the *Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation Committee* to investigate the feasibility and cost of cleaning and resettlement. In the early 1980's, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (operated by the University of California for the Department of Energy) began a series of decontamination tests to discover how best to cleanse the atoll of radioactive hazards. Three different possible solutions to the problem have been suggested.⁸ The most effective, although also most drastic, is the removal of 16 inches of the island's topsoil at a cost of \$96 million: the method used at Enewetak. While this would remove 99 percent of the cesium, it would also remove all the nutrients and water-retention materials. Even with regular irrigation and the massive use of fertilizers, say the researchers, "it could take fifteen years or more to raise a healthy stand of fruit-bearing trees and to begin building a rich soil base."⁹ There is also the problem of disposing of the contaminated topsoil.

Two less expensive and less drastic - although possibly less effective - methods are the drenching of the land with sea water (as sodium particles block the passage of cesium into plants), or the addition of large amounts of potassium to the soil (in the potassium-deficient soil of coral islands plants consume cesium as a substitute). The scientists favour the last option, but say further experiments are needed to determine the effectiveness of both treatments. Most Bikinians are in favor of removing the topsoil. To quote their representative in the Marshall Islands legislature:

Excavation is the only method we'd go for. We are laymen and that's the only thing that gives us peace of mind. We don't want in the future to be guinea pigs in some continuing experiments. It's better to stay away a longer time than to come back when it's not absolutely safe.¹⁰

In late 1987, the President of the Marshall Islands, Amatu Kabua, suggested another alternative: Bikini, Runit Island and another uninhabited atoll should be studied as

⁸ John N. Wilford, "Destiny of Bikini is Again at the Mercy of Technology". *The New York Times*, April 19, 1988; p.23.

⁹ Dr. Robinson, American scientist from the research team. *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Senator Henchi Balos. *Ibid.*

possible sites for storing high-level radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants in the United States and elsewhere.¹¹ Japanese businessmen had informal talks with President Kabua on the issue, and the U.S. Congress passed legislation in late December instructing the Reagan Administration to consider the islands as a nuclear-waste dump. The search for storage sites is becoming urgent in the United States where around 15,000 tons of highly radioactive but unusable spent uranium fuel has accumulated and present storage sites are expected to reach their capacity in the next decade. (The favored site among those being studied in the United States is Yucca Mountain in Nevada, but most people in the state oppose its establishment). Payment for nuclear-waste storage could add as much as \$100 million a year to Marshall island finances, now almost entirely dependent on income from the Kwajalein missile site. Some opposition members challenged the President's suggestion, arguing that if all the states of the United States are opposed to storing the waste it is not something the Marshall Islands should be entertaining. The mayor of the Bikinians said: ... "The people of Bikini don't really like that idea," while the editorial article in the *Pacific Daily News*, Dec. 22, 1987 declared:

...All of the Pacific Islanders should protest, strongly and loudly, any further contamination of the Pacific through nuclear dumping. ...The United States made the waste and profited from it. Now when it comes time for storage let them keep it on the mainland instead of trying to foist it off on ecologically sensitive atolls.

The Parliament (Nitjela) of the Republic of the Marshall Islands voted in favour of the plan, but later withdrew support.

Other kinds of waste, however, may soon be on the way. In March 1989, the Nitjela authorised President Kabua to negotiate a land-fill deal, pending feasibility studies, with Admiralty Pacific Inc., a Seattle-based company. The company is proposing to pay \$58 million a year to dump millions of tons of non-toxic household waste from California West Coast cities into low-lying atolls. Opponents of the project claim that household garbage is known to contain toxic components and that landfill sites on atolls have been shown to be a source of contamination for groundwater and can leach into the ocean. The

¹¹ "To Bikini, Atom Waste Could Be Worth Money". *The New York Times*, April 14, p.4.

company has stated that it will monitor for seepage and the escape of methane gas, use huge magnets to remove metals and hire teams of people to "walk through the waste and remove unwanted items."¹² Critics say that if the company does succeed in rendering garbage non-toxic it will be a breakthrough in landfill technology, and there should be no trouble in finding space in the United States at much less expense.

The feasibility study is to be carried out by Admiralty Pacific, although President Kabua has said that independent scientists could be brought in to conduct the study. Shipments are due to begin in June, 1990, but the study has not yet commenced and the status of the proposal is unclear. The President of Admiralty Pacific Inc. told a reporter that the project was "going fine" while the former Vice-President told him it was "a dead issue." The latter resigned in July 1989, reportedly over the lack of safeguards in the plan and his discovery of a secret proposal to include nuclear waste. The President said the Vice-President was fired for spreading false reports, and declared that "a super project was underway."¹³ Regional grassroots' opposition to the plan continues.

A new problem has surfaced (literally) with respect to Enewetak which may have wider application. An article in the December 1989 issue of the (U.S.) *Medical Tribune* called "'Hot' Shrimp Stalk Sea; Ghosts of Nuke Tests" states that a research team of biologists and radiation specialists from the University of California at Davis have spent the decade of the 1980's studying callianassids or 'ghost shrimp' in the lagoon of Enewetak Atoll. Marine ecologist Thomas Suchanek is an expert on these organisms which spend their lives hidden in long elaborate tunnels dug into the shallow, sandy sea-floor as far as 6 feet below the surface. After the Army clean-up, Livermore Laboratory scientists had measured radioactivity in the lagoon near Runit to a depth of 10 inches and found it minimal; essentially safe. At the depths where the shrimps live, however, the U.C. Davis research team discovered through core sampling that the sand is extremely hot, with radiation levels up to 300 times higher than on nearby land surfaces. The buried radioactive material includes slowly decaying radionuclides, among them americium-241

¹² *Pacific News Bulletin*. May, 1989:14; June 1989:15.

¹³ "Paradise Lost: Now It's a Dump." *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 1990 A1, 8,9.

and plutonium-239 which have half lives of about 25,000 years.¹⁴

Dr. Suchanek states that no-one knows why the radioactive sands are somewhat buried. They could have been forced down by the bomb-blasts, by natural sedimentation processes or the actions of tides and currents. They could be unburied in an instant in a typhoon. Furthermore, in digging and maintaining their burrows, these small crustaceans throw the buried hot sand up onto the lagoon floor. Readings of 10 times background level were recorded in the shrimp's sand mounds. Even as they feed, ghost shrimps pollute. The research team collected outflow water and sediment from their burrows and found it three times hotter when pumped out than when sucked in seconds before. The scientists have suggested that the lagoon area may not be safe either for people or animals, and may remain unsafe for thousands of years.¹⁵

Atomic Legacy

On the morning of March 1, 1954 (Pacific time) U.S. scientists exploded a 15-megaton hydrogen bomb, code-name *Bravo* over Bikini atoll. The bomb was a thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and the largest ever exploded by the Western states. No particular precautions were taken beforehand as the first so-called 'experimental thermonuclear device' exploded at Enewetak two years earlier, a 10.4 megaton bomb named *Mike*, had yielded less effects than expected. Thus people living on nearby islands were neither informed of the impending test nor moved away. After the explosion a mushroom cloud slowly drifted east, depositing white radioactive ash on the ships of the American Task Force, a U.S. meteorological team on Rongerik Atoll, a Japanese Fishing boat, the *Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon)* and the people of Rongelap, Utirik and other atolls in the area. On March 11, the Atomic Energy Commission announced that two hundred and thirty-six natives had been unexpectedly exposed to radiation due to an unexpected and unpredicted wind change in the upper atmosphere.

Lijon Eknilang, a woman born on Rongelap, states:

¹⁴ 'Half life' is half the length of time it takes for a radio-active substance to decay.

¹⁵ Thursday, December 14, 1989; pp.19-20.

I was seven years old at the time of the Bravo test on Bikini. I remember that it was very early in the morning that I woke up with a bright light in my eyes. I ran outside to see what had happened. I thought someone was burning the house. ... the ground started to sway and sink. The loud noise hurt our ears....We were very afraid because we didn't know what it was. Some people thought that the war had started again. A little later in the morning we saw a big cloud moving to our islands. It covered the sky. About ten o'clock we started to feel itchy in our eyes - it felt like we had sand in our eyes. Then came the fallout. It was white and ..us kids.. thought it was white soap powder. The kids were playing in the powder and having fun ... Late in the afternoon everyone became very sick....our eyes itched terribly, and our skin began to burn. The next day the problems got worse. The big burns began spreading all over our legs, arms and feet. ...We had very high fevers and were vomiting. ¹⁶

U.S. Navy vessels evacuated the people of Rongelap and Utirik to the army base at Kwajalien. Another woman says of these events:

... Some American soldiers came and said "Get ready. Jump in the ocean and get on the boat. ... Don't bring any belongings. Just go in the water"... There was no boat to get the people, not even the children and the old people, to the ship. People had to swim. When they got to Kwajalein they were given soap and were told to wash in the lagoon. The soap and salt water was supposed to wash off the radiation. They were not told what had happened, why it had happened, what was wrong with them. Their hair was falling out, fingernails were falling off, but they were never told why.¹⁷

Immediately after the *Bravo* test, a U.S. serviceman in the task force wrote a letter to a Cincinnati newspaper. The Atomic Energy Commission issued an official statement in response:

During the course of a routine atomic test in the Marshall Islands, 28 United States personnel and 236 residents were transported from neighbouring atolls to Kwajalein Island according to a plan as a precautionary measure. These individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. There were no burns. All were reported well (quoted Firth, 1987:18).

The following month a group of Marshallese sent a petition to the U.N. Trusteeship

¹⁶ Lijon Eknilang, *Pacific Women Speak* (1987:15).

¹⁷ Darlene Keju-Johnson, *Ibid.* p.6.

Council asking that U.S. bomb tests "be immediately ceased" and informing the Council of radiation injuries resulting from *Bravo*. American representatives said that while some people had been hurt they had made a complete recovery and there was no reason to expect any permanent after-effects. It was not the Marshallese, however, but events in Japan which brought the incident to world attention. When the *Lucky Dragon* returned to the mainland, doctors recognized the symptoms of radiation exposure in the men and the fish. There was an immediate uproar, and thousands of demonstrators took to the streets. The Government demanded an inquiry into the incident, and many small traders went bankrupt as people stopped buying fish for fear of radioactive poisoning. A year later one of the fishermen died from the effects of radiation. The affair and its aftermath marked the beginning of the Japanese peace movement.

In 1977 John Anjain, a chief magistrate on Rongelap, travelled to Washington to testify before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing on the effects of the *Bravo* explosion. His written statement was placed in the record as there was no opportunity for him to speak during the fifteen minutes allotted to the delegation. The following is an excerpt from Anjain's statement:

... In the morning the sun rose in the east, and then something very strange happened. It looked like a second sun was rising in the west. We heard a noise like thunder. We saw some strange clouds on the horizon. In the afternoon, something began falling from the sky upon our island. It looked like ash from a fire. It fell on me, it fell on my wife, it fell on my son. It fell on the trees, and on the roofs of our houses. It fell on the reefs, and into the lagoon. ... We were very curious about this ash falling from the sky. Some people put it in their mouths and tasted it. People walked on it, and children played with it.

Later on, in the early evening, it rained. ... The water mixed with the ash which fell into our water catchments. [We] drank the water. The next day some Americans came. They had a machine with them. They went around the island. ... They told us we must not drink the water. They left. They did not explain anything. On the second day, ships came. Americans explained that we were in great danger because of the ash....if we did not leave we would die. Some people were taken away to Kwajalein by airplane, the rest of us by boat. ...We were very afraid.

Three years passed very slowly. The American doctors came to examine us from time to time.

...Many women said they had miscarriages, and the babies did not look like human beings. Some babies were born dead. The doctors said they did not know why. Now it is twenty-three years after the bomb. I know that money cannot bring back my thyroid. It cannot bring back my son.¹⁸ It cannot give me back three years of my life. It cannot take the poison from the coconut crabs. It cannot make us stop being afraid.¹⁹

The islanders stayed on Kwajalein for three months to receive medical treatment and observation, and then were taken to Majuro. The Utirik people, almost 300 miles to the east of Bikini, received a much lower radiation exposure than those on Rongelap, only 100 miles to the east. Three years later, the Atomic Energy Commission pronounced it safe for all the islanders to return home. It was in the early sixties, says Lijon Eknilang, that the people of Rongelap began to experience "all of the illnesses we are having nowthyroid tumours, stillbirths, eye problems, liver and stomach cancers and leukaemia". She continues:

My grandmother ...died in the 1960's because of thyroid cancer and stomach cancer. My father ... had already died on June 30, 1954 because he was somewhere around the area when they were testing the bomb. My cousin died of tumor cancer in 1960. In 1972, I had another cousin die of leukaemia. Two of my sisters... had thyroid surgery in 1981. In 1978 I went to Cleveland, Ohio, to have my thyroid tumour removed. Now I have to take medicine every day of my life. And I have had seven miscarriages and stillbirths. Altogether there are eight other women on the island who have given birth to babies that look like blobs of jelly ...no legs, no arms, no head, no nothing. Other children are born who will never recognize this world or their own parents. They just lie there with crooked arms and legs and never speak. Already we have had seven such children.²⁰

¹⁸ Three out of four children who were under ten when exposed to the *Bravo* fallout developed thyroid cancer. Leko Amjain was a baby at the time of the blast. Fourteen years later his thyroid was removed by surgeons at the N.Y. Brookhaven National Laboratory and he died in 1972 of leukaemia. His death was the first U.S.- acknowledged Marshallese death from radioactive fallout.

¹⁹ "The South Pacific Setting." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*. Vol. 18, No. 2, p.18.

²⁰ Lijon Eknilang, *Pacific Women Speak*. (1987:16-17). This is 'soft data' as to my knowledge there are no official studies on birth defects in the Marshall Islands. A USSR press report cited in a (name unknown) U.S. newspaper does provide some support for these assertions. It states that in the year following Chernobyl, the Petrovsky Animal Farm - which is outside the 30-mile evacuation zone - reported 37 pigs and 27 calves born with gross abnormalities (without heads, limbs, eyes, ribs, etc.). Up till then, only 3 deformed animals had been born on the Farm. A report from *The Nuclear Monitor* (U.S) quoted in *Pacific News Bulletin* May, 1990 states that at Cherkassy, within the Chernobyl zone, one in five babies is born

Four years after the *Bravo* explosion, the rate of stillbirths and miscarriages among Rongelap women had risen to more than twice the rate of unexposed Marshallese women for the first 4 years following exposure to radiation. Between 1954 and 1985 thyroid nodules developed in approximately 33 percent of the Rongelapese, including 63 percent of the children less than 10 years old at the time of exposure and in 10 percent of the Utirik population (Lessard *et. al.*, 1954). In 1976, the cancer and thyroid rate on Utirik rocketed and there was an increased incidence of cataracts. An American doctor remarked after a visit to the Marshall Islands in 1980:

There was a general complaint of dimming vision some five or six years ago on Utirik. ...I was told that two boxes of eyeglasses were shipped to the island.. and the people were to come in and choose which ever eyeglasses seemed to help them. And this was the sum of investigation and treatment of the eye problems - of what I think is a unique epidemic of cataracts. American citizens would not likely tolerate such handling. At least my patients wouldn't.²¹

In 1978 a Department of Energy report revealed that in addition to Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik, the four atolls whose contamination by fall-out was known, "a further ten atolls or single islands received intermediate range fallout from one of more of the megaton range tests. A number of these atolls are presently inhabited while others are used for food collection."²² In the early 1980's, DOE scientists conducted research on Rongelap and recommended that people not eat fish or food grown in the northern parts of the island. Alarmed by the report, the Rongalese petitioned the U.S. Government for help in leaving the Island, saying their own government was unable to financially assist them. The U.S. Congress recommended further investigation. In a petition presented to the U.N. Subcommittee on Small Territories in March, 1985, a landowner on Rongelap Atoll said: "We do not believe we can wait another year or two for the U.S. congress to appropriate the money and for the survey to be completed. We are

with deformities (limbs, eyes and ears missing) and in the Mogilev area the number of babies born with deformities was 5 in 1985, 21 in 1986, 39 in 1987, 84 in 1988 and 50 in 1989.

²¹ Quoted in "Bikini: a Way of Life Lost." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 18, No.2, p.19.

²² U.S. Dept. of Energy, *Radiological Survey Plan for the Northern Marshall Islands*. August 22, 1978.

convinced that we must move now to avoid additional radiation exposure. Therefore, we have asked help from other sources."²³

In May 1985, the Greenpeace vessel *Rainbow Warrior*, (shortly to be dynamited in Auckland harbour by French secret agents) removed some 300 people along with their belongings and pieces of dismantled houses to Mejato, a mile-long, uninhabited, mainly sand and coral island given to the Rongalapese by the landowners of Kwajalein Atoll. The evacuation coincided with the statement of the U.S. ambassador at the U.N. Trusteeship Council that radiation levels at Rongelap were less than those recorded at Denver, Colorado, and that the Islanders had been "victimized by outside forces" (quoted Firth, 1986a:209) The leader of the Rongelap group, Jeton Anjain, denied that the evacuation was instigated by outsiders.

We don't need the most brilliant scientists to come and tell us we are not sick. We know we have had health problems on Rongelap from the beginning - we are having them today and we will have them for the indefinite future. If the U.S. thinks that my people are okay why should they come twice a year to use them as guinea pigs? [The evacuation] is not something we wanted to do, but we care deeply about the future of our children and unborn generations. ... We have been suffering since 1954 and we are used to hardships. Our land is our most sacred possession, but our children are more important than the land itself (quoted Firth, 1986a:209).

In 1982, the U.S. Nuclear Defense Agency officially declared that "*Bravo* was without question the worst single incident of fallout exposure in all the U.S. atmospheric testing program." The release of large quantities of radioactive substances had "resulted in the contamination and exposure of some individuals either stationed or residing on distant atolls or aboard various vessels. Acute radiation effects were observed among some of these people." The American personnel on Rongerik were removed by the U.S. Navy one day after the explosion, the Rongelap people stayed on their island for two days and those on Utirik were taken to Kwajalein on the third day. Some Marshallese believe the delay was intentional; that the U.S. military needed information about radiation effects on human beings. The perception has been fueled by scientific reports like the one quoted at the

²³ Julian Riklon, quoted in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 18, No.2, p.20.

beginning of this chapter, and in the mid-1980's the Australian film maker Dennis O'Rourke spent two years investigating the incidents surrounding *Bravo*. He recorded the results in a documentary called *Half Life* which won the Grand Prix for Best Film at Florence in 1985, has been shown at film festivals around the world. He has said of his research:

I never believed when I started the research that the Americans set out with a deliberate policy to expose the Marshallese to radiation, although I met a lot of people who asserted that they did. But at the end of the project I can say that they certainly allowed the exposure to happen, and they have used the victims ever since as guinea pigs to study the long-term effects of radiation on human beings who have to live in a contaminated environment. ...

In a sense, the Marshallese are the first victims of World War III. They are the first culture in the history of our race which has been effectively destroyed by radiation. ... In the name of national security, the U.S. has irreversibly destroyed the fragile world of the Marshall islanders for countless generations to come. ... There are no villains as such, just scientists, soldiers, politicians and bureaucrats who believe that they were and are doing the right thing, and who unleashed this monster on the world. The Marshallese are the evidence for all the world to see.²⁴

U.S. officials have strongly repudiated the film, stating that naval officers had waited to receive firm information about the fallout before evacuating the islanders.

Between 1983 and 1985, a team of independent medical researchers from the University of Washington in Seattle examined the prevalence of thyroid nodules among people on 14 of the 24 inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In earlier studies, people in islands not exposed to the *Bravo* fallout had been used as a control group for the exposed populations, and the prevalence of thyroid nodules among the unexposed islanders was found to be 6.3 percent. The new study found a strong linear relationship between the probability of thyroid nodules developing in Marshall islanders, and the distance of their 1954 home atoll from the Bikini test site. "The probability of a nodule decreases threefold for every 100 miles farther from Bikini, and twofold for every 10 degrees going east to west in a clockwise direction. ... [T]hese findings suggest that the geographic extent of radioactive exposure from the *Bravo* test was much broader than previously assumed".

²⁴ Quoted in Robert Milliken, "Half Life." *National Times*, (Sydney) 21-27 June, 1985.

The researchers conclude that "2.45 percent [the mean rate of prevalence in the most distant atolls] is probably a conservative estimate for the ...background rate of ...thyroid nodules in the Marshall Islands" (Hamilton *et. al.*, 1987).

While "the people dislocated and irradiated by atomic bomb tests in the 1950's are clearly innocent victims", states Stewart Firth, "...it is a mistake to depict the situation of the Marshallese people solely in terms of their 'plight', as liberal commentators in the U.S. are apt to do" (Firth, 1986a:209-210). Although 'innocent' they are not 'simple'. Traditional Marshallese culture involved endless disputes over land, and chiefs and their advisers mastered complex genealogical arguments in advancing their causes. The Marshallese were using the German legal system in deciding their land cases 80 years ago. Since the 1978 study, thousands of people in the northern Marshalls have filed lawsuits against the U.S. Government claiming compensation for personal injury, and the northern atolls have employed an independent scientist to make a comprehensive study of radiation levels. As Julian Riklon said in the U.N. Statement: "The people of Rongelap distrust the studies that have been conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore laboratory. We all know the parable about the fox guarding the henhouse."

The Marshallese have been effective in presenting their case to the World Council of Churches, the U.S. Congress and the U.N. Trusteeship Council, and have become adept in the litigation and politics of nuclear compensation. Before the passing of the Compact, all four irradiated atolls - Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik - had large injury lawsuits before U.S. courts and claims against the U.S. government totalling more than \$5 billion; The money so far paid or offered being regarded as inadequate compensation for loss of land, damage to property and personal injury. These payments were all *ex gratia*; while acknowledging a moral responsibility for the consequences of the tests the United States so far has avoided admitting any legal liability. The early payments in the 1950's to the Bikinians (\$325,000) and the Enewetakese (\$175,000) were lease moneys. Congress voted \$950,000 to the people of Rongelap in 1964, and since 1977

residents of Rongelap and Utirik who develop 'a defined radiation-related malignancy' (not easy to prove) have been eligible to receive \$25,000 each. Prior to the Compact, the Bikinians had trust funds worth \$28 million, including money earmarked for resettlement.

The possibility of successful Marshallese radiation-damage suits against the U.S. Government was negated by the acceptance of the Compact, as its terms specify a financial settlement whereby all existing Marshall Islands' lawsuits will be cancelled and no new ones permitted. A U.S. trust fund generating \$270 million over the first 15 years is designed to split three ways: \$33 million to the Government for health care and monitoring of radiation levels; \$185.75 million to the approximately 3,000 people in the four atolls directly affected by the tests and \$53.25 million to an Island tribunal for compensation to individual Marshallese. Acceptance of the Compact is tantamount to acceptance of these payments as a "full settlement of all claims, past, present and future" (Weisgall, 1985:50).

Pacific Apartheid

Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) in the western chain of the Marshall Islands is the United States' most important range for the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Approximately once a month an unarmed missile fired from Vandenburg Air Force Base in California splashes down into the lagoon at around 17,000 miles per hour. The MX missile was tested here, and SDI research at the base covers all three phases in the tracking and destroying of nuclear warheads. Kwajalein Atoll is the world's largest; its boomerang-shaped necklace of 93 islands and islets enclose a lagoon of some 900 square miles. The main island served as a support base during the early tests, and when they ceased the Navy chose the lagoon as a missile-testing site. People in the impact zone were moved to Ebeye, a 78 acre island one mile-long and 600 feet wide close to the main island.

Over the next few years more islanders were resettled on Ebeye. The first lease agreement between the U.S. and the approximately 5,600 displaced Kwajalein landowners was signed in 1964. It provided a lump sum payment of \$750,000 for 99 years use of the Island as a missile-testing range. In 1964, the Army took over from the Navy and

designated the central two-thirds of the Mid-Corridor Atoll as the new impact zone. The several hundred people living on islands in the area and using other islands for food-gathering were provided with cement block housing units on Ebeye and \$25 a month as compensation for the "inconvenience."²⁵ As missile-testing activities increased, Micronesians from outside Kwajalein attracted by the prospect of employment at the base moved to Ebeye. To quote the *Pacific Island News*, August 1982, "the construction of the Kwajalein Missile Range created a cash economy that has been a magnet drawing relatives and others from throughout the Pacific looking for jobs". At the beginning of 1990, almost 9,000 people - one in four of all Marshallese - live on Ebeye in the densest concentration of population in the Pacific.

Home on the Missile Range

Approximately 3,000 Americans, most of them contract workers, live on the main island of Kwajalein. Indigeneous people are not permitted to live at the base; if an American and Marshallese marry (and wish to live together) they must move to Ebeye. The contrast between conditions on Kwajalein and Ebeye - known in the region as "the slum of the Pacific" - was described by Representative John Seiberling during a 1984 Congressional Hearing.

In January 1982, I personally visited both Kwajalein Island and Ebeye Island. The contrast couldn't be greater or more dramatic. Kwajalein is like Fort Lauderdale or one of our Miama resort areas, with palm-tree lined beaches, swimming pools, a golf course, people bicycling everywhere, a first-class hospital and a school; and Ebeye, on the other hand, is an island slum, overpopulated, treeless, filthy lagoon, littered beaches, a dilapidated hospital, a contaminated water supply, and so forth (quoted Firth, 1986b:18).

In 1983, two U.S. journalists made similar observations:

...There now are over eight thousand people crammed into this hell hole of 66 acres [12 of Ebeye's 78 acres are occupied by a defunct Coast Guard station]. There is no grass, few trees.

²⁵ Stanford Research Institute, *Environmental Impact Assessment of Kwajalein Missile Range Operations* (prepared for Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, Huntsville, Alabama), August 1975, p.17.

Roads are unpaved. There are no drains and the grey, muddy sand is covered with raw garbage and sewage. The drinking water must be imported weekly to a dock, and carried from there to homes and offices. ...The shacks which serve as homes are so crowded that children sleep in shifts. ...Three quarters of a million cans of beer per year play their part in anesthetizing the inhabitants - half of whom are under 14 years of age - from their misery. ... Kwajalein by contrast is a pleasant place, with well-manicured beaches, snack bars, a country club called the Kwaj Lodge, another called the Yukway Yuk, and a PX known as Macy's East (Cockburn and Ridgeway, 1983:157-8).

"In sum", say the writers, "the situation is virtual apartheid."

Although the majority of Ebeye's population is under eighteen years of age there is no high school on the island, and Kwajalein High School is for American children only. Up until the last years of the 1980's, water was brought to the island by boat and raw sewage drained directly into Ebeye lagoon. Pollution levels were at times 25,000 times higher than the level of safety set by the World Health Organization. In early 1990, a Canadian store owner described Ebeye as "an overcrowded slum" with "shacks wall-to-wall, wave-to-wave."²⁶ The average occupancy-rate of houses is thirteen. Alcoholism, suicide, teen-age pregnancy, drugs and gang violence are said to be major problems as is the 'junk-food' diet of many islanders. According to a U.S. doctor at Majura hospital, one child a month dies of malnutrition. Epidemics occur regularly, and there were 700 cases of syphilis in 1989.²⁷ Up to the mid-eighties, the Marshallese could use the Kwajalein Army hospital only in situations of extreme emergency. William Vitarelli, the U.S. High Commissioner's representative on Ebeye from 1967-1969, recalls one such occasion:

We were having a gastroenteritis epidemic ... The Ebeye hospital ran out of intravenous fluids needed to sustain the lives of the Marshallese children severely dehydrated from profuse vomiting and diarrhoea. I took one Marshallese child who was very ill ... on a skiff and motored ... to Kwajalein. I wanted to take her to the Kwajalein hospital for treatment. ... We were stopped at the beach by an American guard who would not let the child enter the island. ... The Marshallese nurse pleaded with the guard that the child was dying, and she could not receive appropriate therapy on Ebeye. The guard did not permit the child onto the island. She died on her way back to Ebeye. ...Five children died during that epidemic (Johnson, 1986:35).

33 "Paradise Lost: Now It's a Dump." *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 1990: A2.

34 *Ibid.* A8.

Marshallese KMR employees travel to work each day across the three-mile stretch of water and risk arrest if found on the base at night. They are not permitted to shop at the Kwajalein subsidized food store and may be subject to random searches and seizure of goods. (A 1976 study found that, on average, food prices on Ebeye were 100 percent higher than on Kwajalein). As two-thirds of the lagoon and the Mid-Corridor islands are off-limits for fishing and food-growing, the people on Ebeye depend almost entirely on wages earned at the base and the compensation paid to the landowners. Most have maintenance or service jobs, and many complain of workplace discrimination. In 1976, anthropologist William Alexander told a U.S. House Subcommittee: "Approximately 75 percent of the workers were able to provide the names of specific non-Micronesians who do the exact same job, but who receive significantly higher pay for their work".²⁸ A former Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory said: "While some of the Micronesian workers at Ebeye have the technical ability to warrant promotion, they do not have the ability to be in charge, to supervise people, particularly Americans". An official of Global Associates (the company operating the base) told an interviewer: "We don't have too many U.S. hires working for \$2.40 an hour. We do everything we can to reserve those jobs, what we call beginning jobs, for our Micronesian friends" (quoted Johnson, 1986:35).

The 'Sail-ins'

From the late 1960's onwards, the landowners of Kwajalein have used direct action tactics in seeking increased lease money, better living conditions on Ebeye and greater access to the islands of the atoll when missile tests are not in progress. In 1968, when compensation was increased from \$25 to \$40 a month, the displaced people petitioned the Congress of Micronesia "to right a grave injustice", pointing out that "electric bills and house rentals exceed \$40 a month, and already some of us have been threatened with eviction" (Keju, 1982:24). Furthermore, they said, anyone born since the relocation was not eligible for compensation. When the petition was ignored by the Marshallese

²⁸ "Current Problems in the Marshall Islands." House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, July 14, 1976, pp.24-27.

authorities the Kwajalein landowners declared they would resettle their islands. In 1969, the first 'sail-in' took place. Occupation of the off-limits islands ended one week later when U.S. officials agreed to negotiate the protestors' demands. The Defense Department and the then 1,470 Mid-Corridor landowners reached a 5-year agreement providing \$420,000 a year for the lease of the land (about \$285 annual per capita compensation). In July 1979, about 500 landowners organized another protest sail-in. After two weeks, U.S. authorities agreed to negotiate new agreements and compensation was increased to \$9 million a year, \$5 million going directly to the landowners.

In 1982, American and Marshall Islands negotiators signed the Compact of Free Association granting the United States a 50-year lease of the base. Under the terms of the agreement, the annual level of direct compensation to the landowners was reduced to \$1.9 million. The result was "Operation Homecoming." This time, about 1,000 people occupied some of the off-limits islands. Marshallese police arrested 13 traditional and political leaders (including all three Senators from Kwajalein) but the occupation continued. "I don't care about missiles or danger," said one landowner, "I only care about my land. Leaving it is just like moving away from a loved one" (quoted Johnson, 1986:37). Chief Kotak Loeak said:

Our people are happy living as they now are, especially in islands where there are no military facilities nor armed guards to keep them in restricted areas. ... After years on crowded Ebeye Island where we were forced to live by the United States we have discovered the joys of natural living, especially the freedom to move around, fish, plant and build living structures from the surrounding elements. I cannot begin to tell you how good the people feel ... For the older people, the return brings tears of joy. For the children, it is an all new experience (quoted Firth, 1986b:20).

The United States refused to negotiate under pressure; in the words of Defense Department official, Noel C. Koch: "The Department of Defense desires a reasonable and fair relationship with the government and people of the Marshall islands. However, we are not prepared to acquiesce in disruptive actions against the Kwajalein Missile Range, or to negotiate while they continue."²⁹ The Army suspended 200 Marshallese employees and

²⁹ *New York Times*, September 13, 1982.

the Defense Department announced that all banking services for Marshallese on Kwajalein would terminate from September 30 1982, out of concern, said Koch, for the islanders' "potential dependency upon U.S. sources, and the resultant negative effect upon independent development of Marshallese capabilities" (quoted Johnson, 1986:28). The islanders stayed on. A missile test scheduled for August 3, 1982 was reportedly postponed because people camped in its path refused to take cover. John Sieberling told a Congressional Committee:

I think the actions of the military out there are hardly becoming of a nation that is a great power. Here we have a bunch of people who are our wards ... We're occupying their land and we're denying them the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances that our Constitution guarantees to our own citizens. And yet we're in their country. I think it's a pretty sad spectacle (quoted JOhnsons, 1986:28).

After four months, the Defense Department agreed to negotiate with the protestors. The result was a new short-term, three-year lease agreement, the return of six islands for housing and food gathering, the creation of a ten million dollar capital works fund for development projects on Ebeye and a reduction in the long-term lease from 50 years to 30 years when the Compact came into force. Demands relating to changes in the treatment of Marshallese by the KMR Command were not successful. Nor was the goal of successive renegotiable short-term leases under the Compact achieved. The landowners have nothing to gain from a fixed lease over a period of fifteen years with a U.S. option on a further fifteen years, particularly as the annual compensation remains the same for 15 years. Thus when the Compact was voted on in September 1983, Kwajalein Atoll was three to one against it, although the Marshall Islands as a whole voted 58 percent in its favor.

When the three-year lease ran out in 1985 and the Compact was still delayed because of events in Palau, the landowners - now organized as the Kwajalein Atoll Corporation and represented by U.S. lawyers - took the opportunity to negotiate for more compensation. They rejected the U.S. request to extend the lease for 60 days, would not accept \$487,000 rent for October, refused to recognize the CFA and delivered a series of

demands with respect to the future lease of KMR. These included the rehiring of maids fired during Operation Homecoming, the opening of Kwajalein High School to Marshallese until a school could be built on Ebeye, the right of Marshallese to eat at the Kwajalein snack bar when transiting the island (which contains the airport) and a one-time payment of \$6 million. The Army agreed to some of the demands but rejected the lump-sum payment demand.

Repeating the tactics of 1982, small groups of landowners set up camps at the base and in the missile impact area, stating that as no lease existed they were within their rights as landowners to resettle their lands. In March 1986, four months after the occupation began, the Marshall Islands Government signed a new short-term lease with the United States. The landowners declared it was not in their interests, and refused to leave. In late April, through an unprecedented 'eminent domain' court order, the Government took possession of all Kwajalein lands and U.S. Army sentries removed the protestors to an island north of Ebeye. At low-tide they walked back across the reefs to Ebeye. A picket line formed on the wharf to keep all KMR transport boats away from the dock, thus preventing several hundred Marshallese crossing to the base each day for work. The action broke up early in May, 1986 after the U.S. base commander was said to have given orders that sentries "shoot to wound" those taking part in the blockade.³⁰

Conditions on Ebeye began improving in the late 1980's. A municipal council was elected in 1983 and immediately drew up a 15-year development plan for schools, new and improved housing, recreational facilities and a causeway to link Ebeye to other islands. The new mayor initiated a public clean-up of the beaches and the lagoon, and compensation money was used to repair the sewerage system - which no longer back-flushes into sinks. From 1985 onwards, a less strict referral policy to the base hospital has been in force (although the Army complains that the Marshallese often abuse this privilege while the Marshallese complain that the procedures are difficult and arbitrary, and they are made to feel like second-class citizens). In 1988, as part of the development plan, Ebeye got its first sidewalks, paved roads, water desalination plant and electric generator. In the summer

³⁰ *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 8, 1986.

of the same year a storm destroyed many of the houses, thus accelerating the replacement process. The causeway has been built, and it has relieved population congestion.

Nevertheless, the people of Ebeye continue to be "the people of the bomb." As a spokesman for the Kwajalein Atoll Corporation told a Congressional Hearing in 1984, "We live in a community in which the military intrusion on our lives not only dominates but controls totally. Our future economic and social development will be within the parameters of what derives from military activity at Kwajalein."³¹ Although Kwajalein remains the prime test site for U.S. long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles and anti-missile defence systems, U.S. and Marshall Islands Government officials signed leases in mid-June, 1989 for U.S. Army use of four new defence sites in preparation for the first series of Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars') tests. The lease of small parcels of land on the atolls of Likkiep, Enewetak, Wotho and Allinglaplap marks the Army's first expansion outside the Kwajalein Atoll missile testing range facility.

A Family Farewell

On May 16, 1986 the United States formally asked the U.N. Trusteeship Council "to honour the wishes of the people of Micronesia, and act to end the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States since 1947."³² The four active members of the Trusteeship Council are the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France (China, takes no part in its proceedings). Three months earlier, the Soviet Union had accused the United States of planning to annex Micronesia to expand its network of military bases in the Pacific region. The official statement charged that Washington was engaged in a "neo-colonial" exercise, and under its agreements with Micronesian governments would appropriate "an exclusive right of control over questions of external relations, defense and

44 Ataji Balos, 'House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks,' March 1, 1984 in *House Hearings on Compact*. August 7-9; p. 34. In mid-June 1989, U.S. and Marshall Islands Government officials signed leases for U.S. Army use of four new defence sites in the Marshall Islands in preparation for the first series of Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars') tests. The lease of small parcels of land on the atolls of Likkiep, Enewetak, Wotho and Allinglaplap marks the Army's first expansion outside the Kwajalein Atoll missile testing range facility.

³² *International Herald Tribune*, May 29, 1986.

finance of Micronesian territories."³³ Nevertheless, in September, 1986, the Trusteeship Council approved by 3 votes to 1 the Franco-British Resolution for trust termination, noting the self-determination process which had taken place in the four political entities of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Northern Marianas and Palau.

The USSR voted against the motion on the grounds that under the terms of the original agreement only the Security Council could decide on termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Soviet representatives declared that the United States had resorted to a policy for the Pacific Islands of "divide and rule", artificially slowing down economic and political development in the territory and turning it into a military staging area that was a threat to the countries of Asia and the Pacific.³⁴ After the signing of the Compact, a taped message of farewell from President Reagan to the Islanders closed with the statement: "You'll always be family to us".³⁵ On July 1, 1987 the ceremonial departure of the U.S. High Commissioner from Micronesia marked the final dissolution of the last of the world's eleven U.N. trusteeships. High Commissioner Janet McCoy (a former campaign worker for President Reagan appointed in 1981) told flower-bedecked Marshallese dignitaries in Kolonia, capital of the Federated States of Micronesia, "We've done it guys! You're on your own."³⁶ Nevertheless, both the decolonization celebrations and President Reagan's speech of farewell were premature in the case of the nascent Republic of Palau.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Marshall Islands Journal*, September 18, 1987.

³⁵ As the title of this chapter suggests, President Reagan's words give new meaning to the term 'nuclear family'.

³⁶ *Ibid.* August 17, 1987.

CHAPTER 3

ODYSSEY OF A WOULD-BE NUCLEAR-FREE NATION, 1979-90

We see that the Compact says military rights may end in fifty years if mutually agreed. This means, we understand, that if the United States wishes to continue its control of our land it need only say so, and this will go on forever. This is unacceptable.

- Gabriela Ngirmang (Palauan Woman Elder), Washington, 1988

The Constitution and the Compact

Context and Background

Palau (or Belau) is a chain of islands 125 miles long and 25 miles wide lying 8,000 miles west of the United States and 500 miles from the nearest landfall of the Philippines. With an indigeneous population of around 15,000 people, Palau is among the smallest of the world's aspiring new nations - and in this case small does mean beautiful. Spectacular coral reefs, turquoise-blue waters and lush rain forests make Palau a diver's and a nature-lover's delight. It is also a marine biologist's and naturalist's delight. The western barrier reef running almost the full length of the island cluster has some 700 known species of coral and 1,500 species of fish. The famous Rock Islands of the lagoon are a maze of low green islands unique in the Pacific. They contain species of birds and plants found in few other places in the world, and in the twelve marine lakes are creatures which have followed separate evolutionary paths over the course of millennia. Huge trees festooned with vines, ferns and orchids grow out of the jagged coral of the islands. The ecology of the forest and the reef is similar; in both cases the layer of stored-up nutrients is thin and plants and animals live directly off each other, recycling each other almost completely. The great variety of life forms and the intensity of their competition gives stability to the otherwise fragile ecosystems of land and sea.

Scattered around Palau are remnants of WW 2: rusting hulks of tanks near the airport, artillery pieces in caves at the entrances to harbours and the intact body of a Zero

fighter-plane in the shallows of a reef. Palau's one first-class resort hotel, built in Koror in the mid-1980's by a Japanese corporation, rests partly on the remains of an asphalt landing-strip for seaplanes. While Palau, once known as 'the Japanese Riviera', attracts divers from all over the world, the hotel depends principally on the waves of Japanese tourists now fanning out over their former empire. The hotel is one of the few large revenue-producing enterprises in Palau. When the Japanese occupation ended so too did most efforts at economic development. The only industry apart from tourism to develop during the years of American administration has been the production of carved wooden story-boards depicting ancient legends and folk tales. As most of these are made by prisoners (with the guards receiving ten percent of the profits), the town jail has become a premier tourist stop.

Like the rest of Micronesia, Palau is a welfare economy heavily-dependent on American aid. Almost nothing is produced for export (with the exception of about 300 pounds of marijuana shipped illegally each week) and very little for domestic consumption. Under the Japanese occupation rice was a major crop, but is now imported from California. When aid money began pouring in from the 1960's onwards most Palauans simply stopped what they were doing - which was mainly fishing and growing taro - and moved to the towns. By 1981, Palau had a total of 34 farmers and 1,127 government employees. Beer is the second largest import item after oil (both in cost and volume) and Palau shares the severe social problems of the other Micronesian states. It also has the "Dutch Disease": government workers make up about half the labour force, while the other half is mostly made up of tradespeople, office workers and professionals. Most manual labor is done by Filipinos.

Nevertheless, Palau has big plans for the future. A glass case in Malakai, the major town, has buttons that light up to identify the National Government Building, the industrial area, the amusement center, the sewage treatment plant and the residence of the paramount High Chief. Only the two-storey Government building containing the display so far exists. Malakai consists of a few small stores, a couple of churches, about fifty houses and

(although there are few vehicles on the island) a two-mile paved road which begins nowhere and goes nowhere. A reporter from the *Los Angeles Times* visiting Palau in 1987 wrote:

The islanders seem to think that financing the future will be no problem. Asked about it recently, a resident of the town of Malakai who was sitting outside the state building took a moment from his marijuana and his science fiction novel and explained his optimism: "Credit, man. You Americans will pay for it - just like always."¹

Culture, Society, Politics

Before the arrival of the Europeans, the basic social unit was a mother and her descendants (*ongelak*) combined into families (*blai*), clans (*kebliil*) and finally a clan confederation (*klebliil*). Clan chiefs formed the village council which was normally split into two equal groups. Decisions, at least ideally, were made by consultation between leaders and their factions, and by consensus within the council. The split of '*bitang ma bitang*' (this half and that half) ran throughout the village, clan and family systems as a form of moiety-opposition used, or so anthropologists believe, to stimulate competition and balance power between the two rival clan confederations led by chiefs of the two head villages, Koror and Melekeok. At the time of the first significant contact with Europeans in the late 18th. century, the island group was divided geographically into two major rival clan confederations led by the chiefs of the two head villages of Koror and Melekeok.

The introduction of firearms upset the traditional balance of power and the village of Koror became dominant. While the Spanish and German colonialists had dealt with the traditional chiefs, the Japanese - mainly civilians - established an infrastructure and ran the islands by and for themselves. Japanese immigrants far outnumbered the islanders, who were expected to adopt Japanese ways. The introduction of a money economy first eroded the authority of the chiefs, and the introduction of American aid and styles of leadership furthered the process. In 1981, Palau's first national leaders were elected through a system of universal suffrage to a proto-typical American form of government. As few traditional leaders run for elected office, the governing elite consists mainly of business-men, trust-

¹ "Palau - Big Dreams Hide Big Problems". Mark Fineman, *Los Angeles Times* June 29, 1987.

trained bureaucrats and professionals. The influence of traditional chiefs remains strong at the grassroots level, however, as does the tradition of split political allegiances.

While there are little visible signs of traditional Palauan culture (apart from two restored men's meeting-houses, one war-canoe and the storyboards) it survives in a kinship system based upon families and clans connected by matrilineage, patrilineage, adoptions and customary land rights. Although exceedingly complex, it has been said that "any Palauan can trace his or her relationship to any other as easily as if reading a map."² Men provide both the traditional and political leadership, but the society is by no means patriarchal - or at least it is not perceived as such by women. According to one:

In Palau women play an important role in issues of policy ... Women traditionally own and divide land. We control the clan money. We traditionally select our chiefs; women place and remove them. Having observed our upbringing closely, we are able to decide which men have the talent to represent our interests. From birth, Palauan women are responsible for men. When the men marry, the women arrange for the settlement and when the men die, the women bury them.³

Palauan nationalism is rooted in a strong ethnic identity born of centuries of relative isolation and self-reliance but the desire for cultural preservation tends to conflict with the equally strong desire for political, social and economic development. A major controversy in the late 1970's centred around the construction by a Japanese corporation of a superport for the transshipment of crude oil. The project would have involved dredging of the reefs, land-filling and extensive on-shore construction. While most businessmen and political leaders favoured the proposal, many islanders - particularly traditional chiefs and villagers - opposed it on the grounds of environmental damage and the threat posed to Palauan culture by a large influx of foreign workers. The opposition won and the proposal was dropped. The desire for independence similarly conflicts with the almost total dependence on U.S. financial and technical aid. In the 1978 vote over whether Palau would remain part of a

² Frances Fitzgerald, "The tides of paradise: an account of a glorious holiday and global politics in Palau." *Islands*, Nov./Dec., 1987.

³ Excerpt from the testimony of Gabriela Ngirmang at a 1988 U.S. Senate Hearing of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on the Compact of Free Association.

pan-Micronesian political system or become a separate political identity with its own Constitution and the right to conduct its own status negotiations, the vote was 45 percent for union and 55 percent for separatism. The decision in combination with the country's financial dependence, was destined to bring the tradition of factionalism to its apotheosis in the next decade.

The Constitution

At least four constitutions were written by the Palauan Congress (the OEK) in the mid-1970's in preparation for the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional Convention. Between January 28 and April 2, 1979 the 38 members of the Palauan Constitutional Convention (the Con-Con) met to draw up the final document. Discussions were also held at the grassroots level and many older people were determined that never again would their island become a battleground for warring foreign powers. Out of this sentiment was born the world's first, and so far only, Nuclear Free Constitution. Article X111, Section 6 states:

Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific question.

Also written into the Constitution was the requirement that any changes to it must receive at least 75 percent of votes in a national referendum.

On April 30, 1979, the U.S. Chief negotiator for the Compact of Free Association, then three years into negotiations, went to Palau and advised the leadership of the Con-Con, the legislature and the Political Status Commission that there were a number of potential problems with the draft; the major ones being the prohibition on the introduction of nuclear weapons and other types of hazardous substances into Palauan territory, and the rejection of the right of the Palauan Government to acquire land by eminent domain for the benefit of a foreign entity - a term which could include the United States. The U.S. negotiator pointed out that these infringed upon the defence authority which the United States would continue to exercise under free association, and could be a continuing source

of friction between the United States and Palau. While the people of Palau, he said, have the right to declare their land, air and sea space nuclear-free, they cannot exercise this right and simultaneously opt for a relationship of free association with the United States. He assured the Palauan officials that the United States had no intention of seeking the use of any land beyond that which was absolutely necessary for defence.

Factionalism had been present from the beginning in planning for the Constitution. Now two powerful oppositional groups emerged: one that dominated in the Senate and the Con-Con and wanted to keep the Constitution intact; one that dominated in the Legislature and wanted to amend it to meet U.S. concerns. Both groups nevertheless desired the relationship of free association with the United States. The Con-Con made some changes in the draft but the anti-nuclear and land provisions remained intact. In a referendum on July 9, 1979 the existing Constitution was approved by 92 percent of Palauan voters. It was immediately voided by the Legislature on the grounds that it was fundamentally inconsistent with the Principles of Free Association signed in Hilo, Hawai'i in April 1978. A revised constitution was put together by a Drafting Commission to meet the U.S. objections, but this was overwhelmingly rejected in an October referendum. An election followed, and this time leading members of the grassroots 'People's Committee for the Constitution' took control of the legislature. The original Constitution was revived and again received overwhelming approval in a referendum held on July 9, 1980 - exactly one year after the first referendum. On the basis of this document, Palau gained a form of self-government in 1981 and Haruo Remeliik was installed as the first president of Palau.

Drama and Melodrama

The next step in the Constitution drama occurred in February, 1983 with the holding of a referendum on the Compact of Free Association. In 1980, changes to the Compact had been made in an effort to overcome the problems posed by the anti-nuclear clauses of the Constitution. Section 314 of the Compact still prohibited the use of Palau for testing nuclear weapons and for the storage of toxic and radioactive materials, but a subsection permitted the transit or overflight of nuclear weapons in times of emergency declared by the

U.S. President or a state of war declared by the U.S. Congress. The conflict between the Constitution and this subsection meant that the latter needed to be approved by three-quarters of the voters, not, as was the case with the rest of the Compact, by a simple majority. The Compact passed by 62.1 percent, but Section 314 received only 52.9 percent of the votes. Nevertheless, the Palauan Congress declared the Compact approved. Pro-Constitution forces led by a traditional chief and mayor of Koror, Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons, challenged the interpretation in a lawsuit. In August 1983, Judge Hefner of the Supreme Court of Palau ruled that the entire Compact was defeated because Section 314 had not received the required voter approval.

The Revised Compact

Once again negotiations commenced. Talks between U.S. Ambassador Fred M. Zeder and Palauan Ambassador Lazarus E. Salii, a strong Compact supporter, resulted in the production in May 1984 of a document named the 'Revised Compact.' Rather than restricting American military action and control, however, the new draft actually increased it.⁴ A summary of the section headed 'Security and Defense Relations' is as follows:

- Palau's territory is closed to militaries of all nations except the U.S. and any national military invited by the U.S. The U.S. has full authority and responsibility for security and defense, and Palau shall refrain from any action the U.S. determines incompatible with its authority for security.

- The U.S. may designate, establish and use defense sites in Palau land and water areas at any time during the 50 years of the Compact, and areas may be designated for exclusive, joint or non-exclusive use. In exclusive use areas the U.S. has unrestricted control over land and sea, including control of exit and entry. Military and space equipment may be installed and maintained. The U.S. has unrestricted control over areas of joint use in times of emergency. At other times Palau may use such an area unless its use is incompatible with the ability of the U.S. to carry out its military mission. Non-exclusive use is defined as the use of land and sea areas on a temporary basis, that is, for military exercises of several weeks duration, after 90 days notice. In times of use the U.S. may control all movements. The U.S. will try, but is not required, to clean up any site after use or return it to its former state.

⁴ From the *Summary of the Compact of Free Association*: a Study Paper prepared by the Micronesia Coalition, Nov. 6, 1986. The paper gives a title by title summary of the 400 page Compact.

- When the U.S. designates a land or water site, Palau may suggest an alternate site. The U.S. can choose either site, and Palau must make it available in 60 days from the original designation.
- U.S. personnel committing offenses against Palauans are immune from Palau courts if the offense was committed while on duty or by personnel attached to transiting vessels or aircraft.
- The U.S. may operate nuclear-capable and powered craft in the air and water and lands of Palau. Palau cannot ask the U.S. to verify the presence of hazardous materials in Palau. The U.S. agrees not to use, test, store or dispose of nuclear materials in Palau. (The Palau Supreme Court ruled that this provision gives permission for the U.S. to "operate", which includes permission for the U.S. to use and store nuclear materials in Palau. For this reason, the Compact needs 75 percent voter approval).
- The U.S. will determine which international security and defense treaties apply to Palau.
- The Compact may be amended only by mutual agreement of the Governments of the United States and Palau through their constitutional processes.
- The Compact may be partially terminated by mutual agreement. If so, economic assistance by the U.S. continues if mutually agreed. The military provisions of the Compact stay in effect and cannot be terminated for 50 years.

The U.S. military has designated exclusive use of about 3,000 acres for a jungle-training camp, and non-exclusive use of stretches of the northern beaches, reefs and shorelands for amphibious assault training. The three main airfields, Malakai Harbour and adjacent waters are designated as joint use sites. (The deepwater channels of Palau's Rock Islands are ideal for sheltering submarines). In return for these rights, Palau will receive about \$1 billion over the 50-year term of the agreement. In all, the U.S. military will have options on approximately 33,000 acres, about one-third of Palau.

Ambassador Salii and other Compact supporters warned that Palau could not afford to reject the Compact because of the Government's severe financial problems,⁵ and a

⁵ The Government had a \$4 million deficit for the fiscal year 1982-83 as a result of increasing government costs (striking public employees received a \$1 million salary increase after strikers bombed the office of the President in 1981) and declining tax revenues, due mainly to the closing of a tuna catching

plebescite on the Revised Compact was set for September 1984. Pro-constitution groups formed a coalition under the title of *Osobel Palau* (Save Palau) to fight against the Compact's acceptance. This time the referendum received 66.9 voter approval; still less than the required 75 percent needed to overrule the Constitution. Asked whether he intended to submit the Compact to a further plebescite, President Remelink (who had chaired the Con Con during the drafting of the original Constitution) replied "No, two is enough. The people have declared their will."⁶

The Power Plant Scandal

In the early 1980's, the U.S. Department of Defense announced it was withdrawing the aging WW2 generator which supplied Palau with electricity. President Remelink contracted with the British consortium IPSECO (International Power Systems Company) to build a 16-megawatt power plant in Palau. The \$32 million cost of the plant was twice the amount of Palau's total annual budget, and its power capacity many times larger than necessary for the existing population. While Palauan law requires competitive bidding for large projects, the OEK enacted special legislation exempting IPSECO from all Palauan laws. U.S. Trust Territory Administrators advised against the project, stating that the proposed facility was "in excess of Palau's needs", that there had not been "full and free competition" and that the Government had not negotiated with the company "for the best possible price" or the "most desirable financial arrangements". The Inspector General of the U.S. Department of the Interior warned the Government that it "could not meet debt service requirements" of the loans that had been negotiated.⁷

Nevertheless, with the assistance of Ambassador Fred Zeder a loan was transacted with a London multinational banking consortium and the deal was sealed. There were rumours that the Pentagon was involved in the purchase of the larger-than-necessary generator, or that the U.S. Administration was seeking to make it impossible for Palau to operation and a copra processing plant. The U.S. had not provided aid supplements to cover the deficits.

⁶ Quoted in film documentary, "Trouble in Paradise", in *Frontline* series, PBS Television San Diego, June, 1988.

⁷ Quoted in briefing paper for U.S. Congress prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union, Sept. 1, 1986.

survive financially without the Compact. Palauan lawyer Carlos Salii, brother of Lazarus Salii and then speaker of the House of Delegates, acted for IPSECO. As soon as the contract was signed, High Chief Yutaka Gibbons brought a suit against the President, claiming that the power plant contract was illegal and procured by bribery. Gibbon's lawyer, Patrick Smith, alleged that had the plant been subjected to competitive bidding it would have cost no more than \$15 million. Soon after the filing of the suit the lawyer's house was firebombed. Smith left the island with his family, and the lawsuit was dropped.

Lacking the \$141 million the Compact would have supplied in the first year of its operation the Government defaulted on the first IPSECO interest payment in the Spring of 1985 - just as the Inspector General had warned. President Remelink announced that he would make an important statement on national television and radio. It was widely-believed that he intended to "come clean" on the power-plant deal, hoping that by revealing the fact of bribery and fraud he would be able to repudiate the loans, establish a legal defense and save the Palauan economy. The night before the scheduled speech, however, the President was shot three times through the head as he stepped from his car into the driveway of his house. Three weeks later four young Palauan men were arrested and charged with his assassination. They included the son and the nephew of Governor Roman Tmetuchl, a strong Constitution supporter who had run second to Remelink in the presidential elections, and was the leading candidate for the next election scheduled for August, 1985.

Governor Tmetuchl withdrew from the election, leaving as candidates only Vice-president Alphonse Oiterong and Ambassador Lazarus Salii, both strong Compact supporters. The latter won easily, and was duly installed as President. The FBI had assisted local police with investigating the murder and it now assisted with the prosecution. The four suspects were tried without a jury before Chief Judge Hefner, a judge from the Commonwealth of the Marianas, and two *láy* judges appointed by President Salii to sit on homicide cases (the usual Palauan practice). The case was dropped initially because of insufficient evidence, but later reopened. In December, 1985, the London bank

responsible for the Government loan sued Palau for \$35 million, and IPSECO declared bankruptcy.

In the midst of growing political and financial crisis another version of the Compact - this time called the 'Improved Compact' - was signed by negotiators in Washington on January 10, 1986. In it, the U.S. agreed not to test, store or dispose of nuclear weapons in Palau, but left open the possibility of transit rights. Other aspects of the 'Defense and Security Relationship' section remained unchanged. At a plebescite held on February 21, 1986, 72 percent of Palau's voters voted in favour of the revised Compact. President Sallii declared it approved and the U.S. Congress began the ratification process. Ambassador Zeder said his country was "honored at this solid and unequivocal statement by the Palau people." The President of the Palauan House of Delegates, however, notified the U.N. Trusteeship Council that the Compact of Free Association was not approved because it received only 72 percent support in the referendum, less than the required 75 percent. In May, High Chief Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons filed a suit in the Supreme Court of Palau, charging that the Compact approval was not valid because it did not receive the approval of three-quarters of the population, because several parts of the agreement were unconstitutional, and because the referendum process was defective.

In March, 1986 three of the four youths charged with the assassination of President Remelink were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.⁸ On July 10, 1986 Justice Robert Warren Gibson found in favour of the High Chief's legal challenge, and invalidated the Compact approval on the 75 percent issue. President Sallii immediately challenged the ruling. On September 17, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Palau declared unanimously that the Constitution invalidated the current version of the CFA as it failed to receive 75 percent approval, and the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons was insufficient guarantee that the Constitution would not be violated. The Court also ruled that the CFA's provisions on eminent domain seizure of Palauan land for U.S.

⁸ The verdict was overturned in September, 1988 after the Palauan Court of Appeals found the evidence against the prisoners "inherently incredible". The murder remains unsolved

military use were unconstitutional, but that the CFA could not be invalidated on this basis until an actual seizure was attempted.

Country in Crisis

Palau's financial situation was now desperate. Another plebescite on the same version of the Compact, this time called the 'New Improved Compact', was set for December 2, 1986. In a letter to the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Territorial and International Affairs dated October 22, 1986, President Salii said that the Government was preparing its educational program and election materials for the plebescite, and requested \$400,000 to defray expenses. The following is the reply of the Assistant Secretary:

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of October 22, 1986 ... I am very pleased that the U.S. Congress enacted the Compact before adjournment. That action removes a major obstacle to full implementation of the Compact. I hope that your planned plebescite will remove the last obstacle.

The Department of the Interior does not have available discretionary funding to pay for political education and other election costs associated with the plebescite. The best and most expeditious help that we can offer is to advance operations funding through the Trust Territory Government. We are willing to advance up to \$250,000 in addition to the normal November allotment for government operations.

If the plebescite is successful, there would be no significant adverse impact on Palau since I believe we could safely assume that the Compact would be implemented during fiscal year 1987. If for some reason the plebescite is not successful and the Compact cannot be implemented, Palau would still have nearly ten months remaining in the fiscal year to reduce government expenditures or obtain additional revenues to cover any operational shortfall.

I sincerely hope that the referendum is successful and Palau can move forward towards its new political status.⁹

Of the money obtained, \$275,000 was slated for voter education and \$100,000 for the conduct of the election. President Salii sent the following memo, headed "Approval of Compact as Priority Program", to all Government departments:

⁹ Letter signed by Richard T. Montoya, Assistant Secretary Territorial and International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior. Copy sent Dec. 23, 1986 to Prof. Roger Clark (Rutgers University, School of Law, Camden, N.J.) in response to freedom of information request.

Since the approval of the Compact of Free Association with United States of America is the top priority program of the Executive Branch of our National Government, it is expected of all personnel to vigorously campaign for the Compact in order that 75 percent approval on the December 2 referendum be obtained. Any personnel ... who chooses to campaign otherwise shall be reported to me at once. If any such personnel uses materials, equipments, or the likes that are properties of the National Government to campaign against the Compact, I request that the matter be brought to my attention immediately. It is no longer tolerable for civil service employees to oppose the system while remaining in it and enjoying all benefits due dedicated employees.

The education campaign began. A memo to the Office of Education directed that all schools be closed and that "all public school teachers shall go on administration leave to campaign for the Compact of Free Association with the United States." Students were directed "to wear their school uniform" and attend a Government rally. A similar rally was held for public-service employees. Two high-school bands were flown to Hawai'i to take part in 'yes' rallies there. The Government funded parties, transportation and campaign expenses in Palau's 16 states, and officials visited Guam, Saipan, Yap, Ponape, the Marshall Islands, Hawai'i and the United States to convince Palau's absentee voters to support the Compact. The pro-Constitution groups also embarked on an education campaign, using their own funds and donations from anti-nuclear groups in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. A letter from the 'People's Committee for Belau Constitution and Compact Improvements' signed by High Chief Ibedul Yutaka M. Gibbons, Rebes [Rep.] Alfonso Oiterong, Senator Isidoro Rudimch and the Speaker of the House, Santos Olikong, was sent to government employees. It stated:

We know that many of you are afraid to voice your opinion or question regarding the upcoming referendum on the Compact of Free Association. We are also aware that there are many reasons for your fear and reluctance to publicly express your concerns. We are in complete sympathy with all of you and offer our sympathy and assistance in the struggle to rid our government of this unethical and unhealthy atmosphere.

President Salii had not requested a U.N. observation team, and the United States was calling the plebescite "an internal Palauan matter". There were rumors, too, that despite the lack of official U.N. approval the trusteeship had been terminated by President

Reagan's November 3 proclamation and that the Trusteeship Council no longer existed. As the date of the plebescite drew near, Constitution supporters organized an international team of independent observers to come to Palau and scrutinize the referendum process. The team included a Danish member of the European Parliament, a law professor and two lawyers from the United States, a Canadian Q.C.¹⁰ and the Executive Director of the Australian Minority Rights' Group. The team arrived four days before voting day and immediately began reviewing the referendum process. Two days before the plebescite, in response to a last-minute request from the Palauan Senate, the U.N. Trusteeship Council sent a team of observers comprised of representatives from France (the Chair), Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the U.K., four U.N. staff people and three U.S. Escort Officers. In the limited time available, the delegation organized a public hearing on the campaign process and then with the independent observers scrutinized the polling process and the counting procedures.

The following question, printed in both English and Palauan, appeared on the ballot form:

DO YOU APPROVE FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AS SET FORTH IN THE COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION SIGNED ON JANUARY 10, 1986, INCLUSIVE OF ITS SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENTS AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS EXPRESSLY APPROVING THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPACT INCLUDING ITS SECTION 324 WHEREBY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN CARRYING OUT ITS SECURITY AND DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION HAS THE RIGHT TO OPERATE NUCLEAR CAPABLE AND NUCLEAR PROPELLED VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF PALAU?

The result of the poll was 66.7 percent approval for the Compact; once again less than the required 75 percent (and less than the February vote).

President Salii broadcast a radio and television message acknowledging the non-approval of the Compact, and warning of the grave economic consequences for Palau of

¹⁰ 'Queen's Counsel' (or King's Counsel), a status in the British legal system between barrister and judge.

this decision. Before leaving Palau, the team of independent observers communicated to the Government and the U.N. delegation a list of concerns about the conduct of the plebescite. They cited such things as improper pressure on government employees and unfair use of resources in the pre-referendum period, missing, damaged or unsecured ballot boxes on polling day, lack of security arrangements for the transport of ballot boxes from the U.S. to Palau and sudden arbitrary changes in the counting procedures. President Saliu charged the international observers with interference in the internal affairs of the state, and threatened the two members still in Palau with expulsion.¹¹

Shortly afterwards, a letter signed by 69 Members of the European Parliament went to the U.N. Security Council. The letter stated that the Parliament had been informed of the numerous forms of coercion and the many irregularities which had taken place during the referendum process. "It did not escape our notice" said the signatories,

... that enormous economic pressure was put on the people of Palau to make them accept the Compact. One instance of this was the publication by the United States Administration, two days before the referendum, of information to the effect that if the people of Palau failed to approve the Compact there would be no renegotiation. This was presented to the people as a serious economic threat, creating a "take it or leave it" situation in which Palau either accepted an unsatisfactory Compact or lost the billion dollars in the Compact.

The letter urged the U.N. Security Council to take its oversight responsibilities seriously, to investigate the matter of the U.S. referendum-expense money and to delay the termination of the Trusteeship for the whole territory to avoid pressure being put on Palau. The letter also requested the Council "to take responsibility for ensuring that negotiations are carried out leading to a satisfactory Compact;" one which would be in accordance both with the Palauan Constitution and the U.N. standards and resolutions on decolonization, including "the right unilaterally to terminate the Freely Associated Status (FAS)" and "to establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and archipelagic base-lines."

¹¹ Press statement transmitted from Palau, Dec. 5, 1986 by David Wright, Q.C. of Toronto on behalf of Wright and Else Hammerich, a Danish member of the European Parliament.

The Referendum and Amendments of 1987-88

By 1987, Palau was deeply in debt. As well as the now \$40-plus million IPSECO debt, the President had borrowed \$400 million from two New York financiers, using as collateral the anticipated Compact funds. President Saliu announced that the failure of the referendum meant there were insufficient funds to run the country. Officials in some of Palau's 16 states filed lawsuits against the Saliu Administration, charging corruption and misuse or mismanagement of funds. The Reagan Administration informed the Palauan Government that the terms of the Compact would not be renegotiated. Overriding the objections of the House of Delegates, the President - who is responsible for the treasury, media, police, power and communications - issued an Executive Order for another referendum on the same Compact to be held in mid-1987.

In the months leading up to the plebescite the water supply was limited to four hours a day, electrical power was cut off at night, social services were cut and constraints placed on political discussions on radio and television. Public service employees were laid off, and the President asked government workers to voluntarily work one day a week without pay. Those consenting to the scheme would be compensated for the unpaid hours when funds became available. On June 27, he prepared emergency legislation for the sacking of 900 of the 1,300 government employees; about half the work-force of Palau. In response to a request from the House of Delegates, Women Elders and Chiefs an international delegation again came to monitor the referendum process. On June 30th, the same question was put to the people. Once again, it failed to gain the approval of three-quarters of Palau's voters.

President Saliu signed the emergency legislation. The Government, he said, was "going broke". On July 7, sacked government workers set up camp outside the Congress, claiming that those opposing the Compact were responsible for the financial crisis. Some members of the Cabinet joined the protestors, who were threatening to "turn Palau into hell" unless funding was found. Violence erupted. Tyres were slashed, houses of anti-Compact activists were threatened with fire-bombings, death-notes circulated and weapons appeared in the streets. In Washington, the Congressional Sub-committee on Insular and

International Affairs convened an urgent meeting to hear testimony on the events in Palau. The Inspector-General of the Department of the Interior revealed that the Accounting Office had found 87 instances of financial mismanagement by the Salii Government, and that investigations were underway concerning commissions and kick-backs received by Carlos Salii in the IPSECO and loan deals. The Chair of the Sub-Committee, Rep. Ron DeLugo, accused the Department of the Interior of having "given up on correcting the problems."

In Palau, President Salii announced his intention of holding yet another referendum; this time not on the Compact but on an amendment to the 75 percent majority clause in the Constitution. If the change to a simple majority received approval in three-quarters of Palau's 16 states, a referendum on the Compact would follow immediately. Nine of the 16 Congressional members voted for the legislation, two voted against it and five were absent. On August 4, 73 percent of Palauan voters declared in favour of the amendment. High Chief Ibedul Gibbons immediately filed a challenge to its validity, alleging that the required 75 percent vote on the legislation in the Lower House had not been met (9-2 in favour and 5 absent), and that the Constitution requires that any change to the nuclear-free clauses must take place in a referendum at the time of a general election (then scheduled for November, 1988).

The Palauan Supreme Court placed an injunction on the Compact referendum until the challenge to the August 4 amendment was decided, but the day before the scheduled referendum Chief Justice Nakamura reversed the decision, stating that it was in everyone's interests for the matter to be resolved quickly. On August 21, 73 percent of Palauns voted to approve the Compact. While supporters and opponents waited for the Court's decision on the amendment (which if upheld would have rendered the Compact's approval invalid) the case was settled out of court on the understanding that President Salii would not allow the ceding of any lands to the United States without the approval of the Council of Chiefs. It seemed that the long battle between supporters of the Constitution and the Compact was finally over.

Not so. Compact opponents argued that the agreement between President Saliu and Chief Gibbons was merely a private undertaking between two individuals, and could be overturned at any time with no possibility of legal action. On August 31, fifty Palauan Women Elders (one of them the sister of the High Chief) walked through the streets of Koror to the Court to refile the Gibbons' suit. "We must protect our Constitution and our land," they said. "It is the only place on earth we can express our 'Palau-ness'. We are not concerned with elections and political parties; we have nothing to lose but Palau."¹² Citing threats to himself and his family, Chief Justice Nakamura excused himself from judging the lawsuit and was replaced by the Chief Justice of the Marianas, Judge Robert Hefner.

The suit was scheduled for hearing on September 8, 1987 and there were public and private warnings of violence if it was not withdrawn. Roman Bedor, a U.S. trained lawyer and a prominent Constitution activist, received death-threats to himself and his family and threats to fire-bomb his office, a major venue for pro-Constitution meetings. The house of Gabriela Ngirmang, one of the Women Elders, was fire-bombed and the local men's club, *Bai Ramtal*, burnt down the same night. On the night before the hearing, the father of Roman Bedor visited his son's office to check the security. A car drove by and under cover of the blackout shots were fired at the figure inside the building. Roman Bedor died the next morning. The women withdrew the lawsuit. Judge Hefner accepted the withdrawal but wrote .."in light of the circumstances of this case, the Court would be remiss if it did not add a footnote to the matter." The footnote stated that there were indications that the dismissal was brought about by intimidation through violence, and that should any of the plaintiffs later wish to have the action reinstated they might file the appropriate proceedings.¹³

In mid-December, the President and Chief Ibedul Gibbons went to Washington to inform Congress that all the necessary requirements for the Compact had been met. President Saliu urged early approval, stating that Palau would run out of money by April if

¹² *Pacific News Bulletin*, Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC), Australia. Vol. 2, No. 4, Sept.-Oct. 1987, p.2.

¹³ *Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas*. Status Report, February, 1988, pp.33-34.

implementation of the agreement were delayed. At the same time, a delegation of Palauan women went to Washington to testify at a Senate Hearing on the Compact. Of the 19 senators on the Committee, one came to receive their presentation. Gabriela Ngirmang wrote the testimony which began with the following statement:

We came here because the women feel that our interests are not being satisfactorily protected, and out of concern for the Palauan citizens. ... Despite much public relations and efforts to sell the Compact, we clearly understand that the implementation of the Compact gives the United States the right to conduct military operations on as much as one-third of our land - forever. We see that the Compact says military rights may end in fifty years if *mutually* agreed. This means, we understand, that if the United States wishes to continue its control of our land it need only say so, and this will go on forever. This is unacceptable.¹⁴

Despite the inauspicious beginning, the women's presentation and presence did succeed in gaining assurances from the U.S. Congress and the Palauan Government of police protection in the event of taking legal action. On March 31, 1988 the women refiled their lawsuit in Palau. Acting for the women, Attorney Anne Simon of the New York Center for Constitutional Rights claimed that the August 4 referendum was not conducted in accordance with the Constitution. President Salii's lawyers argued that the case had already been dealt with when the case of Merep vs. Salii was dismissed after an out-of-court settlement, and that an inconsistency between the Constitution and the Compact created the grounds for the August referenda. On April 23, Judge Robert Hefner found in favor of the plaintiffs. He ruled that the procedures for the August 4 vote were not constitutionally valid as the legislation to set up the referendum had to be ratified by a three-quarter vote in both Houses of the Palauan Congress. Thus both the referenda votes of August, 1987 were rendered "null, void and of no effect." The Government immediately lodged an appeal with the Palauan Supreme Court against Judge Hefner's ruling.

In mid-April, members of the International Commission of Jurists, an organization "primarily concerned with the establishment of Rule of Law coupled with an independent judiciary as an indispensable ingredient in the cause of human freedom" released a 60-page

¹⁴ Quoted in *Pacific News Bulletin*. Vol. 3, No. 2, April/May 1988, p.3.

document based on their mission to Palau in January, 1988. The jurists claimed that "there existed a virtual breakdown of the Rule of Law" in Palau from July to September, 1987 and pointed to "the plainly criminal acts" which led to "a climate of fear and intimidation originating from certain segments of Palauan society" which in turn "inhibited and in some instances prohibited citizen's rights to legal redress." The report accused the Government of complicity. The OEK Session of July was said to have been "held in a climate of near hysteria", and the Palauan Bar Association (headed by Carlos Salii) "failed in its duty to maintain the Rule of Law when it knew, or should have known, that judges, lawyers and litigants were being threatened in their professional capacity."¹⁵

During the May 1988 meeting of the U.N. Trusteeship Council, several Palauans (including the Speaker of the House of Delegates) and representatives from support groups in other countries gave public testimony. Witnesses urged the Council to take its oversight responsibilities in Palau seriously, and asked that the Trusteeship not be terminated until Palau is provided with more options for its future political status than the "Compact or nothing" choice so far presented. The Trusteeship Council, however, proceeded to approve the Compact, although the Soviet Union voted against the motion. Any points of contention, declared the Council, should be 'ironed out' between the United States and Palau. In late April, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved the Compact as part of a larger piece of legislation. The Sub-committee on House Foreign Affairs Asia/Pacific Subcommittee approved it, and passed it on to the full Foreign Affairs Committee for final approval. (Sub-committee Chair, Rep. Stephen Solarz, did not note Judge Hefner's ruling the previous week against the validity of the August referendum). Nevertheless, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, chaired by Rep. Ron DeLugo, refused to act on the Compact until it had been constitutionally approved in Palau and requested the Department of Interior to fund an additional \$3.5 million for Palau in the coming year to avoid lay-offs of government workers. The Committee also asked the Department to study allegations of bribery, corruption, drug abuse, drug trafficking and counterfeiting in Palau.

¹⁵ Quoted in *Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas*. Honolulu, Hawai'i, August, 1988, p. 11.

In mid-June, 1988, Rep. Ron DeLugo drafted an enabling Bill to deal with these concerns. It was accepted by President Sali (although he later changed his mind) and the Compact negotiators in Hawai'i, and introduced to the U.S. Congress on June 23. The Bill increased funding by some \$24 million for capital expenditure and for drug abuse and education programs, as well as authorizing a loan from the U.S. Federal Financing Bank to pay off the now \$43 million IPSECO debt. The Bill did not address the issue of land rights, eminent domain and nuclear-free policies, but required that the Compact must be approved constitutionally in Palau, either with a 75 percent vote or after the passing of a Constitutional amendment.

On August 20, 1988 Lazarus Sali committed suicide at his home and Vice President Thomas Remengesau was sworn in as President until the November 1988 elections. One week later, the Supreme Court gave its long-awaited decision on the Government's appeal. The panel of three judges upheld Judge Hefner's ruling on the invalidity of the legislation providing for Constitutional amendment, thereby nullifying the approval of the Compact in the subsequent referendum and preventing the termination of the U.S. trusteeship in Palau (though not in the Federated States of Micronesia or the Republic of the Marshall Islands). Seven candidates stood for the office of president; approximately half being for and half against approval of the Compact in its present form. Victory went to Compact supporter Ngiratkel Etpison, who defeated a pro-Constitution candidate by 39 votes. The latter called for a recount on the grounds of improper procedures, but the request was not upheld.

Nevertheless, the electoral reshuffle and the prospect of the DeLugo Bill had strengthened the pro-Constitution platform. In January, 1989 the newly-formed Congress created a 20-member Political Status Commission to explore options for Palau's future and renegotiate the Compact, informing them that "any proposal to accommodate changes by effecting amendments to the Palau Constitution will not be considered." The following month U.S. representatives met with Palauan representatives in Guam, and agreed to add some financial subsidiaries to the Compact. No changes were made to the military provisions. Under the new agreement, the United States will pay \$5.5 million for military access to the land (about 2 cents per square meter compared to the local rate of \$165) and a

total 15-year payment of around \$500 million (which critics say will leave the country bankrupt a few years after payment ceases).

On June 27, the U.S. Congress passed all the necessary legislation for approval of the Compact. The Palauan House of Delegates passed legislation for a July referendum on the 'Guam Compact', and the date was set for February 6, 1990. It would be Palau's seventh referendum on the Compact. *Ta Belau*, a new political party comprised mainly of furloughed government workers, began circulating a petition to amend the Constitutional requirement for Compact approval to a simple majority. After a three-day meeting of Palau's political leaders in January 1990, however, it was announced that no amendment to the Constitution would be considered at this time. It was also announced that, "In the unlikely event that the Compact fails to obtain the 75 percent approval in the February 6 referendum, it is the declared intention of this conference of Joint Leadership to consider ammendment of the Palaun Constitution to allow Compact approval by a simple majority vote."¹⁶ The campaign was dropped.

On February 6, 65.7 of Palau's voters - less than on previous occasions - went to the polls. The result was 'Yes' 59.8 percent, the lowest yet recorded, and 'No', 40.2 percent, the highest. President Etpison issued a press release stating that "the voters of Palau clearly indicated that the 75 percent vote requirement for the approval of the Compact was not possible at this time." The statement also said: "It became very clear in this referendum, as was also the case in the six previous referendums, that the majority of the people of Palau still favour and support the status of free association with the United States." The President requested the OEK to convene in February "to assess the situation and to come up with the necessary legislation to resolve Palau's future status."¹⁷ By March, President Etpison had secured the vote of 12 of Palau's 16 members of the House of Delegates for a motion to change the Constitution requirement from 75 percent to a simple majority. While this, if successful, would almost certainly assure the Compact's acceptance, the amendment must first be approved by a 75 percent majority in the Senate

¹⁶ *Pacific News Bulletin*. Vol. 5, No. 2, February, 1990, p.3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

and by a majority of the voters in Palau's 16 states.

The Chair of the Palauan Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs has claimed that 75 percent of the current senators will not vote in favour of the amendment, and a citizens' group called 'Citizens for Belau Integrity' has formed and launched a campaign calling for a three-year moratorium on efforts to resolve the future political status of Palau. Members of the group (many of them traditional women leaders who carried out house-to house visiting before the last plebescite) have begun collecting signatures for a petition to the Palauan and U.S. Governments, and the U.N. Trusteeship Council. The petition states that "the time has come for the governments of Belau, the United States and the Trusteeship Council to put the political status issue to rest for a time while we attempt to address the problems that are crippling the credibility and capability of our government.... Belauans need an opportunity to rationally consider the alternatives in a relaxed and non-coercive manner."¹⁸

In a Radio Australia interview in March, 1990 the pro-Constitution lawyer Roman Bedor called on Australia and New Zealand to mount a fact-finding mission to Palau. He said that as a member of the Political Status Commission he was involved in the negotiations which led to the Guam Compact, and when the Palauan negotiating team objected to some of the Compact provisions, the United States had pushed the enabling legislation through Congress, thus closing off any opportunities for further negotiation and amendment. Bedor described the Compact as a modern-day annexation, and said the United States had failed to live up to its obligation to see that Palauans had a free choice in deciding their future. It was now up to other Pacific nations to take action on the issue.

And at this point of the story it becomes necessary to bring to an end this long though still incomplete odyssey of a would-be nuclear free nation, and bid farewell and *bon voyage* to the beautiful land of Palau.

¹⁸ Quoted in *Pacific News Bulletin*, Vol. 5 No. 3, March, 1990, p.5.

Analysis and Conclusions

If the "what? who? how? why?" questions described in the opening chapter are asked about the conflicts and struggles described in the Marshall Islands and Palau, what might the answers be like? My suggestions are below.

What are the Conflicts/Struggles About?

While the conflicts in the Marshall Islands are nuclear-related, they are not anti-nuclear. Neither is Palau's struggle to save the nuclear-free clauses of its Constitution at base an anti-nuclear struggle; rather, it is a struggle for political autonomy and control over territory. If the criteria of what constitutes a social movement listed in Chapter One are followed the actions of the Marshall Islanders come into the category of 'conflict-based collective actions' while the pro-Constitution battle in Palau must be defined as a 'social movement.' The Marshallese were seeking increased compensation and better conditions and treatment within a prescribed political and economic structure; they were not challenging the structure as such, nor competing with a rival group for the same goal. Only when the Kwajalein landowners re-occupied their islands could this be said to be the case, and at these times they did engage in "behaviour which transgresses the norms that have been institutionalized in social roles;" one of Alberto Manuchi's criteria for a social movement.

The battles, however, were not over land-use but over the value of the land to the users. The 'sail-ins' were not attempts to take permanent control of the occupied islands but symbolic acts aimed at focusing attention on the issue, applying pressure on the military for increased compensation by getting in the way of testing activities, and perhaps relieving feelings of frustration or powerlessness. By contrast, the battle for sovereignty and control in Palau symbolized by the nuclear-free clauses of the Constitution is in every sense a social movement. A dominated and relatively powerless group is resisting the managers of "the great apparatuses of social production" and competing for control of the "production of historicity." The antagonists have entered into conflict "because they share the same cultural field, have the same cultural models" and are competing for the same prize, that is, control of territory. The pro-Compact activists of Palau are engaging in conflict-based

collective actions against those whom they perceive as obstructing their interests or creating financial hardship through refusing to accept the political and economic realities of Palau's situation.

Who is Involved?

The drama being played out in Palau and the Marshall Islands is happening on a world stage with a world-wide cast of players drawn from all levels of power and influence; truly a phenomenon of the new global culture. The actors and institutions involved include the indigeneous people and their governments, the U.S. and Micronesian legal systems, the U.S. Administration and civil and military Departments, the U.S. Congress and its committees and sub-committees, the U.N. and its committees, the European Parliament,¹⁹ the International Commission of Jurists, scientists, professionals, academics and activists from several countries in the Pacific region and beyond. Palau has become a *cause celebre* for the global peace movement; a symbol of the whole David and Goliath anti-nuclear struggle *par excellence* (although perhaps the more apt image is of a gnat and a rhinoceros). All around the world there are people watching and commenting on the struggle of some Palauans to retain the nuclear-free clauses of the Constitution. The *Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific* movement, for instance, carries a regular column headed "Belauan Update" in its monthly newsletter, as does *Ports Watch*, a publication of the Norwegian branch of the North Atlantic Network of the Disarm the Seas Campaign.

How is/was the battle fought?

In both the Marshall Islands and Palau, the groups resisting 'Goliath' have operated almost entirely within the domestic and international political and legal institutions in fighting their battles. With the exception of the 'sail-in' periods at Kwajalein, there have been no demonstrations, no violations of the law. While Micronesians have a certain sophistication in legal matters - one result of their long history of Western colonialism - the

¹⁹ The European Parliament seems to lean towards the left. It has been noted that voters seem much more inclined to elect radical or reformist candidates to this Parliament than to their own national parliaments. The Green Party in the U.K., for instance, received 16 percent of the vote at the 1989 European parliamentary election, but only 2 percent of the vote at a national election.

large number of lawsuits and appeals initiated by the Islanders suggests a considerable amount of professional assistance and financial support from overseas. U.S. and Canadian lawyers and citizens appear to have been particularly active in this respect. Apart from recourse to law and rules of political procedure, bringing domestic and international pressure on U.S. law-makers by raising public awareness and sympathy for their cause is virtually the only weapon the pro-Constitution movement has in seeking renegotiation of the Compact. Nevertheless, while the situation in Palau features prominently in peace movement publications, Western supporters have had little success in capturing the interest of the mainstream media in any country. This may be changing. Two long articles on events in Micronesia, for instance, have appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* in the first two months of this decade. One, already noted, is mainly about the garbage issue but it is also a critical account of the history of American trusteeship and the current situation in the islands. The second, "Island Women Succeed in Thwarting America's Residual Cold War Plans," is a report on the February 6 referendum in Palau by the editor of the *Nation* and is highly critical of U.S. past and present actions.²⁰

Why This Outcome?

In both the Marshall Islands and Palau the outcome of the struggles seems inevitable. The Kwajalein Missile Range is defined as "vital" to U.S. security interests and the SDI program has now expanded to other islands of the atoll. Palau is part of the Pentagon's planned fall-back position if the bases in the Philippines should become unavailable - not a remote possibility given the degree of anti-nuclear/anti-U.S. sentiment in that country, and the nuclear-free zone actions in the Senate. The winding-down of the Cold War in Europe, too, is likely to increase rather than lessen U.S. military activities in the Pacific-Asia region. Armies and Navies must go somewhere and do something if they are to be maintained. Given the dominance of security issues and strategic interests in all U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that the trustee is attempting, as Stewart Firth puts it, to stay on in Micronesia while giving the appearance of leaving (Firth, 1986b). It is ironic that the Soviet Union, the only Trusteeship Council member to voice a protest against the happenings in Palau, was in the paradoxical position of having to register this protest by

²⁰ *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1990, p.M2.

voting *against* the process of decolonization.

With respect to conditions on Ebeye, Stewart Firth argues that, "[h]ad the people not taken the initiative, little would have been done. The history of the U.S. Army at Kwajalein suggests that it responds only to direct political pressure applied in Washington" (Firth, 1986b: 21). While this may or may not be the case, one could hardly expect otherwise. As an Army Command officer told a U.S. resident physician at the KMR base hospital, "the sole purpose of the Army at Kwajalein is to test missile systems. ... [Ebeye] is not of any importance to their [*sic*] being at Kwajalein."²¹ Ebeye, it seems, has fallen between two political stools. While properly the responsibility of the Department of the Interior the close association with KMR has meant that civil officials regard Ebeye as the responsibility of the Army, and the Defense Department has been the chief negotiator with the Kwajalein landowners. Neither is it surprising that the Administration has taken steps to abort the possibility of successful litigation by Marshallese radiation victims as this would have opened even further the Pandora's Box of compensation to U.S. veterans and other claimants. The settlement which puts an end to all past, present and future claims by Marshall Islanders does not extend to those born after the bomb-tests, or to islanders living outside the affected zone. Yet studies by independent scientists are revealing that the impact of *Bravo* was far more widespread than hitherto recognized. So far the Department of Energy has monitored only the northern islands, but the Marshall Island's Government has recently commissioned an independent radiological survey of the entire territory in order to advise the Claims tribunal and the Government on radiation matters and the compensation claims of individuals.

Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1980) argues that the interests of elites in former colonies or Third World countries are linked with the elites of the metropole or the developed countries, rather than with their own people or the governments of other Third World countries. This seems to be the case in Micronesia, although less so in the case of Palau, where opposition to the military terms of the Compact has included political leaders. The

²¹ Statement by Dr. Konrad Kotrady during a 1976 U.S. Congressional Committee Investigation of conditions on Ebeye.

major resistance, however, has come from traditional leaders who are outside or marginal to the dominant power structures, and women seem to be taking over the battle from men. Nevertheless, there are limits to resistance. The Government is deeply in debt and dependent on the United States for approximately 90 percent of its annual budget. The infrastructure is fragile or decaying, and services are at a minimum. Although relatively rich in resources compared to other Pacific states, Palau lacks a productive sector. A net exporter of food under the Japanese occupation, the country is now a net importer. In short, there seems no way Palau can 'go it alone'.

For a time it seemed to pro-Constitution Palauans and their supporters that Rep. Ron DeLugo was on their side, but while his Bill has given the Palauans a breathing space and some cash in the coffers it does nothing to change the military terms of the agreement. Both he and his Committee appear committed to U.S. strategic interests and to the rapid implementation of the Compact. With very little pressure being applied in Washington or the United Nations, the Administration and the Pentagon will almost certainly maintain the 'take it or leave it' posture and simply wait it out. Palau is in the Catch-22 position of being unable to put its case directly to the United Nations until it is an independent state, but obtaining independence means accepting the terms of the Compact which its opponents see as virtually ending autonomy. Until such time as the trusteeship is terminated, Palau must work only through the Trusteeship Council which so far has ignored the possibility of any option for Palau's future other than acceptance of the existing Compact. While the United States has given assurances that it will not exercise more of its military rights than necessary, this does not seem to have reassured the pro-Constitution supporters who are calling for a full review of alternatives for self-determination.

Given U.S. intransigence and Palau's economic and social problems, there seems to be no option for the Palauan Government other than acceptance of the Guam Agreement. It is unlikely that another country will offer an alternative form of relationship. The Soviet Union is on the side of Palau, but the Pacific is still the American Lake and this is no time for confrontation. Neither would this relationship be desired by Palauans. China is both indifferent and poor. New Zealand is also poor and while sympathetic, its obligations are

to its own freely-associated territories in the South Pacific. Japan would not risk offending its major ally and any action that resembles a move in the direction of rebuilding the empire would cause alarm throughout the region, something Japan is anxious to avoid. Even if sympathetic (and silence has reigned), Australia perceives its interests as aligned with those of the United States. The Radio Australia appeal of Roman Bedor is unlikely to gain an official response. There is one new factor which may work to Palau's advantage in resisting military use of the land and water. In August 1989, Palau's offshore reef ecosystem was selected as one of the Seven Underwater Wonders of the World by a panel of judges under the auspices of the Conservation Education Diving Archaeology Museums. The award referred to Palau's unique biological diversity and variety of habitat including coral reefs, marine lakes and caves, mangrove swamps, sea-grass beds and sand flats. In Malakia Harbour alone, biologists have identified 153 hard coral species, more than twice the number found in the entire Caribbean region. Whether this development will have an impact on the situation remains to be seen.

A Palauan Congressman stated in 1989:

... We need a moratorium on the Compact so that we can have the chance to work to unite people and restore internal peace which has been destroyed because of the issue of Compact implementation. Palau should be given a chance to reconcile and think of its future destiny without being influenced by outside actions or the promise of more money; a chance to decide our future status with dignity and preserve our cultural integrity as a truly free people.

That chance is unlikely; the end of the world's first Nuclear Free Constitution seems at hand. What is surprising is how long the resistance has lasted. The image of the villain waiting in the wings and twirling his moustaches is irresistible, but no-one is on the way to rescue the beautiful maiden. If melodrama has an unhappy ending does it then become tragedy? And does this one fit the Aristotelian definition of a good man gone wrong?

CHAPTER 4

SEA-BORNE NUCLEARISM

If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well deterrence is less likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the Navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets.

- Admiral James Watkins (Retd.), 1985

[T]here are good reasons for believing that the first use of nuclear weapons could take place at sea, and for concern that the escalation dynamics of nuclear warfare in this theatre are far less constrained than those which would attend nuclear operations on land.

- Desmond Ball, *Nuclear War at Sea*, 1985

It will be U.S. Policy that a nuclear war beginning with Soviet nuclear attacks at sea will not necessarily remain limited to the sea.

Department of Defense Guidance, FY 1987-88

Nuclear Navies

At sea there are no boundaries. In the words of Admiral Carlisle Tröst, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, "... the Navy operates in international waters where no government's permission to base and fly aircraft is required and where U.S. ships, in a perfectly legal way, can signal menace to any potential troublemaker" (quoted Greenpeace, 1987: 2). Satellites, surveillance stations, ships and aircraft continuously monitor weather conditions and the activities of the enemy, linked by an infrastructure of command, control and communications systems and intelligence activities (C³I). Supply depots, weapons stations, testing ranges, port facilities and naval exercises prepare the global naval forces for combat, and warships call at ports throughout the world for replenishment, R&R or demonstrations of alliance solidarity. Out of the world arsenal of around 50,000 nuclear warheads, approximately one-third are for deployment at sea. Four nuclear states store and deploy over 10,000 nuclear weapons beyond their immediate boundaries and operate military facilities in 65 foreign countries and territories (the U.S. in 41, the S.U. in 11,

Britain in 12 and France in 9). Outside of central Europe, most of these weapons and facilities are for naval purposes. Seaborne nuclearism is not confined to weapons: almost one-third of the world's nuclear-power reactors are used to propel the navies of the nuclear states across or under the seas (see Appendix 3:3)

The naval arms race reached its peak in 1986. At the end of 1987, the U.S. Navy possessed approximately 55 percent of the total naval nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Navy approximately 36 percent and the naval arsenals of the other nuclear states had the rest (see Appendix 3:1). Over 1,100 ships and submarines and nearly 3,200 naval aircraft were equipped to deliver or transport nuclear weapons and just under half of the sea-based platforms were submarines - ballistic missile, cruise-missile and attack. The remainder are surface ships: cruisers, destroyers, frigates and patrol combatants. Virtually all of the Soviet Union's principal warships and about 70 percent of U.S. Navy vessels were nuclear-capable at this time (see Appendix 3:2).¹ The weapons varied from short-range torpedoes and depth-bombs to long-range missiles, with explosive yields varying from one to 1,000 kilotons (or one megaton).²

Until the late 1980's (when the proportion increased) about 60 percent of all naval nuclear weapons were strategic weapons: the submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBMs) designed to penetrate into the home-land of the enemy. The remainder comprised non-strategic or tactical (short-range) weapons designed for ocean combat or for striking land targets from sea. Except for about 100 aircraft bombs, all naval tactical weapons are in the arsenals of the superpowers. Both navies have deployed several different types of dual-capable systems (weapons that can be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads), and most sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are dual-capable. These small, pilotless, single-warhead guided missiles fly at subsonic speeds within the

¹ A ship designated as nuclear-capable is fitted with special launching systems but most surface ships are capable of carrying a small nuclear bomb.

² Major data sources for the above are: Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 1980-1987." *Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: a Complete Inventory*. Neptune Papers 2, May, 1988 (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.) and "Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 87-2." *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June, 1987.

atmosphere and can be used for both ocean combat and for striking targets on land. Their small size and ability to hug the terrain makes detection by radar difficult and because distinguishing between nuclear and conventional warheads requires intrusive methods of verification SLCMs pose a particular problem for arms controllers.

Naval Arms Control

While naval nuclear weapons constitute a third of the world arsenal and have been the fastest growing sector, the only naval weapons so far covered by arms control agreements (in SALT 1 and SALT 11) are submarine-launched ballistic missiles and these provisions which set a ceiling on numbers have now been abandoned.³ Until the late 1980's, no other category of naval weapons had ever featured in arms control discussions. Verification problems with respect to dual-capable systems has been and continues to be the major reason given for the exclusion of all non-strategic naval nuclear weapons from arms control considerations, but the secrecy surrounding weapons on ships and public ignorance of or indifference to the arms race at sea is a contributing factor. As the little rhyme says, "Put the weapons out to sea; Far, far away from me." Out of sight means - or so it would seem - out of mind, although nuclear-ships and naval weapons are a central issue for many anti-nuclear activists.

The silence surrounding tactical naval nuclear weapons at the conference tables of Geneva was broken in the late 1980's when Soviet delegates began offering proposals for bilateral and multilateral naval cutbacks - including the joint dismantling of the naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay and the U.S. Navy base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. With respect to the thorny issue of dual-capable SLCMs, the proposal is that inspectors from each country observe the final assembly of all the missiles and place tamper-proof seals on the warhead compartment of those armed with conventional explosives. In challenge inspections at a later date the seals would be checked to ensure that none of the conventionally-armed

³ Although the nuclear-tipped, ground-launched cruise missile in Europe is banned by the INF Treaty, it is still permitted on aircraft, submarine and ships. The Navy is currently considering ways to more than double the cruise missile's range and improve its accuracy as a conventional weapon. See, for instance, "After INF, the next new arms race". *U.S. News and World Report*, May 9, 1988; pp.26-31.

missiles had been refitted with nuclear tips. Scientists at the University of California, San Diego outlined a similar plan at the end of 1989.

A much more radical suggestion for resolving the problem of dual-capable weapons systems came from within the Reagan Administration itself in early 1988. Paul Nitze, a White House arms control adviser, suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States agree to eliminate sea-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads, nuclear-armed depth-charges and torpedoes with nuclear warheads. Nuclear bombs carried by ships on carriers may also be eliminated. The plan, say its supporters, would resolve "the nettlesome issue of nuclear-armed SLCM's, ...the major stumbling block in the [arms control] talks". As it would also do away with virtually all of the Navy's non-strategic nuclear force it is hardly surprising that the suggestion was said to have encountered "strong opposition from some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and that many Administration officials "do not believe that the United States will ever put forth the idea as a formal arms control proposal".⁴ The continuing SLCM debate and unilateral actions in naval arms reduction by both superpowers in the late 1980's and early 1990's will be discussed in a later section.

The Superpower Navies

The United States is above all a maritime power. Its vessels are deployed in every ocean of the world and its supply and communication infrastructure covers almost every part of the globe. The amount of time the U.S. Navy spends at sea now exceeds time spent during WW2 and the tempo of naval operations exceeds that of the Vietnam War. U.S. Navy vessels are organized into the Atlantic Fleet, homeported on the east and Gulf coasts, and the Pacific Fleet, homeported on the west coast, Hawaii'i and Japan. Naval weapons are stored in ten U.S. states (Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii'i, Maine, New Jersey, South Carolina, Virginia and Washington) and at three overseas locations (Guam, Italy and the U.K.). Several classes of support and logistic ships also store, maintain or transport naval nuclear weapons. About 43 percent of America's strategic nuclear arsenal is on ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the remainder of the nuclear-capable force

⁴ *The New York Times*, April 6, 1988; p.3.

is made up of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and amphibious warfare ships. The aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy are huge, mobile, floating airfields whose planes can attack targets up to 1,000 nautical miles away. The 12 carriers with their escort and supply ships form 12 battle groups (CVBGs). The Navy operates approximately 170 nuclear reactors in its ships and submarines (all submarines have at least one, cruisers have two, one aircraft carrier has eight) and 8 land-based prototype reactors.

Two types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are currently deployed at sea: the Poseidon/C3 missile on Poseidon submarines and the Trident 1/C4 on converted Poseidons and the new Ohio class Trident submarines. All U.S. SLBMs have multiple-independently-targetable-re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to permit a variety of targeting options. Poseidon missiles became operational in 1971 and have a range of between 2,200 and 2,800 nautical miles. Each can be armed with 6 to 14 warheads, and each warhead has an explosive force of 40 kilotons (for arms control purposes Poseidon is counted as carrying 8 warheads). Poseidon's power, targeting ability and accuracy permit an attack on 'soft' targets such as military airfields, bases and communication facilities ('hard' targets are missile silos). The first Poseidon ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fitted with Trident 1 missiles became operational in 1979, and the last of the 474 missiles was delivered to the Navy in 1983. Trident 1 has a range of at least 42,00 nautical miles and each of its 8 warheads has an explosive force of 100 kilotons permitting an attack on 'moderately hard' targets such as bomber bases or heavy industry. The first test firing of the new Trident 11 took place in January 1989 and was expected to begin replacing Trident 1 missiles towards the end of 1989 - of which more later.

The Soviet Union is above all a land power, with few year-round, ice-free ports. Not until the early 1970's did it develop an ocean-going, blue-water Navy organized into four fleets: the Northern (Atlantic Ocean), the Pacific, the Baltic and the Black Sea. Although the world's largest navy in terms of numbers of vessels, two-thirds are incapable of open ocean operations. The submarine force is the biggest in the world and the heart of the Soviet Navy. More than half of the naval nuclear warheads are thought to be on submarine launched ballistic missiles, with the remainder forming the non-strategic force.

In 1987 the Soviet Navy had six aircraft carriers, all much smaller than those of the United States, and two large-deck carriers under construction. Land-based naval aircraft possess a significant portion of the cruise missiles of the Soviet Union, and are the Navy's major strike force. Approximately 350 nuclear reactors propel Soviet ships and submarines around the world, although a limited network of foreign bases and support facilities means that Soviet vessels operate less frequently in distant waters than do those of the U.S. Navy.

During the 1980's, the pace and scope of the naval arms race escalated sharply, with Soviet development exceeding that of the United States. Both countries made substantial additions to their nuclear naval forces and both deployed new generations of versatile, powerful and highly-accurate strategic and nuclear weapons at sea. Both extended their scale and range of operations. In October 1986, for instance, the Soviet Navy carried out the first large-scale exercise with North Korea in the Sea of Japan and the first co-ordinated anti-carrier warfare exercise in the South China Sea. The rapid expansion of sea-borne nuclearism during the first half of the 1980's had much to do with changes taking place in the U.S. Navy in the early years of the Reagan Administration; a process described below.

The New Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy

Between 1961 and 1976, a period described by one American analyst as a time of "malaise and turmoil for U.S. national security interests and organizations" (West, 1985: 5), the U.S. Navy dwindled in size from 689 combat vessels to 443. The principal tasks of the Navy at this time were to ferry ground forces across the Atlantic in the event of war in Europe, engage in defensive sea control against Soviet submarines and move fleet reinforcements from one part of the world to another as required - the so-called 'swing strategy.' In 1978 a top official of the Office of Management and Budget warned the Navy that it needed to find a more convincing rationale for its funding requests at a time when the ground defence of Europe was a priority (Ross, 1989-90: 95). The Navy rose to the challenge, and the result was the 'New Maritime Strategy;' a war-fighting plan for the employment of naval forces developed successively by Admirals Thomas Hayward and James Watkins. The plan does not encompass (although it recognizes the possibility of)

the use of nuclear weapons nor deal with specific war-fighting tactics. Rather, it provides an overall framework for the employment of forces and methods on the presumption of a prolonged conventional conflict.

Then Navy Secretary John Lehman officially announced the new strategy in early 1983. He spoke of "going for the jugular," and the need for the U.S. Navy to "seize the initiative" and "attack and destroy, rather than stay on the defense" (quoted Arkin and Fieldhouse, 1985: 122). According to the Maritime Strategy, a NATO war would be global in nature due to the worldwide interests and alliances of both superpowers, and thus the Navy should play an offensive, not a defensive role. In the event of a war in Central Europe, the U.S and allied navies would have three major tasks: to destroy Soviet submarines in Soviet home waters before they surge to the open oceans; to pin down Soviet ground and tactical air forces around the world, escalating the conflict horizontally (geographically); to destroy as many Soviet ballistic missile submarines as possible. Suggested goals were a 600-ship Navy (to eliminate the swing strategy) centered around 15 carrier battle groups, an emphasis on attack submarines, the introduction of phased-array radar AAW (anti-air warfare) cruisers into the carrier battle groups, and equipment for enhanced electronic warfare.⁵

Admiral James Watkins was not only a founder of the new strategy but also one of its foremost explicators and apologists. To understand its worth and scope, he wrote in 1986, "we must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era - a permanent state of what I call violent peace" (13).⁶ The successive stages of the strategy as outlined by Watkins are:

(1) *crisis response* (ensuring that U.S. naval forces have the range and capabilities required for credible deterrence at any level of conflict through forward deployment of forces, combat readiness and adequate logistical support);

⁵ Congress eventually set the figure at 584 vessels; a decision which prompted the resignation of Navy Secretary, James Webb, who succeeded John Lehman.

⁶ Admiral James Watkins (Retd.) is now Director of the Department of Energy in the Bush Administration.

(2) *transition to war if deterrence fails* (the rapid forward movement of anti-submarine warfare forces, maritime troops and sea-based air power to protect northern allies, force the Soviets to retreat into defensive bastions to guard their ballistic missile submarines and prevent early attempts to interdict allied sea lines of communication);

(3) *seizing the initiative if war breaks out* (U.S. naval forces "will destroy Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if required, and fight our way towards Soviet home waters" (Watkins, 1986:11). As the land-based battle groups move forward, an aggressive naval campaign involving maritime air and anti-submarine warfare unit and mining operations will be waged against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines);

(4) *carrying the fight to the enemy* (completing the destruction of all the Soviet fleets while the United States and its allies carry the war to the Soviets);

(5) *war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies* ("through measures such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces") (Watkins, 1986:14).

While the Soviets place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, states Watkins, maritime forces can influence that correlation by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and improving the U.S. nuclear posture by deploying carriers and Tomahawk platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Some argue that such steps will lead to immediate escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, given the Soviet land operation. Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful purpose for the Soviets, since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture would be enhanced. Neither we nor the Soviets can rule out the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day. The real issue, however, is not how the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclear weapons, but ...how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation... Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crisis and the political will to make difficult decisions early. It will require flexibility to meet the inevitable changes in Soviet strategy. To some altering the nuclear balance may seem dangerous. But the risks exist for both sides; that is the nature of deterrence (Watkins, 1986:14).

Admiral Watkins concludes by expressing his confidence that the goals of the New Maritime Strategy can be achieved through the war-fighting capabilities of the Navy in conjunction with "the pride and professionalism of American sailors". Testing the strategy in exercises, war games and real-life scenarios has affirmed his belief that "should deterrence fail, maritime forces will have the skill, capability, and experience to prevail" (Watkins, 1986:15). The new strategy meshed well with the evil empire rhetoric of the day and, it seemed, found favour. Between 1980 and 1985 the Navy's share of the military budget increased by 63 percent; more than the Pentagon's overall increase of 53 percent during this period.

Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Navy

Strategies and Doctrines

It has been said that there are three ways of doing something: "the right way, the wrong way and the Navy way". Operating far from home and with little public scrutiny, navies have over the centuries built up a tradition of independence and are often accused, rightly or wrongly, of 'arrogance'.⁷ Certainly, the silent service has managed to maintain a greater degree of control over the use of strategic nuclear weapons than have the other services. Whereas Army and Air Force nuclear weapons can only be fired after an authorization code from the President and Secretary of Defense electronically releases locks on the weapons (a safety device known as 'permissive action links' or PALS) the thousands of SLBMs and SLCMs deployed on submarines are exempt from these controls. The reason given for the exemption is the possibility of not being able to communicate an authorizing code to a submarine deep under water.

Although the Navy emphasises the procedural barriers to launching nuclear weapons without explicit NCA command, there is no physical barrier to so doing, and the requirement for specific authorization does not apply in the case of certain so-called defensive or extraordinary situations. The Navy argues that ballistic missile submarines

⁷ See, for instance, William M. Arkin, "Anchors Awry: Our Arrogant Navy." *Washington Post*, Dec. 3, 1989; p.C2 .

must be able to attack the Soviet Union in wartime if the U.S. Government has been destroyed or is unable to communicate with nuclear forces. It is asserted that the ability of SSBN commanders to launch their missiles means that the chance of successful 'decapitation' (loss of a country's leaders) is reduced and deterrence is enhanced. The Navy further justifies its resistance to technical controls by emphasising the rigorous launching procedures. A co-ordinated launch sequence involves at least fifteen individuals, and four officers in different parts of the submarine must turn keys or throw switches. If one officer fails or refuses to do his part the missile cannot be fired. Careful personnel selection, training and discipline are said to be strong guarantees against any unauthorized launch. Nevertheless, the lack of an external release mechanism at least permits this possibility.

While the U.S. Army and Air Force have detailed, comprehensive and officially endorsed doctrines for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in wartime, the Navy has no such doctrine. A Captain who has served with the submarine force writes:

... [U.S. Navy planners] have consistently failed to consider a factor which might radically alter the character of a future war - the existence of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite repeated declarations in the Chief of Naval Operations' annual posture statements that it "is essential that the U.S. Navy maintain a capability to use tactical nuclear weapons if the United States is to be able to fight and win at sea", we have given little serious thought to the naval implications of tactical nuclear war (quoted Ball, 1985:29).⁸

A retired Admiral whom I interviewed remarked that the Navy's lack of a tactical nuclear weapons doctrine was a very good thing "It means they will never be used" - a *non sequitur* perhaps more optimistic than logical. Asked why, if this was the case, so many non-strategic nuclear weapons were at sea he replied, "Well, of course you have to have them; the Soviet Union dominates on land; we have to dominate at sea". Nevertheless, a retired U.S. Navy submarine commander told me that "the Navy hates nuclear weapons. They don't know what to do with them". In his opinion, new naval nuclear weapons were often the result of pork-barrel politics in Congress. "We don't want them; they are forced

⁸ Captain Linton F. Brooks, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: the Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare", *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* January, 1980. (Quoted Ball, 1985:29).

upon us".⁹ He added, "All we really need for deterrence is a few ballistic missile submarines, but there's no glamour in that. Aircraft carriers are what everyone wants, even though the life of a carrier in any large-scale war today would be about four minutes."

Perhaps it is because the Navy does not "know what to do" with nuclear weapons that the new naval strategy is based on the assumption that conflict with the Soviet Union would probably remain conventional. Some experts, however, take an opposite view. Desmond Ball argues in a seminal 1985 paper on the subject of nuclear war at sea that major Soviet surface combatants are generally quite inferior to U.S. counterparts, are far less capable of engaging in any external conventional operations and due to force design and general methods of deployment, "the possibility of destroying U.S. carriers in matched-fleet battles is not a real option for them." He concludes:

In these circumstances, the Soviet Navy must be expected to resort to the use of nuclear weapons at a fairly early stage in any major engagement at sea, particularly when it is called upon to destroy U.S. carrier task forces - and particularly if it is believed that the use of nuclear weapons could be confined to the sea (Ball,1985:32).

Ball goes on to argue that if a nuclear war is going to begin anywhere it is most likely to begin at sea. To support this hypothesis he lists a number of problematic areas:

- accidents at sea due to the close physical proximity of Soviet and American vessels;¹⁰
- the attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets;
- the launch autonomy of naval commanders;
- dual-capable systems and platforms which raise tensions in a conflict and encourage pre-emption;
- U.S. anti-submarine warfare strategy which fails to distinguish between attack

⁹ Support for this assertion comes from the June 1988 enquiry into corruption in the Pentagon and in Congress, where certain representatives are said to have forced trucks that "were not needed or wanted" upon the army.

¹⁰ Desmond Ball states that accidents have accompanied four types of naval activities in particular: (1) covert submarine operations; (2) routine monitoring activities; (3) games of "chicken" by submarine commanders; (4) harassment for tactical military purposes.

- submarines and SSBNs;
- the vulnerability of the C³I structures and the incentives for pre-emption deriving from this;
- U.S. Navy doctrine for conduct of offensive operations in forward areas;
- U.S. Navy doctrine for employment of tactical nuclear weapons;
- Soviet doctrine for war at sea;
- the lack of U.S. contingency planning concerning the escalation dynamics of naval conflict and the resistance to such planning (Ball, 1985:2).

Exercises and Operations

In speaking of "real-life scenarios" in formulating the maritime strategy Admiral Watkins was probably referring to the fact that the two superpower navies operate so closely together that they use each other as targets. Obstructive activities provide information on the likely responses of the enemy in actual naval conflict. The Admiral told Congress in 1984 that "our orange forces, as we call them, ... provide very effective exercise services to our forces because we can really see what we are up against". Submarines also operate routinely within the coastal waters of each country. For the past 20 years, for instance, a Soviet Yankee-class nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarine has been stationed a few miles off the coast of Washington state and Oregon and attack submarines watched the entrances of U.S. submarine bases in San Diego. The Soviet Union announced at the end of 1989, however, that it had withdrawn these submarines from the Pacific.¹¹

A primary assignment of the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) force is the conduct of offensive operations in forward areas, including enemy-controlled waters. Navy officers have testified that the SSN is the only platform "that can operate where the enemy controls the air and the surface", and "often puts itself in and operates in areas which are very contiguous with the home bases of an adversary" (quoted Ball, 1985: 21).

¹¹ U.S. military officials have said that the withdrawal will have little or no impact on the nuclear balance, as the increased range of newer Soviet missiles allows submarines to remain closer to Soviet home waters while still being able to reach U.S. targets.

During most of the decade both superpower navies 'upped the ante' with respect to exercises, operations and war games and engaged in provocative activities. U.S. naval exercises involving penetration into Soviet waters increased in number and boldness as the Navy tested its ability "to go for the jugular". In the words of Admiral Watkins... "We can get inside their knickers before they can find us, and they don't like it."¹² Such activities have taken place during the U.S. Navy's annual "Team Spirit" exercises with South Korea, and the biennial RIMPAC exercises with the U.K., Japan, Canada and Australia. These exercises are held off the coast of California and Hawai'i and among other things involve bombardment of the island of Kaho'olawe which the Navy has controlled since the 1950's. As the island contains a number of sacred or historic sites and is regarded by many Hawaiians as a cultural jewel, an indigeneous 'Save Kaho'olawe' movement has formed with grassroots support throughout the region. Japan, Australia and the U.K. have agreed to refrain from this aspect of the exercise, but the Canadian and U.S. Navies have not.

PACEX 89

The Cold War may be winding down in Europe but during August, September and October 1989, the U.S. Pacific Command conducted the largest military exercise in the Pacific since WW2. As a Seattle newspaper put it: "From Southern California to the Gulf of Alaska, the Aleutians and Sea of Japan, the Pacific is wracked by war - in practice."¹³ PACEX 89 was under the personal command of Admiral Huntington Hardisty of Pacific Command, the first occasion on which a U.S. Commander-in-Chief has led an exercise in peacetime. According to a senior U.S. Navy officer, the purpose of PACEX was to test "basic warfare missions" within a geographical combat zone which "extends from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa, and from the North to the South Pole."¹⁴ The Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense confirmed that U.S. military participation involved 80,000 personnel from all five services - Navy, Marines, Air Force, Army and Coast Guard. All the U.S. allies of the Asia-Pacific region were invited to participate in the war-game and through press reports and government announcements it

¹² Quoted in *The Greenpeace Campaign for Nuclear Free Seas*. Greenpeace, 1987; p.2.

¹³ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, October 31, 1989.

¹⁴ Quoted in *Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas*. Briefing Paper, "PACEX 89", December, 1989; p.1.

is known that Thailand, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and the Philippines took part either in an official or unofficial capacity. A report in the Japanese press stated that PACEX 89 would be "premised on an all-out confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union involving practice of: (1) disabling Soviet forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula; (2) occupying the Aleutian and Kurile islands; (3) controlling the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan; (4) protecting sea-lanes of communication, and (5) attacking the coastal areas of the Soviet Union."¹⁵ The New Maritime Strategy, it seems, is alive and well in the Pacific.

PACEX marks the first joint exercise with Pacific allies conducted on the premise of a major U.S.-Soviet confrontation, previous exercises having been based on the concept of limited conflict, not all-out war. According to the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander at Pearl Harbour, "... one day we had 147 units operating in the Pacific. That constitutes nearly 60 percent of the entire fleet; double the number of ships normally operating in peace-time."¹⁶ Operations included a defence of Japan (involving 2 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, approximately 60 other U.S. warships and 230 aircraft), simulated attacks on the Northern territories, Sakhalin Island and the maritime territory of the Soviet Union, amphibious landing exercises on Hokkaido and the east coast of South Korea, 'mined' ports, carrier and battleship operations, Arctic operations and logistic drills. In spite of the size and scope of PACEX, however, and in contrast to earlier Pacific exercises U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and battleships did not enter the Sea of Japan nor the Sea of Okhotsk, and Admiral Hardisty has said that PACEX 89 was not a provocative exercise.

Apart from a 4-sentence press release in August, the U.S. Navy has said little about the operation, and has released little information in response to Freedom of Information requests. The information gathered and circulated by the 'Disarm the Seas' movement has come mainly from the Japanese press. In contrast to the secrecy surrounding PACEX, the Soviet Union extended an invitation to all Asia-Pacific nations to observe its July 1989 Soviet Pacific Fleet naval exercise. India, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia sent formal

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁶ Quoted in "Pacific War Games," *Spotlight*, American Friends Service Committee, Pacific Southwest Region, Spring, 1990; p.1.

observers but all allied nations declined the invitation, mostly on the grounds that witnessing a 5-hour exercise would not add to the security of the region. The Australian Government spokesman added that the invitation had also been refused "out of consideration for Australia's friends and allies in the North Pacific."¹⁷

'Neither Confirm nor Deny'

The Western nuclear states united policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on land or on ships began in the early 1950's with the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons overseas.¹⁸ The U.S. policy falls within the category of 'vital for national security interests' and so far remains inviolate and seemingly inviolable.¹⁹ Morton Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Nixon administration, gave his version of its origins while testifying at a 1974 Congressional Hearing on U.S. nuclear weapons, strategies and policies. In Halperin's view:

This American policy is based in large part on the fear of senior naval officers that the ability of the U.S. Navy to call on ports in various foreign countries will be greatly inhibited if the United States needed to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on any individual ship. The Navy has argued for an absolute policy of never confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere overseas. In some countries it is well understood that any confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons would lead to a domestic public outcry in that country

I think [the policy] developed initially in a period in which nuclear weapons were looked on with a kind of mysticism as something very different, ... and in which we were not going to talk about where these weapons are. ... It was a subject which when I was at the Pentagon was not

¹⁷ *Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas*, Information Update, No. 14, Oct. 1989.

¹⁸ The Soviet Union has had a similarly ambiguous policy to that of the western states with respect to the presence of weapons on ships, namely: "When at sea, all Soviet vessels carry what is necessary for their operations." In March 1987, however, the Soviet Embassy in Norway informed a Norwegian anti-nuclear group that the Soviet Union would be willing to give assurances to the Norwegian Government that a ship requesting permission to enter the country's harbours was not carrying nuclear weapons. The Norwegian Government (which has a policy prohibiting the entry of nuclear-weapons in peacetime) has not responded to the offer.

¹⁹ France and the U.K. have the same non-disclosure policy, although their ships carry strategic, not tactical weapons. This suggests that their strict adherence to the policy is a symbolic affirmation of status and/or an expression of solidarity with the superpower.

susceptible to review. It was one of those subjects about which it was well understood that the feelings of the military services was [sic] such that one opened this subject at one's peril, and without any success in changing it.²⁰

Halperin concluded by stating that "we should not be storing nuclear weapons in countries where there will be domestic opposition if we admit we are storing. ... We do have ships with nuclear weapons calling on ports of such countries, and as long as that is the case the military will resist confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere. I would urge the Congress to require that the executive branch make this information public." The Sub-Committee agreed. Its Chairman Stuart Symington described the policy as "obviously absurd" and stated in the report to Congress that non-disclosure "is used to cover up questionable policy and practice; is unconstitutional; and is against the best interests of the United States." It would appear that the Committee's findings and recommendation did not find a receptive audience.

Both the policy and the justification for it have been articulated in a number of court cases in which U.S. citizens have attempted (without success) to force the Navy to disclose information about the presence or otherwise of nuclear weapons in American harbours. In one such case before a New York district court in 1985 (*Hudson River Sloop Clearwater Inc. vs. United States Department of the Navy et. al*) the Head of the Ocean Policy Branch at the Pentagon made a clear policy distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. With respect to strategic missiles, said Captain William D. Hahn, "the United States has made a deliberate national security judgement to declassify and publicize a limited amount of information about these systems so as to discourage enemy attack." By contrast, the purpose of tactical weapons "is enhanced by the element of surprise." Thus "every effort must be made to safeguard information as to location, distribution, type, number and deployment patterns of nuclear weapons."²¹

²⁰ Hearings before the *Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad* and the *Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session on U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Doctrine and Policies. March 7, 14 and April 4, 1974; p. 18.

²¹ Affidavit supplied by *Center for Defense Information (CDI)*, Washington D.C., Director: Rear Adm.

Justification for the non-disclosure policy appears to rest on two separate, but related arguments, namely: that information on the nature and location of nuclear weapons is of operational value to a potential enemy and so must not be made public, and that the especially dangerous qualities of nuclear weaponry make it imperative that their location be kept secret in order to guard against interference, theft or terrorism. Navy Secretary John Lehman emphasised the latter reasons in responding to a letter signed by eleven members of Congress in August 1984 urging him to reconsider the policy in light of the proposed homeporting of the USS *Iowa* and support vessels in Staten Island harbour. Sec. Lehman assured them that the Navy goes to "extraordinary lengths" to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons and reiterated that "... the Navy policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons is an absolute security requirement." He concluded:

... In a world increasingly exposed to state-sponsored and fringe group terrorism we cannot risk public advertisement of the specific location of these sensitive weapons. To do so would only substitute a real threat in place of the totally unsubstantiated danger you purport to alleviate by such disclosure.

The response to these arguments by critics of the policy can be summed up as follows:

- (1) the security of nuclear weapons does not depend on keeping their location secret but on the type of arrangements made to protect them;
- (2) the unacknowledged presence of nuclear weapons on ships in port creates unnecessary dangers for a population and withholding this information violates the democratic rights of citizens;
- (3) the policy works against the goal of naval arms control;
- (4) the presence of tactical weapons on surface ships does not enhance deterrence but makes nuclear war-fighting more likely;
- (4) the chief purpose of the policy is not confusion of the enemy, but the obfuscation and confusion of the citizenry. Although originally intended to preclude

Gene La Rocque (Retd.), August, 1985.

political debate in countries abroad where nuclear weapons are located, the policy increasingly has become "a Department of Defense tool to undermine U.S. domestic debate."²²

The non-disclosure policy provides a substantive focus for anti-nuclear opposition in countries which prohibit the introduction or storage of nuclear weapons, and thus the entry of nuclear-armed warships. Although there are approximately fifteen countries²³ which have such policies only two, the micro-states of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, extend the ban to nuclear-capable ships and these countries receive no visits (Hodges and Fry, 1987). Until the New Zealand Government's action in 1985, all such countries where port calls are made had adhered to the policy of trusting the state in question to respect their nuclear-free policy and assumed that if permission for port entry of a nuclear-capable ship is requested it cannot be carrying nuclear weapons.²⁴ As some citizens assume quite otherwise, governments of these countries are accused by anti-nuclear groups of deception and of 'turning a blind eye.' This is particularly the case in Japan, where a number of incidents over the years have contributed to a widespread belief that nuclear weapons regularly come in and out of Japanese ports on vessels of the Seventh Fleet. The latest in this long line of incidents is the report (released by Greenpeace researchers) that an aircraft carrying a hydrogen bomb rolled off the *Ticonderoga* near Okinawa in February 1965 and that the ship entered the port of Yokosuka a few days later.

Opposition to nuclear-capable ship visits grew throughout the 1980's. Three months after the New Zealand action the Icelandic Government declared a similar policy. As Iceland, unlike New Zealand, is strategically valuable to NATO, the country remained in the alliance but nuclear-capable vessels no longer call. In April 1988 the Danish

²² William Arkin, "Contingency Overseas Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: a Report." Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. 1985, and (Arkin, 1985:4-5).

²³ 'Approximate' because governments come and go and policies can change overnight.

²⁴ The New Zealand policy does not prohibit the entry of nuclear-capable warships or require verification that ships are not carrying weapons, but makes the prime minister responsible for determining whether a ship requesting port entry has nuclear weapons on board. (See Appendix 4 for the terms of the N.Z. Nuclear Free Zone Act).

Government fell when the parliament moved to enforce a 10-year old policy banning all nuclear weapons, including those on ships. The result was a new centre-right coalition Government and agreement by a former opposition party to modify its position on the ban in return for participation in government. While confrontation with NATO was averted the issue is now a sensitive one for the Danish public. Large demonstrations occurred throughout Australia during the 1988 bi-centennial celebrations when the country was visited by fifty warships from fourteen nations. All warships were met by protests, and at eleven ports encountered Peace Fleets. In Melbourne a combination of bad weather and union bans on tugboats prevented the berthing of the British aircraft carrier HMS *Ark Royal* and its auxiliary ship. Five months earlier the carrier had been denied a berth in Malta, when port workers blockaded Valetta Harbour to prevent the ship's entry.

Several hundred Japanese citizens came to the port of Nagasaki on September 15, 1989 to protest the first visit of a U.S. Navy vessel since 1974. The *Rodney M. Davis*, an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate homeported in Yokosuka, was on a goodwill visit to the city but after the usual 'neither confirm nor deny' reply was given to the question of whether nuclear weapons were on board the Mayor refused to grant permission for the ship to enter the harbour. The prefectural government overruled the decision, the ship docked and a delegation of sailors went to the Peace Memorial Park to lay a wreath. The mayor refused to attend the ceremony and the protestors, some of whom carried photographs of family members killed in the bombing, would not allow the delegation to approach the memorial statue. The wreath was placed some 100 feet away, and was immediately overturned and stamped on by protestors. A report of the incident in *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (Nov. 1989) noted that, "The U.S. Navy could have saved itself embarrassment by acknowledging that this class of frigate is not nuclear-capable and thus does not carry nuclear weapons."

"Changing the Nuclear Game"

Modernizing the missiles

Early in 1984, the U.S. Navy introduced the Tomahawk; a long-range, highly-accurate, dual-capable SLCM which can be launched from both submerged submarines and

surface vessels. As Admiral Stephen Hostettler, then head of the cruise missile program, said in congressional testimony in 1983, the Tomahawk allows "virtually all Navy combatants, not just the carrier battle groups, to go on the offensive whenever necessary and from any corner of the globe" (Ross, 1989-90:96). The unit cost of the missile in 1988 was around \$3 million, and the official goal is to have approximately 200 Tomahawk-capable ships and submarines and 4,000 missiles by 1995. Of these, around 750 will be the nuclear-armed version for land-attack and the remainder will be conventionally-armed, ocean combat weapons. Both variants look exactly alike. The Soviet counterpart to Tomahawk, the SS-N-21 Sampson, was launched at the end of 1987. So far only the nuclear-armed version has been introduced, and has been deployed only on submarines.

Tomahawk has a top speed of 550 miles per hour, a range of 1,350 nautical miles - far greater than any existing SLCM - and target accuracy to within 90 feet, more accurate than any existing SLBM. The single nuclear warhead has an explosive force of up to 150 kiloton, ten times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Because of its long-range capabilities, power and accuracy Tomahawk not only makes the distinction between conventional and nuclear warheads ambiguous - a characteristic of all dual-capable systems - but blurs the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. Unlike the existing SLBMs which have range but not hard-target (or counter-force) accuracy (and are therefore retaliatory weapons), and unlike other SLCMs which have accuracy but not range, Tomahawk's capabilities enable distant land targets to be attacked from ships and submarines. Hence this multi-purpose weapon can be used as a short-range war-fighting weapon, as part of the second-strike reserve or as a first-strike strategic weapon.

The new Trident 11 will also possess first-strike capability and will be the most accurate and powerful submarine-launched weapon in any naval arsenal. When introduced, the missile was said to have a range of 4,000 to 6,000 nautical miles and the ability to carry 8 nuclear warheads, each with an explosive force of 474 kilotons. This will double the range and more than quadruple the explosive power of the Trident 1 force. The Soviet Union is (or perhaps was) developing a similar missile. The U.S. Navy claims that

Trident 11 will greatly improve the sea-based strategic force's deterrent capability as the D5 (the Pentagon's name for it) gives the United States "the capability to hold at risk the full spectrum of Soviet targets, including those ... which the Soviets value most" (quoted Handler and Arkin, 1987:4); in other words, cities. The combined range, accuracy and power of these new generations of strategic weapons mean that submarine-launched ballistic missiles can destroy hard targets in the enemy's heartland, a capability previously reserved for land-based missiles and bomber attacks, while the submarine force remains in home waters.

The giant Trident (Ohio class) submarines which will carry the Trident 11/D5 missiles are the length of the Washington Monument but their major characteristic is stealth. Powered by a quiet nuclear-reactor, and with dozens of 'sound-whiting' devices to muffle the usual ship noises, the ship is designed to lurk in enemy waters undetected by the sonar devices of tracking submarines. (Submarines are normally called 'boats' but due to Trident's size it is a 'ship'). When the small attack submarines search for the larger ballistic-missile submarines during Navy war-games, Tridents always escape detection unless they deliberately provide clues to their positions. The Trident submarine has been described as "silent, elusive and deadly a black hole in the ocean", and in conjunction with its weapon system is said to be "changing the nuclear game".²⁵ The Soviet Union, which introduced its largest submarine, the Typhoon, in 1983 is said to be "pouring funds into researching nonacoustic means of tracking submarines".²⁶

The declared intention of the U.S. Navy is to arm the ninth Trident submarine and each new one built with 24 Trident 11 missiles and modify the existing eight Tridents in service to carry them as well. The goal is to have 21 Trident submarines and about 900 missiles by the end of the century at an estimated cost of approximately \$155 billion, twice the cost of the B2 Stealth bomber. This makes the Trident/D5 missile system the most expensive as well as the most destructive weapon ever to be produced. The Royal Navy plans to deploy Trident 11 missiles in the mid-1990's, thus increasing the British strategic

²⁵ Tim Carrington and John J. Fialka, "Quiet Threat." *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 July, 1986; p.1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

arsenal from 64 to 512 warheads. France is similarly preparing to deploy a new generation ballistic missile submarine by 1994 and arm it with the new multiple warhead M5 missile. This will increase the French strategic force eightfold.

Nevertheless, the Trident 11 has had a troubled history. At the first sea test in March 1989 the \$26.5 missile was fired from a submerged submarine but pinwheeled and exploded within seconds. The next test in late July was cancelled after Greenpeace protestors in vessels flying Swedish and Dutch flags entered the restricted zone 50 miles off the coast of Florida as part of the organization's Nuclear Free Seas Campaign. The launching was cancelled, said a Navy spokesman, "because of intentional interference from foreign flag ships in a designated hazardous operating area."²⁷ At the third test in early December the missile was fired successfully from the deck of a submarine but only after two Navy tugs had rammed a Greenpeace flagship, damaging it and leaving a three-foot hole in the side. The Navy initially denied the ramming, but after photographs were published Vice Adm. Roger Bacon officially stated that the activists had ignored repeated instructions to leave the danger zone, and that the Navy had "used the minimum force necessary to clear the area."²⁸ A Greenpeace spokesman replied: "No nation has the right to cordon off large areas of international waters to exclude other vessels.. ... Under no circumstances does the U.S. Navy have the right to use force against an unarmed merchant vessel engaged in a peaceful protest on the high seas."²⁹ Another said. "We do expect to mix it up with the Navy; that's the point of protesting. But we had never expected this kind of force, this kind of maliciousness."³⁰ The next test on March 9, 1990 was met with a land protest, but the missile was fired successfully from a submerged submarine. The Navy has said it will proceed with deployment as planned. The missile must be carried by train from Florida to the Trident submarine base in Seattle, and peace activists are organizing railside vigils along the way.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, July 29, 1989.

²⁸ *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 5, 1989.

²⁹ *Navy Times*, January 8, 1990.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1989.

In August and September 1989, *The New York Times* recorded an exchange on the subject of Trident 11 between Michael Ross, a research analyst with Greenpeace, and Admiral Carlisle Trost, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. In an article headed "Trident Doesn't Fly," Ross noted the problems associated with the tests and declared that "we will all be better off if it never flies at all." He went on to state that the weapon was sold to Congress in the early 1980's as a missile that carried more warheads and had more range and greater accuracy than its predecessor. New agreements with the Soviet Union, however, had resulted in reductions in its range and warhead capacity so that it was now almost identical with Trident 1. The only major difference left was the greater explosive power of some of the warheads which, together with the missile's range and accuracy, gave it a first-strike, hard-target capability. The idea of increasing national security through a disabling first strike, said Ross, "reflects a cold war notion that is being increasingly discredited in the Gorbachev era." He concludes: "Trident 11 [is] a cold war relic of unprecedented cost, absurd destructive force, and no use in making our country more secure."³¹

Admiral Trost argued in reply that "the capacity of the Trident 11 missile to attack targets the Soviets value highly, combined with the invulnerability of our ballistic missile force, will increase strategic stability, and improve our deterrence." The new missile had "increased lethality and survivability" compared to the Trident 1, and while changes in the Soviet Union suggest that ...

the intellectual framework supporting Soviet national security and nuclear deterrence may be evolving, how that transformation will manifest itself is unclear. Yet the Soviets are still improving their strategic nuclear capabilities. They are hardening facilities, making many of their forces mobile, have plans to disperse their military forces in time of crisis and continue to maintain the world's only recently upgraded antiballistic missile system.

The Admiral noted that Ross's reference to the \$155 billion cost of the program failed to mention that it referred to a 50-year program life-cycle which would include many related costs. "For a 50-year program that helps guarantee world peace, \$155 billion should not

³¹ *The New York Times*, August 25, 1989.

be viewed as extravagant." The letter concluded: "The Trident 11 is an extraordinarily capable missile whose maturity and role as a guarantor of world peace is imminent."³²

Perestroika and Peace Dividends

Weapon modernization may be "changing the nuclear game", but there are more ways than one of doing so. In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became Executive Secretary of the Communist Party and one of his first acts was to retire Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov who had commanded the Soviet Navy for 30 years. In 1986 Gorbachev began making drastic cuts in the Navy's budget and the U.S. military budget began its decline from the \$99 billion all-time high of 1985. By fiscal year 1989 the Pentagon's allocation had dropped 10.9 percent and the Navy's share had been cut by 13.7 percent. Between 1987 and the end of 1989, the U.S. Navy reduced its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear warheads on board surface ships by one-third (from 3,650 to 2,500) and its nuclear-capable surface ships by three-quarters (from 187 to 49); the smallest number of surface ships since the 1950's. No reductions were made in strategic nuclear weapons on submarines, or in sea-launched cruise missiles. In the same period, the Soviet Navy reduced its non-strategic naval nuclear weapons (from 3,200 to 2,960) and its nuclear-capable surface ships (from 294 to 264). For the first time, the Soviet Union has more non-strategic nuclear weapons at sea than has the United States (Appendix 2: 4).

Naval arms control, it seems, is proceeding unilaterally without benefit of Geneva. If something has to go in the face of a shrinking budget and a Cold War thaw, then let it be tactical nuclear weapons and their carriers - or so it would appear. Whereas Navy officials once insisted that the capability to use these weapons was essential if the United States were to be able to fight and win a war at sea, they apparently now accept the argument that introducing nuclear weapons into a naval war could only help the Soviet Navy as in any conventional conflict Soviet forces would be outmatched by U.S. forces (hence Desmond Ball's argument for the early resort of the Soviet Navy to nuclear weapons). In contrast to bi-lateral actions like the removal of INF missiles from Europe, however, these reductions and the shift in strategy have received no publicity. The information was released through

³² *The New York Times*, September 16, 1989.

the Freedom of Information Act at the request of Greenpeace researchers and published in late December 1989. The Navy has refused to comment on their report, citing its policy of refusing to confirm or deny whether particular surface vessels carry nuclear weapons. William Arkin, director of the Greenpeace Nuclear Information Unit, states:

It is ironic that we have to release this information, in essence doing the Navy's job. The Navy is so afraid of even giving a hint that they are engaged in anything remotely associated with naval arms control they [*sic*] prefer to have this significant unilateral step go unnoticed rather than have it prompt calls for a process to achieve naval nuclear disarmament.³³

Admiral William J. Crowe who retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September, 1989 has been reported as saying that it is in the interests of the United States to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, but his opinion was said to run counter to that of the Bush administration. The newspaper report stated:

During the Malta summit meeting Mikhail Gorbachev proposed specific negotiations to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from all U.S. and Soviet surface vessels and argued generally that naval arms should not be exempted from the overall military reductions in strategic, chemical and conventional forces now being contemplated by the superpowers. "President Bush told Gorbachev that he opposed negotiations on naval arms on the grounds that the current U.S. advantage is needed to support far-flung commitments to U.S. allies."

The article went on to quote Admiral Carlisle Trost's statement that: "Even entertaining such ideas would serve to undermine the fundamental and simple premise of freedom of the seas for all nations."³⁴

NATO's official negotiating stance at both the current Vienna conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and the talks on conventional forces for Europe excludes naval activities not directly linked to land operations. Supreme Commander, Gen. John Galvin, has explained NATO's reticence on the subject as stemming from the alliance's unique reliance on sea lanes for trade and defence.

³³ "Navy has cut nuclear arsenal, U.S. study shows." *The Boston Globe*, Dec. 18, 1989.

³⁴ "Crowe Suggests New Approach on Cutting Naval Nuclear Weapons." *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1990.

Nevertheless, Mikhail Gorbachev is persisting with his efforts to achieve naval arms control, and is urging an 'open seas' agreement to match the new 'open skies' agreement. The Bush Administration is so far continuing to reject the idea of placing limits on naval weapons, stating that the U.S. "... needs a large navy to support its global interests and keep open the Atlantic sea-lanes in time of crisis."³⁵ Arguing that compliance could not be verified, the Administration has proposed rather that each side simply inform the other of how many sea-launched cruise missiles it plans to deploy on its vessels. Soviet delegates have thus far insisted that verification is essential, but now are said to be indicating "a willingness to consider the American approach" and to be "no longer emphasizing inspections on ships, which are anathema to the U.S. Navy."³⁶ According to the writer of this report, some American officials have suggested that "Moscow is angling for a compromise in which the U.S. Navy would be permitted to deploy its planned force of [4,000] sea-launched cruise missiles, but not greatly expand it."³⁷

The consequences for the Navy of Mikhail Gorbachev's apparent intention of "changing the nuclear game" and the growing demand in the United States for the 'peace dividend' remains to be seen. Service officials say they have drawn up plans to cut the active-duty military by 10 percent to comply with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law and one "worst-case scenario" sees the Navy's active force being reduced by 74,000 enlisted men and 3,500 officers. The Pentagon states that Defense Secretary Cheney is studying suggestions for "revolutionary changes" in the U.S. military which would include getting rid of 100 naval ships. Of the four battleships refurbished during the Reagan Administration two are to be decommissioned, and the goal of 15 aircraft carriers is unlikely to be achieved. Whether or not the Navy will rethink its neither confirm nor deny policy now that tactical weapons are disappearing from surface ships remains to be seen. It is clear that the policy and the ship-visits have assumed symbolic importance for both the Navy and the anti-nuclear ship activists; on the one hand, as a test of a host country's

³⁵ "Moscow Urges Sharing of Naval Data." *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1990; p.A6.

³⁶ "Soviets Softening on Limits for Missiles at Sea, U.S. Says." *The New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1989: p.A10.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

loyalty and commitment to the superpower and the task of protecting democracy; on the other, as the physical embodiment of nuclearism.

While many naval officials appear to be striving to retain the *status quo*, there is at least one retired officer who believes that the writing is on the wall and revolutionary thinking is required. The April 1989 edition of the Navy journal *Proceedings* (U.S. Navy Institute) carried an article by Captain Gerald O'Rourke (Retd.) called "Our Peaceful Navy." In it the writer declared that "it seems apparent that tomorrow's international conflicts will be vastly different from those of the past. Economic, political and even religious competition is definitely *in*; military competition is *out*. This new era, already well under way, portends dramatic national upheavals in diplomacy, philosophies of government, economic policies, security and navies." If Gorbachev's 1988 "Declaration of Peace" can be taken literally, said O'Rourke,

this U.S. Navy has suddenly become redundant. Without the Soviet threat, our national needs for naval preparedness are dramatically different and far less pressing than at any time since the early 1920's. The Peaceful Navy could stay much closer to home, deployed on call rather than on schedule. ... Forty year mind-sets and community-itis notwithstanding, the U.S. naval service is in for some soul-wrenching upheavals. For people whose entire professional careers have been permeated by preparedness, it seems ironic and foolhardy not to prepare for our Peaceful Navy of the future (O'Rourke, 1989:79-83).

Conclusions

The U.S. Navy is the greatest Navy the world has ever seen; in size, scope, resources, organization, capability and scale of operations it is in every sense a superpower navy. Like all huge organisms, however, it lacks flexibility and rapid changes of direction are virtually impossible - though they appear less so from a retirement armchair it seems. The leviathan has come into being because those charged with the responsibility for carrying out its assigned task have been convinced that in an era of "violent peace," as Admiral Watkins puts it, superior nuclear war-fighting capability is the right course to pursue. The words used by Admiral Trost in his defence of the Trident 11/D5 missile and quoted at the beginning of Part One also indicate a trust in the so-called 'technological fix' for political problems. Alas that the world has no person or organization of whom this

statement can be made with such conviction.

Then too, as long as the great majority of American voters desire their country to be the greatest military power in the world and to 'stand tall', dependence on nuclear weapons as the least manpower-intensive means of achieving this goal will almost certainly continue. However critical one may be of naval strategies and actions, the people who conceive them and carry them out are doing to the best of their ability the often stressful³⁸ and sometimes dangerous work required by a society. The U.S. Navy is not a power-hungry organization composed of hawks; rather the people who actually fight wars are usually those most anxious to avoid them. Nevertheless, no matter how dedicated or disinterested the individual serviceman, officer or official may be, the Navy as a social institution is not exempt from the iron law of organizations: namely, that once an organization comes into being its first duty is to itself and its own survival.

Much of the recent post-Cold War activity of the Navy seems explainable in terms of this hypothesis. Critics of PACEX 89 and TEAM SPIRIT, for instance, have condemned these operations as stupid and senseless - out of step with the new political climate, serving only to heighten tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and likely to lend support to the hardliners in the Soviet Union who are opposing the closure of the naval base at Vladivostock - but if the goal is to maintain the financial health of the Navy, however, such actions are entirely rational. If 'ideological work' is required to fit Cold War policies and actions to the new political paradigm this is not difficult in a time of uncertainty about the immediate future.³⁹ As Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, director of Naval Intelligence told the House Armed Services Committee in February 1989:

The bear has not become a pussy-cat - he remains a bear. Any analysis of the Soviet Navy today yields the conclusions that they are more capable now than when Gorbachev came to power, even if some obsolescent units have been removed from the fleet. The decline in [Soviet operating tempo] has also increased the number of ships in port ready to respond to an enemy

³⁸ For instance, recent studies show that pilots landing at night on an aircraft carrier experience greater stress than when actually engaged in combat.

³⁹ See (Berger, 1981:Ch.1) for an exposition of this concept.

attack, thus improving the ability of the Soviet Navy to transition rapidly to war (quoted Ross, 1989-90:105-6).

It can be argued, too, that the strategies of peace through strength have produced the new political climate and will be needed to maintain it.⁴⁰

The apparent reluctance of the Navy to abandon the evil empire concept of the Soviet Union also is understandable; no other possible enemy, for instance, has the kind of technology which requires the sophisticated evasive technology of Trident submarines, the jewel in the crown of the Navy's weapon-systems. In spite of its immense cost, the program has thus far managed to sail through the budget wars unscathed and is beginning to appear irreversible. Its sophistication can also work to its benefit. For instance, an editorial in the March 10 issue of *The Economist* titled "The New Nuclear Age" argues that the end of the cold war opens the way for a much lower nuclear balance between the superpowers while still preserving "the blessings of the 1949-90 nuclear era - deterrence of nuclear war, deterrence of huge conventional war" (p.11). Although land-based missiles have posed the problem of being "sitting ducks for the enemy's targeters," says the writer, until now they have been the only missiles accurate enough to knock out Russian missile silos. This year, however, "America's Trident submarines are being equipped to do the job. By pushing the Russians to accept a vastly lower ceiling on warheads and then putting all its missiles out to sea, the United States would reap a rich harvest. Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, would be as convincing as ever."

Such statements are typical of the confusion between deterrence by retaliation and deterrence through first-strike capability. The accuracy, range, power and multiple warhead capability of Trident missiles make Trident not only a retaliatory force but also a first-strike weapon system. Unless the Soviet Union is prepared to leave its second-strike arsenal vulnerable to the possibility of a devastating pre-emptive attack from the sea, the

⁴⁰ The first part of this argument is true in one sense at least; the economic failure which appears to have precipitated the 'people revolutions' in Eastern Europe has much to do with the degree of military spending required for keeping up with the enemy. As the grim joke currently doing the rounds in Moscow says, "We have achieved parity with the Americans and the results are on the shop shelves."

action-reaction process of attaining a similar threat capability must continue. If the Soviet Union *is* prepared to do so (or its economic situation leaves it no choice in the matter) then a U.S. first-strike weapon is redundant, as the opponent cannot be contemplating aggression. Like deterrence by retaliation and deterrence by denial, first-strike weapons and the confidence-building measures required for 'the new nuclear age' are incompatible. Hence, for instance, Admiral Hardisty's insistence that while Soviet naval forces have adopted "more of a defensive posture ... you have to look at Soviet capabilities, which have improved in the Pacific since Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech. ... They're removing older, obsolete ships, but the ships that are replacing them have "three times the capability of those being retired."

Even if it does prove possible for the U.S. Navy to retain a superpower enemy in the new political climate there still remains the Damoclean sword of the Soviet initiatives for naval arms control. To again quote Admiral Trost:

Despite the seeming sincerity, love of peace, and desire for friendship radiating from these Soviet initiatives for naval arms control, the real motive is to reduce an area of disadvantage at little cost to themselves. If the Soviets accomplish even one of the goals of their present campaign, our diplomacy will have suffered disaster (quoted Ross, 1989-90:105-6).

An article in the September edition of the U.S. Naval Institute journal *Proceedings* is even more explicit. The writer states: "From the bridges of U.S. Navy submarines and surface ships, the view of SLCMs is clear - they are effective weapons. The challenge for U.S. arms negotiators is to keep the weapons off the bargaining table and in the combatant's weapon magazines."

Nevertheless, if the bear insists on turning into a pussy-cat the business of maintaining the naval *status quo* will not be easy. The first response to the crisis of emasculation is likely to be the search for a new enemy and a new arena of conflict - such as the Asia-Pacific region, although unless Japan moves towards massive rearmament no nation there seems a candidate for the position. If a suitable enemy cannot be found there is

always the possibility of involvement in a different kind of war. According to an article in the *Navy Times* (October 9, 1989) when Vice Admiral William Smith, Chief of the Navy budget, was asked about the Navy's future he replied "... naval forces expect to be assigned a role in President Bush's new war on drugs." This war, however, does not require Trident submarines, Trident 11 missiles and Tomahawks. What is more likely (at least in the immediate future) is an increased emphasis by the Navy on its uniquely global role of patrolling the world - particularly with respect to Third World intervention - and combatting terrorism; a role it already fills. According to Congressional testimony given by then Navy Under Secretary Lawrence Garnett 111 in 1988, there have been 153 cases since 1955 in which "the Navy has been called upon to respond to crises involving international conflict, tension or terrorist activity or to protect U.S. assets or citizens abroad." He points out that this is roughly 80 percent of the instances where American troops have been employed, and that sea-based forces "are often the *only forces available* to react *immediately* in defense of national interests" (quoted Ross, 1989-90:105-6). Perhaps this is what Admiral Trost had in mind when he said that naval arms control would be "a disaster" for U.S. (gunboat?) diplomacy.

All this is not to say that the Navy bears the full or even the major responsibility for the arms race at sea. As the submarine commander whom I interviewed said when asserting that the Navy hates nuclear weapons, pork barrel politics in Congress is a major factor in these acquisitions. So, too, is the pressure emanating from the so-called 'military-industrial-scientific-complex.' Admiral Gene LaRocque (Retd.) has remarked that when he joined the force in the 1950's the Navy made everything it needed and almost nothing came from commercial sources. "Now, some forty years later, we make almost nothing. Everything is made by commercial enterprises. They come ... [to the Pentagon] and say, "Look, we've got a new black box which is better than your green box, and it'll only cost you \$100,000 per box, and its marginally better than what you had" (quoted Dyer, 1985:216). Nevertheless, interservice rivalry for a larger slice of the budget and the most glamorous weapon is a major factor driving the arms race (see, for instance, York, 1970). To again quote LaRocque:

When I was in the Pentagon I had as many as fifty contracts under my supervision to think tanks around Washington to give us advice on strategy and tactics and even how to deploy various weapons systems. If they didn't answer the mail in the sense of providing reasons for our weapons systems, I wouldn't renew the contract. ... One day I met a young man from one of the most prestigious of the think tanks, and he said he was doing a study for the Navy on aircraft carriers. I said, "Why in the world are you doing a study for the Navy? The Navy is the world's expert on aircraft carriers." He said, "Well, I don't know, but we've got a \$50,000 contract from the Navy, and all we did was to tell them that we thought we could show that the Navy needed eighteen carriers rather than fifteen (quoted Dyer, 1985:218).

I have said that my intention in presenting this study of sea-borne nuclearism in general and the U.S. Navy in particular was twofold: first, to examine the concept of deterrence through denial as one manifestation of traditional thinking about national security in the nuclear age, and second, to introduce one of the chief protagonists in the drama to be outlined in the next section; a drama mostly played out during the years when the Navy was engaging in its major build-up. Before moving to the far South Pacific, however, I take a short theoretical detour to consider the U.S. Navy in the light of Michel Foucault's model of power.

A Power/Knowledge Truth Regime

Contrary to the popular or religious myth, states Foucault, truth is not the reward of free spirits or of those who succeed in liberating themselves from worldly things; rather truth is a thing of this world, "produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint" and inducing "regular effects of power." Truth is never "outside power." Rather, truth is the result of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays; truth is "an ensemble of rules" in which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true. "Isn't power," he asks, "simply a form of warlike domination? Shouldn't one therefore conceive all problems of power in terms of relations of war? Peace then would be a form of war, and the state a means of waging it" (Foucault, 1985:72-3). Hence Foucault's inversion of Clausewitz's famous formula, namely: "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (Foucault, 1985:65-6).

Each society is said to have its "regime of truth" and its "general politics of truth"

... that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (1985:72-3).

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence is one such 'regime of truth,' possessing all five of the important traits which Foucault says characterize 'the political economy' of truth and which are listed above (see p. 36). In the pyramid of power mechanisms attaching to this truth regime, the U.S. Navy, itself a pyramid of power, is near the top; one of the "few great political and economic apparatuses" by which the truth of the militarized state is "produced and transmitted" (Foucault, 1985:73). Hegemonic control of knowledge is one aim of truth regimes, something difficult to achieve in democratic states. Secrecy is one way of doing so, and when the supreme social value of national security is invoked certain information can legitimately be kept from the public. Certain actions, too, can be exempt from the requirement of public accountability. As being accountable for one's actions is a basic social obligation and the giving of accounts a fundamental human activity, the degree of exemption from this normative constraint is indicative either of the power/authority of individuals or groups, or of their marginality - and the Navy is not a marginal organization. The esoteric language of militarism - particularly nuclearism - also works to exclude the uninitiated and enhance the role of the expert.

The Navy and its policies are also "the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation" and of "ideological struggles" over what counts as true or false.⁴¹

The favoured strategy of power/knowledge regimes in dealing with counter-discourse is to

⁴¹ The major organized opposition to nuclear navies comes from the 'Disarm the Seas' movement which formed in the early 1980's and, since 1987, the Greenpeace 'Nuclear Free Seas Campaign.' Greenpeace, the 'North Atlantic Network' and the 'Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas' (the two arms of the 'Disarm the Seas' movement) closely monitor the activities of all the nuclear navies and regularly dispatch their findings to networks of subscribers throughout the world. *Ports Watch* is a North Atlantic Network newsletter, and is produced in English in Norway. *Information Update* is the newsletter of the Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas and comes from Nanoose Bay in Canada. As well as this focused opposition, however, there is also *ad hoc* local grassroots anti-nuclear opposition to the entry of ships in countries with nuclear-free policies, and pressure on governments to refuse to accept the non-disclosure policy.

ignore it. Oppositional groups, on the other hand, strive for some reaction; negative if not positive. Thus the Greenpeace protestors were quick to point out that cancellation of the second Trident 11 test as the result of their demonstration was the first such occasion. The Navy's response when asked to confirm this statement was that it kept no records on this subject. If social movements cannot be ignored, the next most favoured strategy is to turn public problems into private ones by reducing them to psychological, preferably pathological, phenomena. Defining anti-nuclearism as "nuclear allergy" is one such attempt by authorities, as is labelling demonstrators "the lunatic fringe." The early models of collective behaviour did likewise; hence their usefulness for understanding the actions of the group under challenge, if not of the challengers.

Challenging groups also produce truth, but as they are not attached to "the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural within which [the system of power] operates" (Foucault, 1985:75) they are not truth regimes. Nevertheless, they are not powerless. As with truth regimes, the power of a truth system is "exercised through a netlike organization" in which individuals not only "circulate between its threads" but "are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power." Like truth regimes, a truth system requires an ascending analysis of power starting from "its infinitesimal mechanisms which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics" in order to "see how these mechanisms of power have been ... invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc. by ever more general mechanisms" (Foucault, 1980:98). When truth regimes talk of 'the domino effect', for instance, it is exactly this kind of process to which they refer.

I have not conducted an ascending analysis of the power mechanisms of the truth regime of sea-borne nuclearism and the U.S. Navy, but I do attempt to do just that with respect to the New Zealand peace movement. The 'Goliath' of the dialectic has been sketchily (and given my biases perhaps unfairly) traced and largely left unanalysed. The antithesis is more fully explored; first by means of narrative and then through the tools of sociological analysis. One final comment is necessary. In referring to the 'dialectic' I am aware of and agree with the criticisms levelled by Foucault at this concept and at forms of

semiotic analysis (which I also undertake). He writes:

... History has no "meaning," though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communications, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. "Dialectic" is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and "semiology" is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue (Foucault, 1985:57).

By focusing upon the actual struggles of the peace movement in challenging the truth regime of nuclearism and the ruling political discourse in New Zealand, I hope to avoid both these reductions.

PART TWO

ODYSSEY OF A NUCLEAR FREE NATION 1975-1987

.....

*How did we get caught up fighting this forest fire.
we, who were only looking for a still place in the woods?*

*How frail we are, and yet, dispersed, always returning,
the barnacles they keep scraping from the warship's hull.*

.....

- Adrienne Rich
(from "Ghazals: Homage to Ghalib")

*The people made New Zealand nuclear-free - worked for it, donated for it -
and empowered our Government to put it into law. This is a great
accomplishment in a nuclear-mad world, with the U.S., the U.K., Australia
and France all against us.*

- Larry Ross, N.Z. peace activist, 1987

CHAPTER 5

THE PEACE SQUADRON

We will act to prevent any ship carrying nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered ship by filling channel entrances with small craft so that the responsible captain or pilot of such a ship will not proceed.

- Policy Statement, New Zealand Peace Squadron, 1976

In October 1975, the New Zealand Peace Squadron was born. Although there had been previous instances of vessels engaging in peace missions or anti-nuclear protest and peace fleets soon appeared elsewhere, New Zealand citizens were the first to organize a fleet of small craft to oppose the entry of ships of the nuclear navies into their country's harbours. In this section I trace the origins and development of this then unique social and political phenomenon until such time as the actions of the Fourth Labour Government in 1985 rendered the Squadron redundant. I also trace the concomitant growth of the New Zealand peace movement up to the passing of the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, 1986 on June 4, 1987. (Readers who are unfamiliar with New Zealand will find a brief account of the country and its history in Appendix 4).

With the successful passage through Parliament of the nuclear-free legislation, this small country of approximately 3.3 million people and 67 million sheep - once described by Mark Twain as the "last, loneliest, loveliest, most loyal" of Britain's far-flung colonies - became the first western country to formally condemn and reject the concept and strategies of nuclear deterrence. By presenting a chronological account of the events leading up to this happening I aim to answer the 'what?, who?, how?' questions of the research: namely, "What was the conflict about?"; "Who was involved and whose interests were at stake?"; "How was the battle fought and to what end?" The 'why' question will be addressed in the final chapter of the work. Before bringing on stage the players in the first act of the Peace

Squadron drama, however, it is necessary to provide a backdrop and set the scene. Every event occurs within a seamless context of place and time, and deciding what parts of that infinite and infinitely complex tapestry are most pertinent to the phenomenon under investigation is not easy and, to some degree at least, always an arbitrary choice. The difficulty is compounded when the phenomenon is not part of the researcher's lived experience. I have drawn extensively and gratefully upon the ideas and writings of those for whom it is,¹ and what follows is my decision about which parts of the tapestry should be highlighted. As the French tests in the Pacific were without doubt the major factor in the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand in the 1970's, I take this as my starting point in composing the backdrop and stage.

Setting and Scene

The Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique

When France lost its nuclear test site in the Sahara after the 1962 Algerian war of independence the experiments moved to the Pacific colony of French Polynesia and the small atolls of Moruroa (or Mururoa) and Fangataufa. The first bomb was exploded on a barge in Moruroa lagoon on July 2, 1966 - in spite of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 - and 26 more exploded in the atmosphere during the next six years to the accompaniment of growing concern and anger in all the neighbouring countries.² New Zealand's monitoring stations showed that each explosion deposited significant fallout in the southern hemisphere while Australian scientists found strontium-90 and increased concentrations of iodine-131 in milk. The two countries called for an end to the testing but their diplomatic notes went unanswered. The situation was a delicate one for the N.Z. conservative Government as the country's economy was heavily dependent on the European market and by the 1970's the EEC was insisting that future access arrangements would require unanimous agreement between the Common Market countries.

¹ Major sources of unpublished data for this section are: John Boanas, *The Auckland Peace Squadron 1975-79*, M.A. essay, 1980; Owen Wilkes, "History of Nuclear Ship Visits to New Zealand;" draft paper (around 1983); George Goddard, "A Thirty Year Fight for Life;" undated article circulated to the Wellington Amalgamated Watersider's Industrial Union of Workers (around 1985); conference papers and other writings by the Rev. Dr. George Armstrong.

² Data on French bomb tests from the N.Z. Seismological Laboratory (cited in Clements, 1988:Appendix 3).

Citizens, however, can afford to ignore the constraints of *real politik* and during 1972 and 1973 public protest against the testing intensified. Demonstrators took to the streets in Australia and New Zealand, and French airline offices in several Australian cities were attacked. The Government of the newly independent state of Fiji placed a ban on all French military or naval aircraft and the use of facilities by French shipping. The Australian Trade Union Council banned the movement of French goods through Australian ports, and blocked all mail to and from France. Both South Pacific countries jointly approached the U.N. Committee on Disarmament asking that the tests be stopped. At the end of 1972, Labour Governments were elected in both Australia and New Zealand and both new Prime Ministers immediately initiated talks with the French Government to insist that the tests must cease. When France declared that they would continue, P.M. Gough Whitlam of Australia and P.M. Norman Kirk of New Zealand took their case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague seeking an order to end the tests. France refused to send a representative, stating that the nuclear explosions in the Pacific were harmless and that France had a legal right to conduct them in order to safeguard French independence and security. In June 1973, the Court ordered a moratorium on testing until the dispute was decided. The French ignored the order.

During this period, a number of protest boats manned (and womanned) by New Zealand citizens sailed into the testing zone to publicise the issue and arouse world opinion. The contingent included the Peace Media vessel *Fri*, the yachts *Carmen*, *Blue Nose* and the *Spirit of Peace* and the Canadian vessel *Greenpeace III*. During the election campaign Norman Kirk had promised that, if elected, a Labour Government would send a Navy frigate to the testing zone as a gesture of protest and to publicize the issue. The promise was kept. In farewelling the HMNZS Otago in late June, 1973 the Prime Minister said:

...We are a small nation, but we will not abjectly surrender to injustice. We have worked against the development of nuclear weapons. We have opposed their testing anywhere and everywhere. We believe the proliferation of these weapons must be stopped. ... We are a small nation but in the interests of justice we claim the world's attention. We shall do our utmost to

ensure that the eyes of the world are riveted on Mururoa. ... Feeling this threat of worldwide destruction, fearing the pollution of this green and peaceful land we have a duty to act, and act we will.

... Today the Otago leaves on an honourable mission. She leaves not in anger but as a silent accusing witness with the power to bring alive the conscience of the world. We believe by this endeavour we shall contribute not only to our own concern, but make a contribution to the continuing quest for peace and disarmament (quoted Clements, 1988:80).

On July 5, President Pompidou announced that the tests would continue as planned. Norman Kirk announced that orders to the Otago had been amended and the ship would now enter the 120-mile wide test zone. On July 8, the French Government announced that the Admiral of the Fleet had been empowered to take all necessary steps to keep any vessel from approaching within 60 nautical miles of Moruroa. Some of the private vessels were towed out of the zone, but the Otago, under orders not to engage in provocation, remained just inside the perimeter. Back in New Zealand, the Prime Minister kept releasing reports of messages of support received from around the world and invited world television crews to witness the refuelling of the *Otago* by the Australian oil-tanker, HMAS *Supply*. The confrontation between New Zealand and France - so far the only occasion when a Government has engaged in direct action anti-nuclear protest - did attract worldwide publicity and the David and Goliath image pushed by the media aroused considerable sympathy for the South Pacific nations' cause. The Government's action also made a large impact in New Zealand itself.

On July 21, French scientists and engineers exploded a small 5.5 kt. bomb and a second explosion followed a week later. The *Otago* stayed at the site until August 6 and then sailed for home. The tests aroused opposition in Polynesia itself, with thousands of people taking part in street demonstrations. Most Latin American countries registered their disapproval and Peru broke off diplomatic relations with France. New Zealand decided to persist with its case at the International Court, presenting new scientific evidence in 1974. France also persisted. Between July 21, 1973 and September 15, 1974 twelve atmospheric tests of low or unknown (probably low) yield were conducted. At the end of

1974, however, the new French President Giscard d'Estaing announced that in future all tests at Moruroa Atoll would be underground. The International Court of Justice voted by 9 votes to 6 to drop the case as "the claim of New Zealand no longer has any object and the court is therefore not called upon to give a decision." Altogether, 41 explosions had occurred in the atmosphere. With their cessation, objections to the tests subsided - in New Zealand as elsewhere.

The ANZUS Treaty

From their earliest beginnings as remote outposts of the British Empire in what was perceived as an alien and potentially hostile environment both Australia and New Zealand have felt it imperative to have, to quote one of Australia's WW2 prime ministers, "a great and powerful friend." Strong bonds of sentiment and trade prompted both countries to join in Britain's wars, but it was also a way of ensuring - or attempting to ensure - the mother country's protection against the dreaded descent of the 'Asian hordes'; an insurance policy to be paid for with blood and sacrifice. After the fall of Singapore in WW2 the United States took over the role of protector, but anxiety in both South Pacific countries about the possible consequences of a 'soft' peace treaty with Japan led to the concomitant signing in 1951 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation and ANZUS, the mutual security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The shift in dependence was greeted with enthusiasm in Australia but with some reluctance in New Zealand, where pro-British sentiment and loyalty was and continues to be much stronger.

Labour's Anti-nuclear Stance

When the Third Labour Government took over from the conservative National Party Government in 1972 there were four main political parties in New Zealand: National, Labour, Values and Social Credit. (see Appendix 3). National was firmly committed to the ANZUS relationship and any nuclear-related obligations it might entail, both small parties were anti-nuclear and anti-ANZUS while Labour was simultaneously proclaiming anti-nuclear policies and insisting that such a stance was compatible with the tri-partite treaty. The speeches of the new Prime Minister not only fitted the national myth - "Let us have a sense of pride in being New Zealanders. Let us recognize the value of the unique way of

life we have here - a humane, non-violent society, free from the social and economic injustices that plague so many societies" - but also contained a strong moral element. The Prime Minister was also Minister of Foreign Affairs and in his introduction to the 1973 annual report of the Ministry to Parliament, Kirk stated:

The Government which I lead is determined to find and hold to a firm moral basis for its foreign policy. It may be said that the only basis for a sound foreign policy is the national interest. I see no contradiction. I believe that to base our foreign policies on moral principles is the most enlightened form of self-interest. What is morally right is likely to be politically right. What appears in the short term to be the path of expediency is all too likely to lead into a blind alley (quoted McMillan, 1987:20).

The Report declared that the proceedings instituted against France arose not only because of the fact that pollution from nuclear fallout presented a risk to the health of mankind, but also because of a belief that world peace and security depended on nuclear weapons being limited and eventually eliminated. The continued development of these weapons increases tension and the risk of nuclear war.

Strains in the ANZUS Relation

Under the Third Labour Government, and for the first time in its history, New Zealand began to show signs of moving towards a more independent, more-Pacific-oriented foreign policy stance. In the early days of his leadership, the Prime Minister made such statements as, "We aim to accelerate New Zealand's journey towards nationhood" and "All too often we have heard American policy announced in Wellington with a New Zealand accent" (quoted McMillan, 1987: 20). Norman Kirk died in 1973 at the age of 50, and Wallace (Bill) Rowling became Party Leader. He promoted the concept of a South Pacific nuclear free zone at the 1975 South Pacific Forum, and the proposal won endorsement. Together with Fiji and Papua-New Guinea (PNG), New Zealand sponsored a 1975 U.N. resolution advocating its establishment. The Resolution passed by 110 votes to 0, with 20 abstentions. Although Australia voted for the Resolution, the Government had refused to act as co-sponsor and it was later revealed that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam wrote to Rowling warning him that, "Even the limited initial proposal could stir up

controversy with the United States and raise questions about the ANZUS relationship ... this is causing difficulty to your friends" (quoted McMillan, 1987: 23). A memorandum from New Zealand's Defence Chief and Secretary of Defence similarly warned the Prime Minister against promoting the concept of the zone, saying that officials in the partner countries believed it "unwise to test the ANZUS relationship in the manner in which we appear to be doing" (quoted McMillan, 1987:23).

The Vietnam 'Mobes'

The mutual security pact along with the insurance policy mentality meant that both South Pacific countries sent troops to fight in America's Asian wars. Although only a small volunteer army went from New Zealand to Vietnam (unlike Australia which introduced the draft) the country's participation in the war produced quite as profound a crisis of conscience, loyalty and state-people relations in New Zealand as in Australia and the United States. Citizens who had always assumed that New Zealand was on the right side and fighting a just war suddenly found themselves in doubt or no longer believing this to be the case. The Vietnam policy of the Government and Labour Party, still at that time largely dominated by people whose thinking had been shaped by WW2, was increasingly coming under challenge from members of their own families, the large anti-war demonstrations - known as 'Mobes' - and younger members of the Party.

In 1966, Labour's statement on foreign policy declared that a peaceful solution to the situation in Vietnam was the world's most urgent need. Although still supporting the people of South Vietnam in their struggle, New Zealand's 150 artillery troops would be withdrawn and replaced by various forms of economic and humanitarian aid. According to John Boanas, a number of priests and clergy, most of them involved in urban or specialized ministries, were radicalized during the Vietnam war, and this group along with a network of liberal-left bureaucrats in the Protestant mainstream churches, was able to maintain clergy - though not laity - support for motions within synods and conferences relating to nuclear free zone issues.

Militarism, Pacifism and Anti-Nuclearism

New Zealand has a strong military tradition. New Zealanders have been called the 'Gurkhas' or 'Prussians' of the Pacific because of their fighting skills, the wars with the Maoris, the new colony's aspirations to be the arm of British imperialism in the Pacific and the readiness of both governments and people to join in the far-off wars of the Mother country. Nor was bellicosity a mid-19th. century European import to *Aotearoa*.³ "Traditional Maori society ... institutionalized ritual and inter-tribal violence as a means of maintaining social order [and] indigenous conflicts were exacerbated after ... the introduction of muskets, European expropriation of land and introduction of market competition" (Clements, 1988: 88). Such was New Zealand's extreme sense of vulnerability in the early days of settlement, that in 1909 the Government legislated for compulsory military training for all boys between the ages of 12 and 15. Boys who defaulted were fined and sometimes imprisoned, while those who aided and abetted them could be deprived of citizenship rights for up to ten years.

The moment war was declared in 1914, New Zealand seized German Samoa, thereby becoming (due to the time difference) the first belligerent. Conscription was introduced in 1916. Out of a total population of one million, around 120,000 men - 45 percent of all males of military age - served in the armed forces and more than half were killed or wounded; the highest number of casualties in proportion to population of any allied country. Nevertheless, the warrior tradition continued. When the announcement came in 1922 that England was preparing for possible military action against Turkey, the Massey Government offered immediate and unconditional help. The next day 12,000 New Zealanders volunteered to go fight the Turks. Conscientious objectors - known as 'shirkers' - received brutal treatment during WW1, and in WW2 were still treated more harshly than in any other allied country, receiving indefinite prison sentences with no option of alternative service.

In spite of - or perhaps because of - this warlike tradition, pacifism, non-violence and anti-militarist sentiment is also a significant part of New Zealand history. The mainly

³ 'Land of the long white cloud', the Polynesian name for the country.

union-led 1909-1913 Passive Resisters' Union (PRU), for instance, managed to persuade some 7,000 boys (known as the 'We Wonts') to default on attendance at parade-ground drills and training camps, despite the harsh penalties for both defaulters and supporters. Probably the world's first instance of organized non-violent action occurred in New Zealand during the Maori wars of the late 19th. Century, when Chief Te-Whiti-o-Rongomai of Parihaka decided to meet Pakeha (white European, 'stranger') intrusion on to tribal land with passive resistance. On November 5, 1881 an unarmed community of men, women and children met 2,000 armed soldiers with a 'sit-in.' Although the resistance was unsuccessful the chiefs who resorted to warfare were no more successful, and public sympathy was aroused by the novel nature of the resistance. The community leaders were released after a short prison term and immediately initiated new campaigns of non-violent resistance to publicise and attempt to resolve their grievances (Clements, 1988: 88-90).

Women have been particularly important in New Zealand's anti-war movements. Princess Te Paua led the opposition to the conscription of Maori men in 1916 and as early as 1897 the newly-formed National Council of Women was calling for an end to war "between nations calling themselves Christian" and condemning the continuous growth and cost of armaments "as a crushing burden on all people" (Hanly *et. al.* 1986:17-18). The Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was born at a conference in the Hague in 1915, and two years later a branch formed in New Zealand. Members were mainly Labour Party supporters, and in the early years the League was affiliated to the Party. While the Labour Party opposed WW1 conscription, it was WILPF members who were mainly responsible for sustained opposition to it. A number of pacifist or anti-war movements emerged in the between-wars period and while most evaporated with the declaration that Britain was at war with Germany, eight hundred and three conscientious objectors spent the duration of the war in specially constructed work camps.

In the immediate post-war period there was little public concern in New Zealand - or any other country for that matter - about nuclear weapons. Pacifist and anti-war groups began focusing upon the issue in the early 1950's but met with little response until the development of the hydrogen bomb came to the forefront of attention through the *Bravo*

accident and the realization of the new bomb's great destructive potential. The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) formed in 1957, and its annual Easter Sunday marches from Aldermaston (the British atomic weapons research establishment) to London were the first mass demonstrations of anti-nuclear sentiment. CND was established in New Zealand a few years later by two prominent N.Z. women, and branches spread throughout the country. There were some early take-over attempts by members of the radical Left, but the mainly Labour-left, pacifist or liberal-internationalist leadership steered the organization away from this course. Members of CND pursued conventional pressure-group politics such as parliamentary petitions, political lobbying, public education and pamphleteering along with consciousness-raising activities like Hiroshima Memorial Day and Aldermaston-style Easter marches. CND's policies called for complete and general disarmament, withdrawal from ANZUS ('Positive Neutralism') and - from 1961 onwards - the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. Membership peaked between 1961 and 1963 but declined with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the emergence in 1965 of the more burning issue of the country's involvement in Vietnam.

The New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies formed in 1974 at the initiative of a number of prominent, internationally-minded citizens, and it continues to play an important role within the peace movement as a non-activist, non-partisan, non-profit, educational organization. Its aim is to promote peace studies in schools and universities and facilitate research and education on issues of war, peace, international disarmament, conflict and violence. The organization sponsors speakers, conferences and seminars, publishes relevant books and a journal called *Peace Digest* and administers the annual New Zealand Media Peace Prize Award. The Foundation's library contains the largest range of peace-related audio-visual resources and displays in the country, and its Mobile Peace Van helps move them around.

The Environmental and Anti-Omega Movements

A strong environmental movement developed out of the social, political and ideological upheavals of New Zealand in the late 1960's. The Values Party - the world's first 'Green' party - emerged on the political landscape just before the 1972 election and

gained 2 percent of the vote. Its manifesto featured a wide range of environmental policies, the most important being its non-nuclear domestic energy policy. The Party called for decentralization of industry, decision-making and population, a foreign policy stress on international co-operation, non-alignment and the promotion of a nuclear free zone in the Pacific; the latter being as much expressive of the desire to see New Zealand representing Pacific interests rather than those of Europe or the United States, as it was expressive of anti-nuclear sentiment.

In 1968 news came of the proposed establishment of a U.S. Navy Omega navigation system in New Zealand. A campaign against the proposal was launched mainly by students from Canterbury University (Christchurch) but quickly drew in a large cross-section of the community. The Anti-Omega campaign proved a catalyst for the growing opposition to the U.S. military presence in the country and the region, and the system's clear link with nuclear submarines and ships in the Pacific provided a focus for anti-nuclear protest and action. Many New Zealanders realized for the first time that their country was incorporated into a global military system and there was much debate about whether or not the installation would make New Zealand a nuclear target. News of the proposed facility co-incided with the first showing in New Zealand of Peter Watkin's film, *The War Game*, and headlines in the students' campaign flyer accused the National Government of "dealing New Zealand into the war game."

The Anti-Omega Campaign was widespread, widely-based and sustained. In 1971, thirty-three months after it began, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake announced that the Omega navigation station would be built not in New Zealand but in Australia. Some demonstrations against the U.S. military presence continued - in 1972 against the Mt. St. John's satellite tracking station, and in 1973 against the U.S. Navy and Airforce Antarctic forward base "Operation Deep Freeze" at Harewood, Christchurch. As the linkage of these facilities to the global military system or nuclear infrastructure is much less clear the opposition received little public support, although it has continued in the peace movement itself. One legacy of the Anti-Omega Campaign was re-inforcement of the myth of New

Zealand as a country with a history of successful populist movements.

Nuclear Warship Visits

In 1960, the newly-built nuclear-powered submarine, USS *Halibut* put into Wellington Harbour, the first visit to New Zealand of a nuclear-propelled vessel. Although the submarine was equipped to carry 5 nuclear-armed cruise missiles of 800 km. range the visit received little attention. In 1964, a U.S. nuclear-powered carrier task force called at New Zealand in the course of a worldwide cruise. The carrier anchored in Cook Strait and two cruisers entered Wellington Harbour. N.Z. officials and journalists were flown out to the carrier for a military display which included napalm bombings and supersonic flights by carrier-based aircraft, but, again, the visit did not become a public issue. No nuclear-powered warships visited the country during the next 12 years as New Zealand, in common with several other countries - Australia among them - refused to permit such port calls while the issue of liability in case of accidents remained unresolved. (The entry of vessels that might be carrying nuclear weapons was not a part of this issue). In mid-1975, the U.S. Government announced that it was prepared to accept absolute liability for any damage that might occur in a foreign port involving the nuclear reactor of a U.S. warship. Although the legislation was criticised abroad (it provided limited compensation and could not be invoked for the always-contentious issue of radiation-related illnesses occurring much later) all countries except New Zealand removed the ban, and the Rowling Government was under pressure from Australia, the United States and elements of New Zealand's population to do likewise.

And it is at this point in 1975 that the actors begin to come on stage. Those who appear most often in this chapter, and (apart from the loquacious author) speak most, are:

- the Reverend Dr. George Armstrong, an Anglican priest who founded the Peace Squadron while a lecturer in Systematic Theology at St. John's Theological College, Auckland. He left New Zealand with his family in 1970 to work on a doctorate at Princeton Theological Seminary, and returned to St. John's in 1973.
- John Boanas, then a theological student at St John's and now a businessman in Christchurch;

- the Rev. Les Church, then a student at St John's and now a parish minister;
- the 'Boaties,' a group of men living then and now with their families in houses or on boats at Waiheke island, a small island about an hour's ferry ride from Auckland. Those referred to by name are expatriate Englishman Bernard Rhodes, the Squadron Organizer for Waiheke Island, Dave Wray and Danny -----.
- George Goddard, then and now Executive Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Waterside Workers, Wellington.
- Nicky Hagar, now a full-time field worker for Peace Movement Aotearoa (PMA) in Wellington, then a young worker newly-arrived in Wellington who became involved in the formation of a Peace Squadron in that city.

The fact that the initial cast consists entirely of men is not a sampling error. Although women took part in the actions, the Peace Squadron was a male-led phenomenon.

Genesis and Conception

George Armstrong says that the authoritarianism of the Anglican Church came as a shock to him during the period of his theological training, and in his early years as a pastor he experienced increasing disillusionment with the church itself.

People were very self-interested; it was a very middle-class church. There didn't seem to be much real religion in Christianity When I had the chance to go back to theological college and teach I went back with that idea - getting students to think about the fact that Christianity might be more prevalent outside the Church than in it; more present in the active movements for life, health, peace and justice than within church systems. Although I don't despair of the two coming together.

One of the several N.Z. clergy radicalized during the Vietnam war, Armstrong became a member of RAVPOC (Release All Vietnam Prisoners of Conscience) and says he was struck by "the hatred being whipped up against the enemy." At an annual Good Friday religious procession in Auckland, he with some of his students decided to carry placards declaring: CHRIST DIED FOR THE VIETCONG; CHRIST DIED FOR ANZACS⁴; CHRIST DIED FOR ALL. "This," he said, "was seen as outrageous. I

realized I was going to face the full disapproval of my caste and institution if I was going to keep on with it. That was interesting." Armstrong's disillusionment with the Church spread to include all of Western society, which seemed to him "long past its golden age, and well into the silver." At Princeton Theological Seminary ...

What I had hoped would be a marvellous experience ... turned out to be a grinding and negative experience - which I actually turned into the basis of my thesis. I realized that the intellectual elite was not challenging the direction of society any more than the Church was. When I came back to New Zealand in 1973, I was surprised at the enormous sense of relief I felt in coming back to this beautiful place; at getting away from the awful daily catalogue of murder. The harbour seemed particularly beautiful. I couldn't wait to get out on it and enjoy it with my family. So one of the first things I did was buy a boat.

St. John's overlooks Waitemata Harbour, and the returning faculty member encountered a group of students going down to the Harbour to present the crew of the *Spirit of Peace* with safety harness before the vessel sailed for the Moruroa protest. "I discovered there was quite a movement in the College.... Then after I'd been back at St. John's a couple of years Bill Rowlings ... signalled there was American pressure on him to open the ports to nuclear warships."

There were about twenty of us in the dining-room at College," said Les Church, "when George Armstrong came in and said, 'We have to send a telegraph to the Prime Minister to support him.' He'd mapped out the telegram and all of us signed it." The telegram, dated April 16, 1975, said: URGENTLY REQUEST YOU NOT TO PERMIT NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS IN OUR PORTS, COULD CONTRADICT VITAL NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE POLICY. The next month Australia's Minister of Defence visited Wellington and a press leak revealed that talks had taken place on the subject of nuclear-powered warship visits now that the U.S. policy of indemnifying

⁴ Troops sent from Australia and New Zealand to assist Britain in her wars were called the 'Australia and New Zealand Army Corps', and ANZAC has remained the general term for Australian and New Zealand servicemen. ANZAC Day commemorates the WW1 landing in Gallipoli and is a national day of remembrance in both countries.

foreign governments had been established. On July 10, the Prime Minister announced that his Government was "re-examining its policy of not permitting nuclear-powered ships to call at New Zealand ports. But at the moment there are no plans for change."

The Reverend Dr. George Armstrong had not only brought back from his years in the United States an advanced degree and a degree of disenchantment with the state of Western society; he had also returned with "an indelible image of the Quakers in Philadelphia getting out to stop shipments of armaments to Pakistan in 1972." The incident had occurred at a time when West Pakistani troops were attempting to crush the uprising in what would become the state of Bangladesh. Several countries withdrew aid to the Pakistan Government in an attempt to stem the violence bordering on genocide, but the U.S. Government continued to send both economic assistance and military supplies. The weapons were being loaded on ships in the ports of Baltimore and Philadelphia, and in an attempt to bring the shipments to public attention a group of about 50 Philadelphian Quakers formed the 'Direct Action Committee of the Friends of East Bengal.'

They decided to place small boats in the path of the arms ships - "to mine the harbour with our bodies" - and notified the media of their intention. On July 14, 1971 the Pakistani freighter *Padma* was confronted by a flotilla consisting of 3 kayaks, 2 canoes and one rubber dinghy as it steamed up the Delaware River. Seven people were arrested - those who did not stay within the navigation channel - and given a sentence of probation without verdict. The actions continued until August 12, and did succeed in gaining some television and press coverage. A columnist for the Philadelphia *Evening Star* wrote:

Can a dozen or so canoes blockade the port of Philadelphia and prevent a huge ocean freighter from docking here? ... We often think of foreign policy as something strictly conceived and carried out in Washington; as something we ordinary citizens do not decide. But a group of Philadelphians who plan to paddle out in mosquito-sized boats to swarm around an elephant-sized freighter obviously don't believe that. *Foreign policy is happening here* (quoted Newnham, 1986:7)

Immediately after the Prime Minister's announcement, George Armstrong sent a paper round the College setting out the text of a proposed telegram to the Prime Minister

and stating:

- (1) I intend to send this telegram at 11 a.m. today, and invite others to sign (and pay - maybe 20 cents each).
- (2) Signing commits you to the sentiments expressed.
- (3) Signing also lays you open to being asked (but not necessarily to agree) to 'actively' supporting in some way.
- (4) Signing also lays you open to being asked (but not necessarily to agree) to organize and be part of the "peace squadron" later this year.

A few hours later a telegram signed by 33 faculty members, students and spouses was on its way to the Prime Minister. It said:

WE WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT YOUR SAYING ABSOLUTELY NO TO NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS IN NEW ZEALAND PORTS. WE ARE FORMING A PEACE SQUADRON OF BOATS TO PICKET NEW ZEALAND HARBOURS AGAINST NUCLEAR WARSHIPS.

Gestation and Birth

After sending off the telegram, George Armstrong informed the press of his intention to organize a flotilla of boats "to so cover the Waitemata harbour that no captain of a U.S. nuclear warship would consider entry" (Boanas, 1980:3). He stressed the moral and religious aspects of opposition to warship visits and also New Zealand's environmental vulnerability to radiation accidents. Antagonism to the resumption of the ship visits had been expressed by some Harbour Board Officers, yacht clubs and fishermen but they quickly disassociated themselves from the idea of a peace squadron. The publicity given to the declaration, however, did have the effect of promoting concern about the issue among local boat owners who had had no previous contact with peace or ecology organizations. A meeting was called at St. John's to consider what to do next. George Armstrong described the Quaker action, and the general feeling of those present was that the Peace Squadron should be, as one participant put it, "a serious-fun thing ... an educational thing. Opportunities will abound to convey up-to-date details of the full horror of nuclear

weapons. And it will be a people-thing of boaties from the smallest to the biggest" (quoted Newnham, 1987:8). A good part of the discussion centred around the question of whether or not children should be allowed to participate.

George Armstrong said that he would be out of the country for the next six weeks and that "co-ordinators will have to emerge from somewhere." They did. In due course a leaflet was produced and distributed around Auckland. It said:

The Peace Squadron

The ideas and concerns that lie behind the Peace Squadron seem to be shared by the Peace Movement in general. A deep concern about the quality of life that we share in New Zealand, our natural resources and the stewardship of those resources. We are sensitive to any relationship or contact with foreign powers that may prove a danger to this natural heritage. The Peace Squadron is very much a pro-life movement in that we wish to speak positively of the need to preserve our life-giving assets.

The aim is to build a fleet of boats, from smallest to largest, from bath-tub to ocean-going liner. This fleet or squadron will, in the first instance, reflect New Zealand's delight in its harbours and waterways and its desire to keep them free of possible use by nuclear warships from any country. The question has arisen several times recently of the possible lifting of the current New Zealand ban on nuclear-powered warships entering our ports. Such ships would almost certainly carry nuclear weapons. The Peace Squadron would want to express our determination politely, but firmly, to say "No" to such visits. Ultimately the Squadron might blockade a New Zealand harbour to prevent or at least symbolise opposition to the entry of such ships.

Boat owners and participants may choose to play a purely symbolic role. Young children could paddle or sail very small craft close to the shore carrying pennants. Water-safety regulations will be observed and all operations will be of general educational value concerning the alarming rate of nuclear armament development.

If you wish to register your boats with the Peace Squadron please contact the Registrar of Boats,
St. John's College,
Meadowbank, Auckland 5.
Phone - 586199

When George Armstrong returned to New Zealand in the Spring of 1975 he found the nucleus of a peace fleet and a small group of people ready to commit themselves to the project. One of them was Bernard Rhodes, destined to become the co-ordinator for the Squadron on Waiheke Island. Recalling that time, Rhodes said:

It was George's idea. I'd just come back from a Peace Voyage on the *Fri* through the Pacific. I was taking messages to all the nuclear-power countries from Britain. From ordinary people to ordinary people - trying to show that it's not the people who want war; it's the politicians and the militarists. And I'd just hopefully got out after 3 years involvement [with the peace movement] in Japan, and worked my way back here. And lo and behold, we've got this Government inviting nuclear-powered ships into peaceful old New Zealand. I got dragged in because I knew a bit about boats. I wasn't really wanting to be involved. Once involved it's a total commitment isn't it?

In October, 1975 on "Waitemata Peace Day" the Peace Squadron was launched. "There were 7 to 8 boats and canoes," said George Armstrong, "a boat with a lawn-mower engine in it, our boat, a sail-boat belonging to a Catholic priest and a few other Catholics with boats". The launching began with a religious ceremony:

The Presbyterian minister came and said a blessing over Waitemata Harbour. There was a communion service for those so inclined very early in the morning, and then we processed to the water. There were a lot of kids there. We put the boats in the water and, of course, we had an eye to the TV cameras all the time because we knew right from the start that it would be a TV winner if we could swing it. ... We tried to be ingenious. We had Peace Squadron picnics and Peace Squadron manoeuvres. But they're a bit too much like a military operation. That's what wrong with the [title] 'Peace Squadron', although we tried to keep it like a festival on the waters. We'd bring fishing rods and balloons *These waters are full of life and health, and we don't want these death ships in here* We managed to create that image.....

It was a time when there was broad sympathy for these ideals. Whereas church people had been very negative about Vietnam war action, they were very positive, or at least good-humoured, about the Peace Squadron, because it was such a light-hearted thing to do - especially in those early days. It was also quite a dangerous

thing to do, but it was a fun sort of thing and there was a degree of territoriality and patriotism about defending our own harbour from such obviously sinister-looking things as these nuclear warships. We certainly managed to take away the romantic glow of them by pointing them up. And those nuclear subs do look so deadly anyway.

General elections are held every three years in New Zealand and 1975 was an election year. In campaigning for Labour's re-election, the Prime Minister stressed the Party's anti-nuclear stance. He cited with pride the action against the French testing, the South Pacific Forum nuclear-free zone proposal and the Resolution at the U.N. General Assembly. Nevertheless, the economy was spiralling downwards and the political machine of the Labour Party appeared to be running down also. Membership had dropped to 11,000 and there were complaints that the Unions' predominance in the Party was an impediment to progress. The result of the November election was a resounding defeat for Labour. After only one term in office, Labour again found itself occupying the opposition benches. The leader of the National Party Government and the new Prime Minister was Robert (soon to be Sir Robert) Muldoon. As he is a key actor in the drama of the Peace Squadron it is necessary at this point to diverge from the narrative in order to introduce him. Much of what follows is taken from the chapter, "The Unwiser Canute", in Colin James' study of "turbulence and transition in contemporary New Zealand" (James, 1986, 79-110). The writer makes generous use of adjectives, but all New Zealanders I spoke with on this subject, irrespective of political allegiance or their opinion of the rest of the book, described this portrait of their one-time national leader as "brilliant."

Sir Robert Muldoon and 'Muldoonism'

Robert Muldoon stood as a National Party candidate in 1951 and again in 1954. He was successful in 1960 and in due course became Minister of Finance. His first bid for Party leadership in 1972 failed, but he was elected two and a half years later. Nevertheless, the new Leader of the Opposition continued to be treated with some reserve and suspicion by his traditionally conservative Party. Senior members of Caucus demanded that he "lower his profile" after he knocked a demonstrator to the ground during an Auckland political rally and was involved in a shouting match with unionists on

television. Nevertheless, the new leader proved to be a great crowd puller. At the 1975 election the seemingly impossible happened: a National Party victory from 23 seats down.

[Muldoon's] technique was simple and brilliant: ferocious attack (the Labour Government was incompetent), innuendo (the Government was run behind the scenes by communists), personal denigration (Prime Minister Bill Rowling was weak - 'a shiver looking for a spine to run up'), feints towards prejudice (send Maoris and Pacific islanders home to their marae or their islands when they offend against the law), exaggeration (of debt, balance of payments, inflation, unemployment ... fissures within the Cabinet), irresistible funniness and razzamatazz entertainment (straw boaters, balloons, chants and bands). A bandwagon rolled: 4,000 here, 6,000 there. It rolled over Bill Rowling and National Party reservations (James, 1986:89-90).

According to James, Robert Muldoon "constructed a stereotyped of the 'ordinary bloke' or 'ordinary citizen' whom he held in his speeches in exaggerated reverence as the fount of wisdom and the touchstone of political legitimacy" (James, 1986:84). In his autobiographical book, *The Rise and Fall of a Young Turk*, Muldoon wrote: "Lesson 1 for a politician is: Never take the ordinary citizen for granted, and never think of him in the mass. Lesson 2 is: Never speak down to him; he will close his ears to that kind of talk" (Muldoon, 1974:145).

Muldoon projected himself as one of the 'ordinary blokes'. He sought to represent them, articulating every hidden fear, aspiration and hate. The ordinary bloke, in Muldoon's world was, like Muldoon himself, beset by enemies who would deny him (sometimes him or her, but mostly him) a fair go. So he attacked a wide range of shadowy enemies: communists, academics, the Japanese, militant unionists, 'radicals' who wanted to stop sports contest with South Africa, violent Maoris, speculators and rich men The style was direct, it was brutal and for a long time it worked because there was always a shadow of plausibility. The trick was to ensure that the 'ordinary bloke' never identified himself (or herself) as one of the enemies. So Muldoon by and large attacked minorities - and often minorities within minorities (James, 1986:85-86).

Muldoon's strongest support came from the broad middle of the political spectrum and James stresses that it was the *middle* of the socioeconomic spectrum, with policies aimed at keeping these individuals secure; not the *centre* of Left-Right political ideologies. As needs dictated, says James, Muldoon moved between the poles of libertarianism and

socialism. During the campaign of 1975, he brought into existence what became known as 'Robsmob' - supporters outside the normal constituency of the National Party. "Muldoon never fitted well with the National Party. Its members did not think of themselves as 'ordinary blokes'; far from it, they were on the make, or had already made it, or thought themselves socially a trifle (or a lot) above the *hoi poloi*"(87). The author quotes a woman's statement that before Muldoon become leader ... "I could have gone into a room and known it was a National Party gathering just by glancing around, but after, I'd go to the National Party gatherings and think I was at the local football club" (quoted James, 1986:91).

Colin James sums up his portrait of this "astute and pugnacious politician" by declaring:

Muldoon is a fascinating figure. People feared him; hated him; loved him; craved his protection; glowed at small signals from him that might be construed as approbation; admired him; respected him and ascribed to him near godlike powers of intelligence, insight and fixit skills; despised him, abhorred him, and ascribed to him near demonic powers of evil, strategy and destruction. He was by turns charming, gentle, ruthless, vicious, generous, seductive, crushing, funny, cruel. He told it like it was; or made words do wondrous double duty. He put most of New Zealand in thrall, one way or another. ...His fascination is partly in his physique: short, fat, with a huge head, piercing, often cold, eyes, sensitive hands, an accident-distorted cheek that in certain facial composites could make him appear to smile. He was mesmeric, whether one thought of him as a modern-day Rasputin, or as 'Dimples', an object of affection or avuncular security - 'not just a pretty face', as a National party promotional dishtowel gushed (James, 1986:79-80).

This, then, was the man who in late 1975 headed the newly-elected National Party Government of New Zealand.

Baptism

As the Peace Squadron expected, the new Prime Minister was quick to abandon the prohibition on the entry of nuclear warships to New Zealand waters. "To ban them from visiting our harbours," he said, "is incompatible with membership of the ANZUS alliance, and puts impossible restraints on our allies (quoted Newnham, 1986:10). In March 1976,

Admiral Gaylor, Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) visited New Zealand to meet with political leaders. Two weeks later, the Minister of Defence announced that an American nuclear-powered warship would visit New Zealand before the end of the year. In a speech a few days later to the N.Z. Bureau of Importers and Exporters the Prime Minister said his Government welcomed close defence contacts with the United States because the potential threat to the country was in the area of external trade and New Zealand was "totally vulnerable" if it did not retain the freedom of the seas. He went on to say:

We look around the world and ask 'Where is the threat?' And the answer is obvious. ... all the actions of the Soviet Union in recent times point not to defence, but to imperialism and aggression. There is only one power on earth that can resist that aggression, and that is the power of the United States of America. ... We must be thankful that in spite of the catastrophe of Vietnam, a catastrophe caused by the unwillingness of the American Administration to use their ultimate weapons ... there nevertheless remains in the United States a willingness to be the leader and, ultimately, the guardian of the free world. ...

We will have visits from American warships. I promise you that. ... My Government will stand firmly against the protests of concerned New Zealanders who are genuinely apprehensive but, more importantly, of New Zealanders who owe less allegiance to their country and their people than they do to an aggressive foreign power."⁵

Asked after his speech if he was referring to nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister replied: "Yes, that was their ultimate weapon."

The Government would not disclose the place and date of arrival of the visiting warship, but three ports of call were possible: Auckland and Wellington in the North Island, and Lyttelton (near Christchurch) in the South Island. Wellington was thought to be the most likely choice because of the size of the harbour and depth of water, the ease of policing the main channel and, unlike Auckland, the absence of a large population around the harbour. Furthermore, the generally rough seas and weather at the harbour entrance

⁵*Auckland Star*, April 7, 1976.

would deter all but the hardiest sailors from taking to the sea in small ships. Nevertheless, a small group of boats maintained a vigil at the entrance to Auckland harbour. A Wellington Peace Squadron was hastily organized, but opinions differed about whether the planned demonstration would be purely symbolic or whether a blockade should be attempted.

When nuclear weapons first became a public issue in New Zealand in the 1950's, the Trade Unions had formulated a policy on the matter. According to George Goddard:

Union policy was determined by far-reaching discussions at a number of regular monthly stop-work meetings, where such questions as "What's it got to do with us?" ... "The Government should govern" ... "What about the Russians?" were carefully examined, debated and answered. The minority became the majority, and nuclearism as an acceptable proposition was discarded, and a willingness to do something about it became the rule of the road (Goddard, 1985:1)⁶

The impending ship visit was discussed at the regular monthly meeting of the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union, and the motion: "that the N.Z. Waterside Workers' Federation be informed that, should nuclear-powered vessels visit the Port of Wellington, this Union of Workers will cease all work in the Port until the vessel's departure" passed unanimously. George Goddard writes:

... This at a time when the economic future of the industry was most uncertain, where job areas were closing down one after another, when the Government's spokesman had the undivided support of the media on the need for a nuclear umbrella, keeping faith with our allies, maintaining our long-standing tradition of military heroism and the like. Possibly, many of the men who voted for this motion to divorce themselves from the payroll for an unspecified period of time had never heard of Martin Luther, but all understood that it is neither prudent nor safe to do anything against conscience. I know in my heart that if my life has any dignity or value it is because I have worked with caring men such as these (Goddard, 1985:2).

As the time for the expected warship visit drew closer, the Government began releasing press reports describing the various safety precautions to be taken in connection

⁶ This paper, entitled "A Thirty Year fight for Life," was written by George Goddard and circulated through the unions at the time of the Government's rejection of the USS *Buchanan*.

with the visit. Scientists from the National Radiation Laboratory would continuously monitor the water around the ship, tugboat crews would wear protective clothing and so forth. Presumably the reports were intended to be reassuring, but they and the general secretiveness surrounding the visit combined to produce precisely the opposite effect. According to N.Z. peace researcher Owen Wilkes, public concern increased to the levels reached during the Omega debate in 1968 and the French nuclear tests series of 1972-73. Journalists and Peace Squadron organizers competed with each other to discover when and where the vessel would appear, and the affair became what the *Christchurch Press* described as "an undignified cat and mouse game" (quoted Wilkes, 1983).

A group formed in Wellington calling itself CANWAR - Campaign Against Nuclear Warships - and organized a public meeting in Wellington Town Hall for July 1. Speakers included a Labour M.P., a Wellington City Councillor, a representative of the Campaign Against Foreign Control in New Zealand, a scientist from Massey University and union representative, George Goddard. Three hundred and fifty people attended the meeting. A protest to mark Hiroshima Day and a seminar to mark Nagasaki Day were organized for the following month and Squadron convenor Dr. Ken Hulls reported that the Squadron now had 23 boats.⁷ A motion was passed that: "CANWAR declares its total opposition to the entry of nuclear-powered and nuclear armed warships to any New Zealand Port. BELIEVING that such visits (a) pose an unacceptable environmental and health threat to the people of New Zealand; (b) will entangle us inescapably in the nuclear consequences of world power rivalry AFFIRMS that the interests of New Zealand would best be served by the creation of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific."

Eventually, announcement of the time and date of the visit came: the CGN⁸ 35 USS *Truxton*, would visit Wellington on August 27, 1976. On the day of the ship's arrival, a southerly gale blowing straight from Antarctica was whipping up huge waves in Wellington Harbour. Conditions for small boats were extremely dangerous, and the direct action versus symbolic action argument had not been resolved. Of the 20 boats of the

⁷ From a CANWAR leaflet and report of the CANWAR meeting, *Wellington Post*, July 5, 1976.

⁸ Cruiser, Guided Missile, Nuclear-powered.

Squadron, only a few attempted to obstruct the warship's entry into the harbour and these actions were quickly contained by the police patrol vessels. The *Truxton* entered the harbour without incident. Rather than a blockading force, says Nicky Hager, the Peace Squadron appeared that night as a storm-tossed spectacle on the nation's TV screens. Waterside workers, however, refused to berth the ship and because of the rough seas it was forced to turn back and anchor in mid-stream. The ship's captain told reporters he was not accustomed to such a welcome, and said it was the first time a U.S. Navy ship had been denied berthing facilities because of strike action by harbour workers.

Squadron convenor, Dr. Ken Hulls, sent a letter to the captain of the *Truxton* emphasising that the protests "are anti-nuclear, not anti-America or anti-American".

We are protesting because we see the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their associated systems into the South Pacific, and into New Zealand in particular, as a threat to the security of this region of the world. We have watched with considerable concern as successive leaders of the great powers have found it impossible to break out of what we believe is an absurd, dangerous and wasteful nuclear arms race. We and many other people in New Zealand are taking a stand against nuclear weapons; a stand which we believe is necessary for the security and survival of mankind.⁹

The publicity generated by the event was considerable; it was the first time a direct action tactic had been used in anti-nuclear protest in New Zealand, and some Labour M.P.'s had taken part in it. The most effective aspect of the protest, however, was undoubtedly the action by the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union. All activities in the port, including the inter-island ferries, came to a halt for the duration of the visit. The date had been chosen not only because the equinoctial gales could be relied on to incapacitate the Peace Squadron, but also because it was vacation time. Universities and schools were closed - thus preventing student-protest organization - and large numbers of people would have their vacation plans interrupted by the strike. The Government probably calculated that this would aggravate public resentment of the union action, but if so the strategy backfired again. Rather, the protest and the port closure focused public attention on the environmental issue and led to considerable criticism of the Government's lack of civil

⁹ *Hamilton Times*, August 31, 1976.

defence preparation.

George Goddard described the situation thus:

It is the end of the school holidays period, and the inter-island ferries and transport generally is clogged with travelling, holidaying families. A wooden-headed and stony-hearted government has invited into the Port of Wellington callously, maliciously and cynically, an American nuclear warship ... knowing [the above], but seeking to achieve measly political advantages from the consequences. At a special stop-work meeting on 27th. August, 1976, ... it is carried unanimously that the previous decisions related to visits of a nuclear vessel be reaffirmed. ... [I]n terms of the Resolution, all work would cease in the Port (by watersiders) until the nuclear warship *Truxton* clears the harbour. The President of the N.Z. Seamen's Union .. notified the meeting of his members support, the Secretary of the Cooks and Stewards Union advised that his union stood solidly behind the watersiders, and Harbour Board workers had voted two to one against the visit of nuclear vessels to New Zealand. Hundreds and hundreds of telegrams of support were received from all parts of the country, and financial gifts were forwarded to the Trades Council to help defray their advertising and organizing expenses (Goddard, 1985:3).

The ship was scheduled to stay for 6 days and the strikers declared they would stay out for 6 days. The Prime Minister threatened to bring in the armed services to work the port. From the point of view of the U.S. Navy, such a development would have been decidedly unhelpful. As a public relations exercise the visit was already a disaster, and the situation could only worsen if the Prime Minister invoked New Zealand's national emergency legislation. The unions stayed out, the Government backed down and the ship remained in mid-harbour.¹⁰ On September 2, the USS *Truxton* sailed for Melbourne where Australia's waterside unions accorded it the same lonely fate. The day after the vessel's departure from New Zealand the Prime Minister announced that new legislation was being prepared to ban any further political strikes. Union participation in determining New Zealand's foreign policy, said Sir Robert, will not be tolerated.

¹⁰ Owen Wilkes states in his draft paper on the history of warship visits to New Zealand that the *Truxton* visit coincided with the first case of apparent sabotage against a U.S. military installation in New Zealand. On the night after the ship's arrival a \$17,000 antenna tower at a U.S. naval communication unit fell to the ground. As this particular antenna was installed specifically to maintain a link between New Zealand and Hawai'i, it is possible that it was relaying the *Truxton's* radio communications back to the Pacific Seventh Fleet Headquarters.

CHAPTER 6

SEA-BORNE ANTI-NUCLEARISM

If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which we may withdraw at will. But it feels like a real fight.

- William James

THE PEACE ARMADA

The Auckland Peace Squadron had used the summer months (December-February) of 1975-76 to build up membership and promote its plan publicly. A small group met regularly at St. John's to discuss and organize such things as a telephone tree for quick communication, the establishment of an 'early warning system' for unscheduled arrivals, legal issues, recruitment, publicity and the development of a Squadron newsletter. The Prime Minister's announcement of the impending visit of a nuclear-powered warship had prompted rapid mobilization. Les Church described the process.

[After] the announcement we were put in a position of having to do something about it. The media picked it up too. They said, "Now you've made this statement are you going to do something?" George was away in San Francisco and John [Boanas] wanted to take responsibility to do something. I was living with him and I also wanted to do something. The TV rang up on Sunday morning and said: "We want to come and interview you." I remember that they interviewed us on the back lawn. They asked, "Is it going to be just a protest, or do you intend to block the harbour as well?" So I said, "We're going to block the harbour." "So how many boats have you got?" So I gulped and said, "We're going to have at least 50 boats." I knew I could count on about 4 or 5 boats [laughs].

So we had a month to get them. We had to work like hell then. It's hard to identify who's got boats. You can't go to the Yacht Clubs and so on; they're all heavily into the opposition. It's a matter of making contact with people of similar views. Through getting contact phone numbers, good quality posters around the place, pasting up signs, holding off the police and protecting that group [of sign-

posters]. I spent my days on the phone trying to plug into local networks - the Values Party, which was quite strong at that time, and Labour Party people - and to make contact with them. Find out who were the key people, like secretaries, and then get them to ring [people], but also ring myself. And try and find things that everyone could do. You know ... not just people who had a boat.

I remember one of the wonderful things You know, we had no idea when the boat was coming. We weren't notified; it could come at any time. So we sorted out this empty section with this commanding view right down the harbour. And we had a roster which we managed to organize for several weeks of local housewives, mothers with young children, elderly widows, retired people who would go along [laughs] and sit on this empty lot with binoculars. God knows what they would have done if they'd seen it! [laughs]. They felt they were doing something, and it was an important part and I think it was an empowering thing. And there were a lot of things like that. And that started the networks going. There was a lot of sympathy and interest to start with, and word sort of spread around those networks. We kept on advertising in the paper - we'd pass the hat around at the meetings and say we need money for this and we need money for that, and it worked like that.

I had this list of boats, and I was trying to match up boats with crew and all these people wanting to do things. I managed to organize a couple of medical teams on boats to counter what was being said - you know - that people were going to get hurt, that it was grossly irresponsible, and all that. It was important that we were able to continue feeding back and saying that's not so. We do have a medical team. And people kept ringing in and saying they'd heard about it, and they'd like to help. Like one man rang up and said, "I've just been having a conversation with my girlfriend and she said, 'Why don't you put your money where your mouth is? Why don't you get off your butt and do something?' So I'm ringing up to see if there's anything I can do."

The ship had put in at Wellington, not Auckland, but the preparations for mobilization were not wasted. Three weeks after the *Truxton* visit the Prime Minister opened the Auckland Boat Show and at the end of his speech casually mentioned that the *USS Long Beach* (a 17,350 ton nuclear-powered cruiser) would be arriving in Auckland the following week, on October 1. The Peace Squadron sprang into action. George Armstrong had been appointed spokesperson for the organization, and he immediately sent

a cable to the ship's captain which read:

AUCKLAND HARBOUR ENTRANCE WILL BE COVERED BY SMALL BOATS REPRESENTING NEW ZEALAND PEOPLE YOUR ATTEMPT BRING DEATH SHIP AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AUCKLAND WILL VIOLATE NEW ZEALAND HOSPITALITY ENDANGER NEW ZEALAND LIVES VIOLATE AND ENDANGER NEW ZEALAND AND UNITED NATIONS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE PLEASE RESPECT PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE WE HOLD YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES.

No reply was received.

The great majority of the Squadron recruits were people who had never before participated in a protest or demonstration. Most were owners of small boats or boatless but there were a few large craft. Not all of Auckland's Yacht Clubs were categorically opposed to the idea. One had published the Squadron's message in its newsletter and five allowed the leaflet to be placed on a notice board. Most, however, were either not interested or hostile. The Royal N.Z. Yacht Squadron declined to co-operate, and spoke of "statements from people who are at best ill-informed, if not downright ignorant of the subject" while another replied, "...the matters you adumbrate are no concern of this Club and the steps you propose are probably impracticable." The organizers of the Squadron were determined to prove otherwise. Practice manoeuvres were held on the Harbour, and a few of the most experienced boat owners met to work out a "secret strategy". The plan was to place small craft directly in front of the incoming warship before it reached the harbour entrance, for under international maritime law 'power' must give way to 'sail' in open waters. To quote Dave Wray, one of the Boaties, "That was known only to a small group as a strategy; the rest had the general strategy of being there to cause confusion."

Les Church said of the Auckland Squadron's first encounter with a ship of the U.S. Navy:

It was only the night before the actual protest that I got my last boat, my last definite boat, the fiftieth, down on the list, and a crew all jacked up. At that stage

we had no idea how many were actually going to be there, but I was confident we were going to have the 50 boats there.

Some of us set off the night before, the bigger boats, and anchored off Rangitoto Channel to be there at first light. And others set off in the dark about 4.00 a.m. It was all very cloak and daggerish - and in some ways quite a buzz as well. I was scared. I had lived on adrenalin for about 3 weeks and I was feeling ill. All this didn't come naturally to me. But I went off on that morning, and I wasn't scared when it came to the time.

There was all this anxiety beforehand. I got up, and John got up about the same time. We were going on different boats, and leaving from different places. And there was just a determination, and a confidence. I knew there were going to be 50 boats there. We weren't going to end up with egg all over our face. What we said we'd do we had a fair chance of doing. And I think there was a spirit of determination among a large number of people.

It wasn't till we actually got out there and the sun came up, and I looked around and (laughs) there were about 200 boats there! It was just amazing! A lot of people came who weren't going to put their names down and do something organized. But they knew something was going on there. And there'd been enough media coverage in the forefront of news to know where the action was going to take place. And I think some of them just made their minds up on the spur of the moment.

"There were all these little boats with ordinary people who normally wouldn't venture far out from the water's edge," said George Armstrong, "Yet there they were, out in front of this big ship. It has a huge, square superstructure and looks massive in the water." The goal was to stop the *Long Beach* entering the harbour, and the early start of the five or six large boats was part of "the secret strategy." According to the plan, these boats would proceed a mile or so further out to sea than the main body of the Squadron, slow the approach of the warship by moving in towards the harbour in front of it and then by gradually reducing speed, force the vessel to stop just as the mass of small boats caught up with the action. One of the large yachts, *Dolphyn*, belonged to Phil Amos, Minister of Education in the previous Government. Another, the trimaran *Stormbringer*, carried Pat Taylor, the co-ordinator of the Peace Squadron fleet. As the *Long Beach* drew

closer to the harbour entrance *Stormbringer* manoeuvred across her path. Slowly the cruiser came to a standstill as power gave way to sail. "It was incredible to see it stop," said Taylor, "If we'd had reinforcements right then we would have crowded under the bow and the ship would have been forced to anchor" (quoted Newnham, 1985:13).

The trimaran, however, was well ahead of the others and was quickly surrounded and pulled out of the way by police and navy boats. The *Long Beach* moved forward again but now the *Dolphyn* lay across her path. Once more, the engines of the cruiser shut down while the obstructing vessel was removed with grappling irons. By this time the smaller protest boats had caught up with the action, and the 'general strategy' worked magnificently. Confusion reigned. Dinghies, canoes, runabouts and yachts of all sizes, says writer and participant Tom Newnham, were bumped, nudged, rammed and sometimes half-swamped by police boats. Commands shouted through megaphones by police were drowned by the noise of boat engines, helicopters hovering overhead with reporters and television crews and the cheers of protestors at the sight of the *Long Beach* stopped in its passage (Newnham, 1985:Ch.5). Two lone surfboard riders, not part of the Squadron, came within a few feet of the ship's propellers. Said one later:

I didn't paddle a stroke to move out of the way, just sat and waited with my KEEP OUT sign held up. I knew they'd seen me, but we'd seen *Long Beach* mow through everything else, and I wondered if it would do that with a man. And I was angry that the ship's arrival had disregarded people's rights to make this a nuclear-free country. ... I lost my balance within touching distance of the ship's side, and fell in. ... A police *Zodiac* asked if I was O.K. or wanted a lift, but my support boat was near so I declined. The police generally were excellent to us... (quoted Newnham, 1985:17)

Police boats finally managed to form a wedge with the two naval escort vessels in front of the *Long Beach* and the ship moved slowly into the harbour. The blockade plan had not succeeded, but most participants felt they had won the day. "They've had to force their way into our harbour," said George Armstrong, "maybe they won't try it again" (quoted Newnham, 1985:18).

After the Battle

A report on the action prepared by Squadron organizers stated:

The advance group went out too far, and were not together when they encountered the *Long Beach*. Meanwhile, the mass of boats spread out over a wide area so that the principle of a blockade was lost ... and the protest became a series of individual confrontations. This admission, however, in no way diminishes the impact of the protest - the might of the military was forced, even if only temporarily, to take notice of the people who would stand in its way - the aggressive power of the war machine found it could not ignore the existence of its opponents (quoted Newnham, 1985:18-19).

Both Pat Taylor and Phil Amos were arrested during the action and taken aboard the police vessels. Neither the crew nor the constable placed in charge of the *Dolphyn*, however, knew how to handle the 34 ft. sloop. It ran aground, and the procedure of charging Amos was interrupted while he hurried back to take command of the vessel and sail it to the Admiralty Steps. As he stepped ashore, still accompanied by the police, the former Minister of Education exchanged greetings with the U.S. Ambassador who was waiting to greet the commander of the *Long Beach*. When Amos appeared in court to face charges of obstructing the entry of the cruiser, seated beside him was his friend and solicitor, David Lange.

The N.Z. writer, Colin Amery, attempted to have a warrant issued for the arrest of the *Long Beach* commander. Section 198(2) of the N.Z. Crimes Act provides a prison term of up to seven years for anyone who, with "intent to injure, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, sends or delivers to any person, or puts in any place, an explosive or injurious substance or device." On October 1, Amery took out a writ alleging that Captain Schrader, "with reckless disregard for the safety of others, did put in Auckland Harbour an injurious substance or device: namely, the *Long Beach*." As no vessel is permitted to come within 100 metres of a ship in the Harbour, Amery and a companion paddled off in a canoe at 1.00 a.m. and taped a plastic bag containing the writ to the hull of the ship. The next day they saw the packet was no longer in place. Amery's companion dived overboard with another copy of the summons, climbed aboard a launch moored

alongside the ship, dropped the bag on the deck and swam back to the canoe. Through binoculars the pair watched the captain instruct a sailor to climb down to the launch and retrieve the plastic bag. The summons, it seems, had been served.

George Armstrong sent an open letter to Captain Schrader explaining the purpose of the protests, and emphasising that they were not directed against him or his men. The letter concluded:

We would like to comment on your individual responsibility. You, yourself, Captain Schrader, and each member of your crew doubtless have given some thought to this as an active participant in nuclear warfare preparations, as well as in the nuclear energy industry. We appeal to each of you to think very deeply about this. You commented, Captain, that in the course of your ship's passage through the Peace Squadron fleet there was no danger to life, and that you were "not interested in killing people." We are not so sure that our lives were not endangered by your ship's forced entry. We are absolutely sure that there is a big contradiction when the captain of a nuclear-armed warship claims that he is "not interested in killing people." We urge you to think again about this. Some of your fellow-countrymen have courageously resigned rather than continue to assist in nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapons programmes.

We as a squadron are now more committed and experienced than before. We will never give up. Please tell that to the men who sent you

Although the Peace Squadron had failed in its primary aim of creating a blockade, the organizers nonetheless regarded the operation as a success in terms of gaining public attention. During the week the ship was in dock the marches, pickets and meetings sponsored by CANWAR received considerable support from Aucklanders, and over 3,000 people had joined the lunch-time march down Queen Street. According to John Boanas, "Not since the Vietnam Mobes of 1971 and '72 had there been such a sizeable demonstration through Auckland's central city area" (Boanas, 1980: 29). Co-ordination between the Peace Squadron and CANWAR was good, as was co-operation among the groups represented in it, namely: "Quakers, WILPF, Greenpeace, CND, Auckland University Students, Auckland Trades Council, Peace Squadron and ecology groups." Nevertheless, the majority of New Zealanders remained unpersuaded. An opinion poll on

the issue of nuclear-ship visits - the first of many such polls - showed that when asked: "Do you agree with the Government's decision to allow nuclear warships of ANZUS nations to visit New Zealand?" 53.3 percent of the national sample agreed, 37.7 percent disagreed, while 9.0 percent had no opinion.

The media coverage of the event sparked much public comment - both for and against the Squadron actions. One letter to George Armstrong preserved in the Peace Squadron's archives states:

Sir,

Your fruitless and childish efforts to stop the Longbeach entering Auckland Harbour were irresponsible, reckless and senseless. There's no doubt that the fuss about the use of nuclear power and the visits of N-ships is politically motivated and engineered by feeble-minded socialists, militant Trade Unions and pressure groups.

These are trying to create fear and apprehension in the minds of the New Zealand people, but the majority of the people in N.Z. have already overwhelmingly demonstrated in 1975 that they don't need to be told, brainwashed or swayed by the opinions of a pack of second-class "academics", Trade Union bosses or leftist Church leaders.

The truth is you have achieved nothing.

Most people have the guts full of the nuclear freaks, Trade Unions and their sheeplike followers. ... You are a misfit in the pulpit and in the St. John's College and should join the P.L.O. to carry out terrorist activities.

It is a pity you were not crushed under the bow or in the propellers of the Longbeach. You asked for it with your stupid and senseless action and you more than deserved it. ...

It is obvious that Labour and the Trade Unions are still very sour after having suffered such a crushing defeat in 1975. They are trying to create as much fuss and disruption as possible but their recent actions will ensure the sensible voter will not let the Unions of pressure-groups run the country again.

Most New Zealanders have had enough of it and they will prove it again in due course, don't you worry.

(Signed B.O. Hammond)

In December, 1976 the US Navy Secretary visited Wellington briefly and met with the Prime Minister, senior Cabinet Ministers and officials of the Armed Services. At the press conference which followed, he said: "To patrol the oceans in defence of world peace,

the United States Navy has to have free passage for its vessels. These include both nuclear-powered and nuclear-weaponed ships. It is no part of our strategy to reveal openly which ships are nuclear-powered¹ and which happens to be carrying weapons with a nuclear capacity. So bear with us please." He added that the world political situation was such that at all times the United States Navy vessels had to be prepared for war, and that the chances of a nuclear accident occurring were "remote."²

Formalization

In the same month, the first Policy Statement of the Peace Squadron appeared, the outcome of many hours of intense debate and discussion (see Appendix 4). Although the members of the Values Party desired blockade action against all nuclear vessels entering New Zealand waters, the logistical problems associated with any action resulted in a compromise. It was agreed that in circumstances where the nuclear weapon status of a vessel could be guaranteed, the Squadron would be committed to direct action. The Preamble of the Policy Statement outlined the beginnings of the movement; expressed members concern about New Zealand's danger of becoming "locked into" the global nuclear system; gave the Squadron's principal objective as the maintenance of "the traditional rejection of nuclear-powered warships from our ports"; pledged the Squadron "to ensure a re-assertion of this policy together with its extension to include all nuclear-weapon carriers," and invited peace loving persons everywhere, "in New Zealand and in the U.S.A. especially," to join the Squadron in this pledge. The policy statement was not the only mark of increasing formalization - or of shared characteristics with the opponent. A navy-blue and white Peace Squadron flag to be flown while taking part in the protests appeared at this time, and navy-blue and white became the official crew colours.

'War' on Waitemata Harbour

As the months passed with no further announcements of nuclear-ship visits a degree of euphoria arose within the Squadron. It began to seem that the blockading efforts had been successful in demonstrating to the Government the degree of popular support for

¹Nevertheless, all nuclear-powered ships are designated as such by the letter 'N'.

² *Christchurch Press*, Dec. 13, 1978.

keeping the warships out. Furthermore, there had been additional evidence of widespread concern among New Zealanders over nuclear issues during the past year.

Campaign Half-Million

In 1968, a report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development had suggested nuclear power as a way of meeting forecast demand. Although environmentalists began campaigning against the proposal in the early seventies, the issue only came to a head with the advent of the National Government in 1975, and the proposal to install two small reactors in the North Island. Considerable preparation had already taken place with respect to the training of technicians and the surveying of various sites. In 1976, an environmental coalition, *The Campaign for Non-Nuclear Futures*, initiated 'Campaign Half-Million': a project aimed at collecting 500,000 signatures against the introduction of nuclear energy to New Zealand. Although the petition fell short by some 150,000 signatures it created widespread doubt about the Government's plan, and in 1977 the proposal was dropped. The petition had included a clause on visiting nuclear shipping - military or otherwise - and so helped focus public attention on this aspect of the nuclear energy debate. Although this clause clouded the issue for some people, the number of signatures collected did demonstrate widespread concern about nuclear-powered warship visits on environmental grounds.

Anatomy of a Nuclear-ship Protest

The optimism of the Peace Squadron proved unfounded. On December 23, 1977, the Prime Minister announced that a nuclear-powered submarine, the USS *Pintado*, would visit Auckland on January 16, 1978 for crew rest and recreation. The news could hardly have come at a worse time for the Squadron. December 23 was the Friday before Christmas, and most New Zealanders were busy with last-minute shopping or pre-Christmas celebrations. Nevertheless, about 16 people arrived at St. John's College that same night to attend a rapidly-convened meeting. Also present at the meeting was *New Zealand Herald* staff correspondent, Ted Reynolds. Three weeks later his article: "Anatomy of a Nuclear Protest," would occupy a full page of the newspaper.

The *Pintado* is a nuclear-powered, Sturgeon-class attack submarine and George Armstrong began the meeting by quoting an extract from *Jane's Fighting Ships* indicating that this class of submarines is equipped to carry SUBROC nuclear-warhead missiles. He pointed out the difficulties of organizing an action at a time when most people are away on holidays. "What we want to say now is that the Peace Squadron will carry out its policy of opposing the visit of any nuclear ship, and of putting ourself in its path. ... At future meetings boat owners will have to work out their strategy, but the main idea is to get out on the water and try to stop the *Pintado* from entering. Pleasure boats versus that death ship". He told the meeting that he had cabled President Carter asking him to respect substantial New Zealand opposition to the arrival of a nuclear warship and to order the *Pintado* to cancel its trip as the submarine "would have to force its way dangerously through a celebrating peace fleet."

There were twice as many people at the second meeting, 80 (of whom 15 were women) came to the third, and 45 arrived for the final meeting held two nights before the scheduled day of arrival. Blockade strategies were decided upon, and responsibilities for the practical and logistical details of the operation were distributed around the group. Treasurer Les Church said the coffers were empty, and the hat was passed around the meeting. It was agreed to contact every Squadron member through the telephone tree and ask for \$5.00 donation. Squadron organizer John Simpson said he was making sure that every boat owner who wanted to go out on the water under the Peace Squadron flag, and any crew who needed a boat to go on, got in touch with him first. The organizer of the land-based activities reported that arrangements were underway for two protest marches, one before and one after its arrival, and for a continuous picket at the wharf during the vessel's stay. On the night before its arrival, morse signals would be flashed to the submarine by a group on Mt. Victoria. George Armstrong said he believed the submarine would berth at Jellicoe Wharf, the town side of the docks - a statement which was met with some disbelief as it seemed an unnecessarily provocative act on the part of the Government.

There was general agreement that the last strategy had not been tight enough and much discussion of how to improve it. "If you go with [the warship] like last time you are

just an escort. We've got to have a whole fan of boats going *at* it, and row after row of boats after the first line". ... "The idea is to cover the Harbour entrance with small boats so that no responsible captain would bring his ship in." George Armstrong reminded the meeting that if the *Pintado* did enter the Harbour she would be allowed to proceed without hindrance. ... "It is not in our interests to have her end up on a sand-bank, or have any serious accident." A good deal of the discussions centered around safety issues: "...members will observe normal safety precautions. We cannot afford to appear reckless." A lawyer from the Council for Civil Liberties discussed legal rights and obligations and warned of probable arrests. "The most important law to know concerns obstructing a police officer in the course of his duty. Part of his duty is to prevent a breach of the peace. If he thinks your action may disrupt the peace he can give you an order. If you disobey it, you are obstructing him."³

By January 15, 1978 the Peace Squadron stood confident and ready. As the poet reminds us, however, even "the best laid plans o' mice and men aft gang agley."

The *Pintado* Action

January 16 was a perfect summer's day in Auckland. The westerly winds forecast had not eventuated and the sea was mirror-calm. The USS *Pintado* was not due to arrive until noon, and so the peace fleet had a more leisurely beginning than had been possible in the *Long Beach* action. From about 7.30 a.m. onwards, small craft began assembling outside the channel under the eye of police aboard the *Stella*, a 100 foot vessel used for servicing lighthouses. In an article headed, "Eyewitness Account of Auckland Peace Squadron Blockade Against USS *Pintado*," Les Church gives this account of the morning's events:

[The *Stella*] steamed past our craft and pleasantries were exchanged. "Nice day for it", called a young man displaying a police armband. "Yes ...beautiful," responded some of our crew. "Bet you're not getting paid for it," came back in reply. Crew on protest craft busied themselves fixing banners and flags. Several bodies could be seen climbing rigging. Coffee, sandwiches and salads were passed around. About 11.45 a.m. the radio announced a spotter plane had sighted the sub and

³ Ted Reynolds, "Anatomy of a Nuclear Protest," *New Zealand Herald*, Feb. 6.

that at present speed it would not reach the protest fleet for an hour.

Within minutes HMNZS *Waikato* could be clearly recognized. *Waikato*, the same frigate sent into the Mururoa test zone in 1973 by the New Zealand Government as a protest against the French violation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, now being used to help USS *Pintado* force her way through protest craft into Auckland Harbour in a further violation of South Pacific hospitality. And behind the adaptable *Waikato* stalked dreaded *Pintado*. Eight navy and police vessels fanned out from the frigate to form a wedge, and two navy helicopters hovered above the sub. The awesome convoy seemed to increase speed yet again as it approached the Peace Squadron, now blockading the channel with some 100 boats, and presenting for the first time a formidable appearance.⁴

Dave Wray, one of the Boaties of Waiheke Island, was there in a 12 ft. wooden dinghy with his companion Jill Drewery, their two-year old son and the family dog. They were soon to earn the title: "The nuclear family of the year".⁵ Wray tells the story this way:

The first [warship visit] was rather gentlemanly. Then they tried the invasion tactics with the *Pintado*. The whole Peace Squadron, about 100 boats, massed outside the harbour limit. And they charged the fleet with helicopters at mast-head height, and blew all the sirens at once and tried to scare the shit out of us. Helicopters dropped down and the downdraft capsized several dinghies right in the path of the frigate in front of the sub. It just blew boats out of the water. The frig had to go full astern and swing round, and the sub went full astern and because of the single screw it screwed it round half-way. So it was lying across the channel. Then chaos!

It was really very dangerous. My lady and myself ... when we saw the treatment handed out to us - the way they were using these helicopters below mast height ... We were really very angry, because there we were peacefully demonstrating. And I felt it was time to have a word with the Captain. I don't know if he heard me. I told him [laughter]. We were so incensed that - we didn't have sail, so we were able to ... And because we seemed insignificant - all the police were going to the bigger boats on each side of us - it gave us a passage straight through onto the bow. We actually touched the conning-tower, the Captain

⁴ *Friends Journal*, May 15, 1978. p.14.

⁵ Les Church, "Auckland Peace Squadron Blockade," *Friends Journal*, May 15, 1978; p.15.

was 12 feet above us. So I had a word with him [laughter].

I also sent him a letter which he didn't reply to. I also sent our then Prime Minister a letter which he didn't reply to either. So I think they just wanted to forget about the whole thing. I think that one backfired badly. When people saw our own forces being used against us. It was typical Muldoon-style stuff. Squash-em! It was an invasion. We were being invaded! It got a lot of support for the peace movement. Those really violent, heavy tactics really back-fired badly. The headlines went worldwide. They shot themselves in the foot.

Jill Drewery took her son in her arms as the collision approached. "He'd been sleeping in the forepeak but he woke up with the noise of the helicopters. As we lay across the bows I was yelling out to the skipper of the sub: "Go home! We don't want you!..... Then all hell broke loose. The submarine took off at that stage, and that was the most scary and dangerous thing. There was a fantastic turbulence and I lost my jacket overboard." The *Waikato* had seen a gap in the protest fleet and went through it, with the *Pintado* following. Both vessels increased speed to around 15 knots and the pursuing boats of the Squadron were soon left well behind. The Waterside Workers' Union had placed a black ban on Jellicoe Wharf, but the *Pintado* was able to berth without assistance, only one minute behind its scheduled time of arrival.

The effect of the low-flying helicopters on some of the boats had been to rip masts out or tear sails away from rigging. Many small craft were damaged, and a lot of protestors finished up in the water when the down-draught of the helicopter rotors overturned kayaks, canoes and dinghies. One middle-aged canoeist - not a part of the Peace Squadron - suddenly found himself in the middle of the action when the *Waikato* swung around. Later he told a reporter: "I went out for a peaceful, passive paddle to make a private demonstration for a nuclear-free Pacific. I ended up fighting for my life. I intended to keep well out of the way. ... Then the helicopter was right on top of me ... [it] was like being beaten with 10,000 pillows." He was sucked to within 10 feet of the ship's propeller before being hauled aboard a Squadron boat. According to press reports, the submarine commander had telephoned the Operational Commander of the U.S. Pacific

Fleet to inform him of the events in Auckland. Interviewed immediately after the submarine docked, Commander McDonald said of these several encounters:

I still had headway, and I was backing when I saw the swimmer. I went ahead. You must understand that even while backing you can go ahead for a time without interfering with your basic momentum - and by doing that, I washed the swimmer away from the prop. At the same time that I washed him into a small boat at the back I was watching a woman with a baby in a small craft on my bow.... She was holding that baby to her, and I'll never forget the way she looked at me. All the primitive instincts were showing. We were like that for 30 seconds - 30 years - who knows. It seemed like a long time (Newnham, 1986:31-32).

Others also noted the appearance of "primitive instincts". The Chairman of the Auckland District Maori Council wrote in the *New Zealand Listener*:

I took my boat out on the harbour with the Peace Squadron to register my disapproval of the visit of the *Pintado* ... I witnessed some incredible acts of seamanship ... the charges of the little boats at the sinister black hull of the *Pintado* reminded me of angry bees defending a hive. Clearly for some people the submarine's visit triggered a powerful human response akin to the territorial imperative in the animal kingdom.

After the drama finished on the waters, it continued in the media. The newspapers were full of articles, letters and editorials expressing praise or condemnation. Both the protestors and the authorities were declaring the activities of the day "irresponsible and dangerous", but each was referring to the actions of the other. Commander McDonald said that he had nothing to do with the plan to get the *Pintado* into port, though he praised it. The submarine, he said, "remains manoeuvrable at any speed, but at slower speeds it takes more time to manoeuvre. I could have come through using more speed, or using less."⁶ Asked if the 10 knot speed was too great, Chief Superintendent Trappitt, the man in charge of the police side of the operation, replied that the Aucklanders who stayed at home and at their workplaces were in no danger. Those who ventured out in small craft were in danger, as they had been warned they would be.

⁶ Geoff Chapple, "Nuclear protest: the balance tips;" *N.Z. Listener*, Feb. 18, 1978

John Simpson complained to a reporter: "They attacked us for having people in the water - but they blew them into the water." Chief Superintendent Trappitt replied that the blame for that lay entirely with the protestors. "The Navy is entitled to fly 'copters off any of its vessels. If the protestors had cared to look out to sea they could have seen the 'copters out in front ... the *Waikato* was flying flags to signify that the 'copters were flying off its deck ... But the protestors chose to sail under them." The danger, he said, was created "by the guys who deliberately attempted to get in the way of the ship."⁷ One exchange of opinion crossed the Pacific via the *Auckland Star*. Ruth Dorman Strobel of Tucson, Arizona, wrote to the Editor:

This morning I sat at my table, drinking coffee, when I saw a news story of how your people reacted to the USS *Pintado* docking there. ... Well, I have a son aboard the *Pintado*. I want you to know I'm very proud of my son and the sub he is on, also proud of the fact that the United States has people who were far-sighted enough to build an atomic sub, to help keep people like you safe from Commies, just by patrolling the seas. But it doesn't make a mother, father, wife, sister or brother very happy when they read in a paper how our boys are treated in other countries because it's a nuclear sub or ship ... People like you are the first ones to cry for help when there's a war. Think about it. If your sons were on that sub, how would you feel?

Veronica Mary Downey of Glenfield, New Zealand, responded:

Editor, *Auckland Star*,

Dear Sir,

In reply to Ruth Dorman Stroebel, Tucson, Arizona, U.S.A. This evening I sat at my table drinking tea, when I read your letter. Your reaction towards the protestors against the USS *Pintado* docking in New Zealand waters was a natural one, because of your son being one of its crew members. There are many parents in New Zealand whose sons and daughters have no protection against nuclear destruction. They and their country are at the mercy of the nuclear madness of America, Russia or any other country. ... The truth is that nuclear destruction has no respect for the limits men place on the world's seas. Once the power of nuclear destruction is unleashed, whether by accident or design, neither you, nor your son, nor my son, nor communist nor capitalist will have any say in where it should do its destroying ... I thank God that people, world-wide, are making their feelings known on this score. .. It's later than you think, Ruth Dorman Stroebel. The political divisions of mankind have become obsolete in the face of the

⁷ Report in *New Zealand Herald*, January 21, 1978.

greater need for the earth and its people's survival (quoted Newnham, 1985:33).

On January 18, 1978, the *New Zealand Herald* informed its readers that "the visit of the United States submarine *Pintado*, is the subject of a flow of letters to the editor... They are running at a ratio of nine to seven against nuclear-powered ships coming to New Zealand." This and similar reports probably led Dave Wray and others to conclude that the authorities had indeed "shot themselves in the foot this time" with respect to public opinion. The figure quoted, however, measures the attitudes of the people who wrote letters to that paper; it was not an indicator of the attitudes of the general population. A Heylen national public opinion poll taken shortly after the visit revealed that when asked the question: "Do you agree that the New Zealand Government should give permission for American nuclear-powered ships to visit New Zealand ports?" 51.7 percent agreed, 38.8 percent disagreed, while 9.5 percent were undecided. (A tiny shift of opinion since the 1976 *Long Beach* visit, when the response had been 53.3 percent, 37.7 percent and 9 percent respectively). Asked: "Do you agree that New Zealand should allow American ships equipped with nuclear weapons into New Zealand ports?" support for the Government's policy was even stronger: 61.5 percent agreed, 31.5 percent disagreed, and 7 percent had no opinion. (No question was asked in 1976 about nuclear-weapons on ships).

The Auckland Civil Liberties Council laid a complaint before New Zealand's Ombudsman about the tactics used by Navy helicopter pilots during the protest. In December, 1978, after eight months investigation the Ombudsman ruled that the matter was beyond his jurisdiction. He had established that the N.Z. Ombudsman has no power to investigate complaints over orders, decisions, penalties or punishments given to servicemen. "Whether the Act should exclude from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman action of the armed forces which affects civilians," he said, "is another question." The chairman of the Civil Liberties Council said that the narrow interpretation of the legislation gave the Government *carte blanche* to use the armed forces against civilians. The Auckland woman who had initiated the complaint told reporters that the decision raised a constitutional issue: "A policeman cannot hit a civilian over the head without redress but an Armed Services's member can."⁸

⁸ *Auckland Star*, Dec. 22, 1978; and *New Zealand Herald*, Dec. 23, 1978.

There were no further visits of warships to New Zealand for the remainder of 1978.

Waiting for Haddo

A general election was scheduled for November, 1978 and the four political parties launched their campaigns a few months before that date. Labour's statement of policy on nuclear-ship visits was explicit and unequivocal: "Labour will close New Zealand's ports and airports to all nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapon carrying craft." Social Credit and Values continued to adhere to these same policies, while National continued to insist that the risk of a nuclear-related accident was negligible and that as an ANZUS ally New Zealand was obligated to accept such visits. The result of the election was the return to office of the Government, but this time by a very slim majority. Both large parties lost ground to Social Credit,⁹ and Values failed to displace Social Credit as the Parliamentary third party; an outcome which led to its virtual demise as a political entity, although its influence on other parties continued.

The Political Milieu

National's loss of support reflected the growing discontent with the Muldoon Government of various sectors of the N.Z. population. Industrial action had increased markedly since 1975, and had been met with Government legislation banning political strikes. The debate over Maori land rights had intensified during the 1970's, and culminated in the 1975 Maori Land March to Parliament. The various Maori land occupations came to a head in the 1978 Bastion Point occupation, which the Government had ended by calling in the army to assist police in the mass arrests of squatters. The closing down of the abortion clinic in Auckland during National's term of office and the introduction of harsher anti-abortion laws had antagonized not only radical-feminist groups but also the political middle-ground of the women's movement. To add to Sir Robert's public relations problems, a political appointment to the Chair of the N.Z. Broadcasting Commission by the Government had angered the media, and the Prime Minister's axing of

⁹ The success of Social Credit reflected support from small and middle business-men, and from rural areas where the Government was felt to be ignoring regional development problems.

a number of TV documentary programmes together with accusations of political bias had fueled resentment among journalists and reporters. While there was still sharp criticism in the press of some blockade actions the general tone before and after the *Pintado* visit was more sympathetic to the Squadron, and more critical of the Government's handling of the affair than had been the case with the *Long Beach* coverage.

The Announcement

On December 19, a few weeks after the Government's return to office, the Prime Minister announced that the nuclear-powered submarine, the USS *Haddo*, would call at Auckland between January 19-24, 1979, for a routine visit. Once again, the Peace Squadron was presented both with "a grotesque Christmas present," as George Armstrong had called the previous announcement, and ideal weather conditions for a water blockade. Posters, badges and bumper-stickers bearing the words: 'sHADDow of Death' soon began appearing throughout Auckland. Media coverage and public debate about the impending visit was even more intense than in the case of the *Pintado*. Headlines in the *New Zealand Herald*, December 21, announced: NO NEED FOR A FRACAS. "[V]isits by nuclear warships and submarines of the U.S. Navy are scarcely a novelty anymore," wrote the editor: "But so long as they are made the subject of a prime ministerial announcement they are just as likely to be regarded as unusual enough to offer a challenge to demonstrators." The editor went on to say:

One of the first responsibilities of any government is to ensure public safety and defence of the realm. If New Zealand is to be a credible partner in collective defence arrangements with the United States, the least it can do is host American ships. ... Those who would ban nuclear vessels are struggling against the tide. The inevitability of nuclear propulsion increases as oil supplies become scarce and more costly.

The article concludes: "In the case of the *Pintado* the actions of both the authorities and the protestors seemed to many to have been unnecessarily provocative. They need not, and should not, be repeated."

The message was repeated in the January 5 editorial: "As long as the ANZUS

Treaty remains the cornerstone of New Zealand's defence strategy, we must expect visits by United States' nuclear-powered - and probably nuclear-armed - vessels to continue." The visits, declared the editor, are "part of the premium, and a minimal one at that." (Jan. 5) This time, however, the article was sharply critical of the Government's decision to berth the submarine at Jellicoe Wharf during its five day stay. "What is emphatically not needed is the gratuitous provocation implicit in the Government's decision... What point is served by bringing it so close to the heart of Auckland? Why disrupt trade and shipping when other berths are available which would not have that effect?" The Auckland Harbour Board and the waterfront Unions agreed. They expressed "their joint and strong disapproval of the Government's decision to put the submarine in a prime berth" and Jellicoe Wharf was declared unsafe for working during the five day visit. The Board would berth the ship, said the General Manager, but it would demand indemnity and compensation of several hundred thousand dollars for loss of trade and money during the period.

Preparing for Action

Three weeks before the submarine was due the Auckland Harbour Board announced that new limits of Waitemata Harbour would be gazetted and approved by January 12, one week before the visit of the *Haddo*. In all three previous blockade attempts the flotilla of protest boats had gathered outside Auckland Harbour limits where 'power must give way to sail.' Once inside the entrance, however, small vessels must give way to any vessel over 500 tons and by-laws prohibit approach to within 100 metres of a ship in the harbour. The Peace Squadron protested that by extending the harbour limits several miles out to sea the Government was deliberately attempting to thwart N.Z. citizens legitimate right of peaceful protest. Any actions taken would be out of the public eye, and would permit the Navy, Air Force and police to do what they liked with the protest. The Harbourmaster replied that the extended limits were necessary to ensure safe navigation in the harbour approaches. George Armstrong told a reporter that the extension of the limits "has forced the Peace Squadron to reconsider its protest actions."¹⁰

¹⁰ *Wellington Post*, Dec, 20, 1978.

The plan in the past had been to arrange sail craft in such a position that an incoming vessel would first have to slow down, and finally stop as it came up behind a group of slow-moving yachts in front of a mass of small boats. Although the strategy did not exactly work as planned, because the actions took place outside the harbour limits laws were not broken and the question of civil disobedience could be avoided. The relative emphasis on pressure group tactics, symbolic protest and direct action tactics had not been resolved at the time of the 1976 *Truxton* visit and it had remained unresolved. Now the issue of symbolic action only or symbolic action plus direct action and the likelihood of arrests, could be postponed no longer. The Squadron held its first full meeting on January 8, and an intense debate ensued over strategy options.

A newsletter written by George Armstrong on December 26 and circulated to the media and Squadron members before the meeting expressed his point of view. He noted that the Policy Statement of the Squadron dealt with three subjects: policy, strategy and tactics. "Up to now the 'tactics' have been able to be expressed in a form that is lawful *outside* harbour limits: 'We will act to prevent any ship carrying nuclear weapons or nuclear powered ship by filling channel entrances with small craft so that the responsible captain or pilot of such a ship will not proceed.' Given *Pintado* type tactics and given the Harbour Limits Extension it seems necessary to look hard at these tactics." Armstrong goes on to say:

I myself would like to see maximum orthodox political pressure mobilized this time. Let party leaders, M.P.s, Church leaders, lawful citizens speak up, speak out, swell a mighty media chorus which will speak even louder and clearer than our hitherto very effective and highly dramatic tactics have done. That means far more work. I'm pondering the setting up of a hard-working campaign centre womaned or manned continuously; workers well-briefed, and with well-defined jobs relating to media coverage, telephone persuading, publicity saturation, lobbying civic and other leaders, and so on. These ideas can be implemented whatever we decide about exact tactics. Tactics have to be discussed, however, together with all other considerations. There will be a

MEETING AT THE UNIVERSITY MACLAUREN CHAPEL HALL, PRINCES STREET (near Intercontinental Hotel) on Monday JANUARY 8, 7.30 P.M.

Final decisions about on-the-water tactics have usually been understood to rest with those that implement them - namely boat-owners and skippers. But the above will be a general meeting preparatory to such a decision.

The newsletter concluded with a list of people and places "to phone for enquiries, offers of help, etc." One was the 'Epicentre' (Environment and Peace Information Centre), an office in Auckland Town Hall established as a central resource centre by Friends of the Earth, the Peace Squadron, CND and other peace groups.

Although George Armstrong had expressed to the Squadron his personal preference for symbolic action and political lobbying, he told reporters in an interview before the meeting: "... Our official policy will be what it has always been: to discourage the captain from proceeding. It is not so much a case of breaking the law as of civil disobedience. There are times when that is the only course people can take."¹¹ It seemed the majority of the Peace Squadron members agreed. A Squadron report of the January 8 meeting stated:

The more than one-hundred boat owners present rejected any softening of the Squadron Policy of a complete blockade of the incoming vessel despite the realization that the police-military would probably be ordered to intensify their already dangerous and intimidating response to protest craft and protestors. The Squadron meeting reaffirmed its policy, and decided to bring the blockade well within the harbour, and in full view of the inner city and maritime suburbs. It also rejected the manipulation which permitted the authorities to make "law to order" and thus frustrate the non-violent protest of ordinary citizens.

The report reiterated the Squadron's public relations policy of as far as possible avoiding confrontation with fellow N.Z. citizens (meaning the police and N.Z. naval personnel) and "conversing directly through the incoming nuclear ship with Pentagon politicians whom the Squadron believes to be unduly influencing civilian U.S. and N.Z. defence policies."¹²

On January 12, four members of the Peace Squadron requested a meeting with the Harbourmaster. Questions were asked about the *Haddo* entry, the possible use of tugs,

¹¹ "Fresh tactics to deter 'death ship'." *Auckland Star*, January 6, 1979.

¹² *Information and Media Kit. The Blockade of the USS Haddo, January 1979*

whether helicopters would be used ("Not my choice", said the Harbourmaster) and avenues of complaint or appeal against actions by naval and other authorities deemed violent. "The meeting", said the Peace Squadron report, "yielded little value." The group had met earlier with Area Commander Trappitt, again at their request. The next day, an article appeared in the *N.Z. Herald* in which Assistant Commissioner Trappitt said that groups opposing the visit of the *Haddo* appeared to be deliberately flouting police advice. The police were concerned by reports since this meeting that there would be an attempt at blockading Auckland Harbour when the *Haddo* arrived on January 19. He had pointed out the dangers to protestors if they went ahead with a blockade. George Armstrong responded by pointing out in turn that the meeting was held at the Squadron's request and that they "did not go to hear warnings or receive instruction. They had gone to express their hope that the police would be as concerned as they were about the incoming vessel's and the N.Z. naval armed forces' observance of the law."

Mr. Trappitt has claimed that we have flouted his "warnings". That is not so. We took very careful note of them and are acting upon them. The strongest warning concerned the inability of the attack submarine to manoeuvre at low speeds, and the extreme danger of its large propeller by which alone manoeuvrability is possible. My own careful reflection upon this has led to my insistence with the Harbourmaster that the submarine should not proceed under its own power, but be towed. The N.Z. Code for Nuclear Powered Shipping says this quite specifically in 4:1,b. (page 4) "in the case of nuclear powered submarines, a surface escort vessel, preferably a tug, is mandatory."

Mr. Trappitt has claimed that Law and Order may be "flouted" by civil disobedience. ... Our judgement is that the law was 'flouted' by the *Pintado* entry. For the *Haddo* entry, law has been 'manipulated'. The need for civil disobedience may be a sign that law is currently serving a politically powerful and ruthless segment of the population against the less powerful, whether the less powerful be a minority or (as we believe to be the case in the present) an actual majority. As we see it, it is unjust for a foreign great power, assisted by the N.Z. leadership, to force an entry for a dangerous vessel inside New Zealand's and Auckland's front door. This is being done against the wishes of, and without adequate consultation with, vast numbers of N.Z. citizens. The reasons given have been shown to be entirely inadequate (rest and recreation) or factually false (required by the ANZUS Treaty).¹³

¹³ "Statement by the Rev. Dr. George Armstrong, spokesperson for the Auckland Peace Squadron, in response to reported comments of Police Area Commander Trappitt, concerning a meeting between himself.

While the Prime Minister was claiming that those opposing the U.S. ship visits were "a tiny dissenting minority" the Peace Squadron was insisting that it represented the majority of New Zealand citizens. The ambiguity of the situation made such sleight of hand possible. The 1978 poll had shown that a little more than one-third of the population opposed the Government's policy on accepting ship visits, and this figure could be stretched 'downwards' to "the tiny minority". On the other hand, all political parties except National were opposed to ship visits, and 60 percent of the people who had voted in 1978 voted for parties other than National. Thus the peace movement was able to stretch the degree of opposition 'upward' by assuming that all those voting for these parties agreed with their anti-nuclear policies.

The formalization process was proceeding. The Peace Squadron now had a logo, a flag, official colours, a P.O. address, a newsletter and a shared resource centre. It also had the 'Kiwi Knave' and the good ship *Konundrum*. Danny, one of the people living on Waiheke Island, told me of its creation.

The idea of the 'Kiwi Knave' was promoting the idea that New Zealand could defend itself with grassroots force. Instead of the frigates we have now - which are anachronisms: exceedingly expensive and exceedingly vulnerable [*Dave*: they'd go with one shot... *Bernie*: or a poke with a screwdriver...]. They have no military purpose beyond showing the flag. There are 15,000 yachts or more in New Zealand. So my outfitting one with ordinary people was to show that ... and with this whimsical name of 'Kiwi Knave' it was to be an example. The uniforms were made out of plastic rubbish sacks, and bits of scrap-cloth to make kerchiefs, and cardboard ... symbolic of economical grassroots. White uniforms with blue kerchiefs. We had white plastic hats with blue bands made out of scrap sailcloth. And a six-foot high flag; a stylized Union Jack, with two K's back-to-back, and stars. It's reminiscent of the Union Jack, but isn't.

We brainstormed for ideas. We had all the signal flags up to continue navy tradition. There was some idea of saying "No Nukes" but it ended up scrambled and a delegation from the Auckland Peace Squadron led by Dr. Armstrong on December 20, 1978." *N. Z. Herald*, Jan. 12, 1979.

[laughter]. There were forty flags. We collected a bunch of sewing machines, and had a sewing bee - men and women. I made a lot of them myself. We've got a lot of sail-making skills here, and men know how to sew [laughter]. We had a neighbour who lived next door, and he'd been a flagmaster. So he showed us the techniques. There were as many women as men in the Squadron crews. I made a point of recruiting as many women as possible for the *Konundrum*. Some of the women who went to Greenham Common, walked across America [on the Great Peace March], walked to Wellington All the people involved in those things were on that ship.

"In spite of us being out there and sending press releases and so on," said Danny, "it wasn't recognized."

George Armstrong continued to emphasise in the Peace Squadron meetings and to the press that the protest was anti-nuclear, not anti-U.S. or anti-U.S. naval personnel. "There should be a spirit of good humour and non-aggression. We are not resisting the submarine so much as a whole new system of weaponry coming into the Pacific." Squadron members were urged to fly American as well as N.Z. flags on their boats, and to use the Navy's traditional dial-a-sailor service to invite crew members of the *Haddo* into their homes. "We'll be offering them hospitality like anyone else," said John Simpson. "it's a fine way of actually talking to them about peace." George Armstrong informed the press and the Squadron that they were getting "exceptional international support" for the proposed blockade.¹⁴ The 'Clamshell Alliance' of New Hampshire was organizing a protest at the White House to coincide with the blockade, and 'Mobilization for Survival' was organizing a protest on the west coast of the United States. The newsletter states that up to January 20, the Squadron had received messages of support from 26 peace groups or individuals in the United States, 6 from Australia, 1 from Japan and 1 from Fiji. "Further international messages of support have been received by the Epicentre and Friends of the Earth. Those recorded here are direct messages to the Peace Squadron."

The authorities were refusing to state whether or not helicopters would be used with the *Haddo* entry. The Peace Squadron announced a few days before the scheduled visit

¹⁴ *Auckland Star*, Jan. 15, 1979.

that they would be taking kites, helium-filled balloons and other obstacles for helicopters on the boats. "Thereupon," said Bernard Rhodes, "negotiations opened up between the police and the Peace Squadron, and there was an agreement that they wouldn't use helicopters if we didn't use balloons and kites and so on. They got quite worried" [laughter]. Dave Wray informed the media that he planned to include in his crew two pregnant women, six children - the youngest two weeks old - and his grandmother (no room for the dog this time apparently). The announcement brought a spate of letters to the papers accusing him and anyone else who included children in the protest of "gross irresponsibility". Assistant Commissioner Trappit talked of prosecutions under the Cruelty to Children and Young Persons Act. George Armstrong announced that although the Squadron had not yet set its policy on children in boats, there seemed to be a strong feeling against involving children.

The press reported that six groups had announced their intention of seeking a Supreme Court injunction to prevent the *Haddo* berthing in Auckland Harbour. Those involved were the Peace Squadron, Friends of the Earth, New Zealand Peace Studies Foundation, Greenpeace, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Auckland branch of the United Nations Association. George Armstrong informed readers of the newsletter that the groups had employed a lawyer to bring the injunction against the Government and the Harbour Board for failing to adhere to its own N.Z. Code for Nuclear Shipping in terms of adequate civil defence preparations and safety measures. Although, he added, "the legal effectiveness of such an injunction has yet to be tested." The newsletter also reported the probable failure of attempts to contact Daniel Ellsberg and fly him to New Zealand. The idea had been to have an American of international reputation come to New Zealand to support the protests.

Interest in the event was not confined to Auckland. The editorial of the *Christchurch Press* on January 15, under the title "Waiting for Haddo" stated:

Visits to Auckland by American nuclear warships are becoming an annual summer event, timed as if to give anti-nuclear groups the prospect of pleasant conditions for a protest sail on

Waitemata Harbour. ...

A spokesman for the protest flotilla (which continues, quaintly, to usurp to itself the title of "peace squadron") has said that any protest when the *Haddo* arrives will be "non-violent and lawful". ...

The editor went on to declare that it was difficult to understand what the protestors were protesting about, as the risk of a nuclear accident is negligible, and nuclear-propelled ships, like nuclear power, are not going to go away..

There remains more than a suspicion that the protest is directed especially against the United States in a desire to obstruct, or at least irritate briefly, this country's most important ally. For 30 years, the ANZUS Treaty has been the cornerstone of New Zealand's security, endorsed by a succession of Governments, and certainly not seriously questioned in the recent General Election. For a nation which lives by its sea-borne trade, the support of the American Navy is essential. New Zealand cannot hope to defend its trade routes by itself; if it is to expect others to share the task, it cannot deny access to this country's ports to American vessels. ..

Soon after the visit of the *Pintado*, Les Church had moved to the small town of Napier where he was ordained as an Anglican priest.

Just after I moved there it was announced that the *Haddo* was coming to Auckland. My immediate response was "I must go to Auckland." Then I thought if I do, I haven't got a boat. I'm just another person to be fitted on. It would be more useful for me to stay and do something here. So I set about organizing a march in Napier to co-ordinate with the *Haddo* arrival.

There were a lot of things the local people were not comfortable about, but we managed to get a march. Once again, plugging into local networks, getting people to come along. Making it a fun thing: It was very difficult to get people to speak at it too. But it came off. The media wasn't sympathetic, but it was reasonably unbiased.

One New Zealand Church made an official statement on the visit of the *Haddo*. The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church declared the General Assembly's unqualified opposition: ..."Whatever we may believe about the advisability of nuclear power there

can be no doubt on Christian grounds that the development of nuclear weapons in the present greatest-ever arms race is not only suicidal for mankind; it is blatant defiance of God the Creator, and of his purpose for the world." The Moderator urged all thinking people, especially Christians, to "press the Government to have done with all commitments to this Satanic business." On January 17, the Rt. Hon. W. E. Rowling, leader of the Labour Party and Opposition Leader in Parliament, issued a press statement condemning the visit of the USS *Haddo*, and reaffirming his Party's policy of a nuclear-free Pacific. On January 18, Labour M.P. and former Minister for Maori Affairs, the Hon. Mattiu Rata, announced that he had sent a telegram to President Carter condemning the visit, and holding the President personally responsible for any injury to New Zealanders during the submarine's visit. Rata told reporters that he was concerned about the possibility of injury or even a fatality during the protest. As there had been no response from the N.Z. Government to pleas for cancellation of the visit, he felt the time had come to appeal directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces.¹⁵

On January 18, the day before the *Haddo* was due to arrive, the *New Zealand Herald* announced that letters to the editor had reached a ratio of approximately two-to-one against the protestors. So many letters on the subject had been received, the editor said, that it was possible to print only representative selections. On the same day, an Auckland waterfront suburb declared itself a nuclear-free zone, stated its strong support for the Peace Squadron, and said the community had decided to set itself apart from the rest of the country "in view of the Government's obvious rejection of a nuclear-free South Pacific." Police Chief Trappitt announced that a number of private boats had been hired to assist the police in dealing with the demonstration. Police would board and tow away any boats refusing to get out of the way of the submarine, and boat owners would be liable to prosecution under Harbour regulations, and possibly under the Defence Act. North Shore Ferries announced that it would again be running an excursion into the Harbour, stating that about 500 people had watched the entry of the *Pintado*, but "the number tomorrow is expected to be even greater." An attempt by the waterside workers' union to clog the berth earmarked for the *Haddo* by delaying the shifting of vessels there failed. Harbour staff

¹⁵ *New Zealand Herald*,

were said to be struggling to clear away 500 coils of steel cable on the wharf before the submarine docked.

The morning newspapers also carried details of the Navy's plan to escort the *Haddo* into the Harbour. Two white-painted launches would be stationed on either side of the submarine to mark off the area from which protestors and spectators must stay clear. Any craft closer than 100-metres to the submarine would clearly be breaking the law. The Peace Squadron held its final meeting on the night of January 18, and the 100 or so boat owners present agreed that the confrontation would take place as planned. It was decided at the meeting that no small children would be permitted in small boats. John Simpson, warned that mass arrests were possible. He added "I believe there is enough feeling to convey to the captain that we are not moving." He also believed the submarine would stop because if it "mowed boats down" there would be an international incident.

The official time of the submarine's arrival at Jellicoe Wharf was 12.30 p.m. At the last minute, news was "leaked" to the Squadron that the *Haddo* (like the third little pig) intended to arrive well ahead of time and berth soon after dawn. N.Z. naval officials denied the rumour, saying that such a ruse "would not be Navy style." The strategy decided on by the Peace Squadron was the massing of small craft in the inner harbour between North Head and Bastion Point. This would bring the action within full view of the inner city and maritime suburbs, thus not only making the demonstration more effective but reducing the possibility of the authorities repeating the tactics of the *Pintado* visit. Both sides stood prepared for confrontation. This time, however, it was the well-laid plans of the authorities which were destined to go awry.

Close Encounters of the Nuclear Kind

As January 19 dawned, a light drizzle was falling. By mid-morning the sun was shining, the sea was calm and about 100 protest boats and 50 welcoming boats were waiting for *Haddo*. The hills and roads surrounding the Harbour were crowded with spectators, and the ferry was crammed with passengers, most of them waving anti-nuclear banners or Peace Squadron flags and calling out encouragement to Squadron crews. Press

and television crews hovered overhead. The scene on the water resembled a carnival with flags, banners, balloons and music. On the south shore of Waitemata Harbour a 'sports event' was attracting a cheering crowd of spectators. Some twenty protestors had made a raft out of petrol drums and were attempting to launch it while about the same number of police were attempting to prevent it, declaring the raft a danger to other vessels on the Harbour. The tide was helping the protestors and a tug-or-war ensued, with the police up to their knees in water. Eventually a tow truck pulled the raft back to shore.

The *Haddo* had surfaced eight miles out to sea at 9.40 a.m. and led by the *Waikato* was heading towards the Harbour entrance. A large flotilla of police boats with two helicopters took off to join with navy launches in creating a two-ring barrier around the submarine. As the incoming vessels rounded North Head shortly before midday they were confronted by about 200 small boats - protestors, welcomers, police - all pressed together and strung across the narrow 100 foot Harbour entrance. Because of the near collision between the *Pintado* and the *Waikato* a greater distance was being kept between the escort vessel and the *Haddo*. The *Waikato* managed to make its way through the pack, but then some of the larger police and navy launches drew well ahead of the submarine. A crush of small boats now lay directly in the path of the *Haddo* and across the width of the narrow channel. Protest boats quickly infiltrated the remainder of the cordon, a smokebomb was let off, and, as one Navy man told a press reporter, ... "They threw themselves at the *Haddo* like a waterborne rugby-scrum." What followed, said one participant, was "fifteen minutes of pure hell."

The helicopters had stayed well back and the submarine was proceeding slowly at 5 knots. Many small craft were swept into the *Haddo's* bow waves and others scraped along the sides. Grappling hooks were used to push or tow the boats aside but as fast as the police teams cleared the way the flotilla would reform. Confusion increased as other boats took avoiding action. Soon a number of capsized dinghies, kayaks, surfboards and a few swimmers were streaming down the sides of the submarine, some dangerously near to the barely-submerged propeller. A young canoeist, Terry Bell, said of this experience:

When the *Haddo* broke through the main blockade at the channel entrance I made my run across her course and that took me right across the *Haddo's* bows. All I remember was that the bow wave was a hell of a lot bigger than I had ever imagined. .. It was all over in a flash. One moment I was shooting up the bow wave and the next - crunch. I found myself wedged between the hull of the *Haddo* and a speedboat which was held in against the hull while two people in the stern pitched paint bombs at the conning tower. ... I stood up, one foot in the kayak, the other on the *Haddo*, holding on to the speedboat's windscreen, and unsure of which way to go when a guy from the boat stretched out his hand. I thought he was going to help me into the boat, but he took off and leaped onto the submarine. So I changed places with him and jumped into the speedboat, which roared off with what looked like half the police squadron in hot pursuit (quoted Newnham, 1985:41).

One of the men who had thrown eggshells of yellow paint (radiation colour) onto the submarine was Pat Murray McQuarrie, a WW2 fighter pilot, top rugby player, coach and local hero. The man who leapt onto the submarine was Stephen Sherie, a 27-year-old labourer from a country town 40 miles south of Auckland. Terry Bell continues:

Pat is a brilliant driver. How he dodged some of those police boats was incredible. But then one of them came straight at us. Pat swung, there was a crunch, then - nothing. We had stopped dead, although the boat that had been heading for us had already screamed away past our stern. That's when I looked down over the side and saw blue shirts! We were sitting right on top of a police boat, and the crew were pushing, trying to lift us off. Philip jumped over the side, and while the police reached over to get him out of the water I dived under their bow and started swimming like hell for Devonport. I really didn't want to be late for work (quoted Newnham, 1985:47).

Fifteen minutes later, it was all over. Once past the flotilla of protest boats, the submarine increased speed and proceeded without difficulty to Jellicoe Wharf. It berthed almost exactly on time at 12.30 p.m. "The day ended with seven arrests, several damaged boats, plenty of dunkings - and claims of irresponsible behaviour from representatives of most of the participants in the drama," reported the *New Zealand Herald* next day. Recalling the action, Dave Wray said:

After the *Haddo* they interviewed the captain. He was really shaken. He said "I have to admire the courage of these people." A few hours later he'd changed his

tune very much; I think he'd had a message from H.Q.: 'You're not supposed to say that' (laughter). I think the *Haddo* must have blown that man's mind, because I had never seen such a mass of boats in such a confined space. And they'd given the police a whole lot of hired runabouts with powerful outboard motors on them, and they weren't very skilled at using them. I saw one boat accelerate and jump over another boat. It actually left the water and rose up over this other boat. I just couldn't believe my eyes. They were just policemen brought from all over the country, and they put them in boats.

Stephen Sherie found himself the man of the hour. The *Auckland Star* carried a huge front-page photo and banner headline: "BOARDED - HOT WELCOME FOR A YELLOW SUBMARINE. Said news commentators that night: "... Like Zorba the Greek he began a dance, half of defiance, half of joy on the very nose of the incoming sub ..." ... "The image was a powerful one - the lone figure in his life jacket, arms raised in anger on the back of this strange sea creature with the hills of Auckland harbour behind." Even a *Sunday Times* journalist known for his lack of sympathy for the Peace Squadron was moved to say:

[T]hey achieved what in the most traditional of seafaring combat tactics was always worth a few points. They boarded the enemy. Out of the total confusion of the protestors' galvanic thrust at *Haddo* there emerged an unheroic-looking hero. He leaped - it seemed from the sea itself - onto the bow, and there, bespectacled and slightly slack-looking, he held his arms aloft. Then he sat down and hung on. He had some minutes of this glory, while all about him cockleshell craft dipped and overturned, were run over, were shoved, tossed, pulled and towed in a hopeless confusion of activity. Then the hatch behind the turret opened, and a mini-mass of submariners went forward, and, after exchanging views, led the momentary hero below ..."

The *Haddo* in Auckland

On January 19, a large, framed notice appeared in the *Auckland Star*. It said:

USS HADDO

To Commanders, Officers and Crew

**We the undersigned join the majority of New Zealanders in welcoming you
to our country and trust your visit is enjoyable.**

There followed 24 signatures of people from seven towns or suburbs. On the same day the *Wellington Evening Post* ran a front-page article about the events on the water, declaring that:

... The crowd which turned out to see *Haddo* cruise into harbour threatens to turn such events into bigger social occasions than the Anniversary Day regatta. Apart from the waterborne reception committees, Tamak Drive was thick with cars. People with binoculars lined the drive. Hundreds of sight-seers crammed into Savage Memorial Park and North Head for larger views of the arrival.

The next morning, a front-page report in the *N.Z. Herald* bore the heading: **VIEWS CLASH ON HADDO PROTEST** and the sub-heading: **Sea-going hoodlums - or determined and courageous people?** These, said the report, were two of the descriptions levelled at the dozens of people who created brief chaos on the Waitemata Harbour yesterday. The commander of the submarine, Commander N.W. Mims, told reporters: "The entry was frightening because of the danger the protestors put themselves in. Their protest could not be described as responsible." He said he was determined that it should not spoil his crew's visit to the city for rest and recreation. "The protest has made no impact on me, and has not put a damper on the trip." Commander Ian Hunter of the frigate, *Waikato*, said the protest seemed rather ineffective. "If we enter or leave Auckland on any fine weekend we have almost as many problems as we did today." It was Assistant Commissioner of Police Trappitt who described the demonstrators as "sea-going hoodlums" rather than protestors, and said the biggest danger was "their complete disregard of the danger to their own craft and even their lives." He added that protest boats might have to be banned from gathering in the harbour in future because of the danger they posed. The protestors, said the report, saw their action in a different light:

A spokesman for the Peace Squadron, Dr. G. A. W. Armstrong, commented: "It was a very satisfactory protest in many respects. It was an absolutely determined effort by courageous people. ... The fact that helicopters played only a minor role, not an aggressive one, and the slower speed

of the *Haddo*, meant that the authorities were much more responsible this time." The police and Navy had performed extremely well in difficult conditions. ... "I would love to be able to stop behaving like this. ... I would love it not to be necessary. But part of the problem is that unless you show determination to oppose something that is wrong, you have little opportunity of influencing those big decisions which affect the lives of everyone."¹⁶

An article by a journalist member of the Peace Squadron published the day after the visit was headed, **A CLOSE ENCOUNTER OF THE NUCLEAR KIND**. It began:

'Old Yellow Stain' - that's what the Peace Squadron has christened the American nuclear sub *Haddo*, now lying snugly at Auckland's Jellicoe Wharf and that was about the only funny aspect of the affair. Close encounters of the nuclear kind are definitely episodes to be avoided. Especially if you're on a small, bucking protest boat engaged in trying to intercept a monster like *Haddo*.¹⁷

The *Auckland Star* declared '**Boaties may cop it after protest**' and said authorities were making a renewed call for small boat owners to register their craft and to face a penalties system similar to that applying to motorists. Some senior police and naval officers today had privately conceded that the effort to escort the *Haddo* in was not entirely successful. Although about "as massive and as costly" as it was possible to mount, "the small craft got through the cordon of police craft almost effortlessly. One senior naval officer said yesterday's effort only showed that there is no way of stopping determined demonstrators from doing this."¹⁸

CANWAR (Campaign Against Nuclear Warships), the land-based arm of the Squadron supplied buttons, badges and stickers, organized a vigil on the wharf and organized a 'peace march' on the evening of the *Haddo* arrival. The *N.Z. Herald* printed a picture of the event under the caption, **The Best Half-hour Show In Town**. On January 22, the following report appeared in the *N. Z. Herald* :

Jellicoe Wharf took on a carnival weekend atmosphere as thousands of Aucklanders went to

¹⁶ *The N.Z. Herald*, Jan. 20, 1979.

¹⁷ Robert Jones, *8 O'clock Saturday*, January 20, 1979.

¹⁸ January 20, 1979.

glimpse the paint-splattered USS *Haddo*, and to offer hospitality to the crew. After a fortnight of being cooped up in the nuclear submarine and the stormy reception by protestors on Friday, the crew grabbed the offers with both hands. But with hundreds of invitations and a constant cluster of eager hosts at the wharf gates, the crew was finding the goodwill a bit exhausting. ... "We'll have to put out to sea if we want to get any sleep," said one. Not that he was complaining. Other crew members said Auckland was the friendliest port they had ever visited. Its reputation was spreading rapidly through the United States Navy.

Those taking sailors out said it was a good way to learn about the life of people from a different country. Many said they wanted to make up for the hostile reception the sailors received at the harbour. Most of the crew spoken to by the *Herald* yesterday said they did not mind the protest. "The protestors are protesting about nuclear-power, but we sailors are not nuclear-powered, although it would be an advantage considering the number of invitations we have received," said one crewman.

A 50-strong protest group mounted a vigil at the wharf for most of yesterday afternoon.

The *N. Z. Herald* of January 24 reported a fresh crop of letters to the editor as the USS *Haddo* lay at its berth, and again published a representative selection. The major arguments against hosting the warships were the risk of nuclear accidents and of New Zealand becoming a nuclear target, the immorality of nuclear weapons and the morality of civil disobedience in the struggle against nuclearism. Those against the demonstrations mostly argued for realism as against idealism, the necessity for a small country to be defended by a powerful nation, ANZUS obligations, the offence to New Zealanders' traditional hospitality and, a point frequently made, the presence in New Zealand of nuclear medicine and the consequent irrationality of insisting that the country be nuclear-free. An earlier letter by an Auckland physics professor extolling the citizens of San Diego for their accepting attitude towards nuclear warships and nuclear power drew much criticism. Said one woman writer: "Professor Earnshaw appears to think complacency is an admirable human characteristic. ... Earth is getting to be too small a nest for us to engage in the activity which eventually makes the nest uninhabitable."

On January 24, at 7.00 a.m., the USS *Haddo* slipped quietly out of Waitemati Harbour, accompanied by a couple of Navy patrol boats and police launches. A few Peace

Squadron boats - a trimaran, a yacht, two dinghies and a canoe - gathered off North Head to watch it leave. Their large placards declared that crew-members were welcome to return anytime as visitors to New Zealand, but 'No More Nuclear Ships'. The peace movement had been quick to point out that for the five days of its stay, the submarine had been flanked by three ships of the Soviet-bloc: a Russian cruise ship, a Russian freighter loading wool and a Polish freighter unloading its cargo. In March, 1979, Stephen Sherie was charged with wilfully obstructing a constable, disorderly behaviour and being unlawfully on board a boat. "He raised his arms and shouted 'Yahoo', and then 'Turn this bloody thing around'," said a police inspector who had been on the submarine. The first charge was dismissed for lack of evidence and the second was dismissed because the magistrate had some doubts as to whether such behaviour would offend a right-thinking member of the community. The submarine-rider was found guilty on the third charge, however, and fined \$275. Canoeist Terry Bell did not evade the police after diving into the water and probably did not get to work on time. He was fined \$100 for wilfully obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty and for behaving in a disorderly manner. One man charged and fined said he was prepared to risk his life if it would stop the submarine. In all, 7 protestors (not all of them members of the Peace Squadron) received fines ranging between \$50 and \$275.

No ships of the nuclear navies visited New Zealand for the remainder of 1979. Towards the end of 1980, it was announced that the nuclear-powered USS *Truxton* would shortly be arriving in Wellington. The forthcoming visit was used as the basis for a national survey of public opinion in September, 1980. The statement: *In the near future the American nuclear-powered ship the USS Truxton is coming into a New Zealand port* was followed by the question: "Are you in favour of nuclear-powered ships coming into New Zealand ports?" The poll revealed that 49 percent of New Zealanders favoured such visits, 34 percent opposed them and 17 percent had no opinion. (In 1978 the corresponding figures had been 51.7 'yes', 38.7 'no' and 9.5 'don't know'). When the ship arrived in Wellington it was met by a small flotilla of boats in a largely symbolic protest, while about 1,000 people took part in a lunch-time march through the city. The N.Z. Peace Squadron had been born in Auckland, and it remained largely a phenomenon of

its birthplace.

For the next two years, for whatever reason, no nuclear warships called at New Zealand's ports.¹⁹ During this period, however, the country experienced some of the most violent demonstrations and bitter social divisions in its history. The trauma centred around the issue of racism and what many New Zealanders claim is the national religion: rugby.

¹⁹ Anne Martindale was U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand during the Carter Administration and served from August 1979 to May 1981. During the Senate sub-committee hearings on the *Buchanan* incident, Martindale claimed that she was responsible for the cessation of warship visits. She had been deeply shocked, she said, by the sight of the woman and baby in the small boat and the generally dangerous nature of the protests. "I decided that it was just really not in the best interests of the United States to take that risk ... it was really up to me to make the decision, so I made it." The U.S. Navy, however, rejected this interpretation of events, saying that no warships had visited New Zealand because the need to do so had not arisen.

CHAPTER 7

SPREADING NUCLEAR ALLERGY

[During the Springbok Tour] there was a realization that any society, whether Germany or New Zealand had the ability to behave in a very barbarous way. We had up till then been able to sit back and say, "Those dreadful Germans, look at what they're doing to the Jews, or those dreadful Africans, look what they're doing to each other." But there was a sort of realization that we as a nation could do it, and do it to each other. And that was frightening. And I think that's one of the reasons the peace movement took off. Because we all had to look at ourselves very closely, and see that we could do these horrific things.

- Dr. Joan Chappell, N.Z. surgeon and peace activist

Rugby, Racism and Radicalism

The Springbok Tour of 1981

New Zealand considers that it leads the world in rugby and its historic rival is South Africa. Until WW2, the fact that non-whites were excluded from South African tours was a non-issue for New Zealanders; as Secretary of Defence Dennis Maclean said during our interview, "It was an easy national obsession that we should go on beating the daylights out of South Africa on the football field, and nobody really thought that there might be a question of principle involved." The first post-war South African rugby tour was set for 1949. "It was then," said MacLean,

that a N.Z. general who was something of a folk-hero - a revered citizen soldier - declared that as Maori and Pakeha had been united in fighting together in the deserts it was simply not good enough for New Zealanders to kow-tow to South African values and not send Maoris in a New Zealand team to South Africa. This caused a tremendous uproar and the General was heavily criticised. But the debate went on and got translated to another plane when it had to be decided not only what we did nationally, but internationally in response to race questions. This became quite divisive - and still is divisive. A clash between principle and expediency.

The debate did indeed go on. It surfaced again in the 1960's, and again during the Third Labour Government's term in office when the Rugby Union organized an all-white All-Blacks (the national Rugby team) tour of South Africa in the mid-1970's. An anti-apartheid movement formed, and pressured the Government to intervene. The Government did so, and announced that no rugby team could visit South Africa without Maori players. The HART (Halt All Racist Tours) movement then began working to boycott all New Zealand sporting contacts with South Africa, and to sever trade and cultural links until the system of apartheid ceased. In 1981, the Rugby Union invited the South African Springboks to tour New Zealand. The invitation was accepted with the proviso that no Maori player should be included among New Zealand players. New Zealand had signed the Edinburgh declaration against apartheid in sport and many New Zealanders declared the tour would abrogate the agreement. Prime Minister Muldoon expressed some disapproval, but declared the Government had no power to prevent the Rugby Union issuing invitations to the sporting teams of another country.

The tour took place in the winter of 1981. As the matches moved from town to town the protests spread and the people polarized. Thousands of anti-tour demonstrators took to the streets each weekend, often encountering not only police but angry rugby supporters as well. The result was baton-swinging police in full riot gear, police dogs, barricades, barbed wire and the increasing use of violence against the demonstrators.¹ As in the U.S. civil rights' movement of the 1960's, many white liberal-minded members of New Zealand's middle-class mobilized to demonstrate against racial injustice. The tour is said by New Zealanders to have marked the end of the country's 'innocence' and demolished two of its most basic and cherished myths: the myth of a harmonious, non-racist, non-violent society (see Norman Kirk's speech, pp.140-1) and the myth of the friendly policeman. Many opponents of apartheid initially believed that all that was

¹ A newspaper picture at the time of the tour shows George Armstrong walking in front of a row of riot police before the opening of a game and appealing to them to show restraint. Only one match was actually cancelled. This happened at the South Island town of Hamilton, when Pat McQuarrie (one of the men responsible for "the yellow submarine") took a Cessna aircraft from Taupo airport, flew over the field and threatened to land on it if the match took place.

necessary to stop the tour was to bring its racist nature to public attention. Efforts at consciousness-raising, however, frequently had the opposite effect, provoking such comments as "If this country had as many blacks as South Africa we'd need apartheid too."

Personal confrontations with baton-wielding police meant that for the first time many New Zealanders recognized the police force for what it actually is: a weapon of social control in the hands of a ruling elite. The woman doctor quoted at the head of this chapter said:

The Springbok tour got out of control. That *really* showed police are an arm of the government. I still haven't recovered from seeing the way the police behaved then. Here I am, a middle-aged, middle-class woman who's always been law-abiding and I find I still have emotional, antagonistic feelings about the police. It brought people out in thousands. You'd be walking in rows of eight, and you would turn right and suddenly find yourself facing the police. Just ordinary policemen; half of them didn't want to be there and might have families in the protest. It was really quite horrifying to the extent that when the Springboks actually left, and you'd been going out twice a week to these marches - which were themselves traumatic because you didn't know what might happen; you left the children somewhere and went - they were involving to the extent that when they stopped, there was almost withdrawal symptoms.

Another woman said:

The husband of a friend of mine - an Englishman - said when he saw Muldoon issuing police with long batons instead of short ones, "That means trouble." And his wife said, "Don't be silly. They're here to protect us. We've never had police use batons on a crowd." Any protestor was fair game ... people like myself ... I went to one violent demonstration where I found myself screaming at cops because of the way they were treating protestors in the front line. I was so emotionally upset that when it came to the final test I actually couldn't go. There was such turmoil in me about what was happening in our society which we'd always prided ourselves - maybe we were wrong - on being a non-violent society. I think, in fact, we unleashed a lot of stuff ... things came out ... we weren't non-violent, but very good at keeping the lid on.

One woman who had been a lecturer at the Police College during this time said that while taking part in a protest demonstration she suddenly found herself face to face with several of her colleagues. She felt she could no longer work with them and resigned. Another told of an occasion when some demonstrators dressed as clowns in an attempt to lighten the grimness of the confrontations. They did not escape the batons. "When I saw police doing that to the clowns," she said, "I knew something terrible was happening to this country." Another woman said that in the early days of the tour she had taken her teen-age children with her to the demonstrations. "But the crowd would suddenly give way under a police onslaught and you would find yourself right in the front row. It was very frightening and very dangerous. So I made them stay home." A woman academic also mentioned the ritual and 'addictive' nature of the protests:

Going out on Saturday to demonstrate was just a way of life that winter. I remember being at a conference one weekend and this man was giving a paper. Around midday, everyone in the room started shuffling their feet and looking at their watches till the poor man finally stopped, and asked if anything was the matter. So we all said, "It's twelve o'clock!" He said, "Right!" So we all got up and went outside and sat on the front steps of the building. A policeman came past and asked what was going on and we told him, "We're demonstrating." He said "O.K." We sat there for about half an hour, then we went back inside and heard the rest of the paper. We felt we'd done our duty.

New Zealand is a small country with high social visibility. While 'shaming' can work to inhibit extra-legal activity it can also work to promote it. One woman said, "A retired minister and his wife lived a few doors down the street from me then. They were both about eighty. Every Saturday afternoon I'd see them going off hand-in-hand to the demonstrations. How could I stay home?" The more evenly a society splits on a normative issue, the more likely it is that people will be forced to take sides and that the confrontation will be bitter. Rugby as the national sport and the chief vehicle for international status lies close to the N.Z. nerve, and passionate supporters and equally passionate antagonists are found at all levels of N.Z. society.² One woman who said her

² Because rugby is a male sport *par excellence* and dominated by men, it has become a major focus for

involvement with social justice issues began with the exclusion of the Maoris from the 1960's tour said:

The Springbok tour brought together for the first time a broad cross-section of people. You saw everybody [at the demonstrations]. You also saw everybody going into the matches. And you realized they were people just like you. It split families in two; it was really traumatic for New Zealand. It did throw police into a turmoil because of the type of people involved. You did have a radical element, but you also had older, middle-class, establishment people; women who looked as if they were out for a Sunday afternoon stroll. And because you had that cross-section, it made people realize that you could protest, could achieve something. The movement had theologians, teachers, university students, businessmen, WILPF women - older women who have been there wholeheartedly from the beginning, Quaker pacifist women from way back. Now they were being joined by their grandchildren.

As this statement suggests, the tour had the effect of mobilizing many younger people who had never before taken part in demonstrations as well as the veterans of earlier campaigns. A young woman in the Prime Minister's Office in Parliament House said:

The tour changed my life. I was involved in all the Wellington protests. I'd never dreamed of doing anything radical before that. I remember once that a lot of us [from the Department] went into Parliament, and when they said the Lord's Prayer we all stood up and said it very loudly. Then we remained standing, and just stared at the Prime Minister. They ejected us, and they weren't going to let us back in. Then they found out we all worked here!

John Boanas says of the tour:

There were some of the ugliest scenes in our history - if you discount the Pakeha-Maori wars which were the ugliest. Divorces families completely struck down the middle. Only one of our staff was involved - a truck driver who threatened to run me over if he saw me on the streets. There was lots of violence, increasing loss of control-
women's anti-patriarchal actions and sentiments. One result of the Springbok tour was the emergence of a group calling itself WAR, Women Against Rugby.

management and a real problem how to manage the anti-tour thing. What exploded was the myth of the impartiality of the police. They were clever, the front line was manned by Maoris. God, to see all those black faces

The lack of control expressed the nature of the struggle after years of Muldoonism. There was the depression, WW 2, Vietnam and then Muldoon. The Muldoon era had the same effect as Vietnam. You could mount a campaign against Muldoon. He was one of the greatest populist leaders. ... We have this under-achieving thing, we're dull. Then suddenly this terror went right through our dullness; the great, fat insulation we have in front of our brains; it suddenly shot right through that. We're just as manipulative and racist as the worst white-settler societies. How many people went on marches? How many people got beaten up? Not a hell of a lot, though they were pretty big marches. But it pulled in the middle-class You saw a lot of mobilization because they were frightened by this thing.

The clamping down of the National government on visitors from Pacific Island countries who stayed on illegally also had the effect of focusing public attention on the subject of racism. As one woman informant said, "The over-stayer issue caused a lot of trouble. People were stopped in the street and asked for identity, and there were dawn raids. The Maoris were involved because they're dark. And there was quite a revulsion about that." While the tour high-lighted the problematics of Maori-Pakeha relations in N.Z. society, many of those who had been caught up in the traumatic events of that winter also described them in terms of national maturity, "It was important that New Zealand grew up to take its part in the world" or, as one man said, "During the Springbok tour, the country lost its virginity." The quotation at the head of this chapter clearly reflects this sense of lost innocence. Like individuals, it seems that growing-up as a nation requires the rejection of romantic illusions about the self.³

The 1981 General Election

By the end of the tour, the political campaigns for the next general election were in full swing. Social Credit maintained its anti-nuclear stance as did the Values Party, although the latter was now more of a social movement than a political party. Labour's

³ The situation is reminiscent of the effect of the famous - or infamous - study by Stanley Milgram *et. al.* of the authoritarian personality, which revealed the ordinary American's willingness to inflict pain on a fellow citizen if commanded to do so by an authority figure.

policy statement on nuclear ship visits had been honed to specifically address the claim of the Muldoon Government that membership in ANZUS required ship or aircraft visits and that any policy which did not permit this would put the treaty in jeopardy. The statement read: "Labour reaffirms its opposition to nuclear warships or aircraft visiting New Zealand. Neither this policy nor Labour's support of a nuclear-free zone treaty in the Pacific is contrary to the ANZUS Treaty. ... The ANZUS Treaty does not require members to accept visits by particular types of vessels or aircraft operated by alliance members." The anti-nuclear message was repeated elsewhere in the policy statement: "The next Labour Government, in accordance with its desire to promote a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, will continue to oppose visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-carrying craft."

The National Party maintained its established policy of accepting ship and aircraft visits from the Western nuclear states, and - at least according to Labour supporters and those on the political Left - the Prime Minister sought to turn the trauma of the Springbok tour into political capital. One of my informants said:

Muldoon had been very successful politically in being able to tap the working-class, middle-class, right-wing vote in many areas. Rugby spans all of those working-class, middle-class and right-wing areas. Muldoon used the tour as an electoral lever to thrust his support system into a pugilistic posture: "Rugby and liberty against left-wing lunacy, anti-freedom, anti-culture" - because rugby *is* culture in New Zealand. Muldoon used the tour as a complete political weapon - social, emotional - right across the board. He saw it as a real test of his ability to sustain Muldoonism.

'Muldoonism' was sustained - but only just; the Government was returned to office with a majority of two. One new member of the National Party Parliamentary Caucus was 23 year-old Marilyn Waring. Her uncle had been a long-time National Party M.P. and when he retired she stood for his seat and won.⁴ She was a feminist and a peace activist

⁴ I was told by a friend of Marilyn Waring that the latter had chosen as an M.A. thesis topic the process of running for election. Her advisor suggested that she obtain her data by personal participation, so she stood for the seat vacated by her uncle. I was unable to contact Waring to check this account.

who in the past year had organized a Women's Peace Run to bring a peace petition begun by European women to the N.Z. Parliament. While the petition was anti-nuclear, it did not raise the question of the country's role in the nuclear infrastructure nor challenge the country's membership in ANZUS. Nevertheless, as will be seen, the entry of Marily Waring into the parliamentary arena had the effect, if I may be forgiven the metaphor, of putting a cat among the Government pigeons.

The Warships Return

Shortly after taking office, President Ronald Reagan appointed a friend, Mr. H. Munroe Browne, as U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand. The subject of ship visits was raised at a press interview and the new Ambassador said:

If the United States is going to play the role that seems to be expected of us, we are going to have to have ships in the Pacific. We have got to feel that they are going to be welcomed by our friends and allies. Certainly that is the case in New Zealand because the Government has made it clear that our vessels are welcome ... The Government has encouraged us, the military has encouraged us, and the bulk of the people I visit with are deeply appreciative of what the United States is doing. ... We want these ships to be on regular, scheduled business trips. They are not just out showing flags. This is serious business we are about (quoted Newnham, 1985: 48).

In response to the suggestion that many New Zealanders were concerned about the visits, the Ambassador replied: "I do not see that in substance of numbers. ... I am well aware there has been, among some, expressions of disapproval. I have got to think that these are people who do not understand, or want to understand, the facts as we are facing them" (quoted Newnham, 1985:48).

When the annual Labour Party Conference met in Wellington in May 1982, it had before it a resolution proposing unilateral withdrawal by New Zealand from all military alliances. Party Leader Bill Rowling and Deputy Leader David Lange cautioned against acceptance of the resolution until the Party's view that the Treaty could accommodate a nuclear weapon-free zone had been tested. David Lange asked the Party to put its confidence in the leadership on this question. Nevertheless, most of those present

appeared to agree with the statement by one Party member that ANZUS was "a nuclear magnet that would attract a devastating nuclear hail" and the resolution passed with an overwhelming majority. Although Party policy remains in the hands of the policy council and the Government is not bound by Party decisions, the leadership was concerned about this and similar past remits, and work began towards achieving a compromise position on the ANZUS issue.

The Visit of the USS *Truxton*

Immediately after the Labour Party conference, the U.S. Embassy issued a statement concerning the USS *Truxton* which was scheduled to berth in Wellington within a few days. The statement contained an oblique reference to the conference debate and the ANZUS resolution: "... Our reading of the New Zealand electorate gives them a lot more credit than some people apparently do for their understanding of global issues, and their sophistication about things nuclear. ... The USS *Truxton* was welcomed by a large majority of New Zealanders two years ago. ... We have no reasons to believe that New Zealand's hospitality and common-sense have declined since then." Party Leader, Bill Rowling, responded: "That really is offensive. It is arrogance for people from another country to tell New Zealanders they know more about their country than New Zealanders. They seem to confuse totally that New Zealanders can perceive the difference between servicemen who do the job they are told, and politicians who make the decisions" (quoted Newnham, 1985:48).

The results of a May 1982 opinion poll, however, appeared to support Mr. Monroe Browne's interpretation. When given the same statement and question as before: "*In the near future the American nuclear-powered ship, the USS Truxton is coming to a New Zealand port. Are you in favour of nuclear-powered ships coming into New Zealand ports?*" the response was 'Yes', 50 percent, 'No', 38 percent and 'Don't know', 12 percent. In comparison to the 1980 poll, the proportion in favour of the visits had increased by 1 percent, the proportion against by 4 percent and the 'no opinion' category had decreased by 5 percent. When the ship put into Wellington it was again met by a small

peace flotilla and a lunch-time march of around 1,000 but the media showed little interest in either event. In August 1983, however, the nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruiser the USS *Texas* came to Auckland. The result was the largest anti-nuclear demonstration in the country's history.

The Visit of the USS *Texas*

There had been a general surge of activity in the peace movement during the early 1980's; a period which included the escalation of the arms race, increasing cold war tensions, President Reagan's talk of the Evil Empire, U.S. strategists' talk of winnable nuclear wars, the INF negotiations in Geneva, the beginning deployment of the missiles in Europe and the theory of a nuclear winter. All these happenings on the international stage contributed to a growing concern in New Zealand - and elsewhere - about the trend of world events and the possibility of a nuclear war. In 1982, the Commission for the Future, a Government research body, published a booklet detailing the possible effects on New Zealand of a nuclear war, and although the Government abolished the Commission soon after the report appeared, the impact of the work remained. Public awareness of the nuclear issue was also stimulated at this time by the showing of two British films dealing with the nuclear winter scenario.

The setting-up of the Greenham Women's Camp in 1981 to protest against the deployment of INF missiles in the U.K. drew attention to the role of women's activism in the international peace movement, and made a strong impact on New Zealand women. In the same year, Larry Ross, a Canadian-born New Zealander, formed the N.Z. Nuclear Free Zone Committee in Christchurch and in December launched a national nuclear-free zone campaign at a public meeting. The goal was to spread local zones throughout the country as a political tool for the creation of a nuclear-free New Zealand and South Pacific. The NFZ Committee also promoted the concept of a national foreign policy based on 'positive neutrality' - of which more later.

In April 1983, the N.Z. Foundation for Peace Studies invited Dr. Helen Caldicott, the Australian physician, Harvard researcher and U.S. peace activist,⁵ to New Zealand for a speaking tour. For many people - particularly women - the visit acted as a catalyst for the expression of nuclear fears and for anti-nuclear action. When the women camped at Greenham Common asked women throughout the world to make May 24, 1983 the International Women's Day of Action for Nuclear Disarmament, New Zealand women responded in their thousands. The inspiration of the Camp and the impact of the Caldicott tour combined to produce the largest public gathering of women in the history of New Zealand when some 25,000 women walked through Queen Street in Auckland to attend a rally and hear speakers (including Helen Caldicott) in Aotea Square. The day ended with a candle-light vigil by hundreds of women and children on Takaranga (Mt. Victoria). Throughout the country on this day, women organized and participated in demonstrations, rallies, marches, street stalls, street theatre, musical shows and displays. Many of the actions were 'women-centred'. In Wellington for instance, peace groups decorated the building housing the Ministry of Defence with everyday articles used by women, and surrounded it with a human chain.

The upsurge in anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand was not confined to women. Branches of IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) and SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms) formed at this time, and professional and occupational groups began to proliferate. New Zealanders were also becoming more averse to having nuclear weapons on board ships in their harbours. A national opinion poll conducted in April, 1983 asked: "*Would you approve or disapprove of nuclear-armed warships of New Zealand's allies visiting New Zealand's ports?*" The response was 'approve': 46.1 percent; 'disapprove': 40.2 percent; 'Don't know': 13.7 percent. In 1978 the corresponding figures had been 61.5 percent; 31.5 percent and 6.9 percent. No question was asked at this time about ships propelled by nuclear reactors.

The Peace Squadron in the 1980's

⁵ Helen Caldicott discovered the presence of Strontium 90 in children's milk teeth in the United States, and became one of the founders of the national organization, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR).

When the visit of the USS *Texas* was announced Auckland had received no warship visits for 4¹/₂ years. The Peace Squadron as an organized entity was virtually non-existent, but the bonds established during the 'battles' of Waitemata Harbour had been maintained through personal friendships and group activities. In the early 1980's, a number of Squadron boat owners in Cox's Bay in Auckland had formed a group known as the AFW (officially 'Artists and Fellow-Workers' but also 'Arty-Farty Wankers'), and when the announcement came of the imminent arrival of the *Texas* the group provided the nucleus for Squadron remobilization. The telephone tree had disintegrated, and a team of volunteers worked non-stop for 72 hours to recreate it. George Armstrong was no longer available for spokesperson but Jimmy Keogh, an Australian-born member of the AFW and a veteran Squadron member, says he was "pounced on" by the media and quickly found himself filling the role of spokesperson and co-ordinator. Like Les Church in 1976, Keogh experienced three weeks of "craziness" as the visit drew near (Newnham, 1986:49).

On the morning of August 2, 1983 at 7.50 a.m., the USS *Texas* entered Hauraki Gulf flanked by three ships of Her Majesty's New Zealand Navy. A flotilla of 120 boats was waiting in Waitemata Harbour and organizers planned to jam the narrowest part of the Harbour entrance with small craft to prevent the cruiser from entering. A number of protest boats, however, headed towards Rangitoto Channel at the first sight of the *Texas* and so diffused the blockade. One of the first to encounter the warship was the 7-metre dory, *Mahatma Gandhi*, skippered by Dave Wray. The dory rammed and bounced off the side of the cruiser, which slowed and stopped briefly as police boats with grappling hooks took hold of the boat and towed it away. Wray crawled out onto the bowsprit in an attempt to cut the police lines and, with his crewman, was arrested for obstruction. Once on the move again the *Texas* reached a speed of 15 knots and quickly drew ahead of its pursuers.

The core of the Squadron had remained in the Harbour entrance in full view of the thousands of spectators on North Head. As the warship and the escort vessels approached the flotilla, the action began. Orange flares were set off, anti-nuclear banners raised, balloons and kites released. Three men in a power boat dodged in and out of the police

cordon, throwing yellow-paint bombs at the hull of the nuclear-propelled cruiser. People jumped from their boats into the water in the path of the ship. Several boats deployed 'Quaker Bombs' - large spheres of polystyrene sprayed with grey paint to resemble mines, some with smoking borer bombs attaching to them. The captain later told reporters the demonstration was the largest he had witnessed ... "but we expected it". In the inner city, about 6,000 people took part in the lunch-hour protest march, and demonstrations continued all day and into the night. A CND anti-nuclear symbol set up on Mt. Hobson by local peace groups was visible from most parts of Auckland, including the harbour.

The *Texas* had arrived in New Zealand just before Hiroshima Day. On August 6, approximately 40,000 Aucklanders marched up Queen Street to take part in the commemorative ceremonies; ceremonies which the previous year had been attended by about 250 people. The warship left for the port of Wellington the following day, where its presence in the capital city brought out more protest boats and approximately 7,000 lunch-time marchers. Once again, a strike by the Seamen's Union prevented the operation of ferries between the North and South Islands for the week the ship remained in port.

The Continuing Visits

In November 1983, three months after the visit of the USS *Texas*, a 6,000-ton nuclear submarine arrived in Auckland. The USS *Phoenix* was met by a Peace Squadron of about 50 boats, and the water action was preceded by a religious ceremony. A Presbyterian minister blessed the fleet and described the submarine as being "part of the system of nuclear death which threatens life on our planet." A Methodist minister read Deuteronomy 30:19: "Choose life, that you and your descendents may live." Fewer boats took part in the water action against the *Phoenix* than in the previous action, but Jimmy Keogh described it as "the tightest, strongest demonstration we've had." The Captain of the escort ship, the RNZNS *Hawea*, said: "They left it very late, then it all happened. There were some very dangerous acts out there today" (quoted Newnham, 1986:52).

During the Falklands War, the N.Z. Government (who was at that time engaged in

negotiating a trade arrangement with the EEC and looking to Britain for support) had sent a Navy frigate to relieve a British ship and thus permit it to take part in the Falkland's action. The visit of the USS *Phoenix* to Auckland was followed three weeks later by the visit of a ship involved in that war: the 19,000-ton nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable British cruiser, the HMS *Invincible* (one of its officers being Prince Andrew). Although the Peace Squadron used the occasion to make the point that the protests were anti-nuclear, not anti-American, organizers had less success than in the past in mobilizing crews, and naval and police escort vessels outnumbered the 40 protest boats. "They followed us everywhere," said the skipper of one, "it was like having your own personal nanny" (quoted Newnham, 1986:52).

Shortly before the visit of the HMS *Invincible*, Auckland City Council had joined the growing number of local bodies in New Zealand declaring their particular area a nuclear-free zone. As the Government, not the city, had invited the nuclear vessels into the port, the Council resolved the contradiction of the ship's presence by deciding to go ahead with the traditional civic welcome for the Captain and officers, but to draw attention to the city's nuclear-free status. Mayor Cath Tizzard,⁶ who had supported the nuclear-free zone resolution, could not (or would not) attend the reception, and her place was taken by the Deputy-Mayor. He had voted against the resolution, and in his speech of welcome he spoke with enthusiasm of the nuclear deterrent. To the delight of the peace movement, he received a public rebuke from the Mayor. One man gave this account of the happening:

The Captain was invited to meet the Mayor who refused to meet him and made a point that every single burrough surrounding the harbour had declared itself nuclear-free, and that all this had been forced upon the people, and that 65 percent of New Zealand people lived in burroughs that had declared themselves locally to be nuclear-free, and that this was being forced on the grassroots level.

That had an effect on the crew to come in and find that everyone, not just the

⁶ In March 1990, Kath Tizzard became New Zealand's Governor General; the first woman Governor General in New Zealand history, and the third in the British Commonwealth.

wierdos in the boats, *everyone* was against them. There were 20 thousand people on Queen Street, and the mountains around the harbours were just crammed with people holding banners, sitting down at intersections holding up the traffic, and [placing] banners across the motorways.

Early in 1984, came the announcement that the USS *Queensfish*, a nuclear-propelled submarine, would be visiting Auckland; the fourth warship visit in 8 months. By this time, interaction between the Peace Squadron and the authorities had achieved a degree of institutionalization; before each protest, for instance, a meeting would take place between Squadron organizers and the police to air concerns. On this occasion, Jimmy Keogh tried a new tactic. He had discovered that in 1908 the Government had enacted a section of the Crimes Act which permitted charges of piracy to be laid against persons committing certain acts on waters within N.Z. territorial limits, not just, as was usual, on the high seas. Under this Act, any person boarding a vessel with the intention of harassing the crew or damaging the vessel in any way could be found guilty of piracy. Keogh stated that during previous demonstrations, this was exactly what had been done by unknown persons purporting to be police. The authorities conceded the point, and agreed that in future a police officer boarding a protest craft would be wearing an orange jerkin bearing the word: POLICE.

Both sides, it seems, were learning the lessons of confrontation. In the early protests, police had been put into boats with little or no knowledge of how to handle them. One of the Waiheke Islanders said of the authorities:

Actually, they learnt fast, because the first time they had cops out in boats with no life-jackets and just ordinary raincoats and they were damn near frozen. And they had these idiotic tactics. Later on, they brought in the Navy with Zodiacs, and they were beginning to learn. They had a Navy bloke on each boat with the policemen. And they started wearing life-jackets and observing rules of safety. [Before] it had been very unnerving for the [Peace Squadron] skippers.

We learnt things too. The police on the harbour on Zodiacs had a little orange pennant that said 'POLICE' on them, and they wore a blue jersey and a beret. And the

Peace Squadron members also had boats like this with a little orange pennant, and it said 'POLITE'. It was very, very disconcerting for the cops, because they didn't know what to do. ... They're trying to get cleaned up for the archives, but we were photographing them while they were photographing us [laughter]. They reacted to that. We found that cameras were an excellent weapon against excessive violence. Pointing a camera is a restraining influence.

Peace Squadron organizers, however, were not only concerned about controlling the actions of the authorities. With each protest, there had been escalating levels of heroics on the part of some demonstrators - not all of them part of the Squadron - in an effort to maintain media and public interest. As the skipper of the *Konundrum* said, "In some of the later protests we took women out who were prepared to jump into the water in front of the ship, and put themselves at risk." A task force formed to prepare a proposal for reducing the likelihood of dangerous actions or of actions counter to Squadron principles, without diminishing the effectiveness of the demonstrations. The March 1984 Squadron newsletter outlined the strategy for the *Queenfish* protest and added: "As a way of increasing the number of boats and people on harbour protest, 'peripheral boats' are encouraged to sail near the protest, but not too close. Each skipper can chart his own course. Please dress your boat up with banners and black plastic pennants." In the hope of simultaneously adding to the impact of the action and constraining the behaviour of both the demonstrators and the authorities, members were asked to phone in suggestions for "a prestige crew." Prominent citizens would be invited "to participate as observers to see the Peace Squadron, your Navy and Police at work during the forthcoming harbour protests."

The USS *Queenfish* together with support vessels, the USS *Schofield* and the USS *Whipple*, arrived in Auckland Harbour on March 23, 1984. The drive to recruit prominent citizens seems to have borne fruit; the Mayor of Auckland, local mayors and some Members of Parliament were among those on the water. As before, the Squadron aimed at keeping the protest under the eye of the public and the media by remaining in the inner harbour. The *Auckland Star* described the demonstration as "the most spectacular

yet" and the fleet as consisting of "58 yachts, 12 canoes, about 30 other small craft, a surf-sailor and a naked man on a surfboard" (perhaps the reason for the paper's choice of the superlative). The emphasis was on symbolic protest rather than direct action, but whereas the symbolism of earlier demonstrations had centred around the theme of life this one centred around the theme of death. The following report by CND Spokesperson Maire Leadbetter appeared in the April edition of *Peacelink* (the official journal of the New Zealand peace movement):

About 100 craft of every description (including kayaks, rafts and surfboards) turned out to give the United States, the New Zealand Government and the world the unmistakable message: 'No' to New Zealand participation in nuclear war preparations. The Peace Squadron protest was intentionally highly visible and theatrical on this occasion in an attempt to defuse intense confrontation between police and demonstrators. The Squadron boats were decked out with black streamers and flags, and protestors formed a symbolic barrier of orange smoke to isolate the death sub from the living citizens of Auckland. As always, some brave members of the Squadron took their lives in their hands to sail directly in the path of the submarine. Police presence prevented them from stopping the submarine.

The *N.Z. Herald* stated:

In their black-tasselled boats, the protestors - most of them dressed in black and some with painted [death mask] faces - mingled with the other escort craft. At one stage the submarine, which was travelling at an average speed of about 10 knots, slowed to two knots as the protestors waved placards and chanted, "Go Home." The police later said the decrease in speed was for manoeuvring purposes. Several protest craft managed to squeeze through the 100 metre cordon - only to be pushed out of the way by police boats ...

The *Queensfish* dropped anchor at 11.15 a.m. and was immediately encircled by the protestors - some beating drums, some holding flares and others holding up their hands in a gesture of peace.

While the action was taking place on the water, black helium-filled balloons were being released at regular intervals by protestors on North Head, many dressed in black clothes. Others held a 30-metre long banner declaring that Auckland was a nuclear-free zone. The demonstrations continued throughout the submarine's stay in the harbour. The

Peacelink article said that on March 24 "... there was a 'Stand Up and Be Counted' March, and a rally in Aotea Square. The featured theme was hope and conviction that a nuclear free future for New Zealand is possible and achievable in 1984 election year." Over five thousand people were said to have taken part in the march, and members of SCAN (School Children Against Nuclear War) held a silent vigil outside Parliament. Representatives from CANWAR (Coalition Against Nuclear Warships) met with the press at a city post office to 'post' a ten-foot long papier-mache 'submarine' to the Minister of Defence, demanding a stop to warship visits and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone.

While the Peace Squadron provided a major channel for the expression of concern about nuclear weapons and superpower policies, it was predominantly a male-dominated organization using prototypically male tactics in carrying out the direct action protests on the water. Although there were often as many women as men in the crews, and women from the beginning had a major role in organizing the accompanying land-based demonstrations and activities, most boat-owners were men - and therefore the main organizers and planners of the actions. After the *Texas* visit the emphasis shifted to the land actions, and the anti-nuclear activities of women.

Politicians, Parties and 'Women Power'

The Politicization of Women

Peace is More than the Absence of War is a book published in the mid-1980's by the New Women's Press in Auckland. It is a book by women largely about women and their history and role in the N.Z. peace movement. Photographer Gil Hanly provided the many illustrations and nine women wrote the text. Karen Mangnall wrote the introduction and in it states that by the time of the *Queenfish* visit, "the land protests had levelled out at about 6,000 people each march. Politicians and newspapers were keen to point out that the peace movement was running out of steam. In fact the peace movement was happening elsewhere" (in Hanly *et al.*, 1986:10-11). What was happening 'elsewhere' was the proliferation of neighbourhood peace groups throughout the country; their main constituency middle-class women.

The Caldicott tour and International Women's Day had the immediate effect of bringing many previously uninvolved women into the peace movement, adding numbers and momentum to the existing peace groups and organizations and decentralizing anti-nuclear actions and activities. The peace movement blossomed, often literally, as women used their favourite symbols of flowers, branches, leaves, wool, ribbons, feathers and other life motifs in creating displays and carrying out actions. Some women started up new neighbourhood peace groups; others refocused the activities of groups to which they already belonged. Six Waiheke Island women travelled to Greenham Common and other women camped at Auckland Airport in a demonstration of solidarity. Peace Walks to Parliament House were organized, pulling in participants along the way. Women's street theatre developed rapidly. The Pramazons were a group of four women who walked around the East Cape of New Zealand pushing prams containing theatrical props and personal belongings, and putting on their anti-nuclear show, *Pacific Paradise*, in churches, schools and community halls in the towns and villages they visited.

Pauline Thurston contributed the chapter "Working in a Local Peace Group" to *Peace is More than the Absence of War*, and the story she tells of her personal experience during the Caldicott tour and her subsequent involvement in peace groups and politics is typical of the experience of many hitherto apolitical women at this time. She writes:

"Why fuss over your kids, making them clean their teeth, if you are just going to let them get blown to bits by a nuclear bomb?" My son was three years old when I heard Dr. Helen Caldicott ask this question at a packed meeting in Auckland's Y.M.C.A. on 10 April, 1983. I felt a hole open up in my stomach. I stumbled out of the hall, threw 10 dollars into a donation box, and went home. But giving away money didn't change anything. I needed to do much more than that.

A few days later 150 women met together to talk about what more we could do. We decided to have a peace parade up Queen Street on 24 May - International Women's Day for Nuclear Disarmament - and to invite women and children from all over Auckland. About eight women at that meeting were from my own neighbourhood. None of us had media skills, nor did we have the money for newspaper ads, but we quickly spread the word through our own personal networks - through our contacts with other Plunket mothers, playcentre and kindergarten parents, our churches, vegetable co-operatives, other

local volunteer groups, as well as our workplaces. ... and we knew which shops and offices would be sympathetic to displaying our posters and gathering signatures for our local petition to council ...

Our local group had decided to go to the borough council and ask them to declare our borough nuclear-free. ... We organized a petition to the council and, in only 10 days, managed to get 2,500 signatures. ..[W]hen our small group went to the council with our petition that night, the mayor opposed us, and we were defeated on a technicality. Several of the councillors sneered at us, and belittled our arguments. They seemed determined not to hear us. So this was democracy in action? We were outraged (in Hanly *et. al.*, 1986:10-11).

Once involved in a peace group, politicization is only a step away. Karen Mangnall writes of a woman with several young children "who had asked for reassurance that she *could* visit her member of Parliament demanding that he lobby for the Beetham Bill [an anti-nuclear bill discussed below]. A few days later I asked her how the visit had gone. She positively steamed with indignation. 'That little runt. He asked me if my husband knew where I was. We'll teach him!' And her group did, for he lost his seat in the next election." She says of the process of women's politicization:

We had little political experience, no fixed ideas on how to lobby, no leaders. Mainly we fed into existing community networks, and what was most familiar to us, and - most of all - we identified with the system. Very quickly our concern about nuclear war raised questions of control over the political system which acted in our name. .. Patronising refusals of nuclear-free petitions by local councils shocked then steeled the peace movement. For most, it was an object lesson in being on the losing side. We found right was not might.

The National Party was prepared to patronise us while the Labour Party saw us as their secular wing, providing the body count they could manipulate for their own ends. We knew from the British and Australian experiences how futile it would be to hitch our fortunes to one party. We began to build our own power-base. With the media and the press closed to us, we turned to the streets, the shopping centres and our local councils (in Hanly *et. al.*, 1986:11-12).

Although the N.Z. Nuclear Free Zone movement had its official debut at the public meeting initiated by Ross, women were already active in promoting the concept and it was women in neighbourhood groups who were overwhelmingly responsible for the

proliferation of zones at both the grassroots and semi-official levels. Women had found the perfect vehicle for the expression of their nuclear anxieties, and they set about the task with zest and creativity. "By the time the Auckland Regional Authority ... went nuclear-free in September 1983," says Mangnall, "the peace movement had begun a campaign for the nationwide local-body elections in October." As in the nuclear free zone movement, the neighbourhood groups of New Zealand were the arms and legs of the 'Votes for Peace' campaign. Every candidate was surveyed or visited personally and asked to sign a nuclear-free pledge. Leaflets with the names of those who did so were distributed throughout local areas and a few weeks before the election the lists appeared in the newspapers. "Entire councils were overturned," states Mangnall, "but, more importantly [*sic*], we had sent a message to the two main political parties: we could get organisers on the street, and we could get people to vote on a single issue" (in Hanly *et. al.*, 1986:11-12).

A Snap Election

In the 1981 general election, 47 National Party members, 43 Labour Party members and 2 Social Credit members had been elected to the House of Representatives, the sole parliamentary chamber of New Zealand. The National Party appointed from its representatives the Speaker of the House, leaving the Government with a majority of one. For part of its three-year term, however, the Government could count on the support of two disaffected Labour members (one being the son of former Prime Minister Norman Kirk) who, after a falling out with the Labour Party had continued to sit in Parliament as independent members.

The 'New Look' Labour Party

Colin James, describes the Labour Party of the 1960's, like the unions which created it, as being "run on a shoestring out of dingy offices ... inefficient, unimaginative and unimaginably conservative organizationally." The next decade, however, saw the entry of the Vietnam generation of liberals and radicals into the Party and the desire for large change - although in the late 1970's "the economic and political power bases were still firmly in the hands of the pre-war, no-change or slow-change generation" (James,

1986:45). Forty-year-old Jim Anderton became Party Leader in 1979, and immediately set out to "democratise, professionalise and reunify" the Party. By 1980, the new 'liberal-left' - mostly composed of young urban professionals or academics - was both numerous and in clear command of the political machine. Since the emergence of a feminist movement in New Zealand in the 1970's, says James, women had been seeking to expand their role in Party leadership. By the early 1980's, women held on average two of the five executive positions and in 1984 Sonja Davies (who wrote the foreword to *Peace is More than the Absence of War*) became Party President. The generational and attitudinal gap between the leadership of the older parliamentary wing and the younger organizational wing was resolved peacefully in February 1983, when 41 year-old deputy leader, David Lange, replaced Wallace Rowling as parliamentary leader. Having already detoured from the narrative to introduce one 'soon-to-be' prime minister, it behoves me to do the same for the next incumbent - particularly as he is a key player in the Nuclear Free New Zealand drama.

The New Opposition Leader

David Lange entered Parliament in 1977, and could in no way be described as "a shiver looking for a spine to run up," then Opposition Leader Robert Muldoon's description of Wallace Rowling in the 1975 election battle. A lawyer and one-time Methodist lay preacher, large, witty⁷ and extremely articulate (some would say verbose), Lange was more than a match verbally for Muldoon. As one New Zealander told me, "... Bill Rowling was like Walter Mondale - a decent chap and all that, but didn't have charisma. Lange could make the whole world laugh at Muldoon. He'd debate him into a corner and rubbish him. He was a foil for him." Chris Beeby, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, said of David Lange during our interview: "He's an extraordinarily funny man. He gives a weekly press conference and the transcripts of it are a pure joy to read. They're terribly clever. The press doesn't publish most of it." Critics of the new Opposition Leader labelled him "a small-town lawyer⁸... who talks a lot,

⁷ In 1987 a book appeared called *The Wit of David Lange*. During an interview on television, the Prime Minister remarked: "I wrote that book, and I'm not getting a cracker out of it."

⁸ In his Legal Aid practice, Lange had specialized in defending petty criminals whom he said he regarded

cracks a lot of jokes and enjoys the sound of rhetoric, but has neither the intellect nor the patience to get on top of the details of any policy position." A Labour Party colleague described him as something of 'an enigma': "a loner ... prepared to talk about anything, but who rarely lets people get close enough to get a real glimpse of himself." Although considered something of a lightweight - "politically of course"⁹ - he had won the leadership because he was a good television performer and had handled Sir Robert Muldoon with some panache in Parliament.¹⁰

The Nuclear-Free Bills

Three private members' nuclear-free bills were introduced to Parliament during the 1981-84 term; two by Labour M.P., Richard Prebble and one by Social Credit M.P., Bruce Beetham. The first Prebble Bill led in 1981 to the establishment of the Disarmament and Arms Control Select Committee chaired by newly-elected Labour M.P., Helen Clark, a strong advocate for the Party's nuclear-free policies. National Party Caucus member Marilyn Waring had agreed to vote against the bill, provided the Government agreed to set up the Committee. The Beetham Bill of 1982 was sent without division to this Select Committee, Marilyn Waring again having threatened to vote in favour of it. The peace movement immediately began lobbying for public hearings on the issue and for a report back to Parliament before the House rose at the end of the year. Public submissions were called for at the end of November. In its 15-month life, the Committee had received less than 100 public submissions; in the next four weeks it received 350 and, to quote Helen Clark, "the overwhelming majority wanted New Zealand to take a stronger anti-nuclear stance."¹¹

In May 1984, Richard Prebble gave notice that he would soon introduce another nuclear-free bill which, unlike the Beetham Bill, would be workable in law. Marilyn

as society's victims.

⁹ Although he has undergone surgery to limit his food intake David Lange is still a large man.

¹⁰ Michael Gawenda, "The Lange Perspective". *The Age* (Australia), Mar. 22, 1985.

¹¹ Helen Clark, "A Politician's View." In (Hanly *et al*, 1986:60).

Waring notified the Prime Minister that she would vote for its introduction into the legislative process. The bill was introduced into the House on June 12. During the debate Government members contrived to prevent Waring from speaking. Labour M.P.'s tried to surrender some of their own speaking time to her, but National Party M.P.'s used the device of raising points of order (to which the Speaker must give priority) until the time allotted for the debate had expired. Before the vote was taken, Defence Minister David Thompson informed the House and the nation that if the bill *was* passed, the Government would not take it to the Governor-General for consent, a statment which caused an uproar in the House.

The Prebble Bill was defeated by two votes the following day. Although Marilyn Waring and another maverick Government member, Mike Minogue, had voted with Labour and the two Social Credit MPs also voted for its introduction, the two independent one-time Labour members voted with the Government. After the bill's defeat, Marilyn Waring informed the Prime Minister that she would continue to support the National Party except on matters of rape law reform, defence policy and visits by nuclear-ships. She also announced that she would no longer attend the weekly Caucus meetings, thus effectively removing herself from the forum in which she could be pressured to change her position. She made it clear that she was acting on deeply-held convictions and would not budge on the nuclear-free issue.

Marilyn Waring's announcement and her withdrawal of confidence from Caucus made the Government's situation highly problematic. Not only must it now take into account the loss of her vote on certain policy issues but possibly the loss of Mike Minogue's also. To retain power, National would be forced to rely on the support of John Kirk and Brian McDonell, the two Labour defectors. Kirk had a history of erratic attendance (one of the sources of his estrangement from Labour) while McDonell was estranged from the Party because his nomination for re-election was being challenged (all candidates must receive party nomination). An election was due at the end of 1984, however, and since National would soon have its own candidate for McDonell's seat, his

newfound allegiance was unlikely to last. On the evening of June 14, Marilyn Waring was summoned to a private meeting with the Prime Minister, the President and the General Secretary of the National Party.

The private meeting was followed by an emergency meeting of the National Party Caucus, followed in turn by the Prime Minister's announcement to the nation that an election would be held on July 14, 1984. In giving his reason for calling the snap election, Sir Robert said that his Government had nearly lost a vote on a bill that would have put ANZUS in jeopardy. If Government members voted against Government policy it could be said that he no longer had a majority in Parliament and he was unwilling to go through an election year under those circumstances. He had not wanted an early election, but did not want to be put in the position of having to call an election at some other, more inconvenient, time.¹² Snap elections are rare events in New Zealand history. The last one occurred in 1951 after a strike in which the National Party Government of the day had assumed some draconian powers. Although the strike and the Government's response had aroused great controversy, National won that election with ease. Perhaps Sir Robert was hoping for a repeat performance in 1984.

David Lange later described the events of the night of June 14 as follows:

What an electrifying night that was. .. We knew something was up in the early evening, and there were those ministerial statements about defence ... And then there were the confused talks, the lobby groups, and we saw them whispering amongst themselves, and we knew it was on. And we went and made sure that none of our people left, and we watched, and by the time somewhat less than sobered movement was to be seen around the lobbies on the other side, we knew. And then a dramatic call from Government House ... We knew we were into a General Election.

What a night! By 11.40 all my staff had come back .. and were there. The Caucus was there, and that night at 11.40 in that Press Conference we put the seal of winning on that election campaign

¹² The reason given by the Prime Minister for the early election was received with widespread scepticism by commentators, as all the economic indicators were pointing to rapidly worsening inflation and unemployment.

because we said what the issues were; we were able to articulate what the election was about. We told them a Government had collapsed, and that a new Labour Government was on the way.¹³

It was indeed. So, too, is the final episode in this 12-year long odyssey of a nuclear-free nation.

¹³ Report of the 68th. Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1984.

CHAPTER 8

THE KIWI DISEASE

New Zealand is a nuclear-free country.

We reject any strategy for our defence which relies on nuclear weapons. New Zealand will not in any way take part in the nuclear arms race or join in any confrontation between nuclear forces. New Zealand will take no action which suggests that its security depends on nuclear weapons.

- David Lange, N.Z. Prime Minister, 1986¹

The Fourth Labour Government and ANZUS

The brief election campaign occupied the last half of June and the first half of July. While the nuclear-ship issue received considerable attention and was the centrepiece of some Labour candidate's campaigns, the overriding issues were the economic policies of the Government and the leadership of Sir Robert Muldoon. "While it cannot be said," writes Stuart McMillan,² that the election was called on the nuclear-ships issue, the central role of that issue in the election enhanced its significance. Conflict between domestic political circumstances and foreign policy is one of the hazards of Western democratic life. Calling an election set the stage for such a conflict in New Zealand" (McMillan, 1987:12).

Two minor parties were contesting the election: Social Credit (known since late 1984 as the Democratic Party), an old and well-established party which nonetheless had never managed to obtain more than two seats in Parliament,² and the New Zealand Party. The latter was a new political phenomenon espousing, in essence, the principles of libertarianism and mounting an attack on the traditional heartland of National support. The Party was formed in 1983 by disaffected National Party supporters, and its leader was a

¹ "Message from the Prime Minister", in *Nuclear Free New Zealand*. Wellington: Govt. Printer, 1986:3.

² New Zealand's first-past-the-post voting system is a handicap to small parties. Social Credit received slightly more than 20 percent of the vote in the 1981 election, but still gained only two seats.

multi-millionaire property developer, Bob Jones. In theory and in rhetoric National was the party of free enterprise and attacked what it regarded as the socialism of the Labour Party. Under Sir Robert's 'ordinary bloke' style of leadership, however, the Government had in fact pursued interventionist and highly-regulatory economic policies. These included a freeze on wages, prices, rents, company directors' fees and legislation to control interest rates. More and more, National was being perceived - both inside and outside the Party - as having all the characteristics of the parties it opposed, and the N.Z. Party was accusing it of totally abdicating its founding philosophy.

The Nuclear Policies

In 1981, Social Credit's political manifesto had declared that nuclear ships would be prohibited "unless there were extenuating circumstances." The ANZUS commitment would depend upon the outcome of a white paper on defence and on the subsequent debate. In 1984, there were no such qualifications. Withdrawal from ANZUS was an absolute policy, along with armed neutrality and compulsory military service, the argument being that a large number of people trained in military skills would make the costs of invasion too high. While the political and economic philosophy of the New Zealand Party was right-wing, its defence and foreign policies were not. The Party wanted neutrality, and a small, mobile armed force whose sole role would be the surveillance of N.Z. territory and civil defence. Membership in any military pact would be submitted to a public referendum. Although the New Zealand Party sometimes cited Switzerland and Sweden as models for a defence policy, it more often cited the case of non-military Costa Rica, a country similar in size to New Zealand. Bob Jones stated publicly that if he had his way he "wouldn't spend a penny on defence" and went on to ask the rhetorical question: "Who is our enemy? It can't be the Soviet Union because the Russians buy our lamb at subsidized prices. They'd be crazy to take us over and pay the full costs."

Given the changing public opinion polls and the obvious growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in the country, the National Party could no longer dismiss opposition to ship visits as a fringe phenomenon. Instead, it identified the opposition as fear of New Zealand becoming a nuclear target and set out to lay this fear to rest. In 1983, the Ministry of

Defence Report stated:

Despite many attempts to raise alarm and confusion here about the risks of nuclear attack, New Zealand offers no such targets. This applies whether or not U.S. Navy vessels are visiting. ... [T]he type of vessel which comes here does not carry the sort of strategic weapons able to attack the Soviet Union. Some talk about the nuclear umbrella in itself constituting a magnet for attack. But there is no question of struts of that umbrella being located in New Zealand or elsewhere in the South Pacific.

On June 15, the Minister of Defence elaborated the same point in a press statement: warships visiting New Zealand did not carry strategic weapons and therefore the Soviet Union would have no cause to target New Zealand while the ships were in the country's ports.

By the time of the election campaign, National's tactics for coping with anti-nuclear attitudes were threefold: one was to emphasise that New Zealand had no nuclear weapons or nuclear bases and the Government had no intention of acquiring or permitting either; the second was to make the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons and the third was to back the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific - an agreement which would not interfere with existing defence arrangements and would give individual countries the right to decide which ships they invited into their ports. The Party also continued to argue - rightly as it turned out - that a prohibition on nuclear-ship visits would be viewed by the United States as incompatible with the country's membership in ANZUS.

The Labour Party policy statement for the 1984 campaign "reaffirmed Labour's prohibition of visits by nuclear-armed and/or powered warships and/or craft in New Zealand, ... the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, and the prohibition of dumping of nuclear wastes and the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific." The statement also said that the next Labour Government would renegotiate the terms of the ANZUS alliance, "for the purpose of ensuring the economic, social and political stability of the South East Asian and Pacific regions;" renegotiation of the terms of

association being the compromise reached in Party discussions after the 1983 conference remit calling for an end to membership in ANZUS. Clause 12 of the policy statement stated that the "basic requirements of such an updated agreement will be:

- (a) New Zealand's unconditional anti-nuclear stance;
- (b) the active promotion of a nuclear-weapons-free South Pacific;
- (c) the acceptance of absolutely equal partnership on all issues handled within the terms of the agreement and unanimous agreement on all decisions taken under those terms;
- (d) an absolute guarantee of the complete integrity of New Zealand's sovereignty.

The Campaigns

The great majority of people in the peace movement were Labour supporters who saw the success of that Party as the best hope for achieving the nuclear-free goals. Nevertheless, true to the policy of resisting co-optation, the peace movement as a whole did not campaign for any one Party but emphasised support for any Party espousing nuclear-free policies (including the small Maori party, Mana Kotuhake, which had splintered off from Labour in 1981). This meant, in fact, any Party but National. Labour presented a team image and focused on issues it believed to be of wide concern such as education, housing, unemployment and economic hardship. Its campaigns attacked the Government at its most vulnerable point: the ailing economy and the mounting level of overseas debt. National's response was to call on voters "to accept our lot, warts and all" and to produce full-page newspaper advertisements bearing a picture of Sir Robert under the somewhat ambiguous heading, "Who Needs Him?"

Bob Jones of the New Zealand Party was not only a highly-successful businessman; he was also a popular television and media figure with a reputation for a penetrating, if sometimes caustic, wit. A highly-individualistic millionaire with charismatic public appeal proved a political magnet. Like the Muldoon campaigns of 1976, halls decorated with N.Z. Party logos, balloons and streamers were packed to overflowing; a New Zealand Party political rally was a great night out. As one N.Z. businessman told me, "Bob Jones spent millions on getting Muldoon out." Sir Robert, who was his own finance

minister and adamant in resisting the mounting pressure for devaluation and changes in economic policy, called the New Zealand Party 'the Greedies' and described David Lange as "an economic novice." Towards the end of the campaign the Prime Minister told the press, "I'm hoping that in the short space of a day or two I can give him some instruction in the realities of government where you don't give way to every pressure."³

Nevertheless, it was clear that the N.Z. economy was in trouble. An over-valued exchange rate had already led to the down-grading of the country's credit-rating on the New York stock exchange, and in the last week of May the Bank of New Zealand announced that mortgage funds had dried up. There were rumours of illegal deals between companies desperate for funds. During the month of the campaign - particularly in the final week - a major flight of currency abroad occurred as dealers hedged against and anticipated devaluation of the (NZ) dollar; a situation described by Lange as "haemorrhaging from below." The National Party was likewise in trouble. A survey of business leaders, the normal bastion of National support, showed that they had overwhelmingly lost confidence in the Muldoon leadership.

The General Election and its Aftermath

Anne Martindale, a former U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, has described New Zealand as "a profoundly democratic country, one where the opinions of the citizens are given high importance" (quoted Hanly *et al.*, 1986:59). True or not, its citizens certainly believe in recording their preferences - or perhaps, more accurately, their discontents. On July 14, 92 percent of the voting population went to the polls and elected to office a Labour Government, the fourth in the country's history. Labour gained 56 seats and 43 percent of the vote; National 37 seats and 36 percent of the vote, and Social Credit 2 seats and 8 percent of the vote. Although the New Zealand Party received 13 percent of the vote, it did not gain representation.⁴ Studies of voting patterns revealed that 56 percent of those who had supported the New Zealand Party were in the managerial, professional and

³ "Lange's Baptism of Fire". *The Bulletin* (Australia), 31 July, 1984.

⁴ The N.Z. Party resembled a reform movement rather than a political party and after the election (as was the case with Values in 1978) it ceased to exist as a political entity.

administrative occupations, and that it had attracted a disproportionate share of the votes in the 25-40 age category. A survey of electorates showed that the Party had taken support from National at a ratio of 6 to 1 compared with Labour, with Social Credit midway between.

Twelve women were elected to Parliament, the largest number in New Zealand parliamentary history. Ten were Labour M.P.'s, and 2 would become part of the Cabinet. There were also more Government members with university degrees than had been the case in any previous government, Labour or National.⁵ While a few of the 'old guard' of the Party remained, it was clear that a new generation was in command of New Zealand's Fourth Labour Government. The average age of Caucus members was 45; the average age of Cabinet members 42. David Lange at age 42 was the youngest prime minister of this century. At the Victory Conference of the Labour Party in September, 1984, the new Prime Minister said of the June-July campaign:

[T]he great thrill to me in that campaign was the way in which we worked as a team, and throughout my campaign I had the thrill, the confidence of knowing that everyone else in the team was getting it right. ... Wherever I went ... during the election campaign I found people fired up with enthusiasm, people who had taken leave from their jobs and sometimes from their senses to work full-time for the Labour Party, and that great rush of enthusiasm worked because our organisation was there to channel it....⁶

The interregnum period between governments in New Zealand is two weeks. During that time, any major decisions affecting the country must be approved by the outgoing as well as the incoming government. Before the Labour Party was officially sworn into office, the country faced an economic and a constitutional crisis. On July 15, the day after the election, the Reserve Bank suspended all currency dealing - foreign exchange

⁵ B.A. degrees are rarer in Australia and New Zealand than in the United States, and have about the same status as an M.A. in that country. Sir Keith Sinclair, Chair of the History Department at Auckland University and New Zealand's most prominent historian, told me during an interview that about 11 members of the Cabinet had passed through his department and been students of "strong Labour men." He himself had once stood as a Labour candidate.

⁶ Report of the 68th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1984.

reserves having been exhausted - and demanded immediate devaluation of the dollar. New Zealand was on the verge of bankruptcy. Sir Robert Muldoon announced that he and the Prime Minister-elect should make a joint declaration eschewing any need to devalue the currency. Instead, David Lange moved to impose a 20 percent devaluation on the dollar - the largest in 33 years - a three-month freeze on prices and an end to interest rate controls. Sir Robert refused to sign the necessary papers and Lange charged him with "economic sabotage." Within 12 hours, Muldoon's own Cabinet had forced him to accept the Lange plan and surrender control of the country's finances. At the next National Party conference, the Hon. Jim Bolger became the new Leader of the Opposition.

Within 48 hours of devaluation, \$500 million returned to New Zealand, two-thirds of the amount that had flowed out in the month preceding the election. "The job is very much more satisfying than I ever anticipated," Lange told a *Newsweek* reporter. "The only thing wrong is that I don't start getting paid to run this country for another week." Asked whether he was prepared "for the crisis state of the nation's finances," the Prime Minister-elect replied, "It was what I had expected rather than what I had hoped. Having used up every form of borrowing that you could undertake we were literally broke. In one sense, the scale of the problem was a help in its solution. It was so massive that no one could quibble." Asked whether the devaluation of the dollar would simply make it more difficult for New Zealand to pay back its foreign loans, Lange said:

I think you have to come back to certain realities. At the end of 1975 a N.Z. dollar bought one dollar and four cents in the United States. Today it buys 49 cents, which, regrettably, is about where it belongs. Without the most recent devaluation, there would have been an inevitable, slow haemorrhaging downward. But by that radical measure we have the chance to get a whole new wave of consolidation, to change the direction of production, manufacturing and marketing, and then to handle that.⁷

The circumstances in which the Government had taken office had pitched it into immediate and drastic action, but devaluation was a short-term solution to the country's problems. Ultimately, the lower dollar would add to the foreign debt, increase the cost of

⁷ Quoted in "Lange's Baptism of Fire" pp.74-75.

imported consumer goods and boost inflation. Further deregulatory measures were imposed. By March, 1985, when the exchange rate was freely floated, the finance and foreign exchange sector was almost completely free of Government constraints - one of the freest systems in the world. To deal with the corollary of rapid inflation and a high foreign exchange rate, taxes were raised (by methods which most affected the middle-income level), and the traditional subsidies on farming and industry slashed. This in turn led to pressure on the Government to cut state spending by trimming the state sector. Actions taken included the selling-off of unwanted state assets and the corporatisation or privatisation of state entities - including the Bank of New Zealand and lands held by the Crown. All this was music to the ears of free-market advocates but anathema to the majority of Labour Party members and supporters. While there was general agreement that radical change was necessary, these kinds of actions were regarded by many as a betrayal of the Party's principles and philosophy. The Prime Minister and the inner circle of Cabinet insisted that the uncharacteristic economic policy - named 'Rogernomics' after finance minister Roger Douglas - was necessary to rescue the country from its dire economic straits, and promised more traditional Labour policies when the economy stabilized.

The peace movement feared another kind of betrayal. In more ways than one David Lange had experienced a "baptism of fire," as a N.Z. journalist put it, in the interregnum period. On the day of the dollar devaluation he had been visited by U.S. Secy. of State George Shultz *en route* to the 33rd. annual meeting of ANZUS in Wellington, who had warned the Prime-Minister-elect that if Labour's pledge to ban nuclear ships were to be implemented it would spell the end of the Treaty. "For a military alliance to mean anything," he declared, "it must be possible for the military forces of the countries involved to interact with one another." Nevertheless, both men emerged smiling from their brief meeting. Secy. Shultz told the waiting reporters that the basis had been laid for a "good co-operative relationship" and Lange talked of "a continuing association and a dialogue."

A reporter from *Newsweek* interviewed the Prime Minister in the week following the meeting, and asked about the nuclear-ships policy issue. In his reply, David Lange said

that "there would be no unilateral withdrawal by New Zealand from ANZUS" ... that "New Zealand has never had a doctrinaire left-wing government" .. that "social-issue activists get labeled left-wing, and can in some cases be quite destabilizing," ... that "what we have learned is the message that Labour governments have to be more careful than conservative governments." In 1982, the Australian Labour Party, then in opposition, had declared a nuclear-ship visit policy identical to that of its counterpart across the Tasman. When American officials pointed out that the policy threatened the ANZUS alliance, however, the leader was removed and the Party shifted firmly to the Right. Although some anti-nuclear policy statements were made during the subsequent election campaign, when Labor became the Government in 1983 the Party quickly moved to affirm the *status quo*. It seemed to many New Zealanders that the Fourth Labour Government of New Zealand was about to do likewise.

Nevertheless, the Government publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the anti-nuclear stance. New Zealand would not permit nuclear-powered or armed vessels to enter internal waters or ports; nor would its Navy exercise in a nuclear mode with ships of the nuclear states. In the absence of assurances to the contrary, said David Lange, the Government would assume a vessel capable of carrying nuclear weapons was, in fact, carrying them, and would deny that vessel entry. Conventionally-powered and armed warships would continue to be welcome. The Government also re-affirmed its commitment to the ANZUS Treaty on the basis that it was not a nuclear treaty, and Marilyn Waring - who had not sought re-election - published an article in an Australian newspaper in support of this view.⁸ Then Defence Minister, Frank O'Flynn, wrote in the introduction to his annual report:

We have made it clear that we do not ask or wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We do not agree that our participation in ANZUS requires us to adopt nuclear defence strategies. We are meeting our collective security obligations in other ways as we have always done and will continue to do so.⁹

⁸ Marilyn Waring, "N.Z. stand won't change ANZUS." *Age* (Australia) July 20, 1984.

⁹ N.Z. Foreign Affairs Report, 1984.

The Affair of the USS *Buchanan*

In 1987, I attended a conference at Otago University in Dunedin on N.Z.-U.S.-Canada relations. A young diplomat from the American Embassy was there, and when I asked him about the meeting between Secy. Shultz and the Prime Minister-elect he said: "Before the new Government was sworn in there was an ANZUS meeting and Shultz dropped in to see Lange. He said, 'Look, don't send in any ships for 6 months. Then it will probably be O.K.'" Whether or not this is an accurate account of David Lange's statements at that meeting, the new Prime Minister did ask N.Z. officials to begin negotiating with U.S. officials for a ship visit. The ANZUS naval exercise "Sea Eagle" was scheduled to take place in March 1985, and it was decided that at its close a U.S. Navy vessel would visit New Zealand for rest and recreation. According to my Embassy informant, there were many meetings of U.S. and N.Z. officials in both countries to plan the strategy, "and there was a sense of assurance that if a ship came in it would be accepted." Faced with having to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable policies of their Government's denial of port access to nuclear-armed and/or nuclear-powered naval vessels, and the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that when a request was made by the United States, New Zealand would, out of its own resources, decide whether or not the vessel was nuclear-armed.

While this would ensure that neither policy was violated, the details of how such a judgement would be reached were not revealed. Some press statements suggested that New Zealand would use intelligence information supplied by the United States and Australian Governments to make the determination, but when both countries expressed concern over this implication the Prime Minister said that New Zealand would not be relying on supplied intelligence. On December 14, the U.S. State Department sent a diplomatic note foreshadowing a request for a ship visit at the close of the ANZUS naval exercises. The Prime Minister replied to the request by reiterating his Government's non-nuclear policy, and indicated that a ship complying with it would be accepted. According to some newspaper reports, he also requested a list of U.S. ships taking part in the exercise in order to choose one that would conform to the policy.¹⁰

If so, the request was not met. In mid-January 1985, the United States asked permission for a port call at the end of the ANZUS exercise of the USS *Buchanan*; a Charles F. Adams-class destroyer fitted with anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) systems capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional explosives. The Prime Minister told the U.S. Ambassador that another ship should come and suggested that an FFG7 frigate would be acceptable. Although this information was conveyed in a secret meeting between the two men in the Prime Minister's office in the Beehive (the honey-pot-shape building housing the executive wing of the Government), within six hours an account of the meeting appeared in a Hong Kong newspaper, and the next day it was in New Zealand papers. The Prime Minister immediately had his office swept for listening devices, but the source of the leak was not discovered. (Some commentators suggest that the disclosure was not the result of a leak, but of intelligent guesswork on the part of a parliamentary reporter).

Given the strong feelings about the non-disclosure policy it seems unlikely that the U.S. Navy would have acceded to David Lange's private request for an alternative ship, but the leak ensured that it would be the *Buchanan* or nothing. The peace movement mobilized. Within hours, thousands of telegrams arrived on the Prime Minister's desk urging the Government not to abandon its policy on nuclear-capable vessels, and preparations began for a mass protest if the *Buchanan* should come into port. A second leak occurred a few days later when the contents of a letter from Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke to David Lange were made public. Hawke wrote that he understood the Prime Minister and his colleagues would make important decisions on the question of ship visits in late January and wished to know their views before he left for a meeting in Washington on February 2. Hawke expressed his Government's view that membership in the ANZUS Treaty implied that Australia should receive U.S. ships in its ports, and in his opinion New Zealand should do the same. The letter went on to state: "We cannot accept as a permanent arrangement that the ANZUS Alliance has a different meaning and entails different obligations for different members" (quoted McMillan, 1987:80)

¹⁰ *New Zealand Herald*, Jan. 29, 1985 and *Auckland Star*, Feb. 1, 1985.

Always sensitive to the 'big brother' image of Australia, the revelation prompted an outcry in New Zealand at what was perceived as Australia putting undue pressure on the Government to change its position. When the details of the Hawke letter became known, the Prime Minister was in Tokelau attending to "private family matters." Before leaving New Zealand he had made one more attempt to negotiate the visit of an alternative ship, one that clearly was not nuclear-capable. The United States insisted on the *Buchanan*, and requested an answer by February 11. Caucus met on January 31 and according to press reports, "campaign promises, Party Conference resolutions, sensitivities of the peace movement, opposition by ordinary public opinion and moral consistency were invoked to argue that definitive proof, not External Intelligence Bureau or prime ministerial judgement of probabilities would be necessary to sustain the credibility of the Party's anti-nuclear policies, and of Labour's commitment to it."¹¹ After the Caucus meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer wrote out a recommendation based on a report from the External Intelligence Bureau and the Ministry of Defence which David Lange signed when he returned to New Zealand.

On February 4, 1985 the U.S. Ambassador was informed that Cabinet had declined the application for the visit of the USS *Buchanan* on the grounds that "the information available to us has not proved sufficient to provide the Government of New Zealand with the assurance that it needs." The response of United States's officials was shock and anger. As my U.S. Embassy informant said: "You don't send a ship in until you've made sure it won't be refused. When the *Buchanan* was refused, the U.S. Government felt betrayed." Retribution was swift. New Zealand's involvement in Exercise Sea Eagle was cancelled and Washington announced that all other scheduled exercises, training and familiarization exchanges and military courtesy calls between New Zealand and the United States would be discontinued. U.S. officials said that the Government had been told in advance what to expect, and had either miscalculated the seriousness of the warning or had deliberately misled them. Washington warned the Government that the prohibition policy would deleteriously affect the ANZUS commitment, and could lead to destabilization of the

¹¹ *N.Z. Herald*, Jan. 29, 1985 and *Auckland Star*, Feb. 1, 1985. (Quoted Hoadley, 1986:5).

Pacific region.

David Lange appeared genuinely puzzled by the reaction of the United States. He declared that his Government's policy on warship-ship visits had been clearly stated and, he thought, understood. Permission for a rest and recreation visit would have been given if a non-nuclear-capable ship had been chosen. As the United States had insisted on sending in a nuclear-capable ship and N.Z. officials had not been able to assure the Government that the vessel was not carrying nuclear arms, the Government had had no option but to refuse the application. In a personal interview with writer Stuart McMillan soon after these events, the Prime Minister said he was disturbed by the accusations that he and N.Z. officials had misled Washington. He had come to the conclusion that when he said the United States should send a ship it was taken as a diplomatic signal that it would be accepted (McMillan, 1987:63). He added that it may have been naive of him not to have recognized this possible interpretation, but he thought he had made it abundantly clear that a ship that could be carrying nuclear arms would not be acceptable.

Ambassador Monroe Brown, on the other hand, declared that at the July 1984 meeting with Secy. Shultz at which he had been present, the Prime Minister-elect had personally promised a solution, and said he would arrange to admit a ship within six months. David Lange and the N.Z. Secretary of Foreign Affairs (also present at the July meeting) said that no such specific promise was given; only a general undertaking to work towards a solution. U.S. officials acknowledged that the Prime Minister had not actually said that a ship would be admitted, but his words had been interpreted as such.¹² This conflict of opinion suggests a misunderstanding about what would constitute a solution to the problem. To the United States, a solution meant that the Government, like the

¹² Some months after the *Buchanan* incident, Ambassador H. Monroe Browne was replaced by a career diplomat, Paul Cleveland. Although relations had been strained between the Government and the Ambassador, and he continued to accuse the Prime Minister of deceiving U.S. officials about the acceptance of the *Buchanan* the Cabinet nevertheless gave him a farewell party. While in New Zealand, the Ambassador's wife had acquired a racehorse which she raced under the name of 'Lack o'Reason'. David Lange remarked in his farewell speech that this was the only known occasion on which a U.S. Ambassador had liked his country's foreign policy so much that he had named a racehorse after it.

governments of all other countries with this policy, would find a way around the prohibition. Thus there was no point in sending in a non-nuclear-capable ship, as this would not have led to a resolution. To the New Zealand Government, however, a solution meant that the United States would not put the policy to the test, but would send the type of ship which would permit both countries to retain their declared policies. While the United States was asserting that the Government had not taken the American warning seriously, from the New Zealanders' point of view U.S. officials had underestimated the seriousness of their position. David Lange pointed to Prime Minister Hawke's letter as evidence that his Government had made its policy quite clear:

He was astute enough to know that we were serious about our policy and intended to carry it through. He was under no delusion. He had no sense of being misled. He knew where our policy was headed, and he expressed his and his Government's view succinctly. I have no argument with Mr. Hawke, none at all. The United States, on the other hand, clearly had an expectation that the Government would not remain firm. It is almost a classic position for governments of Western democracy to get elected on promises which they don't honour. They thought we would do the same. What they did not understand was how important this policy was to the Government, and how widespread was the support for it throughout New Zealand. This is difficult to explain to Australians who have a completely different view on this question (quoted McMillan, 1987:63).

The Prime Minister seemed to believe that the request for a different ship might have succeeded if information about the choice of the *Buchanan* had not become public. In a press conference on March 11, 1985, Lange gave the following replies when questioned about this matter:

Question: Mr. Lange, are you suggesting that if it were not for this leak made from Hong Kong that you would have been able to actually arrange a ship with the Americans?

Lange: Obviously we would have been well on course for that wouldn't we?

Question: Is there any possibility that this leak based on Hong Kong involved interference with Intelligence traffic out of New Zealand?

Lange: I have no idea. I just simply have no idea at all how that took place. All I am saying is

that it did, and that it effectively torpedoed the chance of having a visit from a conventionally armed and powered warship.

Question: In whose interest do you think it might have been?

Lange: I don't know mate, but it wasn't mine.¹³

Opinion polls conducted immediately after the rejection of the *Buchanan* showed that the interests of the Government, at least, had not been damaged by the incident. Asked in March, 1985 whether or not they approved of the Government's policy of banning the entry of nuclear weapons into the country (which in New Zealand is understood to mean weapons on ships or aircraft) 76.6 percent of New Zealanders said they approved of the policy, 18.6 disapproved, while 4.8 percent had no opinion. The figures indicate a significant shift in attitude and firming of opinion when compared with a similar poll taken eighteen months earlier during the previous Government's term in office. When asked their opinion about having nuclear-armed ships in their harbours in August 1983 (the time of the *Texas* visit), 46 percent of New Zealanders had approved the presence of such ships, 40 percent had disapproved and 14 percent had no opinion. All of which suggests that democratic governments do not so much reflect the will of a people as shape it.

If the Americans felt betrayed or misled by New Zealand's new leaders, the people of the peace movement did not. The planned protest demonstration turned into a massive "Thank the Government" rally instead. Nevertheless, doubts about the commitment of the Prime Minister and some Cabinet members to the policy remained. The following statements are typical of many I heard during the interviews: "I think a lot of politicians in the Cabinet would have been quite happy to see the whole issue die away but they had

¹³ Whether, given the subsequent events, David Lange continued to feel that the *Buchanan* leak had not been in his interest is a matter of speculation. He has appeared to enjoy the international attention focused on him and his country, although according to an Australian commentator he laughed at the suggestion that he had become something of a cult figure to the world anti-nuclear movement, saying that populism was a great danger to politicians, who in general tended to have an inflated view of their own importance. "It's a position where you can be seduced into thinking you are achieving a great deal when in fact what you are doing has absolutely no importance whatsoever to the vast majority of people in the world".

absolutely no choice about it" "Lange came in and was pushed from the bottom. He was going to let nuclear-powered ships in, and there were hundreds of letters from people saying: "Look, it's like having a nuclear-reactor sitting in our harbour" "Lange was being dragged, pushed, shoved and kept to his word here by a Caucus that's been trying to get rid of nuclear ships for years." There were also rumours that some 'horse-trading' had occurred in Caucus meetings; that the Left had accepted the controversial economic policies in return for enforcement of the ship ban. Asked to comment on this rumour, then Labour Caucus member Helen Clark (now Deputy Prime Minister) told me: "That is absolute rubbish. There were no deals, no horse-trading."

The Prime Minister has also repudiated the kind of accusations quoted above. In an interview with an Australian journalist soon after the *Buchanan* affair he stated:

You have probably heard stories which said Lange has, in recent times, changed his views on the nuclear issue. These stories are lies. Let's be quite clear on this. I've actually stood up for the policy regarding nuclear armaments for many years. More than 20 years ago I was handing out pamphlets for the nuclear disarmament movement. I've never deviated from my position. ...I did try and separate nuclear-powered ships from nuclear-armed ones, but then I realised all the nuclear-powered vessels were nuclear-armed anyway, and that I was engaged in a meaningless exercise.¹⁴

Stormclouds

New Zealand has no strategic importance for the United States; Henry Kissinger once described it as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." Nevertheless, Washington regarded this unprecedented action of a long-standing ally and hitherto loyal friend with opprobrium. As one senior official of the Reagan Administration declared:

... unless we hold our allies' feet to the fire over ship visits and nuclear deployments, one will run away and then the next. We will not be put in a position where they want our protection but without the necessary weapons to do the job.¹⁵

The affair captured world attention, sparking an international debate in which the rejection

¹⁴ Michael Gawenda, "The Lange Perspective." *The Age* (Australia), Mar. 22, 1985.

¹⁵ "U.S. Tries to Fight Allied Resistance to Nuclear Arms." *The New York Times*, February 14, 1985.

of the *Buchanan* was variously described as the 'Kiwi disease', 'Kiwi fever', a 'contagion' and an 'infection' by commentators or officials who deplored the action and feared it would spread, and as a 'beacon of hope in a dark world' and the 'triumph of people power' by those who applauded it and hoped that it would. Attempts by supporters of the policy to counter the metaphors of sickness with metaphors of health and healing - 'the Kiwi anti-biotic' and 'the Kiwi cure' - were unsuccessful; the Reagan Administration's label, 'the Kiwi disease,' stuck.¹⁶

Across the Tasman Sea the Hawke Government condemned the action, but declined to intervene in the dispute on behalf of the superpower. In New Zealand machinery for the Nuclear Free Zone Bill was set in motion to fulfill the Prime Minister's promise that Parliament, not the Executive, would have the final say on the country's nuclear-free policies, and the Government set up a four-person Defence Review Committee to determine the kind of defence most New Zealanders wanted. The Committee's terms of reference were:

- to receive and hear public submissions on the Government discussion paper (*The Defence Question*) on the future of New Zealand's defence policy;
- to question groups and individuals making submissions;
- to commission polling to provide objective data on public attitudes to defence and security questions;
- to prepare for Government a report, based on the public hearings and poll data, which will be taken into account in the preparation of the Defence Review.¹⁷

Immediately after the *Buchanan* incident David Lange left the country to address the March 1985 Geneva Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and take part in the 1985 Oxford debate. He took the opportunity of stopping off in the United States *en route* to "reaffirm New Zealand's continuing commitment to ANZUS, and its determination to go on playing its part fully in upholding Western interests and values, especially in the South

¹⁶ The term has now been appropriated by the world peace movement, and given a positive connotation.

¹⁷ *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, July 1986; p.7.

Pacific."¹⁸ Although not received at the official level, the Prime Minister addressed a businessmen's club with New Zealand connections in Los Angeles. He told the audience:

What we have done in New Zealand is to state unequivocally that New Zealanders want no part of nuclear weapons. We do not ask, we do not expect, the United States to come to New Zealand's assistance with nuclear weapons, or to present American nuclear capability as a deterrent to an attacker. We do not wish to have nuclear weapons on New Zealand soil or in our harbours....¹⁹

In London, the Prime Minister spoke with P.M. Margaret Thatcher, and then departed for Oxford to lead the affirmative side of the debate "that nuclear weapons are morally indefensible" against a team headed by the Reverend Jerry Falwell of the United States. The argument for the affirmative won, and David Lange was accorded the unusual honour of a standing ovation both before and after his address.

In the United States, a Congressional team headed by Rep. Stephen Solarz left for New Zealand to try to reason with the authorities. A Congressional Sub-committee was set up to hear testimony on the *Buchanan* incident, and to probe the potential dangers of this seemingly virulent form of southern hemisphere-style Japanese 'nuclear allergy' or European 'Hollanditis.' Navy Secretary John Lehman described the action as "outrageous" and other officials joined him in urging tough economic sanctions. The Government was accused by its critics in the United States and elsewhere of being irresponsible, of pandering to the Left, of failing to meet New Zealand's ANZUS obligations and of taking a free defence ride at other allies' expense.

Asked during the hearings about New Zealand's importance to the Western alliance, the U.S. Deputy Assistant of Defense described it as "a piss-ant little country south of nowheresville." The U.S. Ambassador to Australia echoed sentiments frequently expressed during the Hearings when he said in a Canberra speech that "New Zealand has been a bad boy and must be punished." David Lange angrily described these and similar statements as "political Ramboism", saying that while New Zealand had much affection for

¹⁸ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* Vol. 35, No.1. Jan.-March, 1985.

¹⁹ February 25, 1985.

the United States, it was not prepared to be constantly abused. Although New Zealand did lose its 'favored nation' trading status in the U.S., the non-verbal sanctions nevertheless were confined to the withdrawal of U.S. defence co-operation and shared intelligence,²⁰ and the cessation of high level political contacts between the two countries.

Diplomatic negotiations to resolve the dispute proved unsuccessful. From the beginning, David Lange had tried to ameliorate the effects of the policy and save the alliance by insisting that his Government's policies were anti-nuclear not anti-American, that ANZUS was a conventional not a nuclear alliance and had many important non-military aspects, that New Zealand lives had been sacrificed in the Vietnam War, that the United States was treating New Zealand unfairly in comparison with NATO allies, and finally - to the disgust of the peace movement - that New Zealand's ship policy was "not for export."²¹ Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration warned the Prime Minister that if his Government insisted on going ahead with the anti-nuclear Bill, New Zealand would be expelled from the ANZUS alliance. At a regional conference in the Philippines in August 1986, Secy. Schultz met with David Lange and afterwards announced that until New Zealand changed its policy on ship visits, it could not be regarded as a U.S. ally. "We part company as friends," said Shultz, "but we part company." Later he told reporters that it would be a tragedy if Kiwi disease spread, as it would seriously restrict the ability of the United States to fulfill its defence responsibilities.

State Terrorism in New Zealand

In mid-1985, an act of sabotage occurred in New Zealand which both enraged and united the country. On July 7, 1985 the 40-metre Greenpeace vessel and old North Sea trawler, *Rainbow Warrior*, tied up in Auckland harbour after having completed its first Pacific mission of moving the people of Rongelap to their new home. Its second mission,

²⁰ Not all military intelligence has been denied. N.Z. still has access to raw U.S. intelligence data relating to the region.

²¹ The Prime Minister's opening address at the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) World Congress in 1986 amplifies this statement: ... "It is impossible for me to advance any simple answer to the control of nuclear weapons and the limitation of the arms race. The answer for New Zealand will not be the answer elsewhere."

a protest cruise to Moruroa, was still to come. On the evening of July 10 an explosion occurred and the ship sank quickly. Greenpeace photographer, Fernando Pereira, was drowned when he went to rescue his camera. It was eventually revealed that the explosion was an act of sabotage by two French agents, carried out at the behest of high level officials in the French Government. The President initially denied the charge, but a few months later the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, uncovered and disclosed the details of the operation, and the Government admitted its involvement. The affair led to the resignation of the Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu (nicknamed Hernucléaire because of his enthusiasm for the French *force de frappe*), and a few other senior heads rolled.

The two French agents were tried in an Auckland court and sentenced to ten years in a New Zealand prison. After serving eight months they were released into French custody, mainly - or so it was perceived by the public - in response to a ban placed by France on the import of New Zealand lambs brains and the threat to block N.Z. butter shipments to the EEC. The release was part of a compromise arbitrated by the Sec. Gen. of the U.N. in which Jacques Chirac, the new French Prime Minister, apologised to New Zealand for "the events which took place in Auckland on the night of July 10, 1985", paid 13 million in compensation to the Government and guaranteed access to the European market of N.Z. butter until 1989. On October 24, 1985, a few months after the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing, the Greenpeace protest vessel *Vega* was seized by French commandos at Moruroa, and its seven crew members were arrested. Prime Minister Laurent Fabius was at the site, and he expressed the French Government's determination to clear the area of Greenpeace protestors. Just before the seizure, the crew had radioed a message to Moruroa:

WE URGENTLY APPEAL TO FRANCE TO CANCEL THE TEST. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE RISKS WE FACE BUT THE THREAT TO THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PACIFIC POSED BY THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY IS FAR GREATER.

The tests went ahead as planned. In his 1986 book, *Reflections on the Foreign Policy of France*, François Mitterrand accused critics of unfairly singling out France with respect to

nuclear testing and said the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior* did not "change the substance of the debate." It was an act which had not engaged France morally, and therefore could not be used as an argument against the tests (quoted Firth, 1987:119).

A Commentary

In June 1987 I interviewed New Zealand's Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Chris Beeby and received the following account of the *Buchanan* brou-ha-ha; one which perhaps may be regarded as definitive:

[After the election] there was an ANZUS meeting in Wellington between Shultz, Hayden [Australia's Foreign Minister] and Cooper [the then N.Z. Foreign Minister]. Shultz met with Lange during the meeting and they had a discussion about the situation in which Lange made it clear that he intended to implement the policy, but also that he was wholly in favour of remaining within the ANZUS alliance. It was understood at that stage that the U.S. wouldn't seek to request ship visits for a while. That was a matter of public knowledge. And it didn't. There were some discussions in the U.S. involving New Zealand about what kind of ship might be accepted, but on the basis that New Zealand was not going to have a Nordic or a Japanese solution. It was going to make its own judgement about it.

Then in January 1985, the *Buchanan* was nominated and it went to the Caucus. Caucus said "No, it won't do. We're not satisfied that it won't be carrying nuclear weapons." The major row with the Americans began at that point. They'd certainly been given no promise of any kind. But I think they'd come to expect that that would work; that we'd say 'Yes' to that ship, and we didn't. Then there was a period of to-ing and fro-ing with the Americans, and at a certain point the British intervened in the course of '85. Then we started talking to the British. We ought to have been talking to the Americans, but the Americans weren't talking to us. Britain in effect was acting as a go-between.

We talked to the British at some length about possible solutions. It was known that the Cabinet was going to legislate, and it was going to put the legislation through. And there was never any question of having some Nordic or Japanese-type solution. That wasn't on. What was explored was providing legislation that

was compatible with the Brits and, more important, the Americans neither confirm nor deny policy by making an independent judgement. And those discussions with the Brits were in mid-stream and might have got a solution, I don't know, when Shultz pulled the plug and said, "No. That's the end of it. Off. Finish."

At that point of the discussions the British stopped. It was irrelevant. And we proceeded with the legislation with a few minor changes. On anything to do with nuclear weapons the British are more American than the Americans, and it was inevitable they would follow the American line. I don't know that they did it with great enthusiasm. Perhaps they didn't. They clearly wanted to get a solution. They felt able to talk with us and have discussions with us and try to promote a solution, because at that time the Americans weren't going to talk to us except through that channel.

Asked about his personal feelings on the policy, Chris Beeby said he had "had an obsession about nuclear weapons for 20 or 30 years", and had taken part in the Aldermaston marches when studying international law at London University. He "had managed to get himself arrested outside the Soviet Embassy one week, and outside the American Embassy the next week." The Deputy Secretary went on to say:

It's nice to be involved in an area of Government policy in which I have a very large interest. You know, I think the world's quite mad on the subject of nuclear weapons and it's high time that something was done. And what the Lange Government has done is to make a very important gesture which has sent a signal all round the world. And I think it was right to do it. But I wouldn't overestimate in terms of regional or national security the effects of a policy that keeps out nuclear ships. I doubt whether it would make much difference one way or another as to whether we live or die in a nuclear war. Except that, as I say, it's a very important protest. A small country crying out for change.

The U.S. are worried that 'the disease' will spread, and that's why they took the position they did. And why they took that position on the nuclear free zone. They're worried it will spread. They think it might arouse similar aspirations in Europe. "They'll go soft the way New Zealand's gone soft." I can understand that. But it's a bit odd that they chose to single out New Zealand. They didn't single out Spain or Greece. They're equally wobbly about support for NATO and

nuclear bases in Spain and the like. America's over-reaction was foolish. They could have treated ANZUS as a conventional alliance. New Zealand doesn't want to be defended by nuclear weapons. But it has made us think a lot more about what is defence and national security and it's made us focus on our part of the world, and on a defence policy for the region.

Asked to comment on the rumour that his department was independently negotiating with the United States to resolve the situation Chris Beeby replied:

I've heard that rumour too. It would be a pretty rash Foreign Affairs official that did that. Particularly with an able, intelligent, alert Prime Minister. I mean, since when did anyone pull the wool over Lange's eyes? He's very fast. ... It's true to say that senior people in Foreign Affairs would have liked to see a solution of the kind that has been talked about with the Americans. But to suggest that we've tried to do an end-run around the Prime Minister and moved out on our own. ... Not so. We are in very, very close touch with him and subject to his directions."²²

Nuclear Free New Zealand

"What New Zealanders Want"

In July 1986, the Defence Review Committee published a two-volume report of its findings; one containing the substance of the Report and Committee's recommendations and the other containing details of the opinion poll conducted by the National Research Bureau. The report revealed that a large majority of the 4,192 written and verbal, individual and group submissions received by the Committee supported the Government's anti-nuclear stance and favoured the ship-ban, even if it meant expulsion from ANZUS. The peace movement, it seems, had been hard at work. The opinion poll (based on a representative sample of 1600 respondents) showed that 80 percent of New Zealanders supported the Government's policy of ensuring that nuclear weapons are neither manufactured nor stored in the South Pacific and 86 percent thought their country should actively promote nuclear disarmament. With respect to nuclear ship visits, 66 percent of the respondents wanted nuclear-armed ships banned from the country's ports, 41 percent

²² The Prime Minister was at that time also the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a traditional system which no longer operates.

wanted nuclear-powered ships banned (many wanted both); 28 percent would ban neither, and 3 percent were undecided. Strongest support for the ban came from women, people under thirty-five, Maoris and Pacific Islanders, Labour supporters and people for whom the issue was "very important with respect to their vote." Strongest opposition came from men, people over fifty-five, National Party supporters and those who regarded the issue as unimportant.

Asked to give their preferred choice with respect to ANZUS and the ship-ban, 44 percent chose the alliance *and* the ban; 37 percent chose the alliance and *no* ban and 16 percent chose the ban *and* desired to be out of ANZUS (perhaps an indicator of the size of core peace movement support). When it came to the question of choosing ANZUS *or* nuclear-ships, however, the country virtually polarized: 52 percent chose the alliance, 44 percent chose the ban and 4 percent were undecided. A significant, though not unexpected, finding was that New Zealanders do not fear an enemy attack. Asked to name the greatest threat facing their country, armed invasion was seen as the least likely (18 percent) and least worrying (11 percent); poaching in New Zealand's fisheries as the most likely (91 percent) though not particularly worrying (23 percent); while nuclear war rated as likely (44 percent) and the most worrying (48 percent).

The most unexpected finding of the enquiry was the ranking of countries thought to pose the greatest military threat to New Zealand within the next 15 years. While the Soviet Union headed the list with 31 percent, the United States was next with 14 percent, just ahead of France with 13 percent. Japan, Indonesia and S.E. Asian countries, the once-dreaded 'Asian hordes', each scored 3 percent, while the threat of communism in the South Pacific rated only 1 percent. The largest response (32 percent) was 'none'. Eight out of ten respondents expressed support for New Zealand forming an alliance with another country, preferences being Australia (68 percent), the United States (52 percent), Great Britain (35 percent) and South Pacific Island countries (14 percent). The most preferred alliance option continued to be with the United States and Australia, with New Zealand separate from all nuclear aspects of the tripartite alliance. If not part of an alliance, respondents' ranking of the various defence options was: armed forces as core of citizen

army (80 percent); armed forces only (67 percent); non-violent resistance (26 percent); no resistance in any form (7 percent). The Report stated that the members of the Committee had laboured to reconcile the competing principles of anti-nuclearism (supported by 73 percent) and membership of an alliance (supported by 72 percent). They had concluded that a consensus as high as 80 percent might in theory be built around the policy of a nuclear-free New Zealand in ANZUS, and recommended that the Government work towards that end.

The Committee was chaired by Sir Frank Corner, a retired Foreign Affairs official and one-time N.Z. Ambassador to the United States. Although the four-member panel included sociologist and peace activist Dr. Kevin Clements of Canterbury University, the peace movement was extremely critical of the Committee's findings. So, too, was the Prime Minister, whose letter to members of the panel and addendum of questions needing urgent attention were published along with the findings. The major criticisms levelled at the Report were the ignoring of the pre-Pakeha history of New Zealand in the description of the historical context, a pro-ANZUS bias, no quantitative break-down of the contents of the submissions and failure to differentiate between the written/verbal submissions and the approximately 1,000 coupon submissions resulting from a newspaper advertisement by a conservative group opposed to the Government's anti-nuclear policies. The Prime Minister noted in his letter the Committee's statement that one reason for the recommendations made by the group

is your belief that one of the Committee's roles is to focus and add depth to the defence and foreign policy debate in New Zealand. I agree, but in order to meet this goal it is surely essential that any comments you choose to make should be fair, accurate and objective. It is with this in mind that I am asking your Committee to address itself to the issues and questions outlined in the attached paper.²³

The Legislation

A general election was scheduled for the last half of 1987, and the nuclear-free Bill

²³ *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*. Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, July 1986; p.3. The title of the annex to the Report is *Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*. Wellington: Govt. Printers.

was due for its Third and final Reading by the end of 1986. By May, 1987 the peace groups were beginning to fear that, given the degree of popular support for ANZUS revealed by the Review, the Government was stalling on introducing the Bill before the election. Their fears proved groundless. Labour kept its promise to legislate its anti-nuclear policies into law "through due democratic process", and at 5.30 p.m. on June 4, 1987, after a noisy debate before a crowded gallery, the *New Zealand Nuclear-free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, 1986* passed by 39 votes to 29. Church bells rang throughout the country on that grey winter evening, and champagne corks popped on the steps of Parliament House as a small crowd of people celebrated the moment of the Bill's passing. Inside the Beehive, Labour parliamentarians were preparing for their own celebrations. As captions surrounding photographs of the occasion in *Peacelink* expressed it: "The Bill was passed on the 4th. of June. Members of Parliament organized a party to celebrate and lesser mortals celebrated outside in the gardens under the pohutakawa tree."²⁴

The Bill is not a radical document; its purpose is to give statutory authority to the Government's existing policies and make it more difficult for a future Government to adopt a different stance. Articles 4 to 11 establish the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone. It comprises all the "... land, territory, and inland waters, the internal waters, ... the territorial sea ..., and all the airspace above." Under the Act it is a criminal offence punishable by up to 10 years in prison for any citizen or person ordinarily resident in New Zealand to "manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over any explosive device; or aid, abet, or possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device" within the country. In the case of a citizen or resident "who is a servant or agent of the Crown" the prohibitions apply throughout the world. This means, among other things, that the N.Z. military cannot engage in nuclear-weapon related exercises with the armed forces of another country.

²⁴ The red-flowering pohutakawa tree is New Zealand's national tree, and is known in the northern hemisphere as New Zealand Christmas bush. As the Maori name means 'life' the tree is an important symbol for the peace movement.

The 1987 General Election

The jubilation of the peace movement at the ending of its long march outside the institutions was muted by anxiety over the outcome of the now-looming parliamentary elections. If National ousted Labour, the best the peace movement could hope for would be a ship policy along the lines of the so-called 'Nordic' or 'Japanese' solution of trusting the nuclear state to respect the host country's nuclear-free status (See Hodges and Fry, 1986 and White, 1989). At worst, and more likely, both the legislation and the ban would be abolished. Furthermore, a Labour defeat seemed a strong possibility. Disapproval of 'Rogernomics' had eroded the traditional support base, and many alienated Labour supporters were declaring they would not vote in the coming election; an atypical attitude in a country where the turn-out of voters averages 93 percent. Neither was history on the side of the peace movement; no Labour government since WW2 had achieved a second term in office. So even as they rejoiced in the birth of Nuclear Free New Zealand, peace groups throughout the country were embarking upon yet another 'Votes for Peace' campaign. On August 15, 80 percent of New Zealand voters went to the polls and returned the Government to office with the same 15-seat majority. "What a remarkable judgement! What a remarkable country!" said a jubilant David Lange in his victory speech.

It is perhaps appropriate to conclude this odyssey of a nuclear-free nation with the account of an incident involving unusual behaviour on the part of airline passengers. On June 4, 1987 five members of the New Zealand peace movement were on their way to China. Representatives from the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament had paid a visit to the country in 1986, and now a reciprocal visit was underway. At precisely 5.30 p.m. N.Z. time, 30,000 feet over the Pacific and somewhere south of the Philippines, the members of the delegation rose to their feet, turned to face the startled passengers, raised their champagne glasses and declared: "Ladies and Gentlemen, the Third Reading in Parliament of the Nuclear Free Zone Bill has just been passed; New Zealand is now officially nuclear-free. We invite you to join us in a toast for this historic event."²⁵

²⁵ "Peace Delegation to China." *Peacelink*, Sept. 1987, p.25. The visit was arranged by the N.Z.-China Friendship Society in conjunction with the New Zealand CND. The delegation consisted of Kate Boanas, Marion Hancock, Lyn Hume, Bill Ringer and Ron Smith.

PART THREE

THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF THE N.Z. PEACE MOVEMENT

Sometimes at night when it was wet and cold and uncomfortable and I was aching with sore feet and everything, I used to wonder why I was so happy. And so absolutely content. And thinking about that I realized that for me [the Great Peace March] was a total experience. It involved my body and my mind and my spirit - if there is such a thing as a spirit or soul. It involved my whole person totally and very satisfyingly. ...

And on a bigger scale, I realized that with so many people from so many different religions and backgrounds coming together that the peace movement is a very uniting force. ... It made me realize that the peace movement is part of a new religion. A sort of universal religion of love and justice for all. And a real reverence for life on earth making us all part of the universe. And I like to think that I'm part of that movement. ...

- Maynie Thompson, Waiheke Island, New Zealand

CHAPTER 9

NETWORKS OF EMPOWERMENT

There is no one group which makes policy decisions for the movement; we are all autonomous groups able to make statements, take our own actions independent of the others. This non-hierarchical grassroots movement has been the strength.

- Kate Boanas, N.Z. peace activist, 1987

So far the dialectic between nuclearism and anti-nuclearism has been examined mainly in terms of events in a conflict between two competing reality constructions: a battle about and around the status of truth. Now it is time to look inside the *Weltanschauung* of the N.Z. peace movement; to examine the process whereby the alternative truth of the peace movement is generated, transmitted and sustained in the struggle to control or influence the great apparatuses of social production. While the focus is upon the people of the N.Z. peace movement and the socio-cultural system they created in challenging a global power/knowledge truth regime and the domestic ruling discourse, I believe that much of the analysis has a broader application. Each country's peace movement has specific goals and a specific form arising out of its unique context but the shared goals of nuclear disarmament and (for the core of the movement) alternatives to state militarism mean that each is but one aspect of a world phenomenon, and global communication and the over-arching nature of militarism ensure many commonalities.

While I separate out in the analysis the social system and the meaning system I do so only for heuristic purposes. I regard society, culture and the individual not as interlocking entities continually shaping and being shaped by each other in a continuous, multi-directional stream of interaction - the Parsonian concept (Parsons, 1951:3-23) - but rather as three manifestations of one entity ('three in one and one in three' or, to use a secular metaphor, the light, heat and power of electricity) continually shaping and being shaped by a unique space-time environment.¹ Like Anthony Giddens, I believe that

social structure exists *only* as a set of virtual properties drawn upon by actors in the production of social life (and, I would add, of the self) which is *at the same time* reconstituted through action (Giddens, 1979, 1982). I also regard action and meaning not as inseparable elements of a dual relationship but as a duality. Nevertheless, the Parsonian model is a useful tool for analysis, and I bend it to my purposes.

The Peace Networks

Power, says Michel Foucault, is not something which can be possessed, appropriated or passed on; rather, "power ... circulates; ... power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization." Not for nothing are the buzz-words of peace movements everywhere 'empowerment' and 'networking', two static nouns transformed into active verbs, and much of the organization and activity of the movement can be understood in terms of these two key concepts with the addition of a third to be discussed in a later chapter. 'Empowerment' is the process whereby persons who have not taken action to achieve a desired goal because they perceive themselves as helpless or insignificant are helped to recognize their power-potential and encouraged to act, usually in company with like-minded persons. Empowerment occurs through human, ideally face-to-face, interaction and is realized and manifested only through human action.

The world's peace networks consist of tenuously connected, spontaneously formed groups which are both arenas of human interaction and instruments for action. Women often use the term 'web' or 'matrix of power' to describe a peace network, and may literally form a human web during symbolic protest actions by holding hands crosswise - a process known as webbing. 'Networking' means that some form of power is circulating; that individuals or groups are communicating with other individuals or groups for purposes of empowerment, support, solidarity, exchange of information, consciousness-raising, task organization, goal achievement or all of these. Networking promotes empowerment, or so it is hoped, while empowerment expands the networks. Networking may occur at the local, national or regional levels of interaction but the aim of

¹ From this viewpoint the long-standing structure vs. culture valorization debate of sociology dissolves into meaninglessness.

the peace movement is to expand its networks worldwide: "Act locally; think globally!" The global computer information system known as 'Peace Net' is a step in this direction, and a mirror image (in concept if not size) of the global military communication infrastructure.

The power/knowledge truth regime of nuclearism is also a system of networks, and they already span the earth. While the world's peace networks consist of people, military networks consist rather of places containing people. While they may know each other personally and be known to others, the system does not depend for its operation on this knowledge. Indeed, if personal communication becomes important the efficiency of the regime will suffer; the more machine-like the infrastructure the better it can carry out the will of the authorities and (or so it is believed) achieve its goals. By contrast, the peace networks are nothing *but* systems of personal communication and there *are* no authorities. If human interaction ceases or becomes mechanical an empowerment network will cease to exist, or cease to be effective. While the networks of power/knowledge regimes achieve efficiency in goal attainment through hierarchical decision-making, peace networks must use democratic and, ideally, consensual modes of decision-making - even at the expense of efficiency - if they are to attain their goals through a process of empowerment. While truth regimes strive to contain and control information and action within a select circle and so are necessarily exclusive, knowledge/empowerment truth systems strive to disseminate information and promote action as widely as possible and thus are necessarily inclusive.

In examining the nature of the peace networks and of inclusiveness in the N.Z. context, I focus first upon the Peace Squadron and then upon the 1980's peace movement. In the case of the former I explore the social base, organizational structure, forms of leadership, mobilization, recruitment and resources, and take as my starting point the classical Weberian concepts of sociological analysis (Weber, 1946:180-195).

The Peace Squadron

The Social Base: Class, Status, Party

New Zealand has more boat owners per head of its 3.2 million population than any

other country. In the Peace Squadron stronghold of Auckland (the largest city with a population of around 900,000), there are estimated to be about 70,000 yachts, launches and powerboats - the most in comparison to population of any city in the world - plus an unknown number of non-powered craft. Shortly after the *Haddo* visit in 1979, John Boanas wrote in his analysis of the Squadron that "... membership was early on, and remained, very much a middle-class grouping." This is predictable; a substantial part of the membership consisted of small boat owners, and these are unlikely to fall much below the middle-income level. Those well above it - such as members of Auckland's prestigious Yacht Clubs - are, as the Squadron found, more likely to side with the ruling elites than with their opponents. Nevertheless, the Squadron did include some large craft and the upper-income group was represented; as the reporter at the *Pintado* meeting noted, some people left in Mercedes. Ownership of a boat, of course, does not necessarily imply a median or higher level of income. The Squadron included many tiny, non-powered craft and some of the men on Waiheke Island had built their own boats and live (or lived) on them.

Non-boat owners acting as crews or passengers were a large part of the membership of the Squadron, and most were also likely to be members of the middle-class. All the ships came in on weekdays, so those taking part in the actions were people possessing some degree of discretionary time - professionals, business-owners, managers or self-employed people, non-waged workers (mothers, housewives, students), non-workers (the retired, the disabled, the unemployed, children) or workers with some control over their work-time. The land protests were not confined to weekdays but also took place in the evenings, nights, during week-ends and lunch-hours, so there were opportunities for people with less discretionary time at their disposal to take part in the demonstrations.

New Zealand has a large middle-class. A 1984 demographic study of the country's class structure using classical Marxist concepts² shows the following breakdown:

²"The Demographics of Class Structure in New Zealand." Chris Wilkes *et al*, in *Demography* September, 1984.

Bourgeoisie (owner/pt. owner with at least 10 employees)	- 2.9 %
Small Employer (owner/pt. owner with 2-9 employees)	- 8.0%
Petty Bourgeoisie (self-employed or 1 employee)	- 9.0%
Managers/Supervisors (s'visory/decision-making function)	- 39.2%
Semi-autonomous (mod.-high work autonomy, non-s'visory)	- 6.2%
Proletariat (none or little of the above)	- 34.7%

The residual working class in the United States is said by these researchers to be between 35.2 percent and 56.7 percent (depending on the criteria used), while the petty bourgeoisie estimate is around 6.4 percent. The largest demographic difference between the two countries, however, is in the size of the management/supervisor category, which is between 12.3 percent and 17.6 percent in the United States. Although approximately one-third of New Zealand workers appear to have little or no control over the work process, the large grouping between owners and non-autonomous workers suggests that many people do possess at least some discretionary time during working hours.

The Peace Squadron began in a religious setting but it was not a church-based movement. When in due course the Anglican Church hierarchy and some faculty members expressed unease about the association of St. John's College with the organization, the meetings shifted to secular venues. According to John Boanas, "... membership of the Squadron came from a variety of areas: Labour and Values parties, the environment movement, churches, peace groups, student groups and trade unions." Although some of the latter members probably held radical political views, the Squadron was not a politically radical organization. "[O]ne of the features of the peace protest movement has been the lack of contact with groups to the left of the Labour Party." Labour supporters were mainly those with a liberal-internationalist outlook who were committed to the previous Government's nuclear-free zone and anti-French testing policies and saw the Squadron as an extension of these. While some Labour Party members, like the Parliamentary Party, were able to reconcile adherence to ANZUS with their nuclear-free zone beliefs, the majority assumed that commitment to the latter excluded the former. Values Party Squadron members were particularly concerned with the environmental aspects of ship

visits, and Social Credit supporters were likely to be sympathetic to, if not active, in the Squadron. National party supporters, however, were more likely to be part of the welcoming fleet than the protest flotilla.

Church support tended to come from a number of the more radical priests and clergy, and from laity who felt that their churches were emphasising the comfort and ignoring the challenge of the Christian gospel, and so were looking elsewhere to put their beliefs into practice.³ A major component of Squadron membership came from previously existing Auckland peace organizations and pacifist groups some of which, like WILPF, contained a number of older people. The nature of Squadron activism, however, meant that most of those participating in the water actions were in the young to middle-aged category. By the 1970's - as in other western countries - student protest had become mainly campus-oriented and student participation in the Squadron was minimal. Although individual trade unionist's direct participation in the Squadron was also small, the Union actions were of great importance and the trade unions played a leading role in the initial campaigns against the warships.

Anti-nuclearism and the Trade Unions

I interviewed George Goddard in his dockside office early one working day, and he told me the following story of trade union involvement in the anti-nuclear movement.

Many of the members of the [Waterside Workers'] Union have been active in anti-nuclear campaigns since the early 1950's. Amongst our union members are a fair percentage - perhaps around 30 percent - who came over from the Pacific Islands - Pitcairn, Samoa, Tahiti and other areas around the Pacific - and so were concerned about the French testing. This was the background which generated a number of motions of various stop-work meetings advocating that New Zealand adopt a nuclear-free stance. And in fact the issue had been discussed at various times before we were confronted by nuclear-armed warships in our harbours.

³ Peace groups in churches are often marginal to congregational activities, and often form into house-based ecumenical groups containing both Protestants and Catholics. As one Catholic woman peace activist told me, "I now have much more in common with Protestants in the peace movement than with many of my Catholic friends. I don't think church divisions matter any more."

I myself had attended a conference in Japan organized against atomic and hydrogen weapons in 1968 and had reported back to our members on seeing the rubbish that was left over in the shape of blighted human beings. Even 19 years after the bomb had dropped, people were still dying of radiation sickness and hereditary factors inherited from parents, perhaps grandparents for all I know. This situation and circumstances met a ready response amongst our members, many of whom had been engaged in conventional warfare in their earlier lives, and all of whom had families. So that the nuclear position was seen as a step worse in human degradation than conventional warfare. Our policy was firmly established and many of us participated in the Easter marches.

When the then Tory government under Muldoon decided they would invite the *Truxton* into our harbour for rest and recreation leave, in my opinion it was a deliberate act of provocation; a bit of cheap grandstanding to appear more patriotic than the Union Jack to build up a bit of feeling for the impending election. In fact, in May [1976] our then President - a strong personality and adherer to principle, and a very forceful Methodist speaker - moved a motion that we informed our National Federation of Watersiders, the Federation of Labour and anyone else that might be interested that should a nuclear-armed and/or powered vessel enter our harbour, we'd cease work for the duration of the visit. When this matter of the stopwork meeting was discussed it got very little questioning from the floor as the anti-nuclear question had been well-canvassed beforehand, and all of us had the right to speak in its defence.

The watersiders took the matter of the port stoppage to the Waterfront Central Committee, an *ad hoc* body where groups of different craft unions or trade unions at the port - seamen, drivers, watersiders, harbourboard employees and foremen - met and had a discussion. And it was agreed that should any of them take action they would reciprocate and support each other. And the matter was taken to the stopwork meeting at the end of August by the Watersiders' Union, and the motion put to stop work when the ship came in and not resume until it went out again. One man voted against it. He had strong feelings, and that was all right.

Subsequently, further visits of nuclear ships met with a similar but not identical response because in the interim the matter had been already committed to the Federation of Labour - which embraces the vast bulk of the labour force in New Zealand apart from publicly-employed civil servants, teachers, and the like. And at

that Federal Labour Conference watersiders' delegates moved that local trades councils take up stoppages and other protesting actions on the advent of further nuclear ships. This, of course, lifted it out of one level of individual reaction to a different, and somewhat more complex and widespread level. And at the subsequent visits the watersiders maintained their agreed stand, and other sections of unionists such as car-workers knocked off work for various lengths of time.

In the first stoppage of the *Truxton*, the 1976 one, we were able to gauge the escalating public opinion by the number of telegrams, letters, cheques and bundles of money we received in the Union office from all over the country in support of the action. And all sorts of people sent unsolicited - we never asked for money - sums of money. And rather than pay wages to men who had divorced themselves from the payroll for 6 days, we put the money into full-page ads in the local press, explaining what we were on about, and why we thought people should support us morally and any other way that they felt, if not financially.

There was an attempt to initiate a backlash by that little bastard Muldoon, who wept crocodile tears about these poor kids being marooned, and the mums and dads and all the rest of it. In fact, our own experience is that most people are fundamentally decent, and they know which day of the week it is. And when some of our fellows went down and talked to people waiting at the terminals, they didn't like it, but they clearly understood a number of them that the time of the vessels being invited in was an attack on the anti-nuclear position, and using the sufferings of ordinary citizens.

As the years rolled on, and more of the ships came in we suggested that they anchor off the coast and that [the crews] be brought ashore. And we would have welcomed them. Our fellows aren't anti-American, they just don't want to be blown to hell and gone. When more ships came in the Gallup polls throughout the country indicated that because there was a consistent focal point of opposition, the belief that something could be done, the number of people supporting an anti-nuclear stand steadily increased. The last polls showed that 76 percent of New Zealanders don't want to have a bar of nuclear weapons in or allegedly defending the country.

Organization, Mobilization, Recruitment, Leadership

St. John's College provided the organizational base for the early Auckland Peace

Squadron meetings and actions, something which the Wellington Squadron lacked. From the beginning, the form of the organization was loose and it remained so. There was an overall co-ordinator and various area co-ordinators, a Squadron commander, a media spokesperson, a secretary/treasurer and numerous volunteers who undertook various responsibilities such as organizing the telephone tree and the land demonstrations, contacting possible recruits and raising money. Boats were registered with the Squadron and the names and addresses of all participants recorded. Men held all the key positions with women acting in support roles. There was open discussion and debate at the general meetings, while the skippers of the larger boats met separately to plan their strategies. Some fears were expressed about the ease of Squadron opponents penetrating these meetings, but it was agreed that they would remain open (to close them, of course, would have conflicted with peace movement values). Training in non-violence techniques did not occur until some years after the Squadron's formation.

The general meetings appeared to be occasions for promoting solidarity and affirming goals as well as discussing and outlining plans for campaign activities and the water actions. Bernard Rhodes, Squadron co-ordinator on Waiheke Island, said of the latter:

... It was very loose co-ordination. We had strategy meetings, and things like that. But it never worked out as planned. What it is, is a bunch of individual responses; people acting on their own. About the only co-ordination is "Well, the ship's coming. Expect it about 9.00. You'd better be there!" And then you very much play it by ear on the spot. Of course with an agreement to use peaceful methods only."

It seems that whereas people participating in modern-day military actions are more and more becoming anonymous 'button pushers,' those participating in peace actions are re-enacting the history of 'warrior warfare.' George Armstrong described the 'boaties' of the Peace Squadron as:

... an amazing bunch of people. I sometimes used to think of them as a bunch of people who under worse circumstances would have been pirates. They were magnificent people, buccaneer types, sure of themselves. Nobody was their

master; rugged, individualistic types. You couldn't forge much of an organization out of them but they were simply terrific when it was a matter of getting together for a big push.

There was a tremendous strength in the friendship and interrelation between the people of the Peace Squadron. To me it was a delight because the church set-up is such a reserved, tight sort of group. Well-defended and so on, and doesn't particularly stick to its ideals anyway. This crowd was just as rough as bags, but really nice people. Some were quite respectable; others totally unrespectable. And many in between.

Recruitment and mobilization were carried out by means of telephone trees, personal contacts, contacts with key people, letters, leaflets, advertisements, posters, paste-ups and so forth. The media kits and newsletters produced and circulated to the media and to Squadron members by George Armstrong were simultaneously a means of providing information, outlining plans for mobilization, broadcasting the Peace Squadron message, promoting solidarity, encouraging creativity and participation through inviting ideas for actions and, most important, keeping the organization alive between warship visits. The somewhat formal style of the newsletters suggested professionalism, seriousness, competence and legitimacy, while the informal meetings and personal contacts in seeking recruits provided the human touch. Finding a place and a task within the Squadron for everyone offering their help was both a need and a value, a means and an end. To succeed the peace movement needs numbers and thus cannot afford to be choosy, but an integral part of its value system is inclusiveness and empowerment. For Les Church, it was congruent with the task of ministry:

To me, that is what the church is all about. It's empowering people and helping people not to be overcome by fear, but to stand tall and do things that they can do. It's not through sitting down and praying that the threat will go away. But actually disempowering the threat and empowering the people. And the peace movement is certainly about that.

In a lot of walks in life ... If anyone offers to do something, one can become very suspicious. You know, it's really hard to make it, to get the nomination or to get the job or to be recognized. And that's just so much shit really. In a peace

movement none of that really matters. It's important that anyone who feels they want to do something only has to say that, and have the support and encouragement of everyone. Then they're contributing something towards the common goal. I know a lot of retired people who are sitting there licking envelopes and saying, "I wish I could have been doing this all my life. This is the most important thing I've ever done."

George Armstrong was not only the founder of the Squadron and chief organizer and co-ordinator in the early days, but also the first spokesperson. He said of the *Long Beach* visit:

The media were agog; it was a godsend to them. They sent up a team from Wellington. When they needed someone to go out on the harbour and point out where things might happen, I went with them, so I had the opportunity to lace topographical descriptions with bits and pieces about how we saw things. So I immediately found myself with that media opportunity, and media image.

Very quickly, with the help of other people in the Peace Squadron - who were ruthless in their criticism of how I handled the chances I had on the media - I soon developed a certain skill particularly interlacing your discussion with your message in such an interwoven way that there was no way they could edit it out. Of course they weren't interested in editing it out at that stage, though they were later. [The Squadron members] asked me to be spokesperson, though each time I kept putting it back to them. I didn't want to assume the role of filling it.

Running the Peace Squadron cost money, and it had to be found through donations - mostly from members, but also from outside the Squadron. Passing the hat around at meetings when money was needed for a particular project suggests that there was little in the treasury, although there was a treasurer. When I asked how members who were arrested and fined coped with the payments, I was told that this was never a problem. Dave Wray said, "I was fined \$100 on the *Texas* incident; it was basically a traffic offence. But that was paid for me. People just came up to me in the street and gave me money. I think we ran a profit on that one." It seems that the more daring the act, the more likely it was that it would be punished by the authorities but, provided it was not violent or

irresponsible, applauded by the peace movement.

All the work of the Squadron was voluntary and unpaid. For those deeply involved in organizing the campaigns, the experience appears to have been both demanding and rewarding. Bernard Rhodes said:

I mean we've all got other things to do for goodness sake, it's a strain to have to go out there and protest; to have the meetings and do the work. We're all unpaid, all amateurs, and it all comes out of your own pocket. And it's very expensive in terms of your own time. But it forced things to happen, and we got a non-nuclear government elected.

George Armstrong said of the period when he was co-ordinator and spokesperson:

"Between '75 and '80 felt like 15 years instead of 5. It just went on and on and on. Every summer holidays, just as we were settling down to a bit of peace, Muldoon would announce the visit of a ship. It was really hard-going. But very exhilarating too."

Leadership

John Boanas says of George Armstrong:

He offered intelligent leadership at a time in Auckland when there were few people able to take such a strong initiative. He blended a prophetic, absolutist, religious position with a conventional political call for resistance against the nuclear militarization of the South Pacific. He attempted to decentralize decision-making, and generally create a friendly and informal organization. This was particularly successful, and the Squadron developed a feeling of group solidarity early on (Boanas, 1980:25).

Members who fill organization roles in the peace movement ideally aim to act as spokespersons or facilitators, but charismatic leaders like George Armstrong and Helen Caldicott have always been important in social movements and the peace movement is no exception. As the director of the N.Z. Peace Foundation told me, "We owe a great deal to personalities. Peace movements always rely a great deal on individual personalities."

Nevertheless, there is a tension between this reliance on charismatic individuals and the desire to enact the values of non-hierarchy, egalitarianism and the empowerment of the powerless. George Armstrong revealed his sensitivity to this tension when he said of his position as media spokesperson, "I kept putting it back to them because I didn't want to assume the role." The dilemma is discussed more fully in a later section of this work.

Representing a diverse group is not easy, even - perhaps particularly - in the peace movement. George Armstrong commented that as media spokesperson "... I was often at my wits end how to represent them. They were so different." The problem of representation surfaced in the early years of the Wellington Peace Squadron. Its first convenor was Dr. Ken Hulls, an engineer with the N.Z. Electricity Department who had assisted in the Government planning for nuclear reactor sites. He was a member of the U.N. Association and a liberal-internationalist who advocated nuclear power. While the relationship between the representatives of the various groups which made up the Coalition Against Nuclear Warships (CANWAR) and the Peace Squadron was generally very good, says John Boanas, Hulls publicly disassociated himself from the Coalitions' aims. This was regarded as an insult, and the Coalition threatened to withdraw support from the Wellington Squadron unless the convenor made no further comments.

Nicky Hagar was spokesperson for the Wellington Peace Squadron. He says when he arrived in Wellington in 1976 as a 17-year old worker he was apolitical, but soon after his arrival took part in Campaign Half-Million. "Then when the *Truxton* was coming I rang around to find the Peace Squadron - which had about ten people in it - and got involved as a very junior member of a committee made up of unionists and the University Student's Association of New Zealand. Putting up posters, and so on. The next time a warship came in I was spokesperson of the group, and that's the main role I've had since." The Wellington Peace Squadron "... developed almost completely independently," and he did not meet George Armstrong until the 1980's. "The Squadron was mainly Auckland with its more sunny harbour. Everytime a ship came in here it was more a matter of life and death than stopping a warship."

Perhaps because he took on the role early in life, a facilitating-style of leadership seems to come easily to Nicky Hagar, who at age 28 is now a full-time field worker for PMA (Peace Movement Aotearoa) in Wellington. He said of that early period:

What I was trying to do - and in microcosm it's what a lot of people were trying to do, and I was dealing with warship protests - it seemed that the first few marches and protests we had it was the same people who'd been marching on Hiroshima Day marches for donkeys years. It was the same people who'd turn out for a Latin American support march, etc. There was a desperate need to make it suit a wider public who were still being told "this is just a cranky fringe." And in some ways you're at risk of being left as the lunatic fringe if all you've done if you're just seen as a dissident; as one of these weird people who risk their lives on the harbour.

So for myself I made a conscious effort. The Campaign Against Nuclear Warships as soon as possible became 'Coalition', trying to bring in as many groups as possible. It really stimulated the formation of a group called 'Christians for Peace' trying to get Christians to come. Then they went back to their churches and organized protests. Our posters would have Peace Squadron protest and land protests and a section for church protests - they were having vigils and special services the morning the ship came in. It was a conscious effort to get to the front parts of the society. ... And there was 'Schoolchildren for Nuclear Disarmament.'

There was a marvellous group ... I'll tell you how it happened. There were schoolchildren who'd come to our march, but quite a small number. So I got hold of some teacher friends and said, "Who are the stropky ... who are the good kids in your school?" And I arranged a meeting with three young women who were school principal types, and I said, "You don't have to come to our protests. You can organize your own group with your own name. I will help you do your first press statement, and I'll give you support. And they organized their own first march, and I helped them do the first press release - showed them how. And they never came back after that. But they needed encouragement and a few skills. After that they didn't want to have anything to do with our projects; they had their own.

That meant that when the next warship came in there was one bit in the paper about the Peace Squadron and the usual march we organized and usual pictures and so on, but there was another bit about the schoolchildren's march which was

completely separate. And that had its own publicity. And they were talking to the kids, which we basically couldn't do. Because, you know, they'd put us in a box. They had a box for politicians, and another box for fathers and another box for protestors. But when it was school kids ... that was another way of working through.

The example set by prominent members of the community in opposing the warship visits also appears to have been important. George Goddard told me of two M.P.s who had addressed the 1976 CANWAR meeting in Wellington Town Hall before the visit of the *Truxton* "who were both Labour Party Cabinet material and they put their heads on the line on the nuclear issue. And not only did they speak in favour of anchoring up when this ship came in, but they stood in the picket-line - and it rained like a bastard for six days, a cold southerly all the time - and gave support." He also mentioned the effectiveness of the stand of various intellectuals in the community:

You would expect church people who are on the payroll of the Prince of Peace in favour of such a situation, but intellectuals who see round problems tend to dither. They suffer from the paralysis of possible alternatives. But not this fellow. A man by the name of Walter J. Scott, who was principal of the Teachers' College in Wellington for many years, played an unshakeable role in taking the questions of anti-nuclear debate out of the students' common rooms and the rooms where Left-wing teachers gather, into the public respectable arena. And he chaired the meeting in Wellington Town Hall, and was in the forefront of mobilizing intellectuals in various place where you would not expect them to be speaking out, and he did it on the basis that teachers had a responsibility towards the young. Because of his terrific standing amongst educators and other intellectuals in the community many other people came out of the closet, as it were, on this issue.

George Goddard's position of leadership in the Waterside Workers' Union in combination with his strong anti-nuclear convictions must have been a significant factor in the early formulation of the N.Z. Federation of Labour's anti-nuclear policies and the port actions. Nevertheless, he was careful to point out that these decisions were not imposed by union bosses upon a reluctant but powerless membership:

I want to stress that the policies of this union are arrived at by a meeting of members. Once they're arrived at by historic tradition, self-interest or inertia or for whatever reason, all members carry them out ... There'd be no more show of my standing over any of our own fellows - some of whom are built like a housebarge and move twice as fast - than I have of walking to Soames Island without getting my feet wet. ... The policies have been determined by fellows in meetings; not only are they determined by resolution, but they are prepared to divorce themselves from the payroll - which is a fairly significant thing for people who are working at just slightly better than the average labourer's wage rates - on a matter of principle.

To quote Nicky Hagar, "The N.Z. waterside workers have a long and incredibly honourable history of sacrifice for causes. They were opposing scrap metal exports to Japan before World War 2; they were opposed to the Korean War. Their role should not be under-estimated."⁴

The 1980's Peace Movement

The Social Base

Like New Zealand's anti-apartheid movement of the early 1980's, the peace movement is a broad-based social movement cutting across divisions of class, status, race, gender, age, political parties and ideology. One of the most persistent themes in my interviews with the people of the N.Z. peace movement was their insistence that New Zealanders of all kinds and from all social strata were involved in the actions. To quote one woman informant:

It was inspiring to find in taking part in protest marches that I'd have a Catholic priest on one side of me, a member of a gang in front of me and a gay person on the other side. There'd be lawyers, doctors, old women, teachers, all kinds of young working-class people, Maoris. A big mixture. It always made me excited to take part in that sort of group, because I think "all these people care. So many different people coming together on an issue." I mean, I haven't really got much in common with gang members, but I was always thrilled to see them take part.

⁴ The actions and attitudes of the unions - particularly the Watersiders' Union - and of union leaders like George Goddard is reminiscent of the early union movement in the United States, when it was known as the K.O.L - the Knights of Labour - and those engaging in the struggle for legitimacy regarded themselves primarily as a force for moral change within the total society.

Even political adherence seems to have been transcended on the nuclear-free issue. One upper middle-class woman and long-time Labour supporter told me of going to a political rally during the 1984 election campaign to hear Labour candidate Fran Wilde (now Minister for Disarmament) speak in a town that was "normally very conservative."

When the speaker said that under a Labour Government there won't be any nuclear ships coming into Wellington, everyone stood up and stamped and cheered. That was *extraordinary*. I was thrilled, but startled. Fran Wilde said it was the one issue they were asked about up and down the country. And the one that always got the most applause.

While the great majority of peace movement members in New Zealand as elsewhere belong to the middle-class, their struggle cannot be regarded as, or analysed in terms of, a class struggle. Those who describe themselves as 'peace workers' are not challenging the economic system or the relations of production or seeking to further their own interests within it; they are seeking to change the social production of history in their society in order to further what they perceive as the interests of the totality of New Zealand society, the South Pacific region, the global society or all of planet earth. While capitalism may be a focus of ideological opposition for some members and certain industries and companies are opposed for their role in the military-industrial complex, the conflict is not with capitalists or those who serve them in managerial capacities *per se*; it is with the country's political decision-makers and those who carry out their will on particular issues. For most peace activists in New Zealand these are primarily issues of defence and foreign policy and secondarily issues of social justice, particularly those concerned with race.

Membership

No surveys have been taken of the N.Z. peace movement so it is not possible to know with accuracy the groups on which it draws. Fieldwork observation and peace movement publications suggest that membership is predominantly urban, white, young to middle-aged and part of mainstream society. Those most likely to be taking part in protest demonstrations are women holding feminist values, lesbians, mothers of young children, radical Christians, pacifists or long-time peace activists, teachers, social-work or health-

care professionals, environmentalists, free-wheeling academics, people holding liberal-internationalist views and left-Labour supporters. Membership includes people from both ends of the age spectrum, but the 30 to 60 year-old age-range is dominant. While young people, particularly students, take part in the general activities and often organize their own protests, they tend to be marginal to the major peace organizations and local groups. As one informant put it, "there are always young people at our meetings, but their attendance is irregular".

While the warship actions continued to be an important focus for peace activism until cessation of the visits in 1984, the growth of the land protests and the spread of neighbourhood peace groups from 1983 onwards shifted the numerical bias and to some extent the organizational roles of the movement from male to female. Men continue to be important actors, but it is women who are most involved in the nitty-gritty, day-to-day work of the organization. Waiheke Island is illustrative of of this shift in numbers and emphasis from men to women. Initially, there was one local peace group and most of its meetings were concerned with routine Peace Squadron activities. "Then," said a male participant ...

women's things began happening parallel to the peace group. The International Women's Day action [May, 24 1983] virtually took over the whole village for a day. Helen [Caldicott] was there with doves flying overhead, and there were street theatres and so on. Although there was still a lot done under the aegis of the Waiheke Peace Group, by 1985 we were hesitating to call it that because of the other actions and we began calling it the Waiheke Peace Network. The women began to take over. Some of the men are still there in supporting roles, but there's no need any more for the Peace Squadron which is basically a male thing. And now it's almost become the Women's Waiheke Peace Group.

Maynie Thompson, a retired dental nurse living on the island whose words are quoted at the beginning of this section, added:

We have a very lively women's group here. Some of them are lesbians and some are very strong feminists and they really wanted to do work on women's

things. And some of us belong to ordinary peace groups, and some belong to both. But when six of us went [in September, 1984] to the International Women's Camp at Greenham Common, the women were very supportive of us. I had wonderful support from the women to go to it.

While some peace groups are 'women only' groups, most are mixed. As Maynie Thompson said: "Although I like taking part in women's actions, I don't make that restriction at all. It's obviously something we all have to do." Nicky Hagar states that by the mid-eighties the ratio of women to men "was about 50-50. Today [mid-1987], there are probably more women than men." Nevertheless, it is clear that men continue to be of at least equal importance to women in filling the major organizational and educational roles.

An Ideological Forum

Retired people and non-waged married women are the possessors of most adult discretionary time in a society, and so it is perhaps to be expected that women will outnumber men in any voluntary, mixed-sex, mixed-age organization (particularly as there are far more older women than older men around). Nevertheless, the peace movement has a special appeal for women, whether or not they have time on their hands or enjoy financial support. Militarism is the apotheosis of patriarchy and thus a prime target for those who are most disadvantaged by systems of patriarchal social relations. (Gay men are also likely to oppose militarism on the grounds of patriarchy and homophobia). War, too, is a death-bringer, and because nuclear weapons are often perceived as the bearer of death *par excellence* rather than, as the protagonists of deterrence claim, the preventer of wars, nuclearism is a natural target of opposition for those who are the life-bearers.⁵ Thus women in general and mothers, feminists and lesbians in particular, provide a major source of peace movement membership. In the words of Kate Bonas (wife to John, mother of three daughters, Christchurch peace educator and one of the movement's most prominent actors), "This whole movement has been spear-headed by mothers. We have nothing to

⁵ American poet Adrienne Rich, for instance, tells of being in a French hospital when her third child was born. When she told the woman in the next bed that she now had three sons, the woman said she thanked God she had only daughters. When Rich responded angrily to this statement, the woman asked: "*Vous travaillez pour l'armee madame?*" From that moment onwards, says Rich, she saw the state as her enemy.

lose but our children."

Because nuclear power is a dispoiler of the environment and nuclear weapons are polluters and possible disposers of the environment, nuclearism is a natural target of opposition for ecologists and conservationists. For communitarians or those who label themselves 'social ecologists' or 'social anarchists', militarism is the apotheosis of state power and control and therefore an enemy. Citizens whose prime concern is social justice see military systems and weapons production as wrongfully and wastefully consuming vast amounts of the world's energy, talents, money and material resources. All these issues - anti-nuclearism/war, feminism, social violence, homosexual and rape law reform, environmentalism, communitarianism, poverty and social justice - are hot issues in New Zealand, and for some of its citizens are inextricably linked with nuclearism, militarism and imperialism.

The peace movement provides an over-arching ideological and pragmatic forum for expressing concern and taking action on all these issues, although the actors within this loose and shifting coalition may have very different personal agendas and differing priorities - a potential problem discussed later in this section. One N.Z. peace group which has separated itself somewhat from the national peace movement is the indigenous group, PPANAC (Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Group). Its members count themselves as a part of the Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement rather than of the Pakeha-dominated peace movement, which insofar as its goals are confined to New Zealand tends to be regarded by the Maori as yet another instance of the Pakeha taking care of itself. To the people of PPANAC the nuclear problem in the Pacific is inseparable from the problem of colonialism and racism, and they are distrustful of any white-dominated government in New Zealand, Labour or National. To quote one woman member of PPANAC:

All governments in this country have been the same. They all head in the same direction - capitalism, dependence on superpowers, and most of all white supremacy. New Zealand and Australia have made themselves benevolent rulers, and they have made the Pacific their third world dominion. ... The nuclear-testing cycle is a cycle of racism. It is an act of cultural genocide.

The black people, brown people, don't matter. The darkies are of no value, they are invisible. I believe the reason there are no nuclear tests in New Zealand is that white people are in the majority. ... The nuclear issue is merely an advanced form of colonialism. The coloniser has come with a bigger gun, and a bigger message of peace. It's the same thing.

The message of people in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement is different to that of many peace groups. In the end we have a common goal, but a different struggle. Some people have said that the threat of the bomb has pulled us all together, indigeneous and non-indigeneous people. This is a very naive attitude. Indigeneous people have been fighting little bombs since the first foreigners came ashore. An indigeneous person does not give up the struggle for land, culture and survival to become overawed by the threat of a big bomb. That would be a luxury. Indigeneous people have been facing the possibility of extinction and human degradation for over 145 years. The NFIP movement is not necessarily just anti-nuclear, anti-military bases, anti-superpower domination; it is also pro the land, pro aroha ki te whenua, pro self-determination and pro independence (Halkyard-Harawira in Hanly *et al*, 1986:35-37).⁶

Size

No statistics exist on the size of the N.Z. peace movement. Its official magazine, *Peacelink*, has about 600 subscribers but many are group subscriptions and some copies go overseas. While the movement probably has declined numerically since the passing of the nuclear-free legislation, it is by no means in decline as a social force - as will be seen in the final section. Perhaps, as noted earlier, one indicator of the size of the movement in the mid-1980's is the response given in the 1986 Defence Review poll to the question of countries perceived as posing a military threat to New Zealand in the next 15 years. The 14 percent of New Zealanders who answered "U.S.A." and the 13 percent who said "France" are likely to be a part of, or at least sympathetic to, the peace movement. The largest response was "None," with 32 percent, and this category also could include peace movement supporters as well. The 29 percent of New Zealanders who said they oppose visits by both nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships is also a likely indicator of peace movement support, if not activism, while the 13 percent who oppose or strongly

⁶ Hilda Halkyard-Harawira and Helen Clark M.P. were co-recipients of the 1987 Danish Peace Prize. Membership in the NFIP is not, of course, confined to indigeneous people. There are small but active branches in both Australia and New Zealand, and the movement has supporters in the U.K., Europe, the U.S., Japan, Canada, and elsewhere.

oppose membership in ANZUS and the 15 percent whose preferred option is non-violent resistance or no resistance if New Zealand is attacked suggests that core support is between 13-15 percent. A 1986 directory of peace groups in *Peace is More than the Absence of War* lists 11 national organizations⁷ and 360 branch or unaffiliated groups throughout the country. Even if the size of each was known (which is not the case) the size of the movement as a whole would still be indeterminate, as many groups - probably most - have over-lapping memberships.

What is certain is that New Zealand has by far the most peace groups in proportion to population of any country anywhere. There are said to be about 7,000 peace-oriented groups of some kind in the United States, a country famed for its voluntary associations, but there would need to be about 30,000 to equal the proportion in New Zealand. America's peace groups, too, differ widely in their ideologies, goals and modes of action and are largely disconnected; there is a nuclear umbrella but no peace umbrella in the United States. The situation is very different in New Zealand.

The Peace Umbrella

One of the two outstanding characteristics of the N.Z. peace movement is its diversity and lack of centralized control. As Kate Boanas says, "There is no one group which makes policy decisions for the movement; we are all autonomous groups able to make statements, take our own actions independent of the other. This non-hierarchical grassroots movement has been the strength." The other outstanding characteristic is the equally high degree of co-ordination, the 'peace umbrella.' The overarching organization which bears the title 'Peace Movement Aotearoa (NZ)' is a co-ordinating and networking structure only. Although most peace groups are affiliated with it, PMA/NZ does not regard itself as the N.Z. Peace Movement; nor does it attempt to direct the groups it serves. The organization came into being in 1981, and the aims set forth in its Constitution are:

⁷ Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), CORSO (a Third World development organization), Greenpeace, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the N.Z. Peace Foundation, Pacific Peoples Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC), Peace Forum, Peace Movement Aotearoa, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) Te Whanau A Mataraki and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

To work towards world peace and disarmament by:

1. Improving communication among groups and individuals working for peace in New Zealand and overseas.
2. Helping to co-ordinate peace campaigns in New Zealand.
3. Informing and educating New Zealanders on peace issues and the peace movement.
4. Encouraging analysis and research for the peace movement.

Although a loose network of peace-oriented groups and organizations existed before 1981, there was nothing which could be described as a co-ordinating body. The first move towards institutionalizing interaction at the national level came with the decision to bring together people from all over the country one a year for the sharing of information, discussion and planning of strategies. The first of these Annual Peace Workshops was held in Wellington in 1980, and from it came the idea of forming a national umbrella organization. Out of the 1981 gathering came the proposal for the form it would take, and the document was circulated for discussion to groups around the country. At the 1982 meeting 'Peace Movement New Zealand' was born. An editorial in the *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter* of August 1982 describes this process of genesis and development. It seems that the Rev. Dr. George Armstrong is not only the father of the Peace Squadron.

At the first Annual Peace Workshop, Wellington 1980, George Armstrong was one of the opening speakers. He spoke of the need for unison, bringing up the contentious issue of organization. He called for the Peace Movement to create 'our organization'. At this stage, Peace Movement New Zealand was not envisaged. All we had were vague hopes of cutting down duplication of effort, identifying gaps and working together.

Over the next year, letters flew around the country as [we] tried to understand why the Annual Peace Workshop was not enough. Our frustration increased as we saw the AGM [Annual General Meeting] of ANZUS in Wellington, and the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Haig pass with barely a murmur from the Peace Movement; as we saw *Peace News New Zealand* lacking a secure broad base, founder; as we saw no format for peace activists to discuss the relevance of wider issues such as racism, sexism or poverty.

At the 2nd. Annual Peace Workshop a mandate was given for creating a co-ordinating

structure. This structure was to have a large emphasis on communication and co-ordination. The most emphasis at the Annual Peace Workshop, however, was given to the way the structure should function. It was to be non-hierarchical, non-sexist and non-racist. It was to work by consensus and have open meetings in different centres. Three national meetings later, and coming up to the 3rd. Annual Peace Workshop; where are we?

We have Peace Movement New Zealand Inc., with an office producing a newsletter reporting actions, plans and campaigns around the country. We have a method for sharing articles that individuals or groups receive. We have weathered suspicion of, and unfamiliarity with, consensus. We have no "Leader". We have all the peace groups, if not fully comfortable with, at least accepting the role of Peace Movement New Zealand. We are nearly ready to employ a fulltime worker to service us. We have a sound fundraising scheme, and an agreed on expenditure budget.

This has been no mean task. Now we can go on to share our campaign dreams, to plan and strategize and be successful in our quest for life without the constant threat of war and annihilation. Now we are ready and able to come together and plan strategies, and work together towards a just, sustainable and humane society.

Brave words; the statement reads like a manifesto for Jurgen Habermas's ideal speech situation and encapsulates all the peace movement's most cherished political values: open communication, co-operation, non-hierarchical, non-discriminatory social relations, egalitarianism, consensual decision-making, united and supportive action.

In 1985 the organization which began life as 'Peace Movement New Zealand' became 'Peace Movement Aotearoa (NZ)'; a change suggestive of its members growing Pacific consciousness and alignment with the Maori cause. The appendage is now likely to be dropped altogether within the national context. While some of the founders of Peace Movement New Zealand envisioned it becoming an all-encompassing umbrella organization which would be *the* N.Z. Peace Movement, this has not happened. That there was resistance to this happening is clear. Suggestions for amendments to the Constitution were called for before the 1983 National Peace Workshop and the three recommendations received were published in the September 1983 edition of *Peacelink*. The Christchurch Society of Friends (Quaker) Peace Group asked that the name be changed to 'Peacelink New Zealand', as this "... is a more accurate description, ...and avoids the possible

unhappy association of a sort of 'super movement.'" The Christchurch NZ Nuclear Free Zone Committee also requested that the name be changed to that of the monthly publication "... as its present name is apt to mislead in that it suggests an overseeing or executive body." George Armstrong suggested that as the aims and objects of PMNZ of "co-ordinating campaigns, .. informing and educating, ...encouraging analysis and research" are already being carried out by other agencies, there should instead be "a specific focus on communication (especially for smaller towns and country centres) and networking across the *total* peace-and-justice spectrum" as this need "is urgent."

The Constitution remained largely unamended, although 'networking' and 'communication' did become the prime roles of the new organization. Peace Movement Aotearoa (NZ) is run by a group of regional representatives - of which the PMA office in Wellington is one - known as the PMA working group. As a physical entity, the organization occupies a few rooms in a converted 19th.Century house known as 'Peace House' in Wellington mid-city (diagonally opposite Parliament House), and the few paid staff work side by side with volunteers. The office holds and provides resource material, circulates local, regional, national and international information through its newsletter, co-ordinates, facilitates, publicises and assists groups with activities, promotes the peace movement's magazine *Peacelinks* and organizes the Annual National Peace Workshop at which the Annual General Meeting of PMA(NZ) is held. While PMA is the major co-ordinating body of the N.Z. peace movement it is by no means the only one. The organizations which existed before it are, with the sole exception of the Peace Squadron, still active, and have never regarded themselves as being a part of PMA, although they liase with it.

Groups such as CND, SANA, NFIP and IPPNW all have their local branches, and the Peace Forum is another major co-ordinating body. It began in Auckland in 1982 when a group of peace activists already meeting to co-ordinate their activities decided to create a forum for the exchange of information and for informing the public on peace issues. In 1984 the organization opened an office with a part-time paid worker and volunteer workers in order "to be more supportive of peace groups and individuals working for peace." In

addition to its regular meetings throughout the year and the production of a newsletter after each one, Peace Forum activities include information-gathering, liaising with groups, "activating our telephone tree, action alert system and answerphone to network important and short-notice events," acting as a focal contact point for peace people "to locate each other, to share information and resources through our contact book and address lists," participating in peace movement actions, providing an outlet for goods produced by peace groups, "providing meeting and/or office space and administration facilities" for new, short-term or established peace groups and "making loans and donations to help fund projects (as funds allow)."⁸

Recruitment

Owen Wilkes is a New Zealander and an international peace researcher who is employed by the Wellington office of PMA(NZ). He has been called "a Walking Encyclopaedia" and is a major contributor of expert knowledge to the networks of the global peace movement. Wilkes was in Europe during the days of the anti-missile campaigns, and returned to his home country in mid-1982.⁹ In the *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter* (later *Peacelink*) editorial of November 1982, he summarized his impressions of the N.Z. peace movement after six years overseas and compared it to the European movements.

... The Movement here has not yet mushroomed as it has in Europe, but then N.Z. always tends to be a year or two behind in these matters. ... I still maintain that the N.Z. movement leads the world as far as vigour, originality, dedication and showmanship is concerned when it opposes such concrete events as nuclear warship visits and French nuclear tests.

However, the NZ Movement is weak when it comes to working towards, or even thinking about, longer-term and less substantial goals such as getting rid of (or even questioning the value of) ANZUS, or the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. ... The N.Z. Movement is disturbingly fragmented, and perhaps becoming more so. Why must people set up a new group

⁸ From *Network for Peace*, Auckland Peace Forum Office.

⁹ For part of his time abroad Wilkes worked on the staff of SIPRI (Swedish International Peace Research Institute), an organization which publishes annually a Year Book of technical and statistical information on the state of the world's weaponry.

whenever there is a new Campaign to be fought? There are also disturbing cases of political factions and other pressure groups attempting to take over or recruit from within peace groups. ...

Owen Wilkes was critical of "fragmentation" and the tendency of groups to split off and do their own thing but there were many in the movement at this time who believed this was precisely the way to achieve expansion. Nicky Hager said of his task as field worker for Peace Movement New Zealand, ...

That was a time - not through us doing it entirely, but the coalition I was co-ordinating got doctors groups and librarians for nuclear disarmament and all the different professions caught up in it to set up their own group. Which meant probably that it was the same few people who could just have been part of the coalition, but they'd go off and set up something else like Librarians and Nurses for Nuclear Disarmament, and they didn't see themselves as part of this group but as part of that professional group, and they were getting on with organizing things. ...

As a recruitment and expansion technique, fostering independence appears to have worked. Although one of the peace movement's major goals was realized in the Government's action of February 1985 and reinforced in the June 1987 legislation, the movement continued to grow numerically before levelling out in the late 1980's. The number of peace-oriented groups listed in the March 1983 official newsletter was 90, in November 1984 it was 273, in the 1986 directory quoted above it was 371. In 1988 it was said to be "about 400" by a visiting Danish peace activist, but this figure may have been prompted more by enthusiasm than research.¹⁰ In the 1986 listing (the latest available) 40 of the groups are branches of some larger organization and 56 have names indicating a church or religious connection. The 32 occupational branch-groups named include architects, artists, computer workers, educators, engineers, librarians, pharmacists, parliamentarians, physicians, poets, psychologists, schoolchildren, students, trade unions and the unemployed.

The emergence of these professional and occupational groups in 1982-3, and their

¹⁰ Alf Harbitz, "Ports Watch Visits New Zealand", *Ports Watch Newsletter*, No. 12, Autumn 1988; Norway. p.17.

subsequent proliferation contributed a great deal to the broadening of the social base of the peace movement in the 1980's. Around 20 percent of N.Z. physicians are members of IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), a far, far higher proportion than in any other country. SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms) is another international group strongly represented in N.Z. cities and towns, and the organization employs a full-time professional peace researcher. In most Western countries, academics who are active in the peace movement or who work on peace-related issues tend to be either not attached to mainstream institutions or are low-status faculty members. While New Zealand does have such people - and they are highly-regarded by the peace groups - there is also a comparatively large number of top-of-their department, mainstream academics who write and hold conferences on such subjects as nuclear war and peace, nuclear free zones, the ship visits issue, ANZUS, alternative forms of defence, and so forth.

The Growth Years

The Foundation for Peace Studies was responsible for initiating and organizing the speaking tour of Helen Caldicott in April 1983. The organization is housed on the top floor of a converted, colonial-style house in downtown Auckland, and its director is Les Clements, a retired Methodist clergyman and long-time pacifist. While the surge of women into the peace movement came after the Caldicott tour and the International Women's Day which followed it, several of the people I interviewed insisted that her visit, though a catalyst, crystallized something that was already happening. Les Clements said, "There must have been a nerve that was struck. Otherwise where did all those people come from that filled the halls?" Mary Woodward, the founder of the N.Z. branch of CND in the late 1950's, said, "I was out of the country for 15 years, and when I came back in the mid-70's it seemed to me the peace movement had grown enormously from what I remembered of it. But it's true that Helen Caldicott did make an enormous difference."

Les Clements spoke of the uncertainty that had preceded Helen Caldicott's visit and the changes that took place after it:

I remember a great discussion we had in the Council with how far we should go

in advertising her. Some of our members were saying, "Let's have it over here in McLaren Chapel - which seats about 150 people - and others were asking for the YMCA Gym which seats 2,000! We took the 2,000 one and filled it. None of us knew her work though we'd heard about it. I was personally influenced by a Scottish parson who was there when she did her Scottish tour. And he said, "Believe it or not, Scotland is not the same since she visited."

I had not long come into the office and taken it over, and I was the only one here. I ran the whole show myself. Six years ago my predecessor said, "Well, there's not much to do. You only need to collect the mail twice a week, and there's a bit of banking to do and letters to write, but it's a bit of a sinecure. And it was like that. I could put my feet up on the desk and read books. I had very few callers, very little mail. ... Helen Caldicott's visit was the catalyst without any doubt. The immediate weeks after her visit this office was transformed. There were so many people coming in. From getting mail twice a week, it was getting it twice a day.

I never get tired of telling people about the absolute transformation after Helen Caldicott. It was *incredible*. ... It was very interesting to me to see the kind of people who started coming into the office. A wave of people. I can only describe it in terms of a religious revival. There were people who came in with that same kind of fervour, of having seen the light; people coming in and saying, "What can I do? For instance, a woman came in saying, "I am a grandmother. I have never taken part in anything political in my life. But I'm convinced that I must do something for peace."

Another woman drove up and I saw her looking at this building, and when she came into the office - which was then just one room - she clasped her pearls and said, "Oh dear, I didn't know what to expect." So I said, "What did you expect?" And she said, "Well, when I pulled up outside I thought how lovely for the peace movement to have this beautiful building." She thought we owned it! [laughs] Then when she came in and saw a bank and offices she thought we must have the top floor. Then she finally found the room next door to the men's loo [laughs].

But her eyes were shining, and she said, "Can I do anything now to help?" So I said, "Well, money is always welcome." And she wrote me out a very substantial cheque. But then she said, "But can't I do something *now*?" And George Armstrong phoned just then from St. John's, and said there was a whole stack of

books up there for the Peace Foundation, and how could he get them down here? So I turned to this woman and said could she collect this box of books for me. So she went off, and - I felt a bit guilty really - carted this heavy carton of books, I could barely lift them, into here. But she had this kind of thing like a religious revival. And she said, "Thank God I've been able to do something." Now, how do you account for that? This was only a couple of examples. And there were men too.

George Armstrong also saw Helen Caldicott's tour as "crucial" to the growth of the peace movement in the early '80's.

The women's movement was also moving, and [the tour] carried the twinset and pearls brigade. That middle-class movement really organized themselves. For all their bourgeois consciousness and limitations - and I've got plenty of them myself - that middle movement moved, organized, and worked and worked and worked. It was just amazing to see it.

He added, "When the middle-class starts to move my nose can always sniff it out. And then I start to act. It's a fairly limited sort of vocation, because it's here today and gone tomorrow."

Nevertheless, charismatic individuals were not the only forces of inspiration and recruitment at this time. Nicky Hagar says:

There was a huge thing about Greenham Common. [It] meant that women came in in 1982-3. Helen Caldicott crystallized something that was already going on. What happened was that with the start of the women's groups, [the peace movement] got established in every little town ... women speaking to groups, stalls in streets. They originally got snarled at and called Communists. Then quite suddenly people started talking to them.

I don't believe in national level politics. The kind of people who changed their minds aren't really political. They don't read the papers. They are alienated from national politics. Ask them what's happening in the legislature and they don't know. Yet something got to those people. Nothing we did was enough to account

for the spread. The Peace Squadron was something that focused public attention, and it captured the media so ships became an issue. But the media wasn't enough. I think it was a combination of small things. ... the idea got around, the language started to suit the people....

It seems, as some of my informants declared, that Nuclear Free New Zealand was "an idea whose time had come." Just as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States found its natural base in the black churches of the South and expanded from there, the New Zealand peace movement in the 1980's found its natural base in the existing community networks and the kitchens and living rooms of middle-class homes. The great majority of New Zealand's peace groups are local or neighbourhood groups and their main constituency is women.¹¹ Nicky Hagar said of this time and process of rapid growth:

New Zealand is a small country; it's not like the U.S. for instance. I despair for people who try and make an impact there. They're so brave - God. They don't have all the encouragement that we do here. ... There are networks all through N.Z. society - you've got school networks, businessmen's networks, sports networks.....We didn't have campaign-speaking to all these groups, but there were people who heard something or who we maybe knew, who then got onto someone else. And it permeated like that

Of course it was small scale. It's what we were doing in Wellington, and it doesn't mean it happened in the rest of the country in the same way. But it was like that all over

¹¹ I was present at the meeting of one such group in Christchurch in June 1987, and it was probably typical. It began around 7.30 p.m. in the living-room of the Boanas home and ten people were present, 3 men and 7 women. The major task of the evening was to plan and organize a Saturday 'peace train' from Christchurch to a nearby town; partly as a way of campaigning for the district's Labour candidate (who was at the meeting), and partly as a peace picnic family fun day. There was no designated chair or leader, although Kate Boanas recorded suggestions and facilitated the discussion. The meeting began with a brainstorming session for ideas for the activity and its promotion, and these were written on large pieces of paper on the floor. It was agreed that leading figures in the community - 'Notables' - would be invited (mayors, councillors, politicians etc.), and leading entertainers would be asked to provide their services free. Although the meeting was informal - at times hilarious - at its end the function was organized and all the necessary tasks had been shared around. I was informed in due course that the event was, at least in the opinion of its organizers, a great success.

CHAPTER 10

THE SEMIOTIC SYSTEM, COMMUNICATION AND RESOURCES

Decide to network
Use every letter you write
Every conversation you have
Every meeting you attend
To express your fundamental beliefs and dreams.
Affirm to others the vision of the world you want
Network through thought
Network through action
Network through love
Network through spirit.
.....
Networking is the new freedom
The new democracy
A new form of happiness.
- from *Network for Peace*, Auckland Peace Forum pamphlet

The world peace movement exists not just as a loose system of local, national, regional and international networks; it is also an overarching truth system through which events and objects in the world are interpreted. This does not mean that all who are a part of it regard or use it as such, but as an organizational phenomenon the peace movement is a producer of universal meaning and a shaper of behaviour. In this chapter I consider the myths, symbols, rituals and forms of discourse which shape, sustain and propagate the peace *Weltanschauung* of New Zealand. I also examine the major channels for communicating the semiotic system and the peace message within and without the movement, and the resources which make this diffusion possible. The subject is vast. My discussion here is necessarily limited, and without any claims to comprehensiveness.

Myths and Symbols

Like Roland Barthes, I define a myth as "one of the complex systems of images

and beliefs which a society constructs in order to sustain and authenticate its sense of its own being" (Barthes, 1957:109). I also find useful his listing of the properties of a myth, namely: (1) it is a second-order semiological system (a sign about a sign); (2) it is depoliticised speech (the image has been emptied of its historically contingent nature and made to appear timeless); (3) it is read as a factual system not a semiological system (because the link between the first and second sign appears natural not intentional); (4) it is capable of infinite variety of expression but the underlying message remains invariable.

Not only societies, but sub-cultures and groups within a society have their myths, and the peace movement and the military each have theirs. The all-encompassing myth of the latter is based on the images and concepts of political realism and portrays, in the words of one scholar of international relations, "a politically fragmented world of pervasive insecurity, recurring violence, generalized expectations of war and self-animating strategic logic against strategic logic" (Ashley, 1981:206). So-called idealists, who talk in terms of holistic imperatives in a world becoming one, are accused of indulging in utopianism, romanticism and wishful thinking. By contrast, the peace movement myth not only holds that this fragmented and warring world can be transcended but that it *must* be transcended, and transcendence will be achieved through the empowerment of ordinary people.

The myth of 'people power' is particularly strong in New Zealand where it is widely believed that - to repeat Larry Ross's statement - "the people made New Zealand nuclear free; worked for it, donated for it and empowered our Government to put it into law." The peace movement as a whole shares this view of the small country down-under. For peace activists throughout the world, New Zealand is "the peace nation," the new City set on a hill, the moral leader of the world. Helen Caldicott, for instance, addressed a rally in Christchurch soon after the passing of the nuclear-free legislation and declared:

... New Zealand is a strong light in the world. If your stand slips there will be deep depression in many parts of the world. ... New Zealanders have to take great pride, and be dignified and accept their role as leaders of the world in the nuclear age. ... You must not underestimate what you have done. You are a beacon up there, and everybody sees you as their hope.¹

A young American activist visiting the country for the first time was similarly hyperbolic:

"There's got to be another world, oh yeah, there's got to be another world" Since I heard that song I wanted to believe it, but I never did until I flew to New Zealand. Seeing new Zealand had the psychological effect of translating an unknown, wishful vision of a nuclear-free world into real life, onto a real place. ... Below me was nuclear-free new Zealand, and I was startled by the unusually pure and radiant appearance of the land. I laughed to myself that the Government's anti-nuclear stand must have intensified the beauty of the earth itself (Salzman, 1987:18).

The National Myth

In the 1890's, British statesman and Earl of Oxford, Herbert Asquith, described New Zealand as "... a laboratory in which political and social experiments are every day made for the information and instruction of the older countries of the world." This perception is an important part of New Zealand's traditional myth, and translates easily into the new. It seems to lie behind then Caucus member² Helen Clark's response to questions about the kind of statements quoted above:

Naturally we are not averse to being seen as world leaders. We have in the past been acknowledged to have led the world in the design of our social security system for example. So there is in our history a consciousness that we have given leadership in the past. That is not to say that we ask other governments to imitate us now, but we are happy to be seen as providing moral leadership.³

The new image of New Zealand as peace nation is a cause for pride within the nation's peace movement, if not always so for other citizens. Maynie Thompson, one of the two New Zealand women who went on the Great Peace March across the United States in 1986, said:

¹ Quoted in *Nuclear Free Journal of the N.Z. Nuclear-Free Peacemaking Association*, October, 1987:2.

² Helen Clark is one of the strongest anti-nuclear advocates in the parliamentary party, and was Chair of the *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1985-6* which drafted the Nuclear-Free Bill. She became Deputy Prime Minister in 1989 after David Lange resigned as Prime Minister.

³ *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 18, No. 2, 1986; p.85.

I'm very proud of the New Zealand action, and I was very proud all the way through the March at the tremendous enthusiasm with which this policy was received everywhere we went. Of course, we were mostly meeting people who were keen about peace things anyway. But even ordinary people knew all about 'David Lanjee' or 'Lang' - or whatever they called him. All sorts of names, but they knew all about him, and were really envious that we had a prime minister that would take a moral lead. They'd heard him in debate, and thought very highly of him.

Her fellow-marcher, Anne MacFarlane, added, "New Zealand has modelled that people can be effective in changing the government. There's a kind of psychic numbing and powerlessness and we were able to say, "There's heaps that you can do." Some peace movement members, however, see the peace nation myth as fragile, given the country's warlike tradition and its economic vulnerability. As one man stated, "Peace education means battling against a lot of folk-lore, battling against the mythology passed on by parents and grandparents. We're not revolutionary; we're preoccupied with finding markets for butter and so on."

As well as the new myth of New Zealand as pacific nation there is also the emerging myth of the country as a nation of the Pacific, and this "complex system of images and beliefs" intertwines with the nuclear-free myth in New Zealanders' search for a post-European identity and world role now that the historic ties of sentiment and trade with Britain have been broken. John Boanas takes a somewhat pragmatic view of this development.

We had to grow up economically in the last 20 years. We had such an over-protected economy we didn't have to worry about living in the real world. We lived in a spoiled economic environment - there was a lot of wealth and success in the 50's and 60's without having to work for it. Now businessmen have a new macho aggressive attitude. "To hell with ANZUS, it's a load of crap. We've got to get out there, flex our muscles and trade with the best of them." Its suddenly taken New Zealand out into the whole wide world. So New Zealand has become a part of the Pacific, a part of Asia.

For many in the peace movement, however, "Islands of Sanity in an Ocean of Peace" is a powerful slogan, and identification with the Maori struggle and the anti-colonial (or anti-nuclear-colonial) struggles of indigeneous people in the Pacific is strong. One expression of this sentiment is the increasing number of white New Zealanders who refer to themselves as 'Pakeha' and to New Zealand as 'Aotearoa.' George Armstrong talks of "shame and shock" as being "the accompaniments of Pakeha discoveries about our own history and about the shape of our own institutions and about the self-serving orientation of our own psyches." He writes of an occasion in the early 1980's when PPANAC (Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Committee) put on a show for a Pakeha audience:

There was no need for words in the drama presented ... on the makeshift stage. White explorers, whalers and sealers, traders, missionaries, anthropologists, land sharks, British Navy captains pretending to be democratic diplomats, British soldiers throwing away any pretence, more missionaries, cunning lawyers, settler politicians winning 'independence' for the new Colony, teachers, clergy, academics, scientists, social workers, doctors ... all paraded in turn before us. Last of all, dragged across a jerky wire, the Bomb.

After the show, we split into Pakeha groups. In groups, people simply could not speak: no helpful suggestions, no programmes, just inarticulate impotence (Armstrong, 1986).

The belief that white European civilization has led humankind to the brink of annihilation and that the traditional cultures and values of indigeneous people offer a way out of this (literal) dead end is a part of this Pacific myth. George Armstrong states elsewhere:

'Independence' seeks a profound restoration or transformation: a new politics, a new economics, indeed, in biblical terms, "a new heaven and a new earth." The old 'earth' and the old 'heaven' of Western missionary colonialism was a heaven and earth of ultimate dependency in a brutally straightforward sense. ... The way is open to a nuclear-free and independent Pacific which is strong and free. Its fortification is not armed exclusion. Its fortification is the same strength and freedom which it now offers (as its own unique inheritance and creation) for the nourishing of

the whole ill earth (Armstrong, 1985).

Symbols

Symbols are an essential element of "the complex set of images and beliefs" that combine to create a myth, and they are particularly important in the world of the peace movement. A symbol not only stands *for* something; it also stands *against* something, and it is this opposition which gives it its meaning and its power. Meaning is never inherent in the thing or action itself, but is always bestowed from outside the symbol system through a culturally-shared recognition of this identity and opposition. The symbols and symbolic actions of the peace movement are diverse but all exist in opposition to the symbols and actions of 'the violent movement': colourful, casual, clothes opposing the drab uniformity or uniform brilliance of military apparel; flowers, leaves, birds, ribbons, balloons, feathers, rainbows, 'hands' opposing the cold solidity of the weapons and machines of death; peace banners and slogans opposing the flags and slogans of war; circles and web formations opposing the linear formation of armies; the cheerful rattle-tattle of peace marches opposing the pomp and precision of military marches; the hugs of peace people opposing the non-affective, non-body contact of military personnel; the singing, chanting and dancing opposing the grimness or boredom of military routine; the creativity, spontaneity and playfulness of symbolic demonstrations opposing the rigidity, anonymity and robot-like character of military drills. And so forth.

The three most familiar and widely-recognized peace symbols are the dove, the rainbow and the CND anti-nuclear logo created for the British Campaign's Aldermaston marches in the 1950's (a combination of the semaphore symbols for 'n' and 'd' representing 'nuclear disarmament'). The dove signifies peace and purity, the rainbow beauty, happiness and harmony, the logo a world free of nuclear weapons. The first two are traditional biblical symbols: the dove of the Old Testament signalled to the inhabitants of the ark that the flood waters had receded and promised a new beginning; the New Testament dove signifies the descent and presence of the Holy Spirit. The rainbow arch in the heavens after the flood was the sign of God's covenant with the faithful remnant that he would never again seek to destroy the earth by water. The CND logo resembles a Cross

with arms pointing earthwards. Thus all three major peace symbols could be said to have connotations of divine salvation and redemption. Nevertheless, all three stand firmly in their own right as secular symbols of *this-worldly* salvation and redemption, achievable only through human effort and will.

Larry Ross designed the most prominent Nuclear Free New Zealand symbol: a green CND logo encircling a map of New Zealand in white on a blue background. It seems to possess all the properties of myth described earlier: it is a second order semiological system (the nuclear free symbol is used to create a new symbolic meaning), it is depoliticised and appears timeless (the conflict is concealed), the link between the nuclear-free status and the map of New Zealand appears natural and the message is capable of endless variation. Ross explains the symbolism thus:

New Zealand is the peace nation. The green means keep New Zealand green; the white means keep it free of contamination, keep it nuclear-weapon free. The blue means it is surrounded by the beautiful blue Pacific. Symbolism talks in colours, words and design. When I go overseas I design a badge for that country, which I sell. It helps support the tour, and it spreads the message and creates a sense of solidarity.

The solidarity aspect of symbols is one of their most important ingredients. Bumper stickers, posters, T-shirts and badges not only spread the message and provide peace groups with a major source of revenue; they also identify fellow-travellers and, rightly or wrongly, convey a sense of belonging to a vast and growing organization.

Rituals

Rituals are a major vehicle for the expression of sentiment through the use of symbols, and for proclaiming relations of identity and opposition. Whenever a ritual is in progress, some myth is being enacted. Part of the power of ritual is that it gives the participant a sense of being in control of something which may, in fact, be uncontrollable. Although its history is short, the peace movement has developed regularly repeated sets of behaviour aimed at conveying the peace message to outsiders and affirming the beliefs,

values and norms of insiders. As with myth and symbols, peace rituals consciously or unconsciously oppose the rituals of war. Military marches and displays are time-honoured ways of expressing a form of power which Michel Foucault calls 'exemplary power,' that is, violence as "a display, a spectacle, sanctioning power through its very display" (Foucault, 1977:220-1).⁴ While this form of power was a characteristic of pre-industrial societies, modern societies are characterized rather by 'disciplinary power,' a form of control sustained primarily through the surveillance systems of political and economic elites, and where the threat of violence, though real, remains hidden.

The great ritual occasions of the peace movement are peace marches and rallies and they combine both forms of power. In them it is *non-violence* which is "a display, a spectacle, sanctioning [people] power through its very display," and what is hidden underneath is not violence, but the disciplinary power of the vote. A large turn-out of citizens sends a message to the political elites that they are under surveillance and beware the next election. This is a new form of power peculiar to post-industrial, democratic, 'programmed' societies and it exists side-by-side with both the early and modern historical forms as an instrument for challenging the managers of the great apparatuses of social production within a shared field of conflict.

Personal interaction within the peace movement, while informal, is nevertheless ritualized to a considerable degree, and much of it revolves around the concepts of egalitarianism, informality, friendliness, acceptance and the 'specialness' of each individual. The injunction to the early Christians to "greet one another with a loving kiss" has its counterpart in the peace groups, who normally greet one another with a hug. A small meeting which includes at least one new person will usually begin by having all those present introduce themselves in turn, rather than being introduced to the newcomer. Participants are as likely to be sitting on the floor as on a chair but are rarely in straight rows; a circle is the desired formation. Adhering to the ideal of reaching a consensus poses difficulties in all meetings, but particularly so in large ones. Thus while the interaction

⁴ "Nation States and Violence" in Anthony Giddens' *Social Theory and Modern Sociology* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, is based upon Foucault's concepts of 'exemplary power' and 'disciplinary power.'

remains informal and egalitarian, the decision-making process itself is likely to follow a prescribed form and be tightly-controlled in an effort to reduce the time involved in deciding "what is to be done".

Large marches and rallies are important and necessary rituals for the peace movement. They not only provide the means of sending a message to the political elites and to the public but, like all marches, engender a sense of unity and purpose among those taking part in them; a sense of being in step and side-by-side with large numbers of people who share one's point of view, and of being part of something important and worthy enough to have brought out fellow-marchers and sometimes bystanders as well. The aim is not only to affirm the converted, however, but to challenge the unconverted and to this end, prominent persons - ideally from another country - are sought as speakers at the rallies and demonstrations which precede or follow the large marches. All peace marches give sympathisers the opportunity to 'stand up and be counted', but those of the Palm Sunday variety provide a non-threatening situation and anonymity for those who are testing out the waters of commitment or who prefer marginality. Colourful, casual clothes are *de rigueur* on these occasions, which also provide an opportunity for creativity and a little customary norm-breaking in the form of body paint and fancy dress for those so inclined.

Banners and placards are an essential part of peace marches and making them can be a ritual activity in itself - as the following story about the experience of some youthful British CNDers reveals.

THE GREAT FLAG-FLYING FAILURE

... We bought 6ft. by 7ft. of closely woven red cotton cloth. We improvised a table from a large piece of hardboard resting on two small tables in my far from large studio. First two then four of us set to work. We cut lettering and a dove from card for drawing round. Colin made trammels (large compasses) from a strip of wood, a bradawl, a panel pin and a white pencil for ruling the logo and the rainbow. After a few bosh shots (removed with lumps of blu-tack) we got them on to the cloth in the right places. Denise said she thought the doves should be machine-embroidered separately then mounted on windows of red net - to reduce wind-reistance. Andy, who'd carried the old banner, advised that this was a good idea. We decided to cut out the middle of the logo and fill that also with net. Denise went home with the dove-template and we arranged our

next session.

Next time we painted the logo and lettering with white emulsion paint and small brushes. When they were dry we repainted, and a nice smooth surface resulted. Denise turned up with two beautifully-made white doves with beaded wings. We decided not to mount them on net, but to sew them straight on to the cloth. We did put net behind the logo, sewing it from the front and copy-dexing it at the back. It was nylon net, very strong, and we used it double. Andy advised us that we were doing well.

When they had all gone home again I tackled painting the rainbow. I squeezed tubes of poster paint into small pots of the white emulsion and was pleased with the results - until I looked at the back. I had had difficulty in making enough mixture for the indigo band and had added a dollop of navy-blue liquid dye. This alone of all the colours had gone through to the back. (Where were you Andy? I needed advice!)

However, I was forgiven by the others. The dark blue mark was quite regular in shape, and, apart from a few small seepages and the white sewing thread from the doves, it was the only mark on the back. ... Tired but well-pleased with ourselves we looked at our work. I made a small speech. "My friends - but for Colin the design would never have got on the cloth; but for Denise the doves would never have been so beautiful; but for Andy the banner would never have been as Andy wanted it! I now name this flag the Banner of Twickenham CND. May God bless her and all who sail under her." It was loaded into Colin's car ready for the rally the next morning. We had worked on it for almost 24 hours in total.

Next morning the National Front announced that they proposed to break up an Anti-Apartheid rally somewhere in London. The police then said that NO marches or rallies would be allowed throughout the whole metropolitan area. My feelings were unbecoming to a member of our great Peace Group and I was not, I fear, alone. Nevertheless, until the day we do get our banner on the road and discover otherwise, we can think of no serious mistakes we may have made. ∴ We feel that the days of banners painstakingly hand-embroidered by devoted and housebound wives are gone, and other groups might like to try our methods. Should you feel in need of more information than I have given, I feel that Andy, that good and dedicated teacher, will be pleased to advise you!⁵

When marches precede direct protest actions they can offer moments of glory as well. Nicky Hagar described one such occasion when he recalled the visit of the USS

⁵ Tig Vernon, *Sanity*, May, 1985, p.50.

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⁵ Tig Vernon, *Sanity*, May, 1985, p.50.

Texas in August 1983; a time when the anti-warships campaign peaked and "it really all came together." On the day the ship came into Wellington,

We had our biggest march and our biggest Squadron. There were heaps of boats in Auckland, and in Wellington we had about 30. *And* a storm. If you could have seen them! There were people clinging to boats and being blown out to Cook Straits with gale-force winds. But it was on the front page and the back page and the middle page and another page of the conservative, antagonistic, main Wellington afternoon paper.

And at that main march we had unionists speaking; there was a huge cheer for the Union band; a huge cheer for the Peace Squadron, of course. We had a doctor speaking, Ian Pryor [founder of N.Z. IPPNW], bless his heart. We had School Children Against Nuclear Arms speaking; a Christian person speaking. I managed to find a young National who broke ranks and spoke out. She got absolutely battered for it, poor woman, because they are quite a red-neck bunch, but even there, there were cracks. So it was a way of implying things were moving on and making space for all sorts of people with changing views

Peace movement conferences, camps and extended walks (both geographically and chronologically) are also ritual activities which, like the peace marches, tend in form and content to be reverse images of the institutions and activities of the military and the strategic planners. All three types of gatherings or actions aim ultimately at the exercise of exemplary/disciplinary power through the knowledge/empowerment of members and adherents. In the case of the conferences, the emphasis is on knowledge; in the case of the camps and the peace walks the emphasis is on empowerment. Gatherings like the Annual Peace Workshop place about equal emphases on both aspects. In providing a milieu for sharing ideas and information and for affirming personal identity and solidarity, they are occasions which aim "simultaneously to individuate and aggregate" as Michael Zuckerman says of Puritan ideology (Zuckerman, 1977:205).

Camps, overnight or longer conferences and peace walks are all contexts for the '24 hour socialization' of participants in the sense described by Erving Goffman in his seminal work, *Asylums* (Goffman, 1961). In such situations the longer the time period, the more

isolated the location, the greater the lack of privacy, the more difficult the conditions and the more potentially dangerous the actions, the larger the potential for ideological reinforcement and affective interaction - of whatever kind - to occur. Peace walks, protest camps and sit-ins not only aim to empower participants, foster affective bonds and affirm values; they are also ways of making a public declaration and attempting to influence public opinion. A leaflet advertising the July-September 1987 Peace Walk from Cape Reinga (the northernmost point of the North Island) to Wellington (at the southern tip) contained the following information and statements:

THE 1987 NEW ZEALAND PEACE WALK

Starting on July 14, we will be walking the length of Te Ika a Maui (the North Island), to take the message of peace and nuclear disarmament to the country. The Peace Walk will be an inspirational way to communicate directly with other ordinary people as we walk through cities, towns and rural areas. The Peace Walk will be a joyous celebration of life together, as well as a reminder that we all must act to create a peaceful, nuclear free world. ...

New Zealand's Nuclear Free Zone has been a major achievement in the development of peace and justice in Aotearoa (New Zealand). The nuclear free concept was initiated by the people of Aotearoa. Our success has shown that when people lead, the leaders must follow. With elections occurring this year, the people must once again lead, otherwise there is a danger of losing our Nuclear Free Zone.

The Peace Walk is a positive, creative and personally rewarding way to:

- a) let the political parties know that the Nuclear Free Zone is important, and that it is supported by the majority of New Zealanders;
- b) encourage people to vote for parties which are committed to a Nuclear Free New Zealand. ...

New Zealand is part of the Pacific.

Despite the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, there are still visits of nuclear warships, testing of nuclear bombs, testing of nuclear missiles and the use of Pacific land by the nuclear powers for military bases and exercises. The people of the Pacific suffer from this. New Zealand's Nuclear Free Zone is an important step towards a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific. ...

YOU ARE IMPORTANT

By acting for peace, you can create ripples of awareness spreading out and influencing others. ...

TOGETHER WE CAN CHANGE THE WORLD
 THE LONGEST JOURNEY BEGINS WITH THE FIRST STEP
 JOIN THE PEACE WALK FOR A NUCLEAR FREE NEW ZEALAND

Let us keep the light alive

As this leaflet suggests, exhortatory rhetoric is an important element of the peace movement meaning system, and this and other types of discourse are explored below.

Forms of Discourse

Rhetoric

In the days of the warship actions in New Zealand, the Peace Squadron and the U.S. Navy each tried to seize the high moral ground. The Squadron called on New Zealanders "to keep the death ships out" and talked in terms of life, harmony, justice and health. U.S. Navy officials talked of protecting the free world, pointed to the heavy defence burden being borne by the superpower, and called on New Zealanders to fulfill their very minor alliance obligations. The National Government also used the 'moral obligation to ANZUS' argument as well as the more pragmatic argument that, as a remote sea-bound country, New Zealand's prosperity depended upon keeping the sea lanes of trade and communication open, and as this is a part of U.S. Navy strategy it was in New Zealand's interests to meet the obligations it entailed.

As the least powerful member of this trio and the party challenging the *status quo*, it is not surprising that the peace movement produced by far the most rhetoric and attempted to spread it as widely as possible through speeches, media articles, displays, advertisements, trade union circulars, letters to newspapers, leaflets, banners, placards, posters, paste-ups, stickers and buttons. Considerable ingenuity was used in getting the anti-warship, anti-nuclear-insanity message across. Les Church mentioned one activity during the early days:

What became part of this tradition was these groups that went out in the dead of night, and posted up all round the city. And dodged the police cars. It became a tradition in Auckland and Wellington for a while. There was an amazing - very

subtle, very clever - tabloid thing; as though it was from a newspaper article. It was really only graffiti, but it would be a political comment on something that was happening at the time. A semi-scurrilous thing about some public figure. No one knew where they came from. They went up in the dead of night. They'd be all over the city. Everyone would be seeing them, and talking about them. Really, it was so powerful ...

Street theatre, displays, demonstrations and peace songs are also vehicles for getting the message across, and sometimes actions can speak louder than words. New Zealand peace groups, for instance, were one of the first to carry out an idea originating in the United States of commemorating Hiroshima Day by painting shadow-figures on streets and footpaths to represent victims vapourized by the bomb. Mostly, however, words combine with images on T-shirts, badges, posters and stickers because language reduces the potential for ambiguity and pictures add to the emotional impact. The NFNZ symbol described above - the CND logo encircling a map of New Zealand - uses words to clarify its message, but the N.Z. version of the globally-used CND logo does not. The context is conveyed by the inner lines being drawn in a distinctively Polynesian style, the result of a competition held by CND in 1985.

Humour, satire, ridicule and irreverence are traditional weapons of the oppressed or weak against the powerful, and cartoons are an important part of peace movement rhetoric. A 1988 poster, for instance, part of the campaign to prevent the purchase by the Government of four new Navy frigates from Australia, showed a very fat David Lange and a very scrawny Bob Hawke (Australia's P.M.) wearing polka-dot shower-caps and sitting in a bathtub. New Zealand's national leader holds a rubber duck while his Australian counterpart holds a toy boat bristling with guns. Balloon captions record the following dialogue:

HAVE I GOT A DEAL FOR YOU DAVE, FOUR BIG FRIGATES FOR ONLY 2 BILLION DOLLARS... ! AND I'LL THROW IN THE AMMO FOR FREE....

BUT WHAT ABOUT THE POOR AND THE UNEMPLOYED? ... HOW CAN I

JUSTIFY IT...?**STUFF THEM MATE, WHAT'VE THEY EVER DONE FOR YOU?**

Underneath the picture is written:

unemployment's up
people are homeless
education's being cut
hospitals are closing

*Yet they want
BILLIONS for frigates*

**they have to be
JOKING!**

Published by Just Defence P.O. Box 2114 Wellington

Debate and Dialogue

Personal identity is largely constructed through talk and so too is the identity of social groups. While rhetoric is a linguistic instrument for declaring and reinforcing one's own moral stance, for reaffirming the stance of the committed and sometimes for persuading the uncommitted it rarely succeeds in changing the mind of a committed opponent. For this unusual phenomenon to occur it is almost always dialogue, not rhetoric or polemics which is needed. As most of us, however, prefer to converse and interact with likeminded people our own definition of the situation is continually being reinforced, along with the belief that those who see things differently are incapable of intelligent discussion because they are unreasonable, naive, foolish, unthinking, prejudiced or crazy.

The military establishment and the peace movement are no exceptions. Both engage in huge amounts of internal discourse, debate and argument but dialogue between them is virtually non-existent. This is hardly surprising. As each *Weltanschauung* has a very different root metaphor and each truth system is based on conflicting assumptions not only about the nature of the problem but about the nature of the world there exists very little, if any, common ground for discussion. To quote linguist James Wertsch:

One of the most striking features of the nuclear arms debate is that representatives of various viewpoints seem to be incapable of communicating with one another. Indeed if we use the term "debate" to mean a process whereby the views of various parties are brought into contact and can influence one another, then in many cases no debate is really going on at all. Instead, what we see are several different perspectives that are for all practical purposes monologues - hermetically sealed off from one another. Each of these perspectives presents a coherent world view and seems to have a way of dealing with most of the facts relevant to the debate, but each of them also is in fundamental contradiction with the others in what it sees as the major problem and how it can be solved (Wertsch, 1986).

Nevertheless, this situation of non-debate or dialogue is forced upon, rather than chosen by the peace movement, whose very existence depends on what the Quakers call 'convincement'. If only because the achievement of goals depends upon public persuasion and conversion the peace movement needs and does attempt to engage with the dominant security discourse. It rarely, if ever, succeeds. If the strength of an institution is measured in terms of its moral legitimacy, spatial spread and historical depth - as is usual - then militarism is the strongest and most deeply entrenched of all Western institutions. By contrast, the contemporary peace movement although widespread is numerically small, relatively recent and, except in the case of New Zealand, exists only in the netherworld of non-institutionalized democratic politics. Given nuclearism's social-psychological hold and material resources its protagonists can afford to ignore the counter-discourse unless or until it shows signs of becoming significant. The Nuclear Freeze movement in the United States and the U.S. Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter, for instance, eventually elicited responses and reactions from both military and civil strategists and officials concerning the country's nuclear policies. Similarly, the strength of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand before the 1984 election campaign forced the reigning political elites to argue for, rather

than simply declare, their policy on warship visits.

During the years of the warships campaign, George Armstrong made several unsuccessful attempts to communicate directly with the U.S. commanders by writing to them, setting out the reasons for the demonstration and inviting them to respond. (Dave Wray did "have a word with the captain" of the *Pintado*, but it was probably not intended to be conversational). Several Squadron members and sympathisers also wrote letters to the submarine commander and the Prime Minister about the dangerous tactics of the authorities at the *Pintado* demonstration, although they likewise received no response. When Armstrong and a Maori M.P. sent telegrams to President Carter before the *Haddo* visit informing him of New Zealanders' opposition, expressing concern about the potential dangers to demonstrators and requesting him to put an end to the visits, they were attempting - although still unsuccessfully - to use people power to circumvent the elites and shift the debate to the highest level.

Although the demonstrations were aimed at the U.S. military and the political decision-makers of the U.S. Administration and the N.Z. Government, most of the actual confrontations were with the local agents of law enforcement. This provided something of a dilemma for Squadron organizers, who were anxious not to convey the image of opposing fellow citizens who were merely carrying out their duties. Thus before the *Haddo* visit the Squadron initiated a meeting with the Auckland Police Commissioner aimed at achieving some degree of institutionalization about the actions of both sides. The Police Chief, however, responded with denunciatory rhetoric rather than with dialogue. Nevertheless, it was in the interests of the police to appear to be in command of the situation and to avoid injuring the protestors, so it eventually did become customary for Squadron organizers to meet with police officials before each protest action. Some agreements and compromises were reached as a result of these discussions, but it is clear that Commissioner Trappitt remained an implacable opponent to the end.

In the early water actions, the commanders of the U.S. ships seemed to respond spontaneously to reporters' questions about whether they were disturbed or angered by the

actions of the peace fleets, but very soon all were declaring that they were not at all upset by the protests.⁶ Sometimes sheer persistence has the effect of forcing an opponent into dialogue. During a direct action protest described in the next chapter, for instance, one woman "chased the two bosses" around the satellite construction site at Whaihopi, "talking to them, not letting them get away with treating us as anonymous obstacles in the way of their work ... insisting that they respect us, and that we were doing our work too, telling them that our actions were not personal attacks on them. As they calmed down, listening to them, hearing their feelings and their position I found out heaps, and in the end even the most aggressive one was saying helpful things."

Sometimes conversion or semi-conversion (often on retirement from public office) does occur, and if a prominent 'hawk' becomes 'doveish',⁷ he (the pronoun seems appropriate) is likely to be much in demand as a speaker at peace movement gatherings - although discourse is likely to cease with his one-time colleagues. Peace activists frequently suffer from burn-out and may become inactive or disillusioned but they almost never convert to the military perspective. If this should occur, the impact on that institution would in any case be negligible; unlike the peace movement the violent movement does not rejoice in finding the lost lamb. Rapid and widespread conversion of pacifists and internationalists did occur at the outbreak of both WW1 and WW2, but that was due to factors other than persuasion through reasoned debate. Whether this phenomenon would be repeated in a similar situation remains untested - and perhaps untestable, given the probable nature of WW3.

New Zealand is so far the only country in the world where political structures have been created for dialogue and conflict resolution between the Government and grassroots

⁶ The stock reply today is that they are not disturbed by peace fleets because, to quote one Captain, "Protecting a free people's right to demonstrate is what the U.S. Navy is all about, and what we're here for." It is difficult to think of a response more likely to infuriate the demonstrators.

⁷ Most tend to become 'owls.' For example, Retd. Admiral Gene La Rocque of the (Washington) Center for Defense Information is critical of U.S. nuclear policies, the arms race and the extent of the nuclear arsenal, but remains within the militarist paradigm.

groups with respect to national security and other policy matters. The National Government under pressure from its own maverick members initially set up the Parliamentary Disarmament and Arms Control Select Committee in the early 1980's, but the Fourth Labour Government's *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act* was followed by the creation of a Disarmament and Arms Control portfolio and a non-governmental organization known as PACDAC (Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control). PACDAC consists of eight representatives from the various peace organizations, and its designated tasks are to advise and assist (with the same number of officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs) the Minister of Disarmament, to advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of the Nuclear Free Zone Act and to facilitate the flow of information on disarmament and arms control issues between the Government and the public. How this unprecedented institutionalization of public meddling in the esoteric business of national security has worked out in practice is discussed in the final section of this work.

A clash between Party and Cabinet members at the 1988 Annual Labour Party Conference over Government policies - particularly with respect to 'Rogernomics' - led to the establishment of another unique structure for institutionalizing dialogue between non-government groups and political elites. Then Prime Minister David Lange agreed that where Government intentions were contrary to specific Labour Party policy, the Government would go through a process of consultation. Ten 'Conflict Consultative Committees' (including one on Foreign Affairs-Security) each containing five non-government representatives were in place by the end of 1988. The Labour Party in New Zealand has always depended strongly on grassroots and union support, and (unlike its counterpart in Australia) apparently cannot afford to stray too far right of its centre-left position if it is to keep its traditional constituency.

Communication and Resources

Communication in New Zealand is rapid. It is a small country with a small population and many people know many other people. There are a few national or local newspapers, three radio stations and two television channels. Thus all across the country

on any given day large numbers of New Zealanders are reading, hearing or seeing much the same thing.⁸ Local telephone calls are free, and the telephone is the chief contact instrument for the people of the peace movement. Long distance calls are at a reduced rate in the late hours of the evening and, to quote Owen Wilkes, ... "the New Zealand peace movement springs into action at 10 o'clock." Telephone trees effect rapid mobilization as, for instance, in the flood of telegrams to the Prime Minister and the mobilizing of the Peace Squadron at short notice.

In the Communication Age the possession of a medium for the message is a significant factor in the formation, promotion, survival and success of social movements. Many peace groups in New Zealand, large or small, produce their own newsletters, but the major media vehicle for the peace movement is its official magazine *Peacelink* (originally titled the *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter*). The monthly publication provides a national (and to some extent an overseas) public forum for challenging nuclearism and militarism, as well as for distributing counter-knowledge and information through the peace networks of the country. It is also an important instrument for affirming and sustaining personal and group identity, goals, values and solidarity. The magazine was born alongside Peace Movement New Zealand; indeed, one of the major reasons for the move to create a co-ordinating organization was the desire to establish a firm support base for a national publication. Thus from the start of the discussions about the structure and aims of PMNZ there was general agreement that the production of a newsletter would have top priority. At the 1981 Annual Peace Workshop ... "a Dunedin proposal from the (later) *Peacelink* collective was accepted with enthusiasm."

Peacelink

In June 1982, the Dunedin office collective produced the first issue of the monthly *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter* as "a service provided to peace organizations to facilitate communication between groups." Its producers asked for ... "News of

⁸ During my fieldwork I was interviewed by Radio New Zealand (the N.Z. Broadcasting Commission) about the project. From that point onwards I rarely needed to introduce myself to a potential interviewee; I was already known.

forthcoming events. News and reports of recent activities in New Zealand. News from overseas." The request seems to have been more than met; the March 1983 editorial announced that the format of subsequent issues "will be twice the page size, with the 20 pages giving us nearly 50% more room for news and articles." It was also announced that "... as well as having a new look, the publication will have a new name. ... We want a publication that everyone in the peace movement can identify with, and which will sell on stalls to the interested public. We are still looking for a name - we think it should be distinctly New Zealand in tone, and short. Suggestions are welcomed."

The April 1983 (No. 8) issue bore the new title: *Peacelink*, and the inside cover page declared it to be "an independent peace magazine which aims to represent the diversity of views within the Aotearoa/N.Z. peace movement ... produced by a collective responsible to the National Peace Workshop." The Dunedin office collective consisted of a core working group of five and a number of volunteers. Nine people, five men and four women, were credited with having produced issue No. 8, and their names appeared on the inside front cover. The magazine had an editorial but no editor. By 1985 the word 'Editorial' had been replaced by 'Comment'. The February 1985 issue (No. 27), carried the news that the Dunedin collective "wished to have a break" from the production of the magazine. "Any group (not necessarily an established peace group) which feels it is capable of taking it on is invited to send a proposal by March 15." It was suggested that the minimum number of people necessary to produce the magazine was 8, with 30 more helpers on an irregular basis. "At the present time", said the notice, "the magazine is produced entirely by volunteers."

A Christchurch collective became the next producer of *Peacelink* and then in June 1986 a Hamilton collective became and continues to be responsible for the magazine's production. Over time, it has become more sophisticated and professional in style, more wide-ranging in content and markedly less parochial. In the first 1982 *Newsletter*, 11 of the 14 (small) pages dealt with news from the regions; in September the figure was 6, by December it was 3. In April 1983 there were 3 (large) pages of regional news, although in September - the time of the USS Texas visit and Hiroshima Day actions - the figure was

back to 7. In the next issue it was down to 2. By June 1984, the regional news was confined to one page, and this has continued to be the norm. A content analysis of all editions up to December 1989 reveals that before the middle of the decade most space was given to political issues and happenings and peace movement activities within New Zealand. After 1985, there was equal if not more coverage of international issues, with a major emphasis on happenings in the Pacific region and on the Maori issue in New Zealand.

Resources

Without doubt, the greatest resource of the world peace movement is its volunteers; people who give much time and energy for no financial return. The few people who are employed either on a full-time or part-time basis also contribute a great deal to the organization by typically accepting a minimum return for maximum work. Equally without doubt, the smallest resource the peace movement possesses is money. The resource mobilization theory of social movements - that the emergence of movements is linked to an increase in available resources - is not upheld in the case of the N.Z. peace movement, or, I would argue, of peace movements anywhere; mobilization comes first and the money to finance the planned action or campaign comes after - usually from the pockets of those doing the planning.

In extreme contrast to the resources available to the military power/knowledge regime, the empowerment/knowledge system of the peace movement operates on a shoe-string budget, lives a hand-to-mouth existence and is always on the edge of insolvency. With the exception of Japan where peace organizations are often sponsored by local governments, peace centres or offices are typically small and cramped, overflowing with materials and staffed by a few people working in a voluntary capacity or at a low-wage level. They are usually found in an aging converted house, a portion of community or church buildings, the back rooms of an unpretentious office block or in somebody's spare-room. Apart from the latter situation, the furnishings are likely to have been put together from cast-offs. Donations, ideally in the form of pledges, form the major source of funds and most groups supplement these through such things as street stalls and the sale of books, pamphlets, badges, stickers, sweaters, T-shirts, posters and advertising space in

peace movement newsletters and magazines - hardly large money-spinners.

The New Zealand peace movement fares somewhat better than most with respect to funding. The non-activist, education-oriented Foundation for Peace Studies is an endowed organization (although the amount is not large) and *Peacelink* receives a small subsidy through the distribution of the Greenpeace *Rainbow Warrior* compensation money. As the magazine is frequently critical of, and often opposed to, the Government's policies, this source of funding is tenuous. The fact that virtually all peace groups and organizations in New Zealand are chronically short of funds may be as important as ideology in preventing the emergence of any hierarchical structure. Poverty is a great leveller. The pledging of regular sums by supporters is the favoured means of securing the viability of *Peacelink* but it is always a struggle to achieve this goal, and throughout the magazine's eight year history announcements of its imminent collapse due to lack of funds have appeared at frequent intervals. The following three extracts are illustrative of all peace movements' ever-present twin problems of volunteer burn-out and financial survival.

(No. 13, September, 1983)

THANK YOU!

We'd like to thank all the people who've responded to our appeal for funds in the August *Peacelink*. We've had a good response to the appeal, but our financial situation is still very precarious. Therefore, we hope those of you who haven't yet donated will do so this month - also, please consider joining our automatic payment pledge scheme if you haven't already!

(No. 65, September, 1988)

WILL PEACELINK SURVIVE?

It has become necessary to take a long hard look at *Peacelink* - its function and value, its finances, its future and not least the energy required to keep such a magazine going. ***Peacelink* is at a crisis point and it is time to make some decisions.** There are two main areas of concern.

1. ***Peacelink* is not financially viable** and it's vital it becomes so very soon. For

this to happen subscriptions must reach the 1000 level. Last year, in only three months we were able to up the subscription rate from 350 to over 600, so we know we can do it. Due to a smaller *Peacelink* collective this year we have been unable to undertake any promotion work. Our subscription rate has subsequently slipped back to 550. **If nothing is done about this situation there will a gradual decline and *Peacelink* will cease.**

2. To avoid massive burnouts we need your help. We need to employ a part-time worker whose sole responsibility will be to promote the magazine and sell advertising space. Please find Pledge Campaign on p.3. If **YOU** want *Peacelink* to survive then we ask that you take some responsibility for its success. We are a very small but committed group of people who have volunteered our work, but that does not mean that we have to carry all the responsibility for its success on our shoulders alone.

(No. 68. December, 1988)

THANKS

We would like to thank those of you who have responded to our recent appeals. Donations received in the last two months add up to a grand total of \$3,743. This has brought us through the financial crisis we were in and reassured us that there is support out there for what we are doing. However, it would be far less stressful for us all if *Peacelink's* regular income was sufficient to cover costs; we certainly cannot consider employing a person to do the promotion we feel is necessary unless we have a sufficient regular income. Automatic payments from your bank account are easy for you, and give us the security we need to commit ourselves to the expansions and improvements we would like to introduce. A VERY SPECIAL THANK YOU for this reason, to the few who have felt able to make this commitment. In the month ended 23 Nov., \$19 was deposited into our Pledge Account. We urge others to consider this form of support; if the generous donations we have received were pledged in this way and spread through the year they would be more valuable to us.

It seems that polar responses to the nuclear dilemma go hand-in-hand with polar financial resources. The U.S. Navy is unlikely to express gratitude for having \$19 guaranteed for its operations in the coming year.

CHAPTER 11

MODES OF PERSUASION

Non-violent resistance avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of the spirit. The non-violent person not only refuses to shoot an opponent but also refuses to hate him or her. At the center of non-violence stands the principle of love.

- Martin Luther King, Jr.

If you just look at what we're on about - nuclear weapons and all that - most people will just go away and live with their despair and not do anything about it. What I want to do is empower people to act on their feelings. By doing some fun things together you get the feeling that you can do something; you're part of a group. We use political processes all the time, but we try to influence them in unusual ways.

- Kate Boanas (N.Z. peace worker)

The global peace movement came into being in response to the threat of a nuclear holocaust, and those who call themselves peace workers or 'peace niks' believe (or behave as if they believe) that the threat is co-existent with the existence of nuclear weapons. Thus the goal of removing these weapons is an *a priori* goal, and the avoidance of a nuclear or major conventional war a value they share with the great majority of people everywhere. Beliefs about what should be removed along with the weapons, how major wars are to be avoided and what should replace the current strategy of nuclear deterrence, however, is by no means agreed upon; different people have differing views on the subject. Not everyone, for instance, regards war as a symptom of violent patriarchy nor nuclear weapons as symbols of men's 'missile envy' (Caldicott, 1984). Or, I would add, 'womb envy.'

What most peace activists *do* agree about is Albert Einstein's statement concerning the necessity for new ways of thinking in the nuclear age, and this agreement is manifested

in the attempt to create a culture which will serve both as a visible critique of the dominant forms of Western democracy and a vision of what an alternative social and political culture might be like. Anti-nuclearists within the movement may have limited and non-personal goals, but those who oppose *all* forms of violent conflict resolution and declare their commitment to the concept of 'positive peace' in the world and in their society feel constrained, by definition, to be as well as do. In short, the peace movement, unlike the purely anti-nuclear movement, is not only task and goal-oriented but also oriented towards an exemplary mode of being in the world. This attempt to pre-figure the future by actions in the present has been labelled 'pre-figurative practices',¹ and together with 'networking' and 'empowerment' provides the third conceptual key to understanding the *weltanschauung* of the peace movement. The social and political culture its core members strive to create and make viable in particular local contexts is fragile, permeable and fraught with disappointments, tensions and contradictions but it is also widespread, innovative and persistent.

Non-Violent Principles and Pre-figurative Practices

Most of the political values of the peace movement have already been described in the data, as, for instance, radical egalitarianism, consensual forms of decision-making, non-hierarchical, non-discriminatory, non-bureaucratic forms of organization, environmental and ecological protection, participatory rather than representational democracy and open government. The peace movement analysis of power makes connections between state-sponsored violence, expert discourses on nuclear technology and national security and normalizing discourses on sexuality and family life on the one hand, and, on the other hand, social violence, environmental destruction, imperialism, Third World intervention, sexism, racism and poverty. The analysis is radical in the sense of being directed against the political practices of the nuclear or militaristic state, and in implying the necessity for systemic change in the political structure and in forms of social relations.

¹ I am grateful to my IGCC colleague and fellow peace researcher, Noel Sturgeon, for introducing me to this concept through her work and conference presentations on the political theory of the peace movement. Several of the ideas expressed in this and the theoretical section had their origins in her written reports, and our many discussions on the subject.

Social movements are always in danger of being co-opted by political elites, especially movements which show signs of attaining mass support. The grassroots peace movement, however, cannot be co-opted while a substantial core of its members stick to the goal of non-military, non-violent conflict resolution, for ultimately the power of the state rests upon its monopoly of the means of violence and the contract for national security through armed defence. Anti-nuclear movements like the American 'Freeze' movement of the early 1980's are easily co-opted or overcome by the dominant discourse, for discourse which is anti-nuclear only remains within the violent threat system and thus is no match for the seemingly more moral logic of avoiding nuclear war through flexible response and counter-force (military targets, not cities) strategies. Such movements do not challenge war as a policy or an institution; rather, they challenge the type of strategy or types and numbers of weapons deployed or produced.² The N.Z. peace movement resisted co-optation by the Labour Party at the time of the 1984 and 1987 elections by supporting *all* parties with nuclear-free policies, and its members continue to play an adversarial role by protesting against the Government's policy of increased military spending and by campaigning for the removal of all military-related bases.

The Director of the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute, Egbert Jahn, argues that anything less than the total rejection of war leads to a dead-end for the peace movement. He writes:

Let us imagine for a moment the fiction of a mighty peace movement in the NATO countries, the Soviet Union, China, India, etc. which scraps all nuclear weapons on earth. Would not a conventional war become much more probable again, as it does not contain the risk of a total annihilation of whole nations? And would the production of nuclear weapons not inevitably start again, at the latest on the day of the outbreak of war between industrial states?

Therefore, the widespread nuclear pacifism conceived as 'realistic', which has been taken by

² Diminishing the danger of destructiveness or annihilation in a war is not identical with diminishing the danger of war itself. Arms control or incremental disarmament, whether initiated bi-laterally or unilaterally, is based upon some notion of keeping a balance of power, but given the inherent dynamics of the threat system, only two extreme forms of power balancing are theoretically possible: worldwide general and complete disarmament, or worldwide general and complete second-strike nuclear capability.

many as a first step to complete disarmament and as a historically necessary concession to the needs of conventional military defence of all nations, and which also possesses a broader mass basis than general pacifism ... is nevertheless an impasse for the peace movement. There can be no return to the *status quo ante* August 6, 1945, no reconstruction of a 'merely' conventionally armed world of sovereign nation states capable of waging a war....

In other words, nuclear pacifism, though it appears realistic because of its modesty to some people, is an unrealizable utopia. If there is a historical chance for the abolition of war as a form of conflict in international society, then it exists merely as a chance of general pacifism which fights any war, not just nuclear war (Jahn, 1984:50).

It is probable that a minority of peace activists would call themselves general pacifists in the sense outlined above, but underlying all of the movement's prefigurative practices is the assumption that non-violent relations between individuals, groups and societies are both desirable and possible. Challenging groups engaging in confrontational actions in pursuit of their goals have the choice of using violence against authorities (revolution), violence against people (terrorism) or non-violent public protest. The peace movement, by definition, must choose the latter as its basic goal is to convince the public that non-violent conflict resolution is possible. Non-violence, however, is much more than a necessary tactic for the pursuit of goals; it is the lynch-pin of the movement and simultaneously a shaping principle, a social and personal goal, a normative strategy and a pedagogical mode of behaviour. Members of the peace movement who oppose all forms of militarism usually adhere to the principle of non-violence from one of two standpoints, each of which is explored below.

General Pacifism

This stance is both universalist and absolute and is the position described above by Egbert Jahn. It is the refusal to respond in kind to violent actions in the belief that the power of active goodwill towards the opponent alone has the potential for generating redemptive change. Pacifism's greatest strength is also its greatest vulnerability, for it assumes the existence of a core of humanity and goodwill in the opponent. The two great 20th. century inspirational figures for those engaging in this form of non-violent struggle

are, of course, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King; one a Hindu master who talked of *satyagraha* ('aspiration to truth') and of *ahimsa* ('non-violence, love'); the other a Christian minister who talked of 'soul force' and *agape* ('understanding and creative, redemptive goodwill' ... 'the love of God operating in the human heart').

One of the clearest expositions of Christian pacifism and the command of its founder to "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you" is found in Martin Luther King's, *Strength to Love*; a collection of sermons preached or written during or after the Civil Rights' bus protest in Montgomery, Alabama (King, 1963). While in prison in Georgia, King wrote the chapter headed "Loving Your Enemies" and in it he declares that "... modern man is traveling along a road called hate in a journey that will bring us to destruction and damnation. ... Love even for enemies is the key to the solution of the problems of our world. Jesus is not an impractical idealist; he is the practical realist." After describing the process of learning to love our enemies and giving reasons why we should do so, the writer asks, "Do I sound like most preachers - idealistic and impractical? Maybe in some distant Utopia, you say, that idea will work, but not in the hard cold world in which we live." He answers his hypothetical interlocutor thus:

My friends, we have followed the so-called practical way for too long a time now, and it has led inexorably to deeper confusion and chaos. Time is cluttered with the wreckage of communities which surrendered to hatred and violence. For the salvation of our nation and the salvation of mankind, we must follow another way. ...

To our most bitter opponents we say: "We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. We cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws, because non-co-operation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is co-operation with good. Throw us in jail, and we shall still love you. Bomb our homes and threaten our children, and we shall still love you. Send your hooded perpetrators of violence into our community at the midnight hour and beat us and leave us half dead, and we shall still love you. But be ye assured that we will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. One day we shall win freedom, but not only for ourselves. We shall so appeal to your heart and conscience that we shall win *you* in the process, and our victory will be a double victory."

Love is the most durable power in the world. This creative force ... is the most potent

instrument available in mankind's quest for peace and security. ... Jesus is eternally right. History is replete with the bleached bones of nations that refused to listen to him. May we in the twentieth century hear and follow his words - before it is too late. May we solemnly realize that we shall never be true sons of our heavenly Father until we love our enemies and pray for those who persecute us (King, 1963:40).

Although neither Gandhi nor King formulated a specific theory of non-violence, Jahn believes it is possible to extract seven characteristics of non-violent resistance from their writings. A summary of his formulation is as follows:

1. Non-violent resistance is not just a technique, a means to an end or a method of serving whatever aim; it is a means and a way towards the goal of reconciling all mankind. It has nothing in common with non-violent actions which seek to annihilate, humiliate or suppress others.

2. Non-violent resistance is active, the opposite of passivity and weakness. It emancipates the person from tolerating injustice through fear, and thus can initiate the breakdown of the system of injustice which is based rather on the obedience of those who suffer and endure violence than on the violence of the powerful.

3. A pre-requisite of non-violent action is the readiness to endure violence, although not without resistance; violent action is met with non-violent action.

4. The aim is not to defeat, destroy, conquer or humiliate the adversary but to convince him of a common conception of justice and conflict solution on a level of equality.

5. The objective of non-violent struggle is the victory over injustice, violence, unjust structures, patterns of behaviour that contain and produce violence, but not victory over persons. Non-cooperation and civil disobedience are not means for splitting and separating a society but .. pedagogical methods. ... Dissociation is a method of temporary renunciation of community with those who exert or tolerate injustice until justice has been (re-)established.

6. Non-violent resistance is practised in the spirit of love, not hate for those who use violence or exercise injustice. Love does not mean tender sentiments towards the violent person, but the ability to empathize and imagine oneself in his role. A self-critical attitude is a pre-condition for preventing a Manichean division of people into the good and the bad; those deemed worthy of being alive and those deserving of annihilation.

7. "Non-violent resistance that is based on the premise of the other person's learning capacity through one's own sufferings of violence therefore, as a rule, produces results only in the long run. It requires a strong faith in the future; in the final victory of justice in the thinking and acting of all human beings" (51-2).

Non-violent Civil-based Defence

While Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi base the case for non-violent resistance on the redemptive force of unshakeable goodwill towards an enemy, a somewhat more pragmatic adherence to the principles and methods of non-violence is based on the belief that in the age of the absolute weapon war is an anachronism and non-violent resistance the only rational way of confronting an armed invader or a *coup d'etat*, particularly in the case of small states. Many members of the peace movement who embrace non-violence do so from this perspective and most advocate a process of transarmament: a shift from offensive weaponry or defensive weapon systems to a form of national defence based solely on non-violent civilian resistance. In this system, underground communication networks are prepared and citizens trained in advance in non-violent resistance methods such as strikes, slow-downs and disobedience. In the event of an invasion or a *coup*, or so it is believed, such actions would prevent or severely hamper the setting-up or enforcement of an unwanted regime.

This type of defence is known as civil-based defence, and its most prominent advocate and apologist is Harvard academic, Gene Sharp (see for instance, Sharp, 1973, 1980 and 1985b). Civil-based defence rests on similar assumptions to those of Foucault concerning the nature of power: namely, that unless mechanisms for receiving and channelling power exist power does not exist. In contrast to the high-tech weapon systems of modern armies a civil-based defence system relies solely on human beings; the determination of a well-prepared people to overcome a violent enemy by making the costs of victory outweigh the benefits through various forms of non-violent resistance. By eschewing the deadly products of technology, the eventual overthrow of an invader or dictator is achieved, or so it is hoped, with a minimum of bloodshed. While the notion of civil-based defence may seem dangerously naive, Kenneth Boulding contends that a study

of the history of wars indicates that "a well-organized defeat almost always benefits the defeated party more than the victorious one. ... The historical evidence suggests that a subtle combination of defiance and submission in the face of a threat is what makes for survival and creativity, and that a victory is nearly always bad for the victor" (Boulding, 1985:139). The assertion does find support in the case of Britain, Germany and Japan after WW2, if not the superpowers (although some would argue that the argument holds there too).

Most peace movement people today have some understanding of the principles of non-violence and those engaging in direct action protests - particularly those intending "to commit CD" (civil disobedience) - are urged to undergo training in the principles, goals and methods of non-violent protest. This is mainly a development of the late 1970's-80's. John Boanas notes, for instance, that:

... In terms of non-violent political action, the Squadron had a non-purist approach whereby non-violence or a-violence became a practical requirement rather than a technique or philosophy. While George Armstrong and the Quakers were familiar with Gandhi and King there was no specific discussion about their ideas on non-violence, and it was 1977 before anyone in the Squadron had read Gene Sharp's *The Politics of Non-violent Action*.

Nothing of substance arose from Sharp's work that altered the Squadron view of non-violence, but through 1978 and '79 the work of young N.Z. and British Quakers ... was having an effect [and] CNDers and Peace Squadron members were becoming involved in workshops run by the Quakers. What consequences this will have long term are unknown, but the contribution of ideas on non-violent techniques is important for a N.Z. movement that has unconsciously assumed its present style (Boanas, 1980:33-4).

Had the members of the early Peace Squadron studied the writings of Mahatma Gandhi they might have discovered that while he would have approved wholeheartedly of their insistence that Squadron opposition was to the military, not to people and that it was anti-nuclear, not anti-American, their initial strategy of organizing a flotilla of small boats "to so cover the Waitemata Harbour that no responsible captain of a warship would consider entry" might not have met with the master's approval. Gandhi wrote in 1921:

Some students of Calcutta have revived the ancient form of barbarity in the form of sitting *dharna*. (Exerting moral pressure by sitting at one spot and going without food or water). ... I call it 'barbarity' for it is a crude way of using coercion. It is also cowardly, because one who sits *dharna* knows that he is not going to be trampled over. It is difficult to call the practice violent but it is certainly worse. If we fight our opponent we at least enable him to return the blow. But when we challenge him to walk over us, *knowing* that he will not, we place him in a most awkward and humiliating position. I know that the overzealous students who sat *dharna* never thought of the barbarity of the deed (quoted Jahn, 1984:52).

Egbert Jahn argues that what Gandhi means by 'barbarity' in actions like blockades and sit-ins is that ethical restraints are used as an instrument of coercion; the restraint on killing a fellow-citizen deprives the opponent of his freedom of choice for a certain time. A truly non-violent action, says Jahn, is one which exerts pressure but does not coerce; it leaves the opponent with the choice of succumbing to the pressure or sticking to his previous position. The author quotes the Montgomery bus boycott as an example of this kind of action: by boycotting the buses but not blockading the roads the blacks exerted economic pressure while leaving the transport system free to run its empty buses through the streets. Public transport did not have the right to demand or enforce that black people use the buses. The blacks claimed this right, and were prepared to endure the difficulties of getting to their destination by other means.

Jahn's interpretation is probably correct, but the distinction Gandhi makes between "sitting *dharna*" and his practice of fasting seems a thin one. The restraint in the latter case is not against killing but against not taking action to prevent the death of an innocent person, but in both cases an ethical restraint is being used as an instrument of coercion. The Peace Squadron did not succeed in creating a blockade and so the ships' captains did, in fact, have a choice of proceeding or not. The protests did exert pressure on the Government by arousing public opinion on the issue, although not always to the Squadron's advantage. With the visit of the *Pintado* the choice was made by the N.Z. authorities and the submarine commander to proceed in a manner which was in turn coercive, as it endangered the lives of the protestors. The later water actions were irritating

to the authorities rather than morally coercive, as the aim was to confuse, annoy and present the image of a David and Goliath struggle, not to prevent the entry of the vessels.

Tasks and Goals

"Think gobally!"

Without doubt, the greatest single problem of the global peace movement is the magnitude of its task. While peace people often use the metaphor of David and Goliath to describe their struggle (as I have), it is rather more the case of a gnat confronting a Tyrannasaurus Rex. At the same time, it is just the unprecedented enormity of the global military machine which is producing the driving incentive for change. But the degree of change the peace movement aims for is of even greater enormity, and (with the small and tenuous exception of Costa Rica) utterly without precedence in the history of civilizations. Hobbes has said that men in a state of nature kill one another for reasons of fear, greed or glory and so far cities, states and empires (though not, it seems, hunters and gatherers) have done the same. In seeking to abolish war as a social institution and an instrument of foreign policy, the peace movement is running against the tide of recorded history and venturing into uncharted territory.

The purely anti-nuclear movement, on the other hand, can draw upon the historical memory of a world without the absolute weapon, and nuclear disarmament is theoretically possible. But even if the seemingly insuperable problems involved in achieving this state were to be overcome, the truly insuperable problem of nuclear knowledge remains. Jonathan Schell argues in *The Abolition* that it is just *because* nuclear weapons cannot be 'disinvented' that they *can* be abolished. The essential ingredient of nuclear deterrence, he asserts, is not the weapons but the knowledge, the know-how and the capacity to produce them; in other words, science, technology and the power/knowledge networks. Laid to rest, nuclear weapons could be quickly resurrected in a crisis. But even if this form of 'sleeping deterrence' were possible, and it seems doubtful, the world would still be under the threat of annihilation at any time a national security crisis was so defined, so the problem remains. Nevertheless, there is a logical distinction between the impossibility of 'disinvention' and the possibility of agreement on elimination (as, for instance, with respect

to biological warfare) and it is this which fuels the hopes and the energies of those who oppose the nuclear arsenals. Like Egbert Jahn, however, most core members of the peace movement regard mere anti-nuclearism as an impasse and a trap.

While to most people, arms control seems the answer to the dilemma of what should be done with the weapons, so far the agreements achieved at Geneva have not curbed the arms race, and in the view of some critics, bi-lateral arms control is merely a device to keep the rules of 'the nuclear game' flexible enough to enable it to continue. On the other hand, many people view this situation benignly, as in their view, the weapons "have kept the peace for forty-five years." On the continent of Europe at least the assertion holds; war in that part of the world does seem to have become the victim of its own evolution, even though - and many would say because - it is the most heavily-armed region on earth. Logically, however, the violent peace which has prevailed in the countries of the two blocs in comparison with the conventional or internecine wars which have raged elsewhere implies a chilling conclusion: namely, that war will cease to be a form of "politics continued by other means" (to quote Clausewitz's famous formula) only when every nation of whatever size possesses the capability to annihilate any aggressor. But a world armed with absolute weapons - nuclear, chemical (the 'poor man's bomb') or whatever might be in the technological store - would so increase the danger of accidental or intentional catastrophic war, so poison and pollute the environment and consume so much of the world's resources that this solution is surely not a solution at all.

The peace movement offers another kind of solution based on the oft-repeated words of Einstein that new thinking is required in the nuclear age and on the recognition that, as General Omar Bradley of the U.S. Army put it in 1948, "... modern war visits destruction on the victor and vanquished alike. The atom bomb is far more than a military weapon. It may contain the choice between the quick and the dead. The way to win an atomic war is to make certain it never starts." Therein lies the rub, for there are conflicting ideas about how to achieve this aim. War is deeply engrained in both the psyche and culture of Western civilization and is now enmeshed in the social, political and economic institutions as well. The global peace movement has set itself the gargantuan task of

convincing the huge, unconvinced majority, many of whom are benefiting from that enmeshment, that peace through military strength, the time-honoured way of seeking to prevent war, is not the way to a lasting peace, and is counter-productive to the resolution of the real dangers which now threaten all societies, regardless of ideology.

A large part of the problem is the asymmetry of socio-cultural and scientific-technological evolution. Jonathan Schell has declared that for the countries which possess nuclear weapons "war has been spoiled as a means of settling international disputes" (Schell, 1984:28) and Kenneth Boulding says that "[w]hat the pistol did for duelling the nuclear weapons has done for national defense" (Boulding, 1985:147) - meaning that a highly-dangerous technological development rapidly brought about the demise of a seemingly entrenched institution. So far, however, the national security concept of armed defence is alive and well. In his study of war through the ages, historian Gwynne Dyer concludes:

It is not some fatal flaw in our nature that now threatens our survival, but something much more prosaic: our political institutions and the habits of thought which support them are adapting too slowly to stay in control of the awesome powers of creation and destruction we are now acquiring. One might have wished for something grander, but if we go under as a species that will be our epitaph (1985: 253).

The problem we face, states Dyer, is as simple as it was inevitable: "war ... is lethally incompatible with an advanced technological civilization" (Dyer, 1985:204). Right or wrong, this is the view of the global peace movement, and while the message may be simple the task of getting it accepted and acted upon is not.

"Act Locally!"

The PMNZ Constitution of November/December 1983 states that the broad goal of the movement is ... "To work towards world peace justice and disarmament in Aotearoa-New Zealand, in the Pacific region and globally." As New Zealand's involvement in the global nuclear infrastructure was minimal, the particular goals and strategies aimed at achieving this outcome could be sharply-focused: (1) stop nuclear-powered and/or nuclear-

capable ships and aircraft entering or transiting the country; (2) have New Zealand declared a Nuclear Free Zone; (3) have the whole of the South Pacific declared a Nuclear-Free Zone, and (4) get New Zealand out of a nuclear-linked military alliance - which to most people meant getting out of ANZUS. When Owen Wilkes returned to New Zealand from Europe in 1982 he criticised the peace movement for not having clear goals and priorities, but most activists saw, or came to see, the first three strategies as inextricably linked.³ The fourth was more ambiguous and decidedly unpopular with the mass of N.Z. society, and so tended to be down-played.

There were, of course, some peace activists whose goals were limited to just one of the above (or who simply wished to achieve a change of government), some whose goals extended as far as the abolition of war and a radical restructuring of their own and the global society, and many whose goals were somewhere between these two extremes. Nevertheless, these inter-related goals and strategies, particularly the first three, became the official policy aims of the peace movement after the election of 1975. They were necessarily linked because getting rid of nuclear-weapon carrying and nuclear-propelled visitors would automatically achieve the second goal, and the third was necessary if the first two were to be even slightly meaningful: a Nuclear-Free New Zealand would not keep superpower rivalry spreading to the South Pacific nor stop the French from exploding their nuclear bombs at New Zealander's front door nor prevent the nuclear states using the Pacific as a dumping ground for their radio-active waste.

As all these goals depended on government action, achieving any of them meant either persuading the reigning National Government to change its policies, or replacing the political elites with decision-makers committed to at least some of the same goals. Political parties, however, are by definition not interested in commitment; they are interested in survival and dominance (which is not to say that individuals within them do not place moral commitment over political survival or success). If adopting a certain position appears to be synonymous with political suicide or loss of support then it will not be adopted; if it will

³ Owen Wilkes, Editorial, *Peace Movement New Zealand Newsletter*, Nov., No. 2, 1982; p.2.

increase the likelihood of the party's gaining or increasing power, then it will be adopted. Thus the first task of the peace movement was to convince the present or potential decision-makers of New Zealand that adopting these policies was in the interests of their party. In a democratic society, convincing political parties means convincing the electors (although, as noted earlier, the system may work in reverse). This is what the peace movement from its beginnings set out to do.

Various "modes of persuasion" as Kenneth Burke puts it (1954), are open to peace movements of Western countries in pursuing their goals, but all are necessarily under the constraint of non-violence.⁴ Influencing the decision-makers, and/or gaining adherents, sympathy or support may involve: (1) traditional pressure-group politics - lobbying, petitioning, leafletting, door-knocking, campaigning, advertisements, etc.; (2) education in peace and war issues through dissemination of knowledge and information; (3) attraction through desirable or exemplary values and behaviour; (4) consciousness-raising through symbolic demonstrations or discourse, rhetoric, symbols, rituals, displays, art, drama, etc.; (5) consciousness-raising through radical protest actions involving non-violent confrontation (on the part of the protestors) with authorities. The latter option includes the possibility of civil disobedience and violent or non-violent sanctioning by authorities in response.

Every country's peace movement - though not all groups within it - makes use to varying degrees of all these strategies and tactics. What follows is a necessarily brief account (in reverse order to the above and with the exception of 'attraction' which is explored elsewhere) of how the people of the New Zealand peace movement employ each of these modes of persuasion in endeavouring to achieve their goals.

Direct Action Protests and Symbolic Demonstrations

The blockade tactics originally adopted by the Peace Squadron fell somewhere between the categories of direct protest action and symbolic, peaceful demonstration. It

⁴ This is not necessarily the case with respect to anti-nuclear, as opposed to peace, movements. The anti-nuclear youth group in Europe known as the 'Red Zora', for instance, uses terrorist tactics and regards non-violent actions as the tactics of the weak and cowardly.

seems clear that the Squadron's founders and organizers hoped and believed that confrontations with the authorities could be avoided, and the December 1978 Squadron policy statement was still stating that the strategy was to keep nuclear ships out of the harbour by "filling channel entrances with small craft so that the responsible captain or pilot of such a ship will not proceed". The ships did proceed, however, and although various efforts were made to improve the effectiveness of the blockading strategy, the Peace Squadron eventually realized that even a large flotilla of small obstructing boats was not going to keep warships from entering New Zealand harbours. The result was a mix of symbolic protest actions and individual confrontations with the warships, the N.Z. authorities, or both.

While the direct action tactics had the advantage of capturing media interest and thereby focusing public attention on the issue, and had the potential for gaining sympathy and support because of the elements of courage, daring and risk involved, confrontational tactics are just as likely, if not more likely, to create a negative response in the public mind. They also tended to project an image of Squadron people as an irresponsible 'bunch of weirdos', rather than the desired image of peaceful, life-celebrating, life-protecting responsible citizens. The problem was exacerbated by the participation of outsiders in the protests, and the registering of boats and the flying of an official pennant was in part an attempt to disassociate the Peace Squadron from the risk-taking actions of non-members. The flying of a pennant bearing the word 'polite' in counterpart to the pennants bearing the word 'police' represented another attempt to reduce the likelihood of accidents and of punitive actions by authorities.

Nevertheless, demonstrations and protests always and by definition break legal or customary norms; norm-breaking is what constitutes a demonstration or a protest. In attempting to prevent the entry of the warships, the Peace Squadron violated several norms: the diplomatic norm of welcoming the naval vessels of friendly nations, the cultural norm of New Zealanders as exceptionally hospitable people, the strategic norm linking nuclear weapons with safety and peace and the psychological norm of New Zealand's traditional

dependence upon and obligations to a powerful protector. When the harbour limits were extended, the obstructions constituted a legal violation as well. The Squadron did try to retain the traditional norm of hospitality with respect to the crews; partly in order to minimize the negative impact upon the public of the action, and partly to reinforce the peace movement message of opposition to military systems, not people.

The authorities initially attempted to combat the norm-breaking by denigration of the protestors, then by 'get-tough' methods aimed at making the actions dangerous, then by changing the harbour laws to make them illegal. The use of the Navy helicopters against the Peace Squadron boats was regarded by some observers as well as participants as norm-breaking on the part of the Government; going beyond the limits of legitimate methods of social control. The charge that the Government, not the Peace Squadron, was guilty of dangerous and irresponsible behaviour was an attempt on the part of the Squadron to change public perceptions of norm-breaking and to retain the desired image. There were also some efforts to shift perceptions of norm-breaking behaviour onto the authorities through recourse to law. The early attempt to have a warrant issued for the arrest of the commander of the *Long Beach*, the 'cloak and dagger' serving of the summons and the later warnings issued to the police about acts of piracy were instances of such behaviour, although they were mock-legal actions undertaken more for their symbolic underlining of the legitimacy of the protests rather than the hope of achieving a successful outcome.

From the beginning, the Squadron strove for legitimacy. The blessing of the waters and the pre-protest communion ceremonies aimed to convey the message that those taking part in the actions were responding to a higher duty than obedience to an elected government. The extension of the harbour limits meant confronting the problematic issue of civil disobedience which up until the visit of the *Haddo* had managed to be avoided. As the water actions became more dangerous, harder to control and more likely to lead to arrests, George Armstrong attempted to shift the emphasis away from confrontational tactics to orthodox pressure-politics and symbolic protest. This was resisted by the majority of 'boaties', who appeared to feel it would be tantamount to surrender. John Boanas wrote in 1979:

The question of persevering with blockades was raised because of the problem of mobilising protest on a 'stop-start' basis which was a difficult process, and the danger involved in seaborne resistance. A more conventional pressure group operation could be sustained over a lengthy period, and in terms of the nuclear free zone objective the only party not supporting it was National. ... However, while this discussion preceded the *Haddo* visit, the blockade went ahead and no further discussion has followed about changing tactics.

Nevertheless, the extension of the harbour limits in 1979 meant the end of mass blockading tactics. The new tactic of massing the flotilla close to the shore had a two-fold result: on the one hand it encouraged symbolic forms of protest because the Squadron boats were now more visible to the public; on the other, it made individual acts of risk-taking more meaningful and more rewarding to the perpetrators, thus bringing to the fore the contentious issue of the rights and wrongs of civil disobedience. As the hope of keeping the ships out of the harbour faded, actually touching or getting close to one became an heroic, symbolically important act, while slowing or stopping an incoming warship was regarded as a *coup*.⁵ Any indication that the military or the authorities were shaken or discomfited by the water protests was also cause for jubilation. Consequently, problems or stoppages were down-played by the N.Z. civil and military authorities, and said to be due to reasons other than the Peace Squadron actions. The U.S. captains also appear to have quickly "learned their lines" in this respect, as Dave Wray puts it.

The Peace Squadron and the Media

A journalist once remarked in a television interview that demonstrations do not exist for the benefit of the group being challenged; they exist for the media, preferably the visual media.⁶ If the aim is to exert pressure upon the (usually) recalcitrant authorities through

⁵ This is not unlike the American Indian practice of warriors 'counting coup': that is, gaining honour through physically touching the enemy without his knowledge.

⁶ The speaker recalled one occasion when, as a newspaper reporter attending a demonstration, he encountered a distinct lack of interest as he endeavoured to interview the protestors. When the television van arrived, however, the leader of the group rushed over to it and said, "What do you want us to do?" The TV crew answered, "Well, whatever it is you're doing." Whereupon the protestor replied, "Just tell us what you want, and we'll do it." The story underlines the extremely important role of the media for those taking part in political protest actions.

arousing public opinion, then consciousness-raising actions and activities must be witnessed, heard or read about by as many people as possible. This means getting pictures or accounts of the actions into the mainstream media, and, ideally, onto the television screens. For protestors and demonstrators the media is the message - though certainly not the message; the opposite is intended. John Boanas states in his 1980 essay that "the Squadron tended to use their media coverage as an indicator of success" and was critical of the tendency, but it is an understandable and perhaps realistic criterion. In the early protests the novelty of the Squadron was an advantage, and George Armstrong as media spokesperson did his best to keep it. In speaking of this period he said:

Everything was in our favour; everything was for us. That beautiful harbour in Auckland which is so beautiful for doing something like that on. Everybody can see what's happening for one thing. It was for the first time, and the media were extremely interested. The big thing was the imaginative ingenuity of it. We managed to get our message together, which was a positive message of life and health and hope, and we just kept playing the same old record. There was a tendency of the military and the police, and to some extent the media, to paint us as a bunch of real nasties, but they couldn't do that because we consistently put forward this face. Which was our real face.

The peace movement people put me up there because they felt I'd struck the right note, and wanted to make sure that it kept being struck. They didn't want any cynicism or any anti-American note or any nastiness at all; an impression of sobriety and steadiness rather than lunatic fringe. You could always string the media along Today we had 5 boats, a week later 10, next week 20. And it was a matter of going out to get them, even if they were 50 miles away so you could have them on your register of boats.

Nevertheless, retaining the interest of the media as the water protests became routinized was a problem. One way of tackling it was to stage evermore ingenious forms of symbolic protest. Another was by engaging in evermore daring water actions. The latter meant walking a thin line. If there were too many risky confrontations there was the danger of accidents and of alienating the public; if there were too little the media lost interest. The new tactic in the final days of the water actions of inviting 'notables' to

participate was an attempt to resolve this problem by keeping media attention while reducing the likelihood of dangerous behaviour on both sides.

The 1987 Waihopai Women's Camp

The harbour actions ceased with the rejection of the USS *Buchanan* in 1985, but direct action protests did not cease. Between early 1987 and late 1989, for instance, the construction of a satellite base at Waihopai for Intelligence-gathering activities with Australia was the target of the Wellington-based Anti-Bases Campaign (the other contentious bases being the Black Birch Observatory and Harewood airport at Christchurch where U.S. aircraft touch down *en route* not only to Antarctica but to U.S. bases in Australia). The peace movement describe the facility as a multi-million dollar American/Australian military spy base and aimed to stop its construction. Inspired by the Greenham Common Camp, a number of women set up a Women's Camp in Waihopai Valley on May 2, 1987 for a week-long vigil. The camp lasted instead for 117 days, with the last women and children moving out on September 3. During that period, there were several confrontations between the women and the authorities. The story which follows is taken from an eye-witness account by a participant in one of the actions, and is typical of women's direct action protests within the peace movement (Antonsen, 1988).

It was 6.30 a.m. We took the baskets of flowers and drove on into where the machines were parked; there in the headlights was the first one coming into view. It was covered in balloons, wool and leaves from our decorations the night before. A cheer went up. ... The kettle went on, more decorating began and another huge peace symbol to join the one made last night was built from the base perimeter fence poles lying around. May, Jackie and June, our three "arrestables" climbed up on to the machines and the rest of us sat in between them in a circle. ... We sang, took photos, drank tea. The sun rose and we looked so beautiful.

The first worker arrived, sat in his truck, and spoke into his radio mike to his bosses - Mr. C and Mr. C. They phoned the police to come and get us, jumped into their ute and came roaring down to us at high speed. They were very angry. They stormed around the site, ripping off our weaving and barging through lines of womn aggressively. They basically ordered us out of the way because they were going to continue working - so they started the engines. Our singing intensified. I felt a moment of cold fear, reflected on the faces of all the women I saw as I glanced

around trying to decide which direction to go in first. My decision was made for me by one of the bosses getting into the frontend loader - revving, manoeuvring - then heading for our circle, straight towards me, Lisa and Judy.

... I felt a sudden clear determination - "You're not going to intimidate me, mate," so I looked him in the eye and said "I'm not moving." We remained seated holding hands. ... The bucket of the loader came closer and stopped inches from us - then slowly moved forward under us. Sitting cross-legged, I rocked from side to side to avoid having my bottom pinched between the blade and the ground. ... Then suddenly the other boss was hauling Judy away from me out of the loader bucket. I took off after them I chased him around the site insisting that he hear me. When he climbed up on the grader and reached up to June to haul her off, I pointed my finger at him and said, "If you touch that woman, any women here, we'll lay charges of assault against you." He heard me, and began pulling off the weaving from the grader instead. ...

Glancing around the site again I saw that all of us women had split into three groups one with each of our women on the machines. Each woman did what she had to do. We cared for each other. It felt incredible, amazing and good. But no time to bask in the good feelings, I was off, chasing around the site after Messrs. C and C, talking to them, not letting them get away with treating us as anonymous obstacles in the way of their work. I was insisting that they respect us, and that we were doing our work too, telling them that our actions were not personal attacks on them. As they calmed down, listening to them, hearing their feelings and their position I found out heaps, and in the end even the most aggressive one was saying helpful things.

It was bloody hard work. ... It was very scary; but the strength and unity which we had was amazing. ... Jill and I met the police when they arrived and went with them as they made each of the arrests. The police were good. They worked through me and Jill and then treated our women with care. I felt so proud of Jackie, May and June. They had sat up on those machines and watched the turmoil beneath them as C and C charged around and drove machines into us. One had ordered May to get off the front-end loader and when she refused he drove off at high speed with her clinging to the roof. And now here they were getting arrested and looking so strong and beautiful.

Most of us went into town to support Jackie, June and May but I went back to camp. We were all exhausted but at the same time, felt incredibly strong and close. The special feeling which had been building all through the camp as we worked together, building our camp and working on actions, was sealed by our action that morning. The bond of love, trust and support I have with all those wonderful women will be with me for life.

The story is reminiscent of the battlefield stories of men, and the type of emotional bonding

engendered by men's wartime experiences is clearly present among these members of a 'Women's Army'. The magazine reported that "the five arrestees have been remanded until July 1" and asked for contributions to cover legal and transport costs and the probable costs of fines, as "These should not have to be borne entirely by the individuals involved."

Demonstrations do not take place only for the sake of getting the message across to the public and confronting the authorities; they also exist for the benefit of the group itself. Direct action tactics are just as likely - perhaps more likely - to irritate, anger or harden the opposition of elites than convince them of the wrongness of their ways, and the effect of such actions upon the uncommitted is equivocal. Where non-violent direct action protest succeeds magnificently is in fostering a sense of identity and significance, cementing bonds of unity, promoting solidarity and purpose, clarifying and affirming ideology and goals. In short, it is a powerful tool of 'empowerment.' The great difference between traditional armies and the warriors of the peace movement - men and women - is, of course, the use or rejection of violence. Just as soldiers attend institutions for training in the tactics of violent confrontation, so peace people attend workshops for training in the tactics of non-violent confrontation. Virtually all direct action protests contain elements of symbolic protest to a greater or lesser degree, and while the reverse does not hold, there is always the possibility that symbolic protests will become confrontational as a result of actions by authorities or antagonists. Thus all people taking part in peace protests of whatever kind are urged by organizers to attend at least one non-violent training session. The following set of guidelines is typical of those issued to participants:⁷

Nonviolence is a creative, planned, positive and active resistance. All participants will agree to adhere to the following principles as a guide for their actions:

1. Our attitude, as conveyed through words, symbols and actions will be one of openness and respect toward all people we encounter.
2. We will remain nonviolent, verbally and physically.
3. We will not damage any property.
4. We will not bring or use any drugs or alcohol.

⁷ From the manual issued by American Peace Trust organizers to those taking part in the 1988 Mothers' Day demonstration at the U.S. Nevada test site.

5. We will not run.
6. We will act in the spirit of the action scenario consensus reached by the affinity group spokescouncil. In the event of a serious disagreement, we will remove ourselves from the action.
7. If arrested, we will not actively resist.
8. We agree to fully accept the legal consequences of our actions and will not seek to evade these consequences beyond legal recourse.

PLEASE TAKE PART IN A NONVIOLENCE TRAINING IN YOUR COMMUNITY BEFORE COMING TO THE ACTION. CALL THE OFFICE IF YOU NEED HELP ORGANIZING A TRAINING.

Symbolic Protest Actions

Care must be taken with symbolic protests; ideally they should shock but not offend, startle but not frighten, amuse but not be laughable, be subtle but not obscure, have a light touch but not be childish or frivolous. They also demand unceasing imagination and creativity; routinization is the kiss of death. There was no dearth of ideas on the subject of creative actions in the days of the Peace Squadron. George Armstrong wrote in the 1979 pre-*Haddo* newsletter: "Many ideas continue to flood in for both water-borne and land-based protests, and they are too numerous to list here." The dominant symbolism in the warship actions and land demonstrations was the celebration of life, and life against death; colourful peace fleets opposing the blackness of the submarines and the huge greyness of the warships. Many of the death symbols and symbolic actions of the Squadron and its supporters have already been described - the black balloons, the death masks, the death-ship slogans and pictures, the yellow radiation-colour paint splashes, the orange flares creating a symbolic barrier between the ships and the people, the wharfside vigils denoting the spiritual struggle between good and evil.

Symbolic demonstrations are women's specialty. According to Kate Boanas, "The celebration of life-type things have been when the women have organized it. It certainly wasn't a celebration the day the first Peace Squadron went out. It was afterwards; when the women have been involved, and wanted their children to take part in it." Creativity is the breath of life to peace movements, and peace groups spend much time and energy

thinking up symbolic actions, preparing for them and carrying them through. One example of a group engaging in this kind of activity is LIMIT, a women's group which formed out of the 'Wellington Peace Movement' in December 1987. By means of a public education and consciousness-raising campaign, LIMIT aims to reduce military expenditure (or planned expenditure) and increase spending on social services. "We took the word military, took some of its letters away and rearranged the rest - which is symbolic of what we would like to do to the Defence Vote."⁸

In January 1988, LIMIT wrote a submission for the Royal Commission on Social Policy, and in February made a comparison with the housing waiting lists (the National Housing Network estimates are 20,000 homeless and 15,000 on the waiting list of the N.Z. Housing Corporation) and the estimated cost of the Waihopai satellite. Three hundred and sixty-six 12"-18" model houses were constructed and placed on the proposed site. In March, a mock tender offering to build houses instead of the satellite base was hand-delivered to the Director of Government Communications Security Bureau in a ten-foot long envelope opening into the shape of a house "representing where the money could be better spent." In April, the 366 houses were planted in a mini-subdivision on the lawns of Parliament House along with the banner: *We want homes NOT Waihopai spy base* and a display board providing information to passers-by.

In May, LIMIT's campaign against the purchase of four ANZAC Navy frigates (of which more will be said later) began:

...[W]e built a large tanker and 6 large, pink, hand-held fish. These fish were covered with puns and paraded around the tanker ... "The navy are just sharks in military clothing" "Clam up

⁸ LIMIT claims that "there is a strong belief amongst New Zealanders that more money should be spent on the 'social services' in N.Z. and less on the military," and as evidence points to the 1987 poll conducted by the Royal Commission on Social Policy. When people were asked whether they wanted the Government to spend less, more or the same on various Government activities, results showed that 41 percent wanted less defence spending, 21 percent wanted more, and 35 percent wanted the same. For social services - health, education, housing and job training - 3-10 percent wanted less expenditure, 40-65 percent wanted more and 25-40 percent wanted the same. *Peacelink*, September 1988; p.9.

on military mussel" ... "Don't swallow military propaganda hook line and sinker" ... "Don't let the navy skate off your money, complain to your MP." The humorous fish encouraged public discussion. The message on the tanker and leaflets compared the cost of this military money with educational needs.

Other examples of symbolic actions culled from the ten 1988 issues of *Peacelink* are the following:

(April). At the Waihopai Valley site, 160 people gathered [between Feb. 19-21] to protest the building of the satellite base. An 18 metre CND symbol was painted on the ground, the size of the proposed satellite dish. Inside the circle ...

... a eucalyptus tree and marigolds were planted and watered at the centre of the symbol. To illustrate the houses that could be built, LIMIT provided 366 model cardboard houses, so that we could see how the money could be better spent. The entire group participated in the house building.

(July) - Auckland peace groups march down Queen Street carrying the famous 366 houses which could be built by the Housing Corps for the minimum estimate of the cost of Waihoai.

It seems that demonstrations, too, can be recycled.

(October) - From July 13-16 Waihopai women held a vigil on Parliament House lawns, camping and sleeping in the open. On the day when the anti-Waihopai Petition was introduced into Parliament, 13 women, each wearing a white T-shirt with one large letter making up the message 'NO SPY WAIHOPAI,' entered the spectator's gallery to make a silent protest.

... With our T-shirts carefully hidden beneath jackets, we entered parliament *en masse*. The spectator's gallery was quite full, making it difficult to sit together as arranged, so we had to use some deft body language to signal to each other that only 'No Spy' should be displayed. The 'No Spy' women stood up together and opened coats dramatically at the agreed moment, displaying our message successfully and to effect. We then left the gallery quietly.

(December) - A protest at the U.S. Air Force Military Airlifter Command operations at Harewood Airport.

... Inflated condoms (anti-Aids devices for U.S. forces) and anti-nuclear flying saucers float over the eight foot fence. Some singing and chanting. Protestors appear, theatrically carrying 'assault ladders' on their shoulders, and march along the fenceline. The police deploy.

What messages are being conveyed through these symbolic actions? In most, it is that war-preparation is wrong or misguided, and that military-spending robs the people of what they really need and want. In the April example the satellite circle representing suspicion, antagonism and destruction is replaced by the anti-nuclear human circle of life, growth and constructive social action. The October example 'flashes' the message of women power and solidarity against men's war-games, and is probably a deliberate play on the male form of 'flashing'. In the last example, the message seems threefold: the U.S. military brings a deadly disease that must be guarded against, visitors from outer space bring a 'higher' message of anti-nuclearism and the people reclaim the land in a mock-military attack.

Symbolic actions like these may or may not be effective in getting the message across but they are almost certainly effective in ramming the message home and forging bonds between those participating in them. Because the cause is perceived as pre-eminently worthwhile, it legitimates forms of public behaviour which in a different context would be regarded as childish, eccentric or crazy. Groups formed for such purposes are important knowledge/empowerment vehicles, and particularly so for women. Some of the LIMIT women, for instance, said:

- Being in a women's group is very interesting. The public respond because they don't expect ordinary women to be involved in military issues.

- .. Military expenditure is a big subject, but when it's broken down into smaller parts they can be easily understood. It's really great to take the mystery out of military expenditure and equipment.

- There is so little information on military expenditures available. The more I find out the more horrified I have become and the more I want to do something about it.

- It's important to educate people who don't know what their money is being spent on. It's an enjoyable and positive experience being part of LIMIT.

- There is a lot going on that the ordinary New Zealander has no idea about, and a lot of

money is being spent on defence and security. It's a much bigger issue than I realised. The secret side of military spending should be opened up. It's the only way a public debate can arise.

- The more information I have discovered on military methods and spending, the more disgusted I have become. Working for years in a classroom with children who need so much has made me aware of the unfairness of military spending. LIMIT has helped me to focus my energies and anger and take my concerns to the public (Coulton and Easton, 1988:11-12).

Peace Education and Pressure Politics

Consciousness-raising activities and campaigns like those described above aim to educate the public, but the peace movement also uses more orthodox methods in attempting to instill its values and to bring about radical social and political change. The N.Z. Foundation for Peace Studies came into being in 1975 as a result of the efforts of a small group of people to ... "promote, in the broadest sense and as a matter of urgency, a climate of peace in New Zealand, together with a public comprehension and awareness of the mutual peaceful interdependence of all countries and all peoples." One of its major tasks was to "work for the peaceful resolution of conflict at all levels: interpersonal, governmental and international." New Zealand officially committed itself to peace education when it adopted the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Principle 10: "The Child shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace, and universal brotherhood") and at the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 joined other member states in undertaking... "To take steps to develop programmes of ... peace studies at all levels." (Paragraph 106, Final Document).

Implementation of this commitment had to wait until November, 1984, when then Minister of Education Russell Marshall called a three day conference for representatives from approximately 30 different interest groups to discuss the introduction of Peace Studies into New Zealand schools at every level. The result was a public review which began in 1985 and attracted 30,000 public submissions, the highest degree of political participation in New Zealand history. To some critical observers, it was an indication that the task of educational reform was long overdue. There now exists in New Zealand a (pre-service and in-service) programme for Teacher Effectiveness Training in peace education, a core of teacher support and practice, an official publication based on the public review called

"Tomorrow's Schools" and a Draft Curriculum containing broad guidelines for the implementation of peace education in all schools at every level.

During the period of the review, a group known as STOP (Students and Teachers Organizing for Peace) came into being and established branches in several cities. Its members supported the Education Minister's statement at the initial Education Conference that peace studies, rather than being treated as a 'subject' "should be infused throughout the curriculum, indeed throughout the whole education system."⁹ In the February 1986 issue of *Peacelink*, peace activist and educator Jim Chapple who had been involved in all the peace education planning conferences noted that "public statements announcing these gatherings produced predictable and generally uninformed negative responses from the usual quarters." In 1988, he wrote that "[a] final version of the Guidelines for Peace Studies will be produced before the time for writing of [individual school] Charters¹⁰ arrives. It is also planned to print a brochure as a public education and information source about peace studies. Unfortunately the PM [who took over from Russell Marshall as Education Minister] is holding back on this one for political reasons."¹¹

As this suggests, peace education everywhere is a political hot potato. It tends to be regarded by critics as at best a waste of time and resources and at worst as ideological brain-washing. The aim of diffusing it throughout the curriculum and the ignoring or

⁹ *Peacelink*, July 1985; p. 17.

¹⁰ The Picot Committee set up after the Educational Review was charged by the Prime Minister with investigating the administrative and structural side of education. Their report recommends that every school have its own, community-based governing body. Each school board will be provided with a set of National Guidelines and in conjunction with an array of advisory and support services, each will write its own Charter. This will be a statement of what will be taught in that school, and how the curriculum content will be translated into the teaching process. Jim Chapple writes: "A preview of the National Guidelines clearly shows that the peace studies initiatives, on which so many of us have spent heaps of time and energy, are firmly in place within that Guidelines document. ... [The compilers of the Guidelines], using the Review submissions, the Roper Report on Violence and the Discussion Document on Peace Studies of 1987, have done an excellent job of infusing the peace studies perspectives into the plans for change and progress." *Peacelink*, July 1988; p. 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

devaluing of the peace through strength position, which say the critics, is the stance of the vast majority of people in Western democracies, is said to be clear evidence of leftist subversion. Peace education in schools may also be opposed on the grounds that it will produce a nation of 'wimps' unable and unprepared to defend their country against attack by societies that have not been exposed to this pernicious form of indoctrination. Supporters of peace education, on the other hand, argue that non-violent conflict resolution is anything but 'wimpish', and furthermore is essential for human survival. Schools are already political institutions with biases and indoctrinating functions, and introducing alternatives to the dominant discourse is only one small step in the direction of redressing a vast imbalance.

As to the contentious question of diffusion, how you teach is said to be more important than what you teach. In the words of one N.Z. teacher, "Authoritarian teaching removes children's personal power and reduces their ability to change things for the better." She continues: "The whole environment of the school, its philosophy, the way it functions, and especially how the class teacher's disciplinary methods relate to children will determine how successfully peace studies' principles can be taught. Do as I do, not as I say is a good approach." Given such statements, it is hardly surprising that the issue of peace education is emotive or that it encounters strong resistance, for not only might its content run counter to parental or patriotic values but, if seriously pursued, it has the potential for fostering radical changes in social relations - not just in the education system, but in political and social systems as well.

Peace studies at the tertiary level tends to attract a different kind of criticism. Brain-washing, wimpishness and the debate over generalization vs. specialization are not so much at issue as the accusation that such courses are of the 'Mickey Mouse' variety, and have no place in academia. (If they include the word 'war' or drop the word 'peace' they are much more likely to be regarded as serious and respectable). In universities and colleges, peace studies courses often operate on so-called 'sweat equity'; that is, in addition to their official teaching loads, some faculty members voluntarily provide such courses (which are then often criticised for their lack of numbers and resources). A further tension

can occur over teaching methods. Some instructors - particularly if they come from outside the institution - do attempt to introduce non-traditional or non-authoritarian styles of teaching and evaluation into the lecture room setting, but academically-minded colleagues often reject these practices on the grounds that it reinforces the image of peace studies as a 'soft' subject and makes official acceptance of the program less likely.

Notwithstanding these problems, peace education in New Zealand received the third largest share of the \$13 million compensation money paid by France for the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing of July 1985. In 1988, the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET) had \$1,500,000 for allocation to groups, with 10 percent specifically going to small projects and another 10 percent to Maori applicants ... "to insure both the increasing input of Maori people to the disarmament process and the support of small, but not insignificant, projects."¹² The September 1988 meeting of PACDAC (Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control) discussed peace education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and met with the Curriculum Review Officer of the Education Department. The report of this meeting in *Peacelink* states: "Conclusions were positive; peace education, while not exactly attracting front page headlines, is alive and well in a variety of guises throughout the nation's schools."¹³ This, at the very least, is more than can be said of most countries in the nuclear age.

Social violence is perceived as a major problem in New Zealand, and an important theme of peace education is non-violent conflict resolution in personal, domestic and social life (although corporal punishment continues to be permitted in N.Z. schools). Most issues of *Peacelink* contain articles or information on the subject, and a *Manual on Nonviolence and Children* with "suggestions for teaching peace to children in the home" has been prepared by Play for Life, a Wellington-based organization opposed to war toys and violence on children's television. Workshops have been organized for men seeking assistance in controlling anger and violent behaviour, and both men and women's groups have launched anti-rape campaigns. Whether these and similar initiatives by peace groups

¹² *Peacelink*, October, 1988; p.19.

¹³ *Ibid.*; p. 23.

will have an impact upon the degree of violence in New Zealand society remains to be seen.

Using the Political Processes

Up until the mid-70's in New Zealand, anti-nuclear/anti-war groups like CND, WILPF and the Christian Pacifist Society mostly engaged in orthodox forms of pressure politics - lobbying, petitioning, leafletting, door-knocking, letter-writing, marches and rallies: The Peace Squadron added direct action and symbolic protests to these activities, and the influx of women into the peace movement in the early 1980's shifted the emphasis onto symbolic actions. Nevertheless, pressure politics continues to play a large role in peace movement practices - although often with a new twist. As Kate Boanas says, "We use political processes all the time, but we try to influence them in unusual ways." The 'Votes for Peace' and the 'N.Z. Nuclear Free Zone' campaigns are examples of novel attempts to influence political elites, and both were significant vehicles for the politicization - or 'empowerment' as the peace groups would say - of hitherto apolitical women. The type of action did not require unorthodox or risky behaviour, the goals were limited and clearly defined, achievement was measureable, cumulative and - especially in the case of the NFNZ campaign - tended to create a positive feedback loop: that is, the more the lobbyists succeeded, the more likely they were to continue to do so.

At the time of the 1984 election, 68 percent of New Zealanders were living in local nuclear-free zones; by the 1987 election the figure was 72 percent. New Zealand now has more local nuclear free zones than any other country, and ingenuity combined with hard work to achieve this end. Kate Boanas says of the NFZ campaign:

It was really George [Armstrong] and other ministers in Auckland who first got the idea of declaring places nuclear-free. So they got these red, black and white ['no nukes'] stickers at our first National Conference - at the end of 1981, beginning of 1982. We started a group up here [in Christchurch], and we had a really good group going. We heard about the snap election [of 1984], and we thought that we would try Riccarton, because it was part of the Singleton electorate, and we knew that Waitemari Council was just too big a task to take on in the time. But they refused. ...

So I did quite a lot of thinking. This idea came to me then that if we could plaster Riccarton with stickers, and register voters who supported the zone it would be a way of influencing the Council. So we started door-knocking to find out who was willing to help, and asked people to register and to put up a sticker *and* to allow us to put their house on a big map which we had of this area. We'd been able to get maps from a Drainage Board employee who was on the [NFZ] Committee, and we took the maps to every public political party meeting where we were given permission, and asked every candidate to declare their home nuclear-free. And every party for the election allowed us to do this. ... It was interesting that the New Zealand party had the most radical defence policy at the time, and we challenged the candidate: 'You call yourselves the Peace Party, and we would like you to put this sticker on your house in Singleton.' We warned him that we were going to send the media around to photograph the sticker on the gate, and we made a press release about it. ...

Every time someone would accept a sticker we would colour the appropriate square on the map green. Sometimes a woman would say, "I'd like to put it up, but I know my husband will object." So we would say, "Well, how about sticking it on the kitchen window?." And if they took it, we'd colour in half the square. We even had one man say he would like to put it up but his wife wouldn't let him, so we suggested he stick it in the garage [laughs]. And we ended up with about three-quarters of the map green ...

That month before the snap election was an incredible time of activity. The result of that was over 2,000 voters on the register, and 66 percent of the houses we visited had taken nuclear-free stickers. So we went back to the Council with these facts and the map, but again the answer was 'No'. ... On the grounds that it was just a symbolic gesture, that the U.N. was working on disarmament, local councils shouldn't get involved. ... They were quite threatened by those who went, even though we just went with the facts. But we began showing up at public meetings, and we singled out individual councillors who were sympathetic and we told them they'd better push for it because look at these figures ... and eventually they had to give in.

Declaring one's home, workplace, church or whatever a nuclear-free zone is easy in a country in which no nuclear weapons are stored or manufactured; easy to do, easy to ask others to do. It seems probable that people with no strong feelings about the matter would

accept the stickers or declare themselves in favour of the idea simply to be polite, to end the interruption or because they thought it made no difference one way or another. Such declarations are, as the Riccarton councillors said, merely "symbolic gestures;" neither private citizen nor public official has power to enforce them unless the latter happens to be a part of the country's top political decision-making body. Nevertheless, if enough nuclear-free zones are declared, the symbolic act becomes a political weapon, and this is what happened in New Zealand. Reluctant local and regional officials were told that if they did not go with (what seemed to be) the flow they would lose their incumbency - and they often did. The right-wing N.Z. Party was the first to declare an official nuclear-free policy in the 1984 campaign, and as all political parties save National did likewise it seems that the majority of the candidates were convinced by the campaign's 'facts and figures'.

In 1988, David Lange received an award for "Distinguished Peace Leadership" from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in Santa Barbara, California. In his speech of acceptance he said: "...anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand is part of the mainstream rather than some fringe political movement. That mainstream conviction, of course, is a feeling that a rational government cannot ignore." Nicky Hagar of PMA said of the nuclear-free zone campaign:

One of the ways the peace movement grew - which I had nothing to do with, in fact, I'd opposed it; I didn't think it would work so well - was the idea of small nuclear-free zones in towns. And I thought it was just silly. *I was a hundred percent wrong!* It was *so* influential. Suddenly, there was an active way to be working in every small town, rather than sitting home watching TV.

Larry Ross, founder of the N.Z. Nuclear Free Zone Committee, said in 1987: "About 8 years ago I was told that we should first of all get New Zealand declared nuclear-free, then the Pacific, then the whole world. My attitude was ... Well, they're great aims, and there's no harm in it, so I didn't realize that 8 years later we'd be on the edge of that happening in this country." He added that when visiting peace groups abroad ...

I challenge them to have a local nuclear-free contest; everyone likes a competitive

challenge [an assertion which some of his peace movement peers would challenge]: "Here is little New Zealand in the lead in nuclear-free zone declarations." It means looking at things in a new way; a 'peace race', not an 'arms race'.

Peace Movement Actions and Public Attitudes

The March, 1985 edition of *Peacelink* published the results of an Auckland University study by two political scientists and two sociologists based on a random sample of 300 Aucklanders in September, 1984 - two months after the Labour Government took office (Pringle and O'Shannessey, 1985). Attitudes to various forms of peace activism were one aspect of the investigation, and the results were as follows:

ATTITUDES TO ACTIVITIES OF PEOPLE SUPPORTING PEACE

	Approve	Neutral	Disapprove
	%	%	%
Signing petitions	79	9	12
Joining peace groups	74	11	15
Lobbying for local NFZ's	66	9	25
Taking part in a march	63	12	25
Letters to media, politicians	82	8	10
Education about nuclear issues	93	2	5
Picketing ships or embassies	35	8	57
Harbour protests	28	9	63

It seems that the more orthodox or non-confrontational the activity, the higher the rate of approval and *vice versa*. The 28 percent of respondents who say they support harbour protests is probably a fair indicator of the degree of firm support for the peace movement - and perhaps could be extrapolated from Auckland to the country as a whole. As this was the first and (to my knowledge) only such survey, there is no way of discovering whether attitudes toward direct action protests changed from the time the Peace Squadron actions began in 1976, or whether there has been any significant change in general attitudes since 1984.

CHAPTER 12

PROBLEMS AND PROBLEMATICS

We women are, of course, well used to being talked over, interrupted, ignored, treated as if we are ignorant and foolish and subjected to the removal of our passionate concerns by intellectual and analytical devices at the hands of men. But it is very hard to take this sort of treatment from men who profess to be peace activists.

- Jane Severn (N.Z. Catholic Commission for Justice and Development)

Some of the problems of the global peace movement have already been noted as, for instance, the magnitude of the task, the miniscule and unpredictable financial resources, volunteer burn-out as a result of too many demands on too few people for too few visible successes and dependence on an often hostile or indifferent media. The New Zealand peace movement has all of these problems - although perhaps to a lesser extent than elsewhere - as well as some which are peculiarly its own - such as the somewhat uneasy relationship between the mainly Pakeha peace movement and the mainly indigeneous Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC). What follows is a listing in no particular order of importance of some (by no means all) of what I perceive to be the major problems, conflicts, tensions and dilemmas confronting peace movements in general and New Zealand's core activists in particular, along with some of their solutions or attempted resolutions.

External Problems

The Problem of 'the Collective Good'

In his seminal work, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1968), Mancur Olsen brought to the forefront of academic attention a problem faced by many contemporary social movements: why would a reasonable individual choose to support a cause which benefits everyone (or everyone within a large category) equally, whether or not they

contribute to its success or maintenance. Why, for instance, become a financial supporter of American Public Radio? The peace, environmental and feminist movements all face this problem of recruitment in the face of the 'collective good' but so, too, do the institutions of the military within democratic societies. The state strives to overcome the problem in the first instance through moral persuasion and selective rewards to the volunteers, the usual methods for combating the problem, but if appeals to patriotism and the enticements of job-training, special privileges, comradeship, glamour, prestige, excitement, travel, early retirement and so forth prove insufficient to turn citizens into soldiers or if the need is perceived as urgent, the problem is simply removed by shifting from voluntary recruitment to conscription.

No such option is available to the peace movement. With the sparsest of resources it must depend on moral persuasion and mainly psychological rewards in recruiting citizens to its ranks. Moreover, the problem faced by all social movements of how to turn apathy or indifference into support and supporters into activists is exacerbated in the case of the peace/anti-nuclear movement, for people must be persuaded to think about something which is extremely *unpleasant* to think about,⁸⁹ and about which they feel they can do little anyway. One way of encouraging participation is to make the activities both enjoyable and affirming. While peaceful demonstrations and "putting one's body on the line" are virtually the only weapons available for non-violent protest this is not the sole reason for the peace movement's great emphasis on symbolic demonstrations. Anne MacFarlane of Waiheke Island said: "I've been effective in peace actions since I moved to the island four years ago because of the peace group here. The group has constantly done creative, innovative, exciting things to keep the peace issue before people." Larry Ross designs peace badges, posters and stickers and produces a widely-circulated monthly newsletter. He says of these and other activities:

There's lots of room for creativity in this. People don't realize what opportunities they have to use their creative talents in peace-making, in getting the message across. My background in advertising, marketing and as a would-be inventor means that I'm continually thinking up new ideas I can use to achieve the goals. ... I can do a lot of things well. Peace-making gives me lots of outlets -

speech-making, artistic talents, use of inventive capabilities

In a sense, too, the peace movement can, like the military, provide 'job training' - or at the very least, educate about issues considered important. Anne MacFarlane took part in the peace march across the United States in 1986, and has produced a book about the experience called *Feet Across America*. She said of the march, "It was exciting, exhausting. I developed new skills. I gained a lot of experience in speaking and writing. Also a lot of knowledge. If nothing else, it did turn out a lot more effective people when they went back to their own peace groups." The statements of the women in LIMIT also indicate satisfaction with achieving an understanding of the esoteric subject of military spending. Extensive and intensive involvement in the peace movement, however, can offer a great deal more than simply gaining or improving skills, knowledge or competence; peace activism can expand social horizons, facilitate entry into public life and lead to national and sometimes international recognition or acclaim.

This is particularly the case for women, and Kate Boanas is a dramatic example of the life-changing effects of politicization through peace work. She says that at the time of her marriage in the mid-seventies she knew and cared little about politics and was not at all sure that she approved of John's anti-nuclear activism. Her main role in the Peace Squadron was "providing tea and sandwiches for the mostly male crews" and "taking the abusive phone calls at St. John's" after the actions. Very soon, however, she was committed to and deeply involved in the peace movement. She said in 1987:

Ten years ago I knew *no* politicians. Within 2 years of local activism in peace work I knew at least 4 of the local M.P.s well enough to chat to if I bumped into them on planes, etc. Now after 12 years of this work I know at least 12 around the country. They are accessible to me and others, they are prepared to listen, they know our names and backgrounds, and we are only a phone-call away for prompt action.¹

By the end of the 1980's, Kate was co-teaching a peace course at Canterbury University in Christchurch, had visited China with the N.Z. peace delegation, was one of

¹ Private correspondence.

the two NGO (Non Government Organizations) representatives in the New Zealand delegation to the 1988 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in New York, is a member of PACDAC and Co-chair of the Foreign Affairs and Security Consultative Committee, had addressed the 1989 Labour Party conference in this capacity, helped to produce a book on Australian militarism and had her views on this subject broadcast throughout Australia on the national radio network. The Boanas household hosts peace people from around the world and Kate is known internationally as one of the most prominent members of the N.Z. peace movement.

Another incentive for joining a peace group - particularly for lonely people or newcomers to a district - is that it is a ready-made community in which, at least philosophically, every individual is welcome and everyone's contribution is regarded as valuable. Peace work can be intrinsically interesting, but it is also perceived as satisfying and worthy. All the members of the N.Z. peace movement whom I interviewed appeared to find their involvement in it rewarding, if time-consuming, and for some it was absorbing. One houseworker-mother told me, "I can't wait to get everyone off in the mornings so that I can get on with my peace work." An older man said as he prepared his group's newsletter for posting, "For the first time in my life I feel I'm doing something worthwhile. I'm only sorry that I've had to wait seventy-five years to do it." For the core activists of the movement, however, it is clear that peace work is much more than an interesting, worthwhile or rewarding aspect of their lives; rather, it is an all-encompassing commitment into which other activities and commitments must be fitted, often with a good deal of tension.

It has been said that people demonstrate when they don't know what else to do and peace activism can be a way of relieving fear, anxiety or tension. It can also *be* a source of stress, however. Les Church, for instance, talked of feeling sick before the *Long Beach* action and said, "None of this comes easily to me." In fact, peace activism is just as likely, perhaps more likely, to engender a sense of powerlessness, distress, disappointment, depression, discouragement or despair than to relieve psychological stress, although, again, this is less the case in New Zealand. Anne MacFarlane took part in a Nevada test

site protest during the peace march and said of this experience:

There were three consecutive days of protest. They let the bomb off on the third day. It was a tragic, awful moment. We tried to sing rousing peace songs, but I couldn't. I was just totally choked. If I'd been able to make any sound it would have just been a scream or something. Yet this was very remote; nobody was killed because it went off. But we thought we would be able to stop it happening, and they let it off. There was great sadness on that occasion.

Thus while the rewards of being an active member of the peace movement can help counteract the problem of the collective good, it seems that the moral imperative to take this kind of action is the stronger, and in many cases, the sufficient motivation.

The Problem of 'the Collective Bad'

The problem of the collective good is based on the hypothesis that the greater the number of people who benefit from some happening whether or not they help to bring it about, the harder the task of mobilization. The theory of the collective bad is just the opposite: the greater the number of people affected by some malignant happening, the easier the task of mobilization. Pacifism as a world movement began when substantial numbers of ordinary citizens began to be killed along with the soldiers (although peasants and poor women had always suffered from marauding armies) and the age of the absolute weapon saw the birth of the global peace/anti-nuclear movement. The task of mobilization in the face of the collective bad poses two kinds of problems. One is that people must be convinced that they or those they care about *will* be affected; the other is that they must believe that it is possible to avert the happening through taking some action. The nuclear winter scenario gave a boost to peace movements everywhere, and was particularly important in the remote South Pacific. No longer could the inhabitants of the southern hemisphere take comfort from the fact that if a nuclear war occurred it would most likely have a catastrophic effect only in the northern hemisphere. Now there truly would be no escaping the consequences of a nuclear holocaust, or so it appeared in the early 1980's.

Fear of communism has been the prime motivator for the policies of nuclear

deterrence and superior war-fighting capability, while fear of a nuclear holocaust is the prime motivator for the peace movement. Nuclear war is one aspect of that fear; another is the fear of a nuclear accident or uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The threat of a nuclear war is amorphous and remote from everyday life and most people have learned to live with it. By contrast, the threat of radioactive contamination or accident is local and salient, and officials responsible for the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear power must convince the public that the risk is small to negligible. The more they succeed, the harder the task for the peace movement. Before each warship visit and before the 1984 election in New Zealand, the National Party Government attempted to assure the population that visits by nuclear warships posed no danger to the environment and did not make the country a nuclear target. Although many peace activists were more concerned about New Zealand's involvement in a nuclear alliance than in the risks of a radiation-related accident, environmental concern offered a way of engendering public support in a small island country whose economy is heavily dependent on primary production and tourism. Les Church said:

I think an important thing in the early days was that two important movements came together. There was the environmental concern and concern about land-based reactors, and then there was the world peace movement. And the visits of nuclear armed and powered warships to New Zealand in the late 1970's enabled those two concerns to be brought together.² Repeatedly, people have tried to force them apart and say, "No, nuclear weapons are a different matter from nuclear reactors. Simply having nuclear-power is not a threat in the same sense that nuclear weapons are."

It was really important in the early days to hold the two groups together; to keep them as one. I haven't fully understood the environmental issue in any detail - I come to it from a peace movement orientation. I can remember George [Armstrong] saying at the start: "And we're not going to let anybody drive a wedge between them." So it was a pragmatic thing, a tactical thing.

The 1980 polls in New Zealand have consistently shown the public to be more

² I would add feminism to this confluence of social movements in New Zealand during the 1970's.

opposed to nuclear-armed than to nuclear-powered ships. The September 1984 opinion poll indicated that 42 percent of New Zealanders supported nuclear-powered ship visits and 51 percent opposed them, while 23 percent supported visits by nuclear-armed ships and 72 percent opposed them. It was probably this split in attitude which prompted David Lange while Opposition Leader in 1983 to suggest that Labour Party policy might separate out the two issues, perhaps the first attempt to resolve or ameliorate the looming port-call problem with the superpower ally. The telephone trees of the peace movement sprang to life, and the next day thousands of telegrams arrived at Parliament House urging the Party *not* to change its policy. The danger for the peace movement of having "a wedge" driven between the two issues passed when David Lange concluded that as all nuclear-powered vessels were also nuclear-capable there was no point in pursuing the matter further.

The difference in New Zealanders' attitudes to the two kinds of nuclear vessels was clearly revealed in the July 1986 Defence Review Report, the latest existing poll. It showed that 3 percent of respondents favoured banning only nuclear-powered ships, 28 percent favoured banning only nuclear-armed ships, 38 percent would ban both, and 28 percent would ban neither. Those in favour of banning both types of vessels gave as their major reasons ... "the possibility of accidents; because such vessels pose an unwarranted danger to New Zealanders; because they may make New Zealand a nuclear target in the event of war." Hence the importance for the peace movement of focusing upon the environmental-accident aspect of port calls, even though it enabled opponents to shift the debate to the level of safety rather than of morality or national interest.

George Goddard said of the nuclear-armed vs nuclear-powered controversy:

Nuclear-powered ships was a somewhat more contentious issue amongst maritime workers because our whole livelihood, our bread and butter, derives from handling ships and we were told that nuclear power was the in-thing. It was like sliced bread - good for everybody. And we'd accept that, provided it can be demonstrated that they're reasonably safe. All the evidence is that nuclear-powered ships are about as safe as a dose of the pox.

The German nuclear-powered ship failed on its first trip and it's being converted. The American ship, the *Savannah*, packed up as well, and the Jap ship that was going to carry cargo all round the world for nothing and a Merry Christmas to all, it packed up as well. And fundamentally, nuclear-power will only be used in vessels where expense is of no consequence at all - in military installations when under the guise of patriotism the profit and loss account can run any deviation it likes - except for the builders. It's like the Second Coming; nobody's actually witnessed it yet, although many think it might well occur.

The Problem of Maintaining Support

One problem that the 'peace through strength' and the 'peace through reconciliation' schools have in common is that the more their goals are achieved, the more difficult it becomes to attract or maintain public support. In times of détente or improved relations with the Soviet Union the former worry that force strength and the bargaining chips accruing from technological development - in their view the reason for the improved situation - will be eroded by cuts in military spending, while the latter believe that the improved situation is due to grassroots pressure on governments and worry that this will weaken as the immediate danger fades. The New Zealand peace movement is in the position of having achieved two of its major goals (no nuclear ships and no U.S. alliance) but as this means little in the global context of nuclearism, its key activists are struggling with the problem of keeping anti-nuclear public sentiment strong through opposing much less agreed upon foci of contention such as the use of 'Operation Deep Freeze' at Harewood airport by U.S. military planes *en route* to Australia, the possible role of the Black Birch observatory in missile guidance systems, the establishment of the Waihopai satellite intelligence base, the military alliance with Australia and the indigenous people's struggle for a nuclear-free and independent Pacific.

Another problem peace groups face in attracting and maintaining support is that the need to avoid routinization requires evermore imaginative and creative types of protest action. While the potential for creativity symbolic demonstrations offer is an important part of the selective rewards of membership, they must always to some degree be counter-cultural - otherwise they would not *be* demonstrations - and this can deter the more conventionally-minded citizens from wishing to be associated with the actions or the

demonstrators. The equally necessary requirement of making the activities enjoyable enough to attract participants and vital or loud enough to attract attention can also lead observers to conclude that the demonstrators are simply having a good time and amusing themselves. As one American critic of the peace movement told me, "Some people like golf, some people like going to the movies; some people like demonstrating. The peace movement is just having fun."

Asked about this type of criticism, Kate Boanas replied:

There are people who don't understand what the peace movement is all about. There are people who think we're just having fun. But I think that's changed in this country. We think the war-mongers have just been having fun, and they've been off playing their war-games. We don't want them playing with our lives. We're interested in survival. That's the message that's come across in this society. I don't know what it's like in other countries. The celebration of life-type things have been when the women have organized it. It certainly wasn't a celebration the day the first Peace Squadron went out. It was afterwards - when the women have been involved, and wanted their children to take part in it.

If you just look at what we're on about - nuclear weapons and all that - most people will just go away and live with their despair and not do anything about it. What I want to do is to empower people to act on their feelings. By doing some fun things together, you get the feeling that you can do something. You're part of a group.

Internal Conflicts and Tensions

Consensus Decision-making

The N.Z. peace movement like peace movements everywhere self-consciously strives to put its values into practice. This does not mean that it always succeeds, but (unlike the Japanese peace movement) neither does it air its dirty linen in public. Here and there in the peace movement literature, however, are indicators that not all is sweetness and light. Peace people are human too. In the September, 1986 issue of *Peacelink*, for instance, an article describing the history of the National Peace Workshops states:

It is heartening that the whole Workshop atmosphere of support and cooperation has progressively replaced the antagonism of the early years. That is not to say that there are not large areas of disagreement, but the emphasis on consensus decision-making has meant that we have learned to deal with these differences constructively. Long may it continue! (Hennessey, 1986:4-5).

While consensus decision-making is one of the peace movement's major values it is also a major source of contention. In 1982, one year after the formation of Peace Movement Aotearoa, a commentator noting the achievements of the organization said, "We have weathered suspicion of, and unfamiliarity with, consensus."³ Nevertheless, when amendments to the Constitution were called for in 1983, George Armstrong requested that in Clause 7 (d) "...after the word consensus be added the words or ... by a two-thirds majority of those present and choosing to vote." He went on to state: "I personally like consensus decision-making. It is a profound Quaker tradition. It is at the heart of the 'Non-violent Action' tradition. But PMNZ has to be 'wider' than these traditions. Maybe **one day** PMNZ could adopt consensus as a constitutional base, but it has been, I believe, premature and divisive so far."⁴

Commenting generally on his proposals, Goerge Armstrong wrote: "I appreciate that this brief note conceals a host of **very** controversial issues. I would not dream of taking this initiative unless I was (as I am) very seriously concerned about the well-being of the 'nation-wide' Peace networking 1984 operations. ... Despite difficult internal Peace Movement controversy, I believe we have great possibilities for influencing our country's directions over the coming months - **if we hang together, in as wide a network** as humanly possible." All the proposed amendments, however, were rejected. The October 1983 Annual General Meeting of PMNZ decided to replace the ordinary meetings of the organization with a 'working group' or 'representative committee', and expressed the hope that "this structure will lead to more continuity in decision-making. ... It was also agreed that these meetings be open and that decisions would be arrived at by consensus rather than voting."⁵

³ Editorial, *Peacelink*, April 1982.

⁴ *Peacelink*, September 1983; p.3.

Carol Gilligan argues in her book, *A Different Voice* (1982), that men tend to be goal-oriented while women tend to be relationship-oriented. While this seems a somewhat stereotypic view of male-female psychology and behaviour, the early dispute over the pragmatics of consensual decision-making does appear to split along gender lines. The women had their way. A 1984 *Peacelink* article reviewing the history of PMA states: "[A]fter three years of existence PMA has earned our trust. It has always used consensus decision-making which, whilst meaning that its evolution has been slow and unwieldy at times, has ensured that the organization is answerable to us all." A paper prepared by six women for the 1986 U.N. University conference on Pacific issues held in Wellington reports:

Already the peace movement has adapted and changed its structures largely as a result of the impact of the women's movement. Peace Movement Aotearoa, for example, holds annual workshops based on non-hierarchical, participatory, cooperative organisation. Shared, consensus decision-making with an emphasis on networking and encouraging action, is the accepted process for most peace groups in this country.⁶

The Tension of Charisma

While most social movements yearn for a Martin Luther King to lead them the opposite is true for the N.Z. peace movement, and to a large extent for peace movements everywhere. Like consensual decision-making, non-authoritarianism and egalitarian relations are major values of the peace movement, and the 1983 editorial reviewing the progress of Peace Movement Aotearoa/N.Z. declared triumphantly, "We have no leader." Nevertheless, it is also the case, to quote Les Clements of the Foundation for Peace Studies, that "peace movements always rely a good deal on individual personalities" and George Armstrong and Helen Caldicott clearly filled an important role in the early years of mobilization. Then, too, the media look for a leader to interview and if one cannot be found precious opportunities for spreading counter-knowledge and counter-truth are lost.

⁵ *Peacelink*, February 1984; p.14.

⁶ The paper was prepared by Jocelyn Armstrong, Kate Boanas, Margie Lovell-Smith, Marion Lyftogt, Pat McCarthy and Jane Severn.

The tension was present from the beginning, and has been mainly resolved by designating certain people as spokespersons. Nevertheless, there is a thin line between the two roles, and George Armstrong indicated his sensitivity to this fact when he said of his role as spokesperson for the Squadron, "I kept putting it back to them. I didn't want to assume the role of filling it." Kate Boanas highlights both the problem and the values of the peace movement when she said in 1987 of a visiting peace activist:

At one point in the weekend she yelled at me to shut up and accept that I was *the "LEADER"* of the peace movement!!! [in New Zealand]. I still cannot accept her position that we have to have a 'leader.' She found my position unusual - that I acknowledged the jobs that other women did as support for my work were equally important for the survival of the movement as my speaking, writing and initiating. I claim to have had a role in the movement for change, but I will not denigrate the incredibly important work of people like Jocelyn, George, Owen, Larry, Nicky, Elaine, Maire, Elsie, Muriel and so on. We have been partners in this together. I feel she laid too much importance on the ego and the role of the individual, instead of the power of the collective actions.⁷

Sexism and Racism

The feminist theme of male oppression - often described as white male oppression - is strong in the peace movement, and women and indigeneous people frequently see themselves as being in the same boat. A Maori woman activist articulates the sentiments of many Pakeha women when she wrote in 1984:

... The first oppression occurs between men and women. From this stems all other forms of exploitation: racism, capitalism, imperialism. Look at the world's history and today's dominant cultures - all controlled by men. All of us are concerned with the thoughts and prejudices of those powerful old white men ruling Russia and America. The military is one institution where men control and women accept. Women never win wars. We lose those we love, we are raped, we are prostituted (Browne, 1984:13).

Given these sentiments, it is not surprising that the issue of sexism and the

⁷ Private correspondence; September 22, 1987.

perceived undervaluation of women is a major source of tension within the movement, and has led to the 'women only' syndrome of some peace groups. As the writer of the above article goes on to say, "[Women] are the domestic servants and the cheap labour of the Movement, when we constantly collate the articles but don't write them, when we order the megaphones but don't speak through them." The U.N. University conference paper quoted above states:

... If you look at the real workings of the Peace Movement in this country, what will you find. Go into any office or any peace group ... look behind the typewriters, the phones, the sustaining cups of tea, the endless task of contacting volunteers, of making displays, of fundraising, staffing stalls, writing letters, running creches, keeping lists and talking to people in ways that do not alienate but empower them within the context of their own lives and concerns. Who are the people doing all this, making the peacework a real movement in our society? Most of us are women, and many of us are unseen and unheard.

Commenting on a full-page feature article "Inside the Peace Movement" which appeared in a 1986 issue of a New Zealand Sunday newspaper⁸ a woman activist said:

The article implies that men did it all. One woman was photographed and given a brief mention halfway through the article. A couple of other women were named; the rest of us, with all our herstory and commitment, were lumped together in the phrase 'and others.' We have been in the back for a long time, and women are starting to get fed up with it. We want to have our story told. We don't bother about no recognition, except that we do get sad when we're not asked for our opinion.

We don't get time to write. How can I type with children on my knee? So often the tasks we do are those like collating which we can do with children helping - making banners, practical things. Men, who are still organizing, will not invite women to chair meetings. I got very angry about that a few years back. I said I was not coming to any more meetings where there was a line-up of five men. Men won't share the limelight. They won't say "Please go and interview _____ whose story is important." Though they're beginning to hear the message more.

_____ came here recently because I had a peace researcher here, and we did a

⁸ Roger Foley, *N. Z. Times*, March 2, 1986, p.11.

peace release together. Then we came back here. I was doing the ironing, a great big pile of shirts, while they were talk, talk, talk. And we were talking about women's issues, and ___ looked at me and said, "But ___, be honest with me. Have I *ever* been sexist? I nearly shot the iron off the end of the board at him and said, "Take over mate!" But I said, "Do you want an honest answer?" He said, "Yes." So I said, "Right. You'll get it." And I let him have it. In a very caring way I told him about how it had hurt for a very long time.

So next week he rang me and said he had a lovely photo of me in the Square with my daughter, and he was going to use it in the next newsletter because he thought I should be given credit for all I do. And he has improved a lot. There is hope. But we always expect to have it happen yesterday. They're beginning to change. On the whole most men in the peace movement are very careful about equal participation. We wouldn't survive without them, or they us. I'm really grateful for what all these men are doing. We just want to have an equal voice.

George Armstrong said of the intertwined issues of racism and male chauvinism:

It's a difficult problem for us. Even our peace movement activity is kind of racist. It's been programmed into us - the ideology of the dominant culture. So indigeneous people sense that something is wrong: this is the same oppressive force even if it comes under the name of peace. It's very hard for white people to accept that in any way. If you accept it you're likely to be paralysed by it; you need to get beyond it. Men have to deal with chauvinism too. The first efforts were not easy, but you have to shake out of that. It's a problem for the peace movement.

Women and Academia

Women's resentment of what they perceive as patriarchy and male chauvinism within the movement reaches its zenith in the context of academia. It was after the visit of a prominent European male activist/academic to the U.N. University conference on Pacific issues in Wellington in 1986 that a Pakeha woman wrote the words quoted at the beginning of this chapter. While women peace activists have a high regard for the work of researchers within the movement or for career intellectuals who supply data or publish articles helpful to the cause, they tend to resent conferences where the primary activity is the presentation of scholarly papers by men. Such traditional-style gatherings are condemned as prime examples of

'the white male system.' Before the 'Beyond ANZUS' conference of June 1984, for instance, women speakers expressed indignation at being allotted 15 minutes during a 3-day conference to present women's perspectives on the alliance, and noted that indigenous people were receiving similar treatment. They wrote: "We women say 'Look at the power at this conference. Look at our individual power. Know where it comes from. Who benefits from it and who is oppressed by it. We all want change, change involves a letting-go of power.'"

Michel Foucault asserts that a mark of the contemporary era is "the insurrection of subjugated knowledges" and says it is the theme which unites all his disparate writings. It seems an apt concept for describing the response of many women and indigenous people to conventional academic procedures. One Australian woman participant at the ANZUS conference wrote:

[T]he sad fact that [the Australian] delegation of 57 contained not a single Aborigine provided ample room for reflection. ... A strong and honest dramatic presentation of a woman's perspective on the arms race and ANZUS brought us face to face with the role that sexism and patriarchy have played, and the importance of bringing this issue into the work of peacemaking. The peace movement was forced to look more and more closely at itself, and the next step was to identify and acknowledge all these oppressive forces operating in it.

And so we came to the point of wanting to change the structure and process of our conference. Many people, especially women, saw the format - 'experts' on stage addressing an audience seated in rows - as symbolic of the same type of oppression that we feel from ANZUS and the arms race. We wanted to try alternative ways of operating just as we were searching for alternatives to submitting ourselves to ANZUS. ... The seats were rearranged in a circle, and the procedure was altered to allow us time to share our feelings and responses to the presentations of the speakers, to enable everyone to participate and to facilitate communication with each other. The reclaiming of power and participation by 'ordinary people' and most especially by women, was highly symbolic of the transformation upon which our work to go beyond ANZUS must be based.⁹

While women attending peace conferences are often frustrated and angered by conventional procedures, male academics are often frustrated and angered by the procedural styles favoured by women. They resent the derogation of expert knowledge and the

⁹ Jane Severn, *Pax Christi Newsletter*. Vol. 9, No. 4, 1984; p. 9.

disdain for timetables, and are irritated or embarrassed by the insistence on sharing "feelings and responses." The 1986 U.N. University conference on Pacific issues returned to the norm; 31 papers would be presented by visiting and domestic male academics. When women objected, they were allotted the final time-slot. When they objected again they were given the second to last. Six women wrote a conference paper, and one came to read it.¹⁰ She began:

I do not have a scholarly paper to present to you today. I have chosen instead to give the collective offerings of a group of six women who gathered to reflect on this task. Between us we have a wealth of intelligence, several university degrees, and years of experience and wisdom as active peace workers in this country. But we have deliberately declined this opportunity to present yet another academic paper. Instead, we wish to contribute something real from the richness and depth of Pakcha women's involvement in peacemaking over many years in this country. We are all part of that herstory, even though most of it goes unrecognized in the dominant culture of this land - the white male system.

The paper criticised the absence of indigeneous people at a conference purporting to be about Pacific issues and questioned the value of conferences which mainly consist of "academics and experts talking to other academics and experts." The writers challenged the expectations of conference attenders with respect to standards of accommodation, and said that "peace requires a radical change of lifestyle on the part of the privileged." The women noted the lack of facilities for child-care at the conference or financial provision for child-care at home and asserted that there was "a very thin line between careless oversight and active exclusion by that oversight." They expressed cynicism that this conference was the fifth of a series. "Oh yes, we are cynical because the enormous growth and energy we experience in our daily involvement in the peace movement has not come from high level conferences. It has come from the other end of the political spectrum." The paper outlined the contribution of women to peace and social justice throughout the history of New Zealand and concluded:

We do not wish to be relegated to tea-making and child-minding at meetings. We do not wish to have to fight for time and space to have our softer voices heard at question time - only to be

¹⁰ Kate Boanas was the presenter.

reprimanded later for causing an unnecessary fuss: We want our children to see us taking equal participatory and decision-making roles in groups. We want seats arranged in circles rather than rows. We want men to move over, make space for us to participate equally, perform support roles for us as we have done for them forever. We want non-hierarchical structures, shared decision-making by consensus, facilitation rather than chairing, child-care facilities, recognition that someone else must do the housework while we are at meetings. We want respect from the media. We want to work with men, not for men. ...

In short, we are not convinced that lofty conferences have achieved much in the past, nor that they are likely to do so in the future. Our invitation is simple. "Come down to EARTH" where the real progress towards peace is happening. Open your eyes and ears to women, and let this be an effective new direction for us all.

"What About the Children?"

From the very beginning of direct action protest in New Zealand the question of children's participation was controversial and it remained so. The question was raised and debated at the first meeting called to discuss the formation of a Peace Squadron. "They should be left out. They should not be manipulated as political pawns," said one woman. "Not so", said another, "This is a water-safety operation as much as anything. ... In fact we intend to educate." Others added: "It is a serious-fun thing. ... an educational thing. Opportunities will abound to convey up-to-date details of the full horror of nuclear weapons" and "Children can play peace games as well as war games. After all, it's children who are going to be destroyed, even more than present adults."¹¹

The issue continued to be a headache for organizers as the presence of young children in the boats provided a golden opportunity for opponents to charge the Squadron with irresponsibility. After the visit of the *Pintado* there was even talk of prosecutions under the Cruelty to Children Act. This was definitely *not* the kind of public image the Squadron wanted. On the other hand, the presence of children was symbolically important and sometimes a practical necessity. Furthermore, to make rules excluding them would not only have entailed the risk of alienating some parents but also would have introduced an element of authoritarianism counter to the spirit and ethos of the peace movement. As the

¹¹ Quoted in *Peace Squadron*, Tom Newnham p. 8.

water actions became increasingly dangerous, however, a compromise was reached. Squadron organizers informed the press that in future the presence of small children in small boats would not be permitted.

While some parents regard the involvement of children in peace actions as right and proper and an opportunity to impart parental values, others regard it as a subtle form of coercion or manipulation. An even more salient problem for parents, however, is whether, or to what extent, children should be made aware of the nuclear danger. Inspiring fear in the young is seldom viewed benignly; as Ronald Reagan remarked about the thousands of anti-nuclear letters from children he received during his term of presidency, "I think it is terrible that people are frightening children in this way." The issue can also provide a convenient red herring. The public controversy in the United States over the showing of the T.V. documentary *The Morning After* in the early 1980's focused beforehand almost entirely on the question of whether children should or should not be permitted to watch it, and afterwards on its effect upon them. Hardly, one imagines, the goal of the film's producers.

The non-dangerous land protests could also be problematic, as Kate Boanas discovered in the early days of the Peace Squadron. During one warship demonstration she took her three daughters, Jessie, Annie and Lucy down to ^{Lyttelton} the Auckland waterfront to watch the proceedings. Jessie, the eldest, was then four years old. Kate said:

When Jessie saw the submarine coming towards us she began to shake all over. Then she began to scream. I couldn't stop her. We had to go. She was still crying and shaking when we got home and she said, 'Mummy, promise me you'll never make me see that terrible thing again.' Then she said, 'But I want you to help Daddy stop it coming, so you go back and I'll stay here and mind the little ones.'

Even if a parent is in theory opposed to children's participation in peace movement activities, parental involvement cannot help but impinge upon family life and transmit parental values. As Kate Boanas said of her daughters during a newspaper interview some six years after the above incident:

They've grown up with it. They went on marches in utero and when they were pre-schoolers. In a sense they've given me permission for this work. I couldn't be as fully involved without their support. ... There's quite an art in juggling the commitments of family with peace work. ... When I was asked to attend the United Nations' Special Disarmament Session [in 1988] I had to ask them how they felt about me being away for five weeks. They supported me. They knew I was going to try to make the world a safer place.¹²

Although sometimes expressing resentment at their mother's involvement in extra-familial peace activities, Jessie, Annie and Lucy, now 10, 7 and 6 years old, are themselves active campaigners, frequently sending off letters and pictures to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control - whom Lucy addresses as "The Minister of Bombs". During the battle over the purchase of frigates for the N.Z. Navy, ^{Annie} Lucy wrote to the then holder of this Portfolio, the Hon. Russell Marshall:

No Frigates

Well my mum has stopped so many of those frigates kiling people Im glad I help to and it is so hard my mum thinks Frigates arent the best thing.

The Minister thanked Lucy for the letter and the picture she had sent, and said he would put it up on his office wall "for some other people to see." He added, "If you and your mummy and a lot of other people help me, we might just one day stop people from making and using bombs." Such exchanges would appear to support the contention that as there is no way to keep children from hearing the nuclear facts of life, political action is the best antidote for anxiety or depression about the future.

The Problem of Heterogeneity

A prime characteristic of the N.Z. peace movement is its broad social base. To quote Kevin Clements:

...Women, indigeneous peoples, Kanaky and Nicaraguan support groups, environmentalists,

¹² Glenys Bowman, "I'll Mind the Babies So You Can Stop the Warship." *N.Z. Women's Weekly*, May 1, 1989; pp. 32-34.

vegetarians, ecologists, anti-vivisectionists, non-pacifist anti-nuclear activists, absolute pacifists, religious peace workers, humanists, artists, poets, professionals, trade unions, political parties, activists and quietists all lay claim to being part of the New Zealand peace movement (Clements, 1988:120).

While this heterogeneity is undoubtedly one of the movement's greatest strengths, it can also be a source of conflict and contention. The anti-nuclear platform and the norm of non-violence may be embraced by all and link differing actors and groups, but differing values, political agendas and priorities for action can also be divisive. Degrees of leftist political ideology are a dividing factor in some countries but this is not the case in New Zealand where the extreme Left has little, if any, influence on the movement.¹³ In several countries, too, there is a factional split between the Left and New Age wings of the Green movement but again this is not - or not yet - the case in New Zealand, where peace and environmental issues intertwine. One point of controversy which does exist concerns the strong anti-male emphasis of lesbian and radical feminist groups. While some members of the peace movement regard this emphasis as damaging to the greater cause and/or diversionary, others regard such criticism as exhibiting dangerous tendencies towards homophobia, or argue that as the challenge to patriarchy is the lynch-pin of systemic change the focus is not only legitimate but necessary.

A similar dilemma exists with respect to social justice and racial issues. While some activists argue that the peace movement should not dissipate its energy and resources but focus on the single, less politically controversial issue of anti-nuclearism, others believe that the achievement of this goal is meaningless or even dangerous without changing the conditions which give rise to war. Thus, it is argued, dealing with issues like imperialism, racism, economic exploitation, social violence and Third World poverty is of primary, not secondary, importance. While differences of opinion remain a concern, dialogue does occur and minds can change - or, at the very least, statements about beliefs can change. One man with a reputation for pushing the single issue of anti-nuclearism said in our

¹³ In Japan, for instance, there is a bitter and long-standing split between the Communists and the Socialists in the peace movement over the justification or otherwise of the nuclear policies of the Soviet Union.

interview, "To our opponents the nuclear-free issue is a single issue, but when you think of the things that have to be changed to change this country it can't be a single issue."

While there are many differing agendas within the N.Z. peace movement and varying degrees of opposition to traditional forms of state militarism, there is unanimity of opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, and it is this consensus which provides the unifying force for action. As Georg Simmel points out in his essay, "The Negative Aspects of Collective Behaviour" (1950) diverse groups are able to work together because people can generally agree about what they are *against* although they are likely to differ sharply about what they are *for* if the opposition succeeds. Dr. Alan Webster of Massey University has articulated this general consensus of opposition in an article entitled, "N.Z.'s Anti-Nuclear Policy - Why?" It reads like a *credo* for the N.Z. peace movement. Each of the ten doctrinal-type statements begins with the words "WE OPTED OUT" followed by the reason for so doing. These are, in sum:

- because we love our land, our earth, our natural environment ...
- because we consider that the concept of nuclear war is insane ...
- because nuclear weapons have changed the concept of war and rendered traditional defence alliances obsolete ...
- because we do not believe that a nuclear arsenal is a deterrent
- because for many of us it seems the height of hubristic arrogance to believe that our particular moment of international intolerance is so important that it should dictate the end of civilisation and history ...
- because we believe that the presence of nuclear weapons on any territory makes it a target ...
- because nationalism is irrelevant and dangerous in the global human society ...
- because we wish to protect a nuclear-free South Pacific ...
- because most New Zealanders don't want nuclear weapons within 10,000 miles of us ...
- because we do not accept the Red-scare tactic ...

The writer concludes with a quotation from the pastoral letter of the U.S. Methodist Council of Bishops, *In Defense of Creation: the Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*.

"Therefore we say a clear and unconditioned NO to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons. We conclude that nuclear deterrence is a position that cannot receive the church's blessing. We state our complete lack of confidence in proposed "defenses" against nuclear attack and are convinced that the enormous cost of developing such defenses is one more witness to the obvious fact that the arms race is a social justice issue, not only a war and peace issue (Webster, 1988:13)."

Green Politics

When radical social movements gain a considerable degree of popular support but still fail to have their goals implemented, the question inevitably arises among supporters as to whether, or at what point, it is necessary to form a political party. Having successfully politicised many citizens, should the next step be penetration into the territory of political decision-making? This question poses a particular dilemma for peace movements, for to move from the role of exerting influence on political parties to the role of exerting political power runs the risk of not only compromising fundamental principles, but becoming that which is opposed. It is one thing to proclaim and practise the values of an alternative political culture within the confines of a social movement; it is quite another to translate them into the wheeler-dealer world of party politics.

The problem is already confronting the Greens Party in West Germany. When formed in 1980, its manifesto declared:

We are determined to create a party organization of a new type whose main characteristics are grassroots democracy and decentralization. ... The central idea is the permanent control of all representatives in office and of all institutions by the constituency, and the possibility to recall people in office at any time to make our policy and organization transparent to everybody and to prevent the "take-off" of elected officials. ... Our internal organization and our relationship to our voters and supporters is the exact opposite to the establishment parties in Bonn. ...

To achieve these goals, the new Party deliberately left the central structures relatively

powerless and subject to control from below, excluded M.P.s from holding office in the Party, limited the time for holding office or a seat in Parliament, required M.P.s to contribute part of their salaries to an 'eco' fund, made all Party committee meetings open to members and required that women, who comprise about one-third of the Party membership, hold at least 50 percent of all offices, a demand made by women under the motto, "An end to self-restraint!"

Notwithstanding these attempts to structure a new type of political party, Jurgen Maier, a member of the Federal Executive Committee of the West German Green Party who visited New Zealand in 1988, claims that "Reality ... is often different." The party came out of a variety of political backgrounds, and the influence of "old cliques and in-groups" has been far more important than that of the formal structure. Control from below is often limited to procedural questions, and is rarely extended to binding policy decisions. There is pressure to permit more than one term in Parliament - particularly for members who have become well-known media figures - and federal MP.s increasingly try to remove the grassroots elements limiting their freedom. The media praise these attempts as "realistic" and "denounce grassroots democracy as unconstitutional and incompatible with the system of representative parliamentary democracy." (Maier, 1988:10).

According to Maier, the most severe shortcoming of the FRG Greens has been the inability to organize "profound political discussions" about policy direction, and force the M.P.s to comply. "You can establish a new party with a great variety of opinions on almost anything. But once you are in parliament and have to act on almost every political issue from taxes to foreign policy you have to be a political party with a minimum of common policies, and you cannot stay the loose amalgamation of twenty single-issue movements." Today the Party is split between the left wing ('fundamentalists') faction and the right wing ('realists') faction.

The right wing increasingly tries to water down the radical green policies ... whose lack in the established parties initiated the foundation of the Green Party ... [and] the Party so far has been unable to enforce party policy against a parliamentary group which increasingly tries to become an

autonomous unit. In the end, only the outcome of such real conflicts will show whether the Green Party is in fact "the alternative to the traditional parties" or whether it has simply become just another party trying to get their [sic] share of power (Maier,1988:11).

The statement reads like a litany for a lost cause - or as evidence for the time-honoured maxim that all power corrupts.

Unlike New Zealand's 'first past the post' voting system, West Germany's system of proportional representation favours small parties. The breakthrough for the German Green Party came in their second election campaign of 1983, when they cleared the 5 percent minimum vote required for representation and won 27 seats in the Bundestag. In 1987, their share of the national vote rose to 8.3 percent, and they gained a further 17 seats. When the Values Party formed in New Zealand in 1972 it received 1.96 percent of the national vote and by the end of the decade was represented in every electorate. Although it attracted about 7 percent of the vote at the 1981 election, no candidate obtained a seat in Parliament and the Party dissolved as a political entity.

The policies of the Values Party were based on environmental concern, liberal moral values, limits to economic growth and energy use, a structural shift to grassroots democracy, withdrawal from all military alliances and transformation of the armed forces into organizations for performing civil emergency and civil service functions. No N.Z. troops would operate overseas unless under U.N. auspices. A founding member declared in 1988 that "in many ways Values was a genuine Peace Party" and went on to state:

Long before Chernobyl, before Reaganite militarism, before the hole in the ozone layer, before new evidence of potentially disastrous greenhouse effects, Values maintained that thoughtless technocratic expansion would destroy peace and the environment; Capitalism and Communism had nothing more to offer. New Politics were, and are, essential to decent human survival (Thomson, 1988:13).

Disaffection with the actions or non-actions of the Fourth Labour Government is leading some N.Z. peace activists in the direction of forming - or re-forming - a political

party to give expression to these values. As a *Peacelink* article said in mid-1989:

There is clearly a need for a new approach to politics in New Zealand. The current parties do not offer any choice. Voters should have a choice, an alternative. We believe that alternative must be Green. Green politics is a worldwide political movement which is more than just concern for the environment; it is a totally new, holistic way of thinking. It is peace, feminism, ecology, social justice and equality for all within a sustainable economic system.

As a first step in the (re)creation of a N.Z. Green party, a political group in Wellington has created a 'Green Alternative List' to field candidates in the 1989 local body election, and declared that "Together we will put green issues and green voices into the Wellington councils in 1989" (Gregg, 1989:34).

It seems that in the current climate of environmental concern green politics are on the move. The recently formed U.K. Green Party surprised everyone by obtaining 16 percent of the vote in the 1989 European Parliament elections (although it received only 2 percent in the national elections), and its 'alternative-style' conference held shortly afterwards received much media attention, both domestically and internationally. Unlike existing political parties, Green Parties and their supporters feel themselves to be part of a global organization, and representatives from more than 20 countries now meet regularly to discuss policy issues. Nevertheless, where there is a 'winner-take-all' electoral system, small parties of any ilk will continue to find it difficult to penetrate the corridors of power. The system is under challenge in New Zealand and petitions are circulating to hold the Government to its declared policy of electoral reform, but change is unlikely before the October 1990 general election.

If change does occur in the near future, a Green/Peace Party could find itself in the role of power-broker or part of a governing coalition. Nevertheless, as the experience of the West German Greens shows, success has its own problems and carries with it the danger of becoming "just another party trying to get [its] share of power". Until the recent events in Eastern Europe, radical change in political, social and economic structure has been achieved only through violent revolution (or, as in India, has been followed by

violence), and it has yet to be seen whether the removal of Communist institutions and the demand of people and governments for independence will remain non-violent. Whether it is possible for non-violent movements within Western democratic societies to achieve radical change by first becoming a part of the established system, or whether power can be decentralized through means antithetical to the ends are questions yet to be answered.

All the problems, conflicts, tensions and dilemmas discussed above are present to a greater or lesser degree in peace movements everywhere but there is one problem which so far is unique to New Zealand. I have labelled it 'the ultimate dilemma' and made it the subject of the opening chapter of the next and final section. To conclude this one, I shift the focus of attention from the movement as a whole to the individuals who comprise it.

CHAPTER 13

PEACE PEOPLE¹

It's become my life, my passion, my mission, in the same way, I think, that Albert Schweitzer must have felt when he went to Africa to do his missionary work and other people do their missionary work. This is my thing. That's why I do it....

- Larry Ross, N.Z. peace activist, 1987

The above statement made during one of the interviews raises questions not yet specifically addressed. What perceptions do people have of their motivations for becoming a part of the peace movement? What stories do they tell of their personal journeys to commitment? What complex set of beliefs, values, hopes and fears do they bring to their involvement? What kind of security policies, if any, do they envisage for the future? In the days of the Peace Squadron one of the motivating factors for participation was probably the prospect of fun, excitement or a day's free sailing on the water, although this aspect must have had less appeal as the actions became more dangerous. Another may have been simply the desire to oppose and remove the National Party from office. Sir Robert Muldoon was a prime minister who, one way or another, inspired strong passions. But what prompted and still prompts a core of committed people to expend much time, energy, money, thought and passion on what most describe as 'peace work'?

Seeking answers to this question was not the focus of my research, and indeed would have constituted a study in itself. Nevertheless, it was inevitably a part of it, and - to me at least - a fascinating and important part which deserves some attention. Hence I have selected from the interview material or from the writings of peace activists some statements which shed some light on the syndrome of questions posed above, and which

¹ While I interviewed many prominent N.Z. peace activists my particular focus was on the formation and development of the Peace Squadron. Hence there are several present-day core activists whom I did not or could not contact in the time available.

are typical of many statements made during the interviews. While the views expressed on these occasions were idiosyncratic and diverse, some common threads are discernible. One is the frequent expression of a religious, moral or philosophical belief, although usually with a new twist. Another is fear as a motivating force, hope as a sustaining force and faith in the potential for change through 'people power.' Another is the belief that individuals have a moral responsibility to take action to effect positive change, regardless of the forces posed against them. Yet another is that the type of change necessary will require social, economic and political restructuring as well as changes in the values and attitudes of individuals. It is also clear that the stress placed on particular peace issues reflects particular life experiences. While not all those who addressed the national security issue agree on what is desirable, all indicated that large change in traditional practices and ways of thinking about the issue is essential. Approximately half the people I interviewed made some reference - positive or negative - to family background as an influential factor.

The male-female division in what follows is organizational only; I cannot detect any significant difference between the two groups. As I believe people should be permitted to speak for themselves about themselves, the statements are mainly presented *verbatim* and with a minimum of authorial comment. Most of the people quoted below have already appeared in the text, but they are here re-identified briefly. The section headed 'Children' includes only a small part of my own research. The remainder comes from a Peace Studies project by two undergraduate students at Canterbury University, Christchurch² and is included here for its interest and its charm. Whether the views of Jessie, Annie and Lucy Boanas are typical of the views of other children whose parents are active in the peace movement, and who have "gone on marches in utero and when they were pre-schoolers" I do not know.

Women

Kate Boanas is nationally and internationally prominent in the N.Z. peace movement. She was described in a national women's journal as "this remarkable thirty-

² I am grateful to Rachel Friedlander and Jane Wright for permission to reproduce this aspect of their research.

*five year-old woman" and the Boanas household was said to be "a mecca for peace workers, academics and researchers from around the world."*³

Kate Boanas says she grew up in a fairly conservative family environment with little awareness of peace issues. "Our generation was simply not told about Hiroshima." During the early years of marriage and of husband John's involvement in the Peace Squadron, Kate was still "shying away from any direct political action." Change came *via* the composer Penderecki.

I was teaching music at Epsom Girls' Grammar in Auckland. One day I played a piece of music called *Threnody to the Victims of Hiroshima*. The kids didn't understand it at all. They thought it sounded terrible. Who were these victims anyway? I was 23 - and I couldn't tell them. I felt they should know why this song of lament had been written, and so I found the information. It totally changed my life. That was the beginning of my voyage of discovery about weapons and the state of the world. I knew I had to do something to stop the madness.

My father and mother have always disagreed with me about my anti-nuclear stand. ... "We've got to have American warships coming here." But for the first time my father had been to a vets conference where a woman raised the issue of what nuclear war would do to the animals - never mind the people and the land - and they decided to form a group. And he said, "Vets could lead the country on this." And I said, "Dad, the mothers have been leading this for a very long time without any professional backers. We are the life-givers. And we're motivated by that."

What kept me going while I was producing three children was the fact that everywhere I was walking I was carrying new life within me. There was this incredible force in me. And people would say to me, "Go on, give it up, take a rest and enjoy your kids." And I'd say, "Look, there's something growing inside of me that wants a life!" I feel I'm being part of a movement that's going to make the world safe for them. It's so strong in me, this survival instinct and this moving child within me.

It's hard balancing it all. Sometimes I feel I just want to get on with my peace

³ N.Z. *Women's Weekly*, May 1, 1989; pp.32-34.

work and the children want me - and there is an anomaly in all that. Sometimes they say, "You love your friends more than you love us" because they feel this thing has possessed me In the biblical times the prophets were men. They could just get up and leave their children, but mother prophets couldn't. They were all men. Today's prophets are both. The men are having to mind the children, and they're not sure they like that.

The little peace groups all around the world are having an effect. It just takes a long time. The message I want to get out to the men is "Stay in there. Stick with it and something will happen." With lots of little groups of people doing it everywhere.....

To the interviewer from the women's journal, Kate said:

Women ... are more than half the world's population. We have a right to 50% of the decision-making. We need to inform ourselves on the issues and ask our partners to take on some of the responsibility for childcare so we are more free for decision-making roles. We must keep on reminding men that we have different ways of doing things and different priorities. ... Being a mother of three children under four prepares you for anything. You can take on the world!

Women in my position have the luxury of being able to choose to earn or not. It's a privileged position, especially at a time when many people are living at subsistence level. I feel I have reaped many benefits from the system. My work is a gift - but one I can afford. It's my choice. ... New Zealand has a strong history of both men and women peacemakers. I believe our nuclear-free stance has generated hope throughout the world.⁴

Marie Leadbetter was spokesperson for CND between 1983 and 1987. Her mother, Elsie Locke, is a prominent N.Z. writer and long-time peacemaker who was co-founder of CND in 1959. Maire was involved with the Christchurch group as a teenager "because of my mother's activities", but it was not until she moved to Auckland in 1971 that she became an active member of the organization.

... It was really small and struggling then. Then I had a couple of kids and didn't do much for a few years either. But I've been heavily involved from around 1983 and stayed that way until I stepped down as spokesperson just recently. It

⁴ *Ibid.* p.34.

was pretty well a full-time job for the last 3 or 4 years - everything from training the demonstrators and trying to keep the office ticking over to making press statements and media interviews. Lobbying letter to politicians and that sort of thing, speaking to groups. It was a bit of a strain actually, but I think I'm feeling it more now that I've stopped [laughs]. I just somehow kept going at the time. It's taking me a while to find my new level of activity now. I'm specifically Pacific co-ordinator for CND. ... My husband supports me. I wouldn't have been able to do all this without his help.

There are some worrying things [about N.Z. defence policies] to my way of thinking. ... The kind of exercises and the kind of training and philosophy behind our defence I don't think has changed very much. My particular worry is that they prepare for counter-insurgency operations and that they still are in much the same mould as they were when they were preparing for fighting wars overseas. I'm absolutely against intervention. They're not thinking of intervening on the side of the indigenous people. [Then Australian Foreign Affairs Minister] Hayden talked about "Kanak rebels fighting the French Government" - so that's illustrative of the way they're thinking. They're not thinking of supporting the Kanak people and others in the struggle for independence. They're really thinking in the old mould of supporting Western interests.

I think non-alignment is an exciting policy. It's the true policy for the independent people of the Pacific. We can work together with the Pacific people. My personal feeling is that what we really need to pursue for security in the Pacific is diplomatic endeavours. Military solutions aren't going to solve anything in the Pacific. This shows up when we're offended against - when the French blew up the *Rainbow Warrior* in our harbour. There's nothing you can do militarily about a thing like that. But we can use our diplomatic skills in seeking international support. That's the way we have to go. It's the way the Kanak people have to go too. They're not looking for military solutions. They know they're not going to achieve anything that way. The way they're going to achieve anything is getting international support and the solidarity of the Pacific people.

The world has changed with nuclear weapons and I think people are gradually changing too. It's becoming more important to find peaceful solutions. Personally, I would like not to have a defence force in New Zealand at all. Maybe something to patrol the fishing. I don't think I'd want civil disobedience either. I think the only way we can protect ourselves is not to do anything about anyone

invading us except try to receive international support and the established ways of getting that kind of support. ... I don't think I can really describe myself as a pacifist; no, not totally. I do believe in non-violence but that doesn't mean necessarily Circumstances can make it very difficult for people not to be involved in armed struggle. In the Phillipines for example, El Salvador, Nicaragua and places like that. There are forces within that can't change their style of thinking. That's something we perhaps under-estimate sometimes. Like the forces within the established military. I think that happens with our military too. They put themselves beyond civilian interference. They make it clear they're not in favour of Lange's anti-nuclear policies. ...

I think you can clearly demonstrate that a lot of things wouldn't happen without activism. For instance, would the Lange government have stuck to its policy in 1985 when they refused the *Buchanan* if we hadn't developed a tradition of activism? Because what we did was to get out on the streets then in January 1985. I personally think that was a very important part. We held a march and a rally in Queen Street with 2 days notice, On January 30th. We had 10,000. We wouldn't have got them - like that - to respond if we hadn't developed a tradition of activism.

I think everything that we do in the way of demonstrations and actions is significant. It's hard to see it sometimes. Something's small-scale and we think, "Oh gosh, was that worth doing?" But it's all part of the process. Maybe in our *Disarm the Seas* action next week - which will probably be quite small-scale - we won't build a major awareness of the risks of Tomahawk Cruise missiles with that particular action, but as time goes on this will grow. For sure. If the Trade Unions had not been prepared to take that strike action while the nuclear weapons were in port would the awareness have grown up in the Trade Union movement? Would we have a Trade Union Peace Office active in getting peace groups on job sites today? I mean, all these things do build on one another.

Robyn Halliday is the Christian Peace Network Field Worker for the Wellington area. She describes her 5-hour a week job as "basically to support the various peace groups in the Wellington area, to liase with individuals in parishes to try to build up more contacts and to help with the three annual functions we have a year." She attends an Anglican church "with a strong social conscience; it was a church that Les Church was curate of." It was Robyn Halliday who contacted clergy throughout New Zealand to request that church bells be rung at the moment of the passing of the Nuclear Free

legislation.

My own involvement [in the peace movement] really didn't come about till towards the end of '82. Which is probably about the time that the various parishes in the Wellington area began to form small peace groups as such. Before that I had belonged to a travel host organization and I was invited to join that by a Quaker that I knew. And when I said "I'm not a pacifist" [laughs] they replied that I was moving in that direction. Something I wasn't even aware of 17 years ago. So, to me, it was quite a natural step on. ...

I think one probably has to go back and look at how you respond to anything, I mean, I had been involved in a local thing because of young children. Then I started a drop-in centre and creche, and then I was on a progress association for four years and went down to challenge the mayor in his office [laughs]. So I think one simply begins to realise that you can become empowered to do something about things that concern you no matter what the issue is.

I think as far as I'm concerned the peace movement was something I felt very sympathetic to. I'd always for many years had an interest in foreign policy and been very concerned that we hadn't placed a greater emphasis on foreign policy in our political system. I mean we had one major foreign policy debate in 6 years. It was quite frightening. I remember being concerned when Warren Cooper was appointed Minister because he was 16th. ranked in the Cabinet - quite apart from the man himself. That was the level of foreign policy under our previous Government. ...

When I came into the peace movement I bought some of those things with me. I'm quite happy to organize things I mean, I look around at all the academics and researchers and think [laughs] "Well, they can write the papers." But unless there's a certain amount of organization, unless there are meetings called, unless there's a degree of organization - which there has to be, even in the peace movement where we work in forums - some of those skills are actually lost.

So I see that is something I can perhaps do. I'd been involved with the parish peace group right from its inception. I went to the Day of Peacemaking in Wellington in early '83 and out of that it was seen that there were a number of parish groups being formed and we could form an ecumenical group. Which we did. And that was important. Because at that stage, even back in '83, we were not

doing things together. Certainly not with the Catholics.

And I then became more and more involved with the secular movement. I volunteered to help at the PMA office, and [after the *Buchanan* affair] replied to a lot of letters from overseas: "How wonderful!" ... "How did you do it?" [laughs]. For about a year I did that on a voluntary basis. And then I became involved with the *International Year of Peace* Committee as a facilitator. That gave it a sort of status I suppose. There was money involved we could call on and use. This year, when this particular job fell vacant, I said I'd like to be considered for it. And I was asked if I'd like to do it 5 hours a week - that's what it is. It's a title; a name as such. And that I find helps on certain occasions.

I cannot claim to be a pacifist. I think I would like to be, but I just know instinctively that I am not [laughs]. I have made a submission on the defence question. I said I would push very strongly for a non-aligned policy. That's a dirty word, but it's only a dirty word the way it's used. They always say "Cuba and Libya are non-aligned" [laughs]. They forget all the other countries. Because if you look at the history of the non-aligned movement, there are many things that we have in common. It grew out of a sense of identity; it grew out of India, Egypt and Yugoslavia. It was something that was unique to them. And I think it's remained that way. One of the difficulties we have we haven't quite reached the stage where we acknowledge that we are still seen as part of the Western culture. I remember somebody saying to me "You don't look non-aligned" [laughs]. ... Justice to me is very important, but I don't see it in a simplistic way. That injustice is always done to the blacks by the whites. It's not as simple as that. It's very much more complex, and we've got to really look at each situation as it arises.

To me I find Switzerland's neutrality very limiting. Sweden, on the other hand, after all, has a policy more of non-alignment so they're able to take a much more active role.⁵ The other countries such as Austria, Finland, are neutral really because of their geo-strategic position. We're not in that situation. We're not tied to armed neutrality like Ireland. There are historical differences. So I think non-alignment is a more viable system for us. But do we need to label it? I think we get hung up on the label because the majority of people in the non-aligned movement are not our colour and the neutrals are. In the end, when you look at Sweden, it's a little hard to decide what is neutrality and how studiously it is

⁵ Sweden has not officially declared a policy of neutrality.

observed as opposed to non-alignment....

Dr. Joan Chapple is a plastic surgeon and peace activist and a member of IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War).

I come from a pacifist family. My grandfather was imprisoned for pacifism. So to go into the anti-nuclear thing was for me a matter of course. Activism started for me in 1960, when the Maoris were excluded from the All-Blacks team to South Africa. There was a protest. And that was the first time for me of New Zealanders being prepared to protest. The Vietnam war was a very passionate issue. The Springbok tour was another issue along that path of people wanting to see a better society. ...

For a long time after the Springbok tour I couldn't watch Rugby. If anyone *dared* to send New Zealanders now to South Africa to play rugby there would be a real - I mean everybody knows the power now of popular protests, and they know it in the anti-nuclear thing and the Rugby South African thing. And they're prepared to say what they think and stand up and be counted. It's popular. It's no longer eccentric or radical.

I'm *totally* against the nuclear thing. In my work I see so much of the damage that's been done to fingers and toes and other parts of the body from radiation used for benign purposes really - before researchers realized its dangers. To deliberately produce it to inflict that kind of damage and suffering is obscene, just obscene. People could say "No" to nuclear power and nuclear things, and if they did they could stop it tomorrow. And that's the insane thing. And frustrating.

But we're not alone. There are more and more people in other countries too. We're busy seeing how interchange between groups in other countries how we can use our experience to help other countries. I mean, it's no use unless its for export from here. Lange said [New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy] is not for export at the IPPNW conference. It was a non-political platform and he could have said anything, but he said that. The doctors were furious with him; sickened in fact. ...

I have a fascination with American society and I like Americans. They broke away from the British class system. Now it's all based on money, and I don't know if that's any better. But I like Americans; I don't feel any antagonism

towards them. But I do feel antagonistic about their imperialism. On a whole range of issues they're very moderate people till you start talking about foreign policy. Then they go off the deep end. The Russians are seen as bad guys, and they're the good guys. I don't see it in those terms. I prefer American society because it's a Western society, but undoubtedly there are many people there who'd be better off in Russia. Both countries have their good and bad aspects. Capitalism has solved the problem of making money and its done some good things in the world, but it hasn't solved the problem of distribution; of how to make fair and just societies where people are the first priority.

Maynie Thompson is a retired dental nurse living alone on Waiheke Island, although at the time of our interview she was caring for a young woman with terminal cancer and her two children. She was one of the six N.Z. women who went to the Greenham Common Women's Camp in 1983 and with Anne McFarlane participated in the 1986 Great Peace March from the West Coast of the United States to Washington.

Helen Caldicott inspired me. And the people of Greenham Common. Those were two things that strongly influenced me to concentrate on peace things. I'd always been involved in other things like racism and anti-apartheid. It was going to the International Women's Camp at Greenham Common that inspired me to go on the Peace March because I noticed there were very few American women there - though there were women from all over Europe. I felt it was American women we really needed to make contact with.

We only had 6 weeks to prepare. I got a job washing dishes in a restaurant 2 or 3 nights a week, and I had stalls at the local market to sell some of my own bits and pieces. Then one day this old man of 91 rang and asked how much we needed, and I didn't tell him. But he said he was nearly blind and couldn't read anymore, and it would give him a reason for living one more year if he gave us money to go. He gave us \$5,000 - his life-savings. That made us absolutely committed to getting to Washington. We couldn't let Bert down. ...

Sometimes at night when it was wet and cold and uncomfortable and I was aching with sore feet and everything, I used to wonder why I was so happy. And so absolutely content. And thinking about that I realized that for me it was a total experience. It involved my body and my mind and my spirit - if there is such a thing as a spirit or a soul. It involved my whole person totally and very

satisfyingly. I found the social life satisfying, the warmth and the friendship of the people. I found the march satisfying - the physical exertion especially satisfying - and the walk through the beautiful country, in tune with beautiful nature. It was very inspiring.

So really I felt totally content with what I was doing. And on a bigger scale, I realized that with so many people from so many different religions and backgrounds coming together that the peace movement is a very uniting force. And I felt no separation at all between myself and Jews and agnostics (I would call myself an agnostic, a humanist probably) many different kinds of church groups, Buddhists, Catholic nuns All these different people coming together with one purpose. It made me realize that the peace movement is part of a new religion. A sort of universal religion of love and justice for all, and a real reverence for life on earth making us all part of the universe. And I like to think that I'm part of that new movement.

It's different from the old way of doing things. It lacks the structure and the hierarchy of the old church groups, and it's a little bit different - it's part of the New Age religion, but it's different again because some of the New Age beliefs start to get a little bit woolly and airy-fairy. But with the Peace March, somehow or other it made connections between these inner peace movements and developing your own soul and so on, and the activism. And I see these as two definite parts of myself and they had the opportunity of working together in the Peace March. And the people worked together in the same way.

I don't feel any separation between myself and people who are really committed church people. And agnostics and atheists. I don't consider myself any different from people in China who are working for a better world, or in Russia. It was also very satisfying to me how I could relate to young people, men and women, as real friends. And lesbian and gay people, on a really friendly basis. It makes life so much more *exciting* because we really limit our experience so much when we just relate to people of our own kind. Though it wouldn't have been the same if we hadn't had the one goal we were all working for, the thing that brought us together....

I hope it will take us a bit closer to the turn around. I was very inspired by Helen Caldicott's vision of thousands and millions of people at the grassroots level coming together and pulling back from the brink of nuclear war. Saying, "That's

enough!" I've never called myself an absolute pacifist, but at her meeting I decided I wanted to be part of that movement. So that's why I take any opportunity to, you know, do that. ...

Mary Woodward was co-founder with Elsie Locke of the N.Z. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1959, and now works as a volunteer at the Foundation for Peace Studies in Auckland.

I read about CND in the *New Statesman* and thought I'd like to establish a branch here. So we had a meeting in Wellington, and then groups formed in Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. I was in Christchurch, so I worked with the Christchurch group. So that's how I became interested. It was the time of the big marches in Britain but our group was quite separate from the British group.

We opposed the British deterrent but we saw New Zealand's involvement through the ANZUS Treaty. People would say to us, "But the ANZUS Treaty has nothing to do with nuclear bombs." But we see now that America is making such a big fuss about it that of course it has everything to do with it. Apparently America can't exist if they don't put their nuclear ships into our harbours. America is actually saying that ANZUS is based on every tiny detail of the nuclear deterrent being permitted. So that our contention is actually proved now, 20 to 30 years later.

I'd never been a pacifist and I was in retreat from the church at that time. It just seemed crazy. It didn't seem a rational thing to be making nuclear bombs. Perhaps I might have started off with the idea from university days hearing Karl Popper speak after Hiroshima. And his view was that there would never be any war again because it was so obvious that it would be foolish to go to war. We would destroy everything and destroy ourselves. And that seemed sensible to me. But of course, far from not going to war we thought we could get bigger and better things and the deterrent theory developed. And that just seemed to fly in the face of common sense. It was my common sense that was assaulted more than anything else at that stage....

There hasn't been peace for 40 years. If we look at the number of people killed in wars since that time there's more than died in WW2. It doesn't happen to have been Anglo-Saxon people who have died, but the people who have died are just as important. And of course the price of that is that two-thirds of people in the world are starving, and thousands and thousands more have died from starvation. They're just as dead as if there'd been a war.

Men

The Reverend Dr. George Armstrong founded the Peace Squadron in 1975 while a lecturer in systematic theology at St. John's Anglican College, Auckland, and was said to have blended "a prophetic, absolutist, religious position with a conventional political call for resistance against the nuclear militarization of the South Pacific."

George Armstrong says that some of his strongest childhood memories are of disliking injustice, liking people and getting on well with most of them. "Everyone's a work of art in their own funny way." His family were strong Labour supporters and to his father "the advent of the [First] Labour Government was like the coming of Christ to the Jews." One of the things which drew him into the ministry was the conviction that "welfare doesn't have to be earned. Christianity is all about making sure that people who haven't got the basic things get them. It's just as plain and obvious as that."

To the traditional moral and religious dimension of anti-nuclearism George Armstrong adds the concept of the peace movement as secular theology, and of peace activism as public liturgy. In a paper expounding both these concepts, he defines secular theology as "a way of actively and reflectively doing the truth. It is not a new set of dogmas or images of the divine to be elaborated in lectures and mastered by ... elites." Just as there is a church-type drama of worship and prayer so there is a type of public liturgy. "Protest itself is an art form." The water actions were a dramatic acting out politically of "what was really going on in the outward public events." Even more, the Peace Squadron actions were "an attempt to influence those events by 'imaging' a new and better way for the nation. Beyond stopping the death ship we were trying to coax into being a new manner of life together." The many telegrams and letters of support received after the *Long Beach* action suggest that

For many thousands of new Zealanders the Peace Squadron attempts celebrated some of their deepest feelings, aspirations and commitments. Though the occasion was heavy with death and threat, the form of the Liturgy managed to convey a lightness and a positiveness, a sanity and even a few laughs. ... Make no mistake: it was a deeply religious occasion. ... It was a liturgy. It was certainly public.⁶

The action against the *Long Beach* is described in Pauline terms: "life against death, ... weakness against power, ... foolishness against the wisdom of this world, vulnerability against impenetrable armour: human bodies and frail little boats against thousands of tons of steel. The paper concludes, "That was a great day of the Lord that was."

In our several interviews, George Armstrong continued to link peace activism with the forms and expression of religious commitment. Of fellow activists in the United States he said:

The American peace movement has a hell of a time. I'm full of admiration for people like the Berrigans who take the hammer and smash missiles. All that Ploughshares work and Ground Zero stuff in Seattle. Those people dedicate their lives to it. Almost like going into a religious community. They're just in and out of gaol; on railway lines trying to stop nuclear weapons. I see what we did as five years of quite big effort, but nothing like that long-term commitment with very little result. Basically it's like a kind of martyrdom. I'm full of admiration for it. ...

The moral imperative for a non-racist society in New Zealand is a major focus for George Armstrong's activism:

It's so important for this country to deal with racism. Otherwise we'll lose our integrity. The peace movement here must make headway on this issue. The whole of our history has to be turned around. In a sense this whole nation is founded on violence - one group against another. Since it's only 150 years of history it has got to be readdressed. The white people here are saying you can't undo history, but you've got to in some way. That's where the peace movement is blessed with the extraordinary challenge from those people in the Maori movement who are prepared to put energy into it. The NFIP is likely to make the most enduring contribution, though it's hard to see how to put the two together.

⁶ George Armstrong, "Peace Squadron as Public Liturgy." N.Z. Student Christian Movement Journal, *The Ark*; No. 8. October, 1977.

The concept of a nuclear-free and independent Pacific is also a theological concept to George Armstrong; one that points to a radical form of religious truth for Western Christianity. In a paper setting forth these ideas he writes that an "Independent Pacific" means neither "isolationism" nor "a collection of restored, armed-to-the-teeth national sovereignties." Rather, the term points to "... a complex holistic 'spiritual' reality which binds or re-binds Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian families into a spiritual totality in which there is hospitality also for the white tribes according to the manner of the Pacific ancestors." He quotes a Maori theologian's description of the difference between the introduced Westernized Christianity and the indigenous spirituality of the *tangata whenua*, 'the people of the land':

The introduced brought with it a sense of hierarchy that was not present in the old beliefs. You were never set in dominion over the earth or the other creatures - you grew up out of it. The word that is used is *tapu* from which we get the word *tupuna*. *Tapu* means 'to grow'. In the introduced religion one is given the sense that you were created in order to have control over the creation, which in a sense creates a tremendous conflict.

To me this wisdom of the *tupuna* is nourishing. It may be present in an entombed form under Western Imperial forms of wisdom, and resurrecting this hidden wisdom is a future task for Western scholars and theologians. For the moment, wisdom is readily accessible ... in a deeply-rooted Pacific form through Polynesian, Melanesian, Aboriginal and Micronesian myth, ideology and theology. ... The wisdom of the *tangata whenua* is Holy Ground. I acknowledge this to be so, and I tread with respect and bared feet (Armstrong, 1983:12).

Les Church is an Anglican priest who was a founding member of the Peace Squadron during his student years at St. John's College. He regards peace work as an essential aspect of ministry: "empowering people is what it's all about". With the Peace Squadron, "There was a sense that here was an opportunity for people to take power to do something. And if everyone did that - well, anything can happen. And that's still exciting isn't it? A little country acting out participatory democracy. A vision of a world without this threat."

I was born on August 6, 1945 - *really* a child of the nuclear age. I grew up when New Zealand was recovering from the war. I always had a feeling there was

a cloud that hadn't lifted. There was something dark over us. When I was very young my father gave me a book on the contribution of British engineering firms to the war effort. He was an engineer and it meant a lot to him, though he never talked about it. I couldn't read, but there were photos, very graphic photos, that terrorized me as a child, and came back to me very vividly then.

It started off with firms producing very prestigious items like Rolls Royces and Bentleys. Then you saw the same factories producing bombs, aircraft and torpedoes. Instead of men working at quality craft there were rows and rows of women all looking much the same with scarfs on their heads, packing bullets and rifles. It was pictures of a whole nation taken over by a sickness. There were pictures of Winston Churchill and the King and Queen, all the heavies, going to the factories and inspecting what was being done. Blessing the whole process. The last picture was a bloody great scrap-heap that went over acres. All the planes and tanks and everything blown to pieces. I suppose what it was trying to say was that here's all this scrap metal and we can start all over again and make what we want out of it.

To me, as a young child, it spoke to me of the utter futility of it all. It was an image that has always been with me. And I had nightmares over the sense that this sickness hadn't gone away. And the utter futility of life I suppose. There wasn't anyone to talk to about this. I would be scared to close my eyes because of the picture in the dreams. But my brother would just say, "Shut up and go to sleep." So I grew up with a real sense of not being able to talk about it; that others didn't see reality in that way. So it was important for me at St. John's to find a group of people who really did think of things that way. And a real personal triumph on that first morning; looking around and seeing all those boats and thinking, "Well, other people feel this way too." ...

If you ask what the peace movement wants for defence you'll get as many different answers as there are people. Is there as an answer that we peace people want? I don't see pacifism as being the answer for us. I think a highly-trained and efficient purely defence force would be a great thing for New Zealand. It no way approaches that now. The National government relied on ANZUS and ran down New Zealand's defence force. If we're going to have a defence force let's have one that we can be proud of and not patterned to strategies of big powers - America or anyone else.

To me that's what this movement is all about. For too long we've sheltered under the umbrella of someone else. We need to stand on our own feet. We've fought other people's battles. You know, it's part of New Zealand coming of age, and maybe to fight our own battles and to sort out what is important for us. And certainly following in the footsteps of Big Brother or Big Mother have not been in New Zealand's interests. I think everyone recognizes that.

The whole business of threat, I think, has changed. A whole different strategy of defence is needed. It's a different world now. The threats are more the enemy within. I don't mean defence in the sense of turning it against citizens. I see more threat coming from terrorist groups or groups that are driven to desperation to get some form of justice that they embark on terrorist actions. I think that's more of a threat to our security and well-being. A foreign policy that seeks to promote justice and listen to the voice of oppressed or indigenous people is the only sane policy. Not a policy that calls upon the big power or heavy clubs of Big Brother.

And I cannot see for myself what security ANZUS gives us. I really can't see it, and I don't think I'm alone in that. The U.S. is helping to clarify the confusion over ANZUS and our policy by its actions. I think they're doing us a service actually.

Canadian-born New Zealander Larry Ross was a prime mover in the nuclear-free zone campaign of the early 1980's. He founded the NZ Nuclear Free Zone Committee and its newsletter, and travelled widely to spread the message. Since the advent of the Labour Government and the legislation he has focused upon promoting a policy of 'positive neutrality' for his adopted country.

The idea of positive neutrality is based on my years and years of work starting around 1950 in and out of the peace movement, and pondering questions posed by the bomb, and analysing how the peace movement has fared in different countries. While the peace movement might like to claim successes, in actual fact not one weapon has been thrown away except in obsolescence. ...

I saw there weren't successes and I decided I would try to develop a defence policy that would give to New Zealanders the sense of security that ANZUS now gives them - by making it worthwhile to other states to respect their neutrality because of the services New Zealand can give to the international community.

Services like peace-making, secure data storage, banking and finance like the Swiss, mediation in international disputes. Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland are all used by contending powers as negotiating theatres. Why can't we have such a place in the Pacific? Does it always have to be done in Europe? ...

[Peace work's] become my life, my passion, my mission, in the same way, I think, that Albert Schweitzer must have felt when he went to Africa to do his missionary work and other people do their missionary work of various kinds. This is my thing. That's why I do it. I feel we're on the cutting edge of the struggle for human survival on the planet. It's a huge issue. We're teetering on the brink of annihilation, and all history if we fail will be meaningless. There will be no history. The bomb and extinction hits everybody, and thus I feel it's an important issue; it captures me totally. Because if I and others who are doing the same thing fail, then that's the end. And what more important issue can you find than that? ...

I think [my commitment] stems from my upbringing. I'm the grandson of a Methodist minister on one side and a Baptist minister on the other, and my parents imbued me with a social conscience. ... I have no particular church orientation. I have a humanist belief. I don't have an anthropomorphic view of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. I think there's a consciousness of which we can be a part, but it doesn't take an interventionary role. Though I sometimes think by focusing on this great planet, strength might come to feel with the universe. It's up to us to choose survival or annihilation. ...

Expatriate Englishman Bernard Rhodes was co-ordinator of the Peace Squadron on Waiheke Island and continues to be active in peace groups there. He participated in the first sailing of a peace ship from England, and spent some time in Japan working with the peace movement in that country.

Once we get rid of nuclear weapons we can go ahead with doing positive and constructive things. The great new Age of Consciousness has to grow through the mass of people from the grassroots to the top. So they don't feel the need to be defended against anybody. ... Simultaneously raising children and educating them to be people who don't need to dominate others for their own security. And above all, don't have the fear of others doing it to them.

The whole consciousness of the world has to change, and the abolition of nuclear weapons will reflect that process. A long slow process. It is possible for these rapid evolutions to take place. Cro-magnon Man succeeded Neanderthal Man very rapidly. Nobody quite knows what happened. But in a very short time [Cro-magnon man] displaced old thinking with superior attitudes. In those days mainly in weaponry. Now it's time to supersede weaponry. It can be done, but it takes great positivity and wanting to do it.

People who make nuclear weapons just don't think about it. They say it's a job. My hometown in the U.K. makes subs. Part of the movement has to be finding new jobs and lifestyles for people who'll be out of a job. It's anti-life. The procreative drive to survival is the main motivating force behind humanity, and it's that I have faith in. That this life force will be greater than the dark force that's just negating everything. We shall overcome. Over the last few years I have obtained a faith which has replaced my fear. That life will win out.

Dave Wray is one of the 'Boaties' of Waiheke Island who participated in all the actions against the warships, although not as a registered member of the Peace Squadron.

All faiths - anything that's positive - I'll take it. It's said that Christianity and Communism have one thing in common: they've never been tried. My faith's humanist, but there may well be some guiding Spirit over all. But it doesn't matter much in this life whether you believe that or not. It's a matter of improving life on earth. God may be learning with us. Evolution is always a refining process. It's possible that the human race is a dead-end, but I don't fully accept that. We could be obsolete but I hope not. I've got lots of youngsters coming up, so I hope not.

George Goddard is a long-time executive of the Waterside Workers' Union and a member of the World Peace Council. In August 1954 he attended the 10th. Anti A and H Bomb Conference in Japan as a representative of the N.Z. branch of the WPC, and visited Hiroshima at this time.

In a paper circulated through the unions in 1985, George Goddard writes that on the basis of his experience at that time

... the present writer was able to relate the visible horrors stemming from the use of the bomb to

stopwork meetings with some effect, and he remains to this day unable to comprehend how creatures masquerading as men could knowingly consider unleashing this monstrosity for any reason upon their fellows, and especially women and children. Worse than wolves, a scorpion would show more compassion for other species, let alone its own. Time passes, public interest waxes and wanes, watersiders' policy against nuclear weapons stands. ...

Today the members of the Wellington Watersiders' Union stand firmly in support of the anti-nuclear weapon policies of the New Zealand Federation of Labour, and are delighted that the New Zealand Labour Government has given expression to the clear wishes of the New Zealand people.... If pressed, wharfies would admit to a quiet but heartfelt pride in the part that they as individuals and their officers and organizations have played in bringing about this state of affairs. It's been a long road, and there's still a long way to go.⁷

In our 1987 interview, George Goddard continued to stress the fact that many union members have been active in anti-nuclear campaigns since the early 1950's.

The Pacific Islanders feel that what was paradise in many respects is being infected and polluted by irresponsible Western powers. Not only by testing, but also by the schoolboy-standard, gang-style business of prancing around with nuclear warships. They feel it deeply and almost inarticulately, but at our earlier meetings it was them that turned the tide really by saying simply, "It's no good. It's got to stop." ...

What do you say to anyone who says, well, nuclear war is horrible, but nuclear weapons are keeping the peace? *Bullshit!* Anyone who says that is either dishonest or mentally defective. There hasn't been a day of peace since WW2 finished. We've got fellows in our ranks who've fought in Malaya or in Korea or in Vietnam - millions of people literally have died since WW2. What those people are saying is that it might be that us whities can get away from conventional warfare if we've got a nuclear bomb.

I'm a gardener. If I want to grow radishes I don't plant onion seeds. To say that you're going to get peace by making weapons that by accident or design can obliterate - and in the system that prevails an accident becomes part of the danger - will obliterate everybody, is the mouthings of a simpleton. And really, if you advocate that lunatic asylums should be put in the hands of homicidal maniacs, advocate a pro-nuclear policy.

⁷ George Goddard, "A Thirty Year Fight for Life."

John Boanas lives in Christchurch where he manages a number of family companies. He was a founding member of the Auckland Peace Squadron while a theological student at St. John's College in the mid-1970's.

The thing that struck me as a secondary school student was the Vietnam war. And I think that's the thing that affected my view of New Zealand and the world from a little boy of about 8 or 9 in the late 50's when it began, through the 60's. That was the catalyst that got me thinking about the political side of things. My father had quite liberal attitudes in some areas. He was very antagonistic to American involvement in Vietnam, though he was conservative politically and economically. I grew up in a very conservative Anglican private school system that was far to the right of Genghis Khan. So the fact that he supported me made it easier for me to continue. By the time I got to the university in the early 70's where I met Kate the Vietnam thing was winding down. But it had made a very strong impression on a lot of young people. The new issue was the French testing in the Pacific.

Following university we both went to St. John's Theological College, and it was just an unusual experience. I think I saw the church as a liberalizing, refreshing kind of institutional happening. Of course, when I arrived there I realized that in many ways it was quite the reverse. So what really got me radicalized was being involved in a fairly radical alternative movement at St. John's. Privately it was very stressful, more stressful than it might have been had I been involved in more traditional political movements. ... But during those years the anti-nuclear thing was building up. And George Armstrong was kind of the rising star of a peace movement that had been pretty unproductive at times. But George came up with some wonderful ideas on mobilizing people and public liturgy And the whole Peace Squadron thing got going, so we suddenly got involved in all that - and suddenly got involved in a whole lot of extra-parliamentary politics. Trade unions, peace movement politics - from Quaker pacifist groups right through to crazy radical elements. That whole Peace Squadron thing really consummated a number of marriages. ... So anyway, the Peace Squadron was a really important thing for Kate and myself.

After leaving St. John's I did community work in the suburbs for a time and then worked as secretary for the N.Z. Foundation for Peace Studies. Then we heard about the Bradford Peace Studies programme, so off we go in 1977 and were

there for about a year and a half. The only thing I remember about Bradford - apart from the eternal infighting between the Trots and the Gandhians and the Marxists and the Libertarians and what have you - it was a real dog's breakfast of a peace studies course. It was not that we were naive. I mean we were used to political infighting, but this was bizarre; this was just crazy. And what really interested us going over there was that Europeans feel that the world ends round the corners of Western Europe, so we were determined, I was determined, that whatever work I did would be on the N.Z. peace movement. So I had to come back to New Zealand to do what I personally thought was important work. ...

I think by the time I got back from Bradford that I lacked a freshness of view. I'd had this rather partial political experience, and I think it wasn't good. ... I became privately fairly pugilant - I think I was not liking the person I was becoming because I'd had this really heavy time in the church. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear thing in New Zealand was a most interesting social movement to be in. And I guess the Peace Squadron thing after leaving St. John's was a wonderful thing - socially, privately, emotionally. So not everything was bad. ... I think mainly it's only in the latter years that I've felt that I was somewhat overcome by the environment I was in, and that I wasn't as independent an actor as one might like to be in these circumstances. So whilst I think it was great on a social level, privately I think it's left a few scars on me I would have preferred not to have.

And now this last phase for me has been a commercial capitalist phase. Basically I run a group of family companies. ... So that's been another big change for me, and I guess you wouldn't describe it as an odyssey [laughs]. It's something else. ... And it's been hard for Kate and me to come to terms with the fact that we were involved in the church and the peace movement, and its had its stresses on us being involved commercially in the kind of position I'm in. So that's yet again another sort of journey which has an ongoing dialectic. So that's where I'm at now

The Reverend Les Clements is Director of the N.Z. Peace Foundation and a retired Methodist minister. He was a founding member of the Christian Pacifist Society in 1936, "then the only significant body in New Zealand coming to grips with the problem of participation in war." As a conscientious objector during WW2 he spent "three years, three months and five days" in a prison work camp.

It's always a surprise to me to hear people in the peace movement talking about defensive defence. For to me, pacifism is the only way to go. To become a complete pacifist. I had moments when I wondered whether I was right. And I still have moments. I suppose I'll die not knowing whether I was right. But it was right for me to do it at that time. To me, the only sensible course for people to take is to say, "Well, as for me, I will have no part in this thing." And, naively, I believe that if enough people in the world said that, there wouldn't be any armies.

Of course, a few scientists will fight the next war for us anyway. But ... 'Generals for Peace'; one from the U.K. came here. He said, "I'm not pacifist." He gave me the impression in personal conversation that he was doing this in the British tradition because, "Gad, this was no longer war. Dropping bombs on people's not the thing at all!" [laughs]. But he'd be all for the usual parade-ground stuff, patriotism and so on. I think the battle against militarism is a long way from being over. All we're doing is holding it in check.

I had problems in my nine years in the WCC [World Council of Churches] which is a pretty radical body. But once they got into liberation theology they were prepared to support armed conflict for justice and peace in Latin America. And I had many an argument with that - which was very difficult, because I met many of these radical priests from Latin America who saw nothing incongruous about conducting mass with a machine-gun in their hand. And I used to say to them, "This is exactly the same argument as nation states use. There's never been a modern war that hasn't been fought for the highest ideals. They're all just wars."

So the only thing to do in my book is to say "No" to the lot. But of course, many people argue about the futility of that: "It's very comforting to withdraw and let other people spill their guts." I was often - and still am - rather shaken in my pacifism simply because once the full horror of the Nazi regime came to light you know And you begin to feel "Well, did I stay out of all that?" It certainly stops you from any feelings of self-righteousness, though I don't think I've ever been guilty of that. I've had so many friends in the army who are still my friends. And the whole business becomes so complex. I can argue intelligently WW2 was *not* fought to release the Jews from concentration camps. We went to war for all the old reasons. But emotionally one can't help feeling .. well, maybe in the great scheme of things there was a need for all that blood-letting. That's a dangerous thought too. It's like turning Hiroshima and Nagasaki into a sacramental event. ...

Prison was a terrible place. ... You weren't allowed to have razors of your own. We had to go to the prison barber to be shaved, and they shaved you with a cut-throat razor. ... And there was I, leaning back there with my face lathered with a sharp razor being applied and this guy asked me what I was in for. And I told him I was a C.O. And he waved this razor around my head and said, "I'm in for murder." Still looking at me with the razor poised he said, "It's a bloody funny world isn't it? I'm here for killing someone and you're here for *not* killing someone" [laughs]. In WW2, in proportion to population, we probably had more C.O.s than anyone else. And treated them more harshly than other Western countries - indeterminate sentence to the end of the war, denied right of appeal; Britain and the United States allowed alternative services. They set up detention camps because there were so many of us, but it was just an extension of prison.

There's a significant resistance to war stemming from World War 1. You can trace a thread which has blossomed now. Many young people are unaware of what has gone before. But they're unconsciously influenced by that stream of war resistance. It's just as deep in our history as our warlikeness. We dashed thousands of miles to fight other people's battles. ... When you think of our location, our remoteness from theatres of war, you wonder what the hell we were doing in the trenches of Europe in WW1 and fighting in deserts in WW2 - or in Vietnam or Korea for that matter. We have got this warrior tradition. But we've also got this less well-known pacifist tradition.

Children

Jenny Chapple is a 14 year old student in Auckland and daughter of Dr. Joan Chapple.

I've been going to protest marches since I was five (Joan Chapple: "Not if you didn't want to go"). I *loved* going. I'm wrapped up in the whole anti-nuclear thing. I like living in New Zealand. I wouldn't want to live anywhere else. I feel it is important to be involved; to try to do something. If we get enough people then something's going to change. ...

I only know what I've been told and you don't know if it's biased. I definitely don't think nuclear weapons a good idea. I've heard some arguments for nuclear power, but the waste is just something that's too hazardous. With nuclear weapons - it's all just wipe out cities. I know kids who take drugs to wipe out the fear. At

school they don't do enough - they could write letters, protest. When the *Texas* came in we stopped to protest, but not many people went down to the wharf.

Responses of Jessie (10), Annie (7) and Lucy (6) Boanas to questions devised by N.Z. researchers Rachel Friedlander and Jane Wright.. (Four N.Z. women were asked the same questions).

How would you define peace?

JESSIE

Peace in the world would be great. I would be happy. It probably won't happen in my lifetime. Countries would get along and the leaders would all be friends, sharing. Having the world and most animals protected. There would be no murders or violence or abuse. That's caused when people are really angry inside; upset or uptight.

ANNIE

Peace means to me doing no harm.

LUCY

Stuff being quiet and helping us be living and trying to stop the bomb. A peaceful world, nobody would be naughty - sticking up and lighting bombs. Making lots of noise. I usually dream of happy things, everything's calm, everything that kills you is not around New Zealand or the world, like swords and people in the army. Well if there was a cannon, I'd just put a flag on it, so when it went off all these signs would come out that say peace is quiet and no bombs.

How would you define power?

JESSIE

Control over things. You can push people around.

How would you define power for yourself?

JESSIE

When I handle something I've never done before. It makes me feel good inside

when I can control what I'm doing. And power is responsibility.

ANNIE

Doing something that's good, power to do good things. When I feel powerful I do a good thing and Mum congratulates me. I feel proud.

What vision do you have for a peaceful world? What do you see as crucial for a peaceful world?

JESSIE

It would be men and women equal. No racism. Sharing responsibility in the world, everyone would get on or if they didn't like each other they'd still be polite to them. Everyone would get a fair chance no matter who they were. No one would be homeless.

ANNIE

People not dying, lots of people not doing harm. Everybody would be proud. People would know how other people feel. Animals would be happy.

LUCY

The world would be great. I'd make it into candy floss and swings and slides and do things for other children and other adults and make people change their minds about the bomb. If I could make the world anything I wanted to I'd break down the bombs and stuff without making a sound and make it not hurt anybody, just make flags come out. And everybody who bombs people, they might bomb their wives or their babies and I wouldn't do that. I wouldn't change my mind about stopping the bomb because when I grow up I think all the frigates and bombs are going to be gone. If I found any gold I'd make it into plastic because it's usually not very helpful around the world, it's just a colour.

What priorities do you have for building peace?

JESSIE

Feeling equal to other people. If you're equal with them that counts a lot because you don't feel superior to them or left out because people are supposed to be really big shots.

ANNIE

No killing, not us or anything. Worms, if you kill them you'll be spoiling nature. God, does he know about bombs and everything about that?

PART FOUR

POSTSCRIPT, CONCLUSIONS

*Peace the great meaning has not been defined.
When we say peace as a word, war
As a flare of fire leaps across our eyes.
We went to this school. Think war:
Cancel war, we were taught.
What is left is peace.
No, peace is not left, it is no canceling;
The fierce and human peace is our deep power
Born to us of wish and responsibility.*

- Muriel Ruykeyser

CHAPTER 13

POST-NUCLEAR POLITICS 1987-1990

[W]hat actions can this Government realistically take, both here and abroad, to promote peace? ... How can we advance disarmament in the broader context of our foreign policy in a way which is politically credible and acceptable domestically? How can we advance disarmament in the broader context of our foreign policy in a way which is politically credible internationally and which does not damage other aspects of our security such as our economic interests?

- the Hon. Fran Wilde, Minister for Disarmament, 1989.¹

The Ultimate Dilemma

I stated earlier that the subject of this chapter would be the 'ultimate dilemma' confronting anti-nuclearism. There is, of course, no such thing, either for societies or social movements. All problems exist within bounded contexts and thus any dilemma can be removed or rendered irrelevant through a paradigm shift - although that in itself may constitute a problem.² The ultimate dilemma for anti-nuclear activists - at least for those who also oppose state militarism - exists only within the contemporary world paradigm and revolves around the question of how to prevent the production of new generations of deadly and costly conventional weapons and the consequent risk of major conventional wars if the anti-nuclear goals are achieved. Perhaps the dilemma is more accurately described as being the last for anti-nuclearism and the first for the hypothetical world of post-nuclearism.

If general nuclear disarmament should occur one would presume the conditions

¹ Statement made during the Manawatu Wea Lecture Series, 'Peacemaking in the 90's' A Government Perspective. St. Andrew's Church, Palmerston Nth., April, 1989.

²It could perhaps be argued that an ultimate dilemma for the human species is how to change our behaviour before we destroy ourselves and/or render our earthly habitat uninhabitable. Even in this case, however, there are futurists who predict the creation of an artificial environment in space.

which made this happening possible would include the means of controlling state-sponsored violence, but in the present heavily-armed world of jealous and rivalrous nation-states where racial, ethnic and ideological conflicts are endemic, the dilemma confronting the peace movement of any one country is how to move people and policy-makers in the direction of adopting non-violent strategies for national security if the anti-nuclear goals are achieved unilaterally. As New Zealand is so far the only sovereign state where anti-nuclearism is institutionalized, this 'post-nuclear' problem - and opportunity - is so far unique to the N.Z. peace movement. Events in that country in the final years of the 1980's represent the playing-out of this dilemma for both peace people and policy makers, and are described below.

The Government's Dilemma

For many New Zealanders and for some international observers the actions of the Fourth Labour Government in early 1985 shifted the country from the status of a subservient and insignificant small state in the Western alliance to that of a tiny, courageous nation standing out against the rising tide of nuclear madness. They also created a political and strategic dilemma for the new Government, for what policies come after a hitherto loyal member of the Western alliance rejects not just the presence of nuclear weapons, but the quasi-sacred doctrine of nuclear deterrence itself? If, as David Lange declared at that time, most New Zealanders regard nuclear weapons as not only useless for national security but also immoral, do not wish to be defended by them and will not permit their country to be a cog in the wheel of a nuclear alliance - then what?

The problem of how to translate the newly-acquired domestic and international image of 'peace nation' into practical policy and, even more salient, political viability has continued to haunt the Government - as the words of New Zealand's present Minister for Disarmament quoted at the beginning of this chapter suggest. Although clearly not averse to the country being perceived as a peace nation, the policy-makers of New Zealand seem anxious to avoid charges of political idealism. In a speech delivered to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in Santa Barbara on the occasion of receiving the organization's *1988 Distinguished Peace Leader Award*, David Lange condemned what he called "starry-eyed

interpretations" of his Government's actions, and was adamant that the anti-nuclear stance is "not a pacifist policy, not isolationist, and has no particular political or theological basis."

Some New Zealanders, however, do regard the nuclear-free stance as isolationist, idealistic, ideological - and misguided. An official in the Department of Defence articulated this view when he said of the legislation and its supporters:

It's gone ahead too far, too fast. It's mortgaged very important collective security interests of New Zealand and put in jeopardy a whole lot of very hard-earned professional linkages and contacts around the world. My feeling about people involved in IPPNW and other groups is that they're people who want to be involved in power, but aren't putting up with the traditional realities of power. It's all very worthy and it's very important but it's not somehow confronting the essential problem; that power exists and we have to try and monitor, control it, but not pretend that it's not a factor.

I am worried when a lot of people in this country say, "Oh, but everywhere I go everybody says how nice it is New Zealand is leading the way, and they're so grateful to New Zealand." But nobody in power is saying that. Nobody in any country with any serious commitment to defence interests is saying that. There's no country except maybe Vanuatu and the [then] Bavadra Government in Fiji and perhaps the Solomon Islands who are saying that.

But the important countries for New Zealand, the first four trading partners for New Zealand - the EEC, Australia, Japan and the United States - those four are all of one mind about this sort of problem. All come down firmly in accepting that *collective security* is essential. That a commitment to nuclear deterrence is probably inescapable, and the whole coherence of the West is an important thing.

I think the Government is right about the difficulty of actually staying on board the nuclear train in a small country, and I think the Americans have failed in managing collective security systems well. There was a bit of a take-it-or-leave-it approach to the way this was done. But against this I happen to believe that the collective security arrangement with the United States was an unparalleled opportunity for a tiny country to have its day or two in court in the West. And I tremble, really, for the absence of that.

While there are many New Zealanders who strongly disagree with this attitude and this concept of collective security, and some who favour abolishing the armed forces altogether, most nevertheless recognize that a Costa Rican-style solution³ to the problem of 'what next?' is unlikely at the present time; a view supported by the Defence Review polls. The necessity of offering some pragmatic and democratically viable political alternative to traditional defence strategies and military alliances means that peace people frequently need to do a good deal of 'ideological work,' to again borrow Bennett Berger's useful concept (Berger, 1981, Ch.1). Although some continue to adhere to the principles of pacifism or non-violent civil-based resistance, others settle for advocating some form of low-level defence strategy such as purely defensive non-provocative weapon systems or purely coastal, peace-keeping or civil emergency military forces, along with foreign policies of non-alignment, armed neutrality or positive neutrality.

Thus far, the Government has come down firmly on the side of political realism in confronting the dilemma of 'what next?' The initial response was in line with majority public opinion: namely, keep nuclear weapons out of New Zealand but remain in the ANZUS alliance by labelling it 'non-nuclear'. When this option was effectively torpedoed by Washington, Government policy shifted to the next clear public preference: a strengthening of the bi-lateral defence relationship with Australia. As critics were quick to point out, however, this policy has inherent contradictions for the anti-nuclear stance and the peace nation image. Australia is firmly tied into the (now defined as nuclear) ANZUS alliance, officially supports nuclear deterrence, is committed to furthering U.S. political and strategic interests in the region, willingly hosts the U.S. bases which play a significant role

³ Costa Rica is the only independent state of over a million people which lacks military forces. After the two-month civil war of 1948, the leader of the rebel army, José Figueres Ferrer, became President of the new democracy and took the unprecedented step of disbanding both armies in the belief that in Latin American countries armies pose the greatest threat to democracy and are primarily instruments of domestic oppression. "So when I had the chance to abolish the military, I took it. ... There were two armies, one defeated, one victorious. To disband the defeated army was no problem. First we licked them, then we disbanded them. As for the victorious army, they were all volunteers who wanted nothing else but to go home." (Quoted in Gwynne Dyer, *War*, p. 158). Costa Rica has an armed police force, but its training, equipment and actions are not para-military.

in the nuclear infrastructure and mines and sells uranium (some of it to France). Furthermore, argue the critics, Australia perceives itself as a rising middle-power state and regional superpower and is not only seeking to increase its arms export trade, but under the direction of Defence Minister Kim Beasley is engaging in the largest peace-time military build-up in the country's history.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that adopting any other security policy was regarded by most members of the Cabinet as synonymous with political suicide - and the draconian economic changes were quite suicidal enough. The Government forged ahead with plans for increased economic and military co-operation with Australia while simultaneously taking peace-oriented actions congruent with its new image. These included furthering peace education in schools, funding for some grassroots organizations and the upgrading of disarmament and arms control from one aspect of the Foreign Affairs portfolio to a separate portfolio. The task of assisting and advising the new Minister is shared between the International Security Division of the Ministry of External Relations comprising nine professional diplomatic officers, and PACDAC (Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control), whose eight lay members are broadly representative of the various elements which make up the N.Z. peace movement.

The creation of PACDAC in 1987 was in part an attempt to improve the deteriorating relations between the Government and the peace movement as well as to reinforce the peace nation image at home and abroad. Nevertheless, this step in the direction of the more open government demanded by the Labour Party and grassroots organizations ("No more closed door decisions!") increased the potential for conflict by opening up to public debate the hitherto esoteric issues of foreign policy and defence; areas of decision-making normally regarded by governments everywhere as the exclusive preserve of high-ranking political elites, senior bureaucrats and top military leaders. Increasing conflict between the Party and the Government in virtually all areas of decision-making led in October 1988 to the creation of the 10 five-person policy consultation committees. This further gesture towards grassroots democracy, however, mainly had the effect of drawing the battlelines even more clearly.

Much of the initial conflict and controversy centred around the Government's economic policies, referred to by a visiting Australian correspondent in 1989 as "the savage changes wrought upon the gentle haven across the Tasman."

Unemployment, at about 7.5 percent is historically (but not internationally) high, the Public Service has been slashed, hospital and school administrations have been hacked back, many manufacturing industries have been gutted by cuts in industry protection and there are taxes on every conceivable thing, including consumer goods, livestock and land.

In this rural-based economy many farmers were forced from their land by the removal of subsidies, and the surge in the exchange rate. Farm prices in many areas dropped by 50 percent or more. ... The New Zealand economy has not been merely bleached, it has been burnt and cleared by the fires of the international market.⁴

As we have seen, a major area of dispute with the peace movement was the issue of Government defence spending. The move to strengthen New Zealand's economic and defence ties with Australia led first to the building of the Waihopai satellite base and the sustained peace movement campaign against it, and then to the Hawke Government's request that New Zealand purchase four Australian-built frigates as its contribution to an ANZAC blue-water Navy. As David Lange stated in his (leaked) report to the Cabinet after visiting Canberra for defence talks in August, 1988:

In Mr Beazley's view the region required the protection of a frigate force of some twenty ships. ... Without New Zealand's help, Australia would be three or four ships short of this essential requirement. ... [T]he ships were required ... to deal with more significant regional powers who, by the turn of the century, may have developed a naval capability which could pose a serious threat - especially in the submarine area - to both Australia and New Zealand.⁵

The result of this seemingly modest proposal was the 'No Frigates!' campaign, and one of the most widespread, intense, and passionate public debates in N.Z. history.

⁴ *The Age* (Melbourne). August 29, 1989; p.10.

⁵ Quoted in Nick Brown, "Gung ho' Beazley's sabre-rattling image," *NZ Herald*, May 26, 1989; p.9.

The Battle of the Frigates

On August 10, 1988, a week before his departure for Australia, David Lange gave a foreign policy speech entitled "Facing Realities" at the Institute of International Affairs in Wellington, and delivered "a home-truth" to the peace movement. He began by stressing government responsibility for decision-making and the need for political realism:

... Managing external relations is a key task of government. But on external issues much of what I read and what I hear is nostalgia or wishful thinking. That worries me. The international arena is littered with traps. A country like ours cannot afford to lose sight of the balance between the ideal and the possible. There are risks in forgetting the difference between being principled and being credulous. There is a fine line between idealism and naivete.

He described the political, strategic and economic changes taking place in the world, and the need to lay to rest "the tired old myths" of the Cold War era. "The rules of the late 1980's have changed. The answers are no longer set down for us. We have to be prepared to develop our own." With respect to the region, "the myth of the Pacific as a quiet backwater has gone, ... we can no longer consider the South Pacific as naturally isolated from the rest of the world's problems."

This situation, said the Prime Minister, raises basic and controversial questions about where our security interests lie, how they are to be pursued, and with whom. He continued:

The question of who we work with will always get some strident responses. ... The nuclear debate here threw up some self-appointed spokesmen promoting concepts of alliance that came close to feudalism. ... And then there are those at the other end of the spectrum who are now critical because we have failed to renounce our alliance relationships and turn non-aligned.

Arguments put forward at both extremes are out of touch with reality. The Cold Warriors have been frozen into irrelevance by the passage of time. The proponents of non-alignment, on the other hand, are apt to forget that some important things have not changed. ...

Australia is particularly important in this regard. ... So for this government the question of

turning our back on old friends and wandering off into an international no-man's land simply does not arise. Those natural bonds are fundamental to any debate on our security relationships. Consider that a home-truth.

The Prime Minister concluded his speech by referring directly to the frigate proposal. "Final decisions on replacing the Navy's frigates are some way off," but when that point is reached the Government will "give particular weight to three things. First, the balance of priorities within a limited defence budget. Second, the fact that a regional defence policy for New Zealand makes little sense unless we have the ability to perform certain basic naval tasks. And third, the fact that both for operational reasons and to achieve logistic efficiencies there are compelling arguments for going the same way as the Australians if at all possible."

For many New Zealanders, however, there were much more compelling reasons for *not* doing so.

The Opposition Campaign

In addition to the country's peace activists, a majority of the N.Z. Labour Party and a number of Caucus members opposed the frigate purchase. Labour Party President Ruth Dyson agreed that New Zealand needed to retain a blue-water navy, but said the Party would mount an Anti-Frigate campaign to encourage alternatives to the joint frigate concept more appropriate to the defence needs identified in the Defence Review; these being for civil defence, possible anti-terrorist activity and low-intensity military conflict in the South-west Pacific. Early in 1989, Kate Boanas and Chris Tremewan, co-chairs of the Party's policy committee on foreign affairs and security (one of the conflict consultative committees) called on the Government to scrap all frigate tender options and look at cheaper options, stating that:

... there are serious dangers for New Zealand's well-being, defence and national sovereignty in opting for an expensive, inappropriate class of vessel which functions effectively only in an auxiliary capacity to the Australian Navy". ... Some Ministers seem intent on conjuring up unlikely military threats to justify this enormous expenditure, when it is widely agreed the

international situation is much improved and it is unacceptable for New Zealand to contemplate gunboat diplomacy in the South Pacific.⁶

While many people active in the anti-frigates campaign desired a foreign policy which excludes state-sponsored violence and military alliances altogether, it was tacitly understood that this type of opposition to the frigate purchase - widely referred to as 'the frigate deal' - would be unlikely to persuade the electorate. Thus the opposition focused upon several aspects likely to hit a New Zealand nerve. The arguments the activists hoped the electorate and the Caucus would find more compelling than those put forward by the Prime Minister were:

- (1) the \$2 billion cost of the vessels in a period of high unemployment, reduced social service expenditure and widespread economic hardship;
- (2) the unsuitability of the frigates for New Zealand's defence needs as outlined in the 1987 Defence Review and White Paper;
- (3) the return to a position of subservience to a larger power's interests as the price of maintaining the defence connection;
- (4) the loss of the high moral ground achieved through the anti-nuclear stance by buying into Australia's 'gung-ho' militarism and links with the nuclear war machine;
- (5) the failure to explore alternatives to the frigates or to investigate other, possibly less expensive ways of obtaining them.

The Cabinet continued to insist that the decision had still to be made, while the Australian Government continued to insist that naval co-operation between the two countries depended on their having complementary ships, and that defence co-operation was essential. N.Z. Navy chiefs endorsed this view and argued that the four new frigates were not only necessary but made good financial sense as it was both expensive and inefficient to maintain the present aging fleet. The Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (one of the advisors to the Minister of Disarmament) gave a widely-reported speech in which, like the Prime Minister, he referred to "external interest in

⁶ "Party support for defence needs," *The Press*; (Christchurch) Jan. 28, 1989

the region" and the lost innocence of the South Pacific, stating that "... military coups, civil unrest, liberation struggles and hijacking have all variously occurred there in the past three or four years." The Government, he said, would be retreating from its solemn obligations to its smaller neighbours if it did not go ahead with the purchase. "The whole world is watching whether or not New Zealand buys the frigates."

Chris Tremewan responded to the speech in a newspaper article titled "Kiwi Independence put at Risk."

...Vulnerable to an Exocet launched from the back of a sheep truck, these high-tech frigates are quite unsuitable except to give the navy something to show off behind the bike sheds, and the diplomats a chance to renege on our non-nuclear principles.

Furthermore, argued Tremewan, many technical researchers have shown that "other ships would better suit our new defence objectives, and give New Zealand a blue-water navy at a much lower cost than a \$2 billion dollar donation to rebuild Australia's moribund ship construction industry." What the Ministry of External Trade and Foreign Relations is presenting, declared Tremewan, is not reasoned arguments or technical evidence, but a world view of the standard "us-and-them" Cold War variety. "As the Russians are being particularly unhelpful of late in providing a threat, it is necessary to mutter darkly about an unstable Pacific." But, stated Tremewan,

... the Labour Party does not subscribe to the Ministry's world view. It is committed to an independent foreign policy consistent with New Zealand's own perception of its role as a Pacific nation. ... Rather than seeing our closest neighbours in the Pacific as threats, an independent foreign policy should enable us to consider ways of integrating our defence forces in pursuit of common objectives of peace and economic justice. The potential of this policy cannot be explored when we go running back to our old mates who, in any case, have their own interests at heart more than ours. ...

Perhaps, as Mr. O'Brien said, the whole world is watching us just as they did when we stood up for our non-nuclear principles. But surely they are now wondering whether we are going to sacrifice our hard-won independence just because lobbies of civil servants and Canberra salesmen want to force us back to an outdated world view. Our sovereignty is worth more than four frigates,

whatever their price.

The months passed and the debate raged on. The Labour Party voted at its two conferences to phase out the present Navy frigates in favour of a more appropriate (but still blue-water) fleet, and the opinion polls showed that over 70 percent of New Zealanders opposed the frigate purchase. The Prime Minister declared that two ships may suffice at the present time, and emphasised that money for the new ships would come out of the existing defence budget. Naval officials expressed alarm on both counts. Price-reduction negotiations with Australia continued. There were suggestions that New Zealand might lease, rather than buy the ANZAC frigates and David Lange referred to experts a proposal for buying Danish frigates on hire purchase. An editorial in *The Press*, April 28, 1989 expressed concern about the idea of hiring or leasing the frigates:

The Australian Government so far has been generously accommodating in its attempts to find ways to help New Zealand to the purchase of four new frigates. Some kind of time payment will almost certainly be available, on terms favourable to New Zealand. ... Even critics of the frigate replacement programme would surely prefer that New Zealand owns its ships rather than have them subject to the direction of foreign owners.

Encouraged by the favourable opinion polls, the anti-frigate campaign increased momentum. 'NO FRIGATES!' slogans and posters abounded. One, depicting David Lange and Bob Hawke playing with toy boats in a bathtub, has already been described. Another featured a Rambo-style Kim Beasley with frigate-guns blazing from both hips, accompanied by the captions: "HE'S BACK... HIDE YOUR WALLETS!" and "ONLY THE N.Z. PUBLIC COULD STOP HIM." The Chair of the Australian parliamentary South Pacific Sub-committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade visited New Zealand and told reporters he was "stunned" by the extent of the debate. "We cannot quite comprehend the severity of it." If New Zealand opted not to participate in the program, he said, it would be virtually impossible for the two navies to exercise together because the ships would not be compatible. He expressed the belief that the large economic benefits of sharing in the project were not appreciated.

Infighting between David Lange and Finance Minister Roger Douglas over some aspects of economic policy as well as the latter's bid for leadership had led in late 1988 to the sacking of Rogers and the appointment of David Caygill to the post. The slight softening of 'Rogernomics' seemed to have little impact on public opinion. In early April, 1989, a national poll showed that support for the Government was at a record low of 34 percent, while support for the National Party had risen to 58 percent; the largest gap since the Government took office. David Lange's rating in the 'preferred Prime Minister' vote fell to 14 percent, the lowest rating of any N.Z. Prime Minister, while the vote for the leader of the Opposition dropped by one point to 11 points. The M.P. receiving the highest popularity rating was Maori lawyer and National Party member, Winston Peters, who scored 19 percent.

The Trouble with ANZUS

In April 1989, David Lange addressed an audience at Yale University. Shortly before leaving New Zealand the Prime Minister was interviewed in his Wellington office by a *TIME* magazine correspondent who asked: "You're going to the U.S. but you are not seeing anyone in the Administration. What does that say about U.S.-New Zealand relations?" The Prime Minister replied, "It says the U.S. deems it important not to have any upper-ranking contact with anyone from New Zealand. That's their decision, not ours". Questioned about why support for his Government was declining, he said: "... 160,000 unemployed in a population of 3.3 million, and disunity in the Party. It's as simple as that."⁷

April 25 is Anzac Day in Australia and New Zealand; the traditional day for commemorating the war dead and a ritual celebration of national identity. The acronym stands for 'Australian and New Zealand Army Corps'; the date is that of the bungled and ill-fated battle of Gallipoli in WW 1, when thousands of Anzacs died on a Turkish beach. The massacre is said to have marked the coming of age of Britain's two former colonies, and on this day each year veterans march through the streets to memorial shrines, gathering afterwards for reunion parties. Although with the passage of time Anzac Day has become

⁷ *Time*, May 8, 1989.

both less significant and more controversial it continues to be an important ritual occasion for many Australians and New Zealanders, and is particularly so for returned servicemen's associations.

It was on Anzac Day, 1989, that David Lange delivered the lecture at Yale. He began by saying that it was "... difficult for Americans to understand why in New Zealand politics the nuclear issue became and remains part of main stream politics, and is not, as tends to happen elsewhere, regarded as a fringe issue." He gave reasons for why this was so, and emphasised that nuclear weapons would continue to be excluded from New Zealand. What [then] Secretary Shultz had called "corrective measures" would not be taken. Neither, he said, did New Zealand now expect that the United States Government would change its position.

The conclusion is obvious. There is not and cannot be any security alliance between the United States and New Zealand. There can be no going back to the way it was.

The lesson is plain. In the end it proved impossible for a small country to maintain a security alliance with a nuclear power on any terms other than those set by the nuclear power. For all of that, our belief that we were right to say 'No' to nuclear weapons is if anything stronger now than it was five years ago. The price of that belief was the security alliance with the United States. It is a price which New Zealand is prepared to pay.

David Lange called the alliance "a dead letter" and towards the end of the address said:

The basis of the alliance was a commitment to consult, and consultations have stopped. If this sterile situation continues for long, New Zealand ought to address the question of whether there is any relevance in remaining formally part of a security arrangement which provides for ministerial meetings in which we are no longer able to participate. This raises the issue of whether New Zealand should give formal notice of withdrawal from the ANZUS Council. The treaty allows for that.⁸

Different elements of the lecture suggested that the 'No Frigates Campaign' may or

⁸ From the full text of the speech printed in *Otago Daily Times* (Dunedin); April 28, 1989; p.4.

may not be about to score a victory. On the one hand, the Prime Minister said that New Zealand was totally committed to developing greater regional self-reliance and spoke of the common interests of maintaining defence links with Australia, one of these being the joint purchase of equipment. On the other, he emphasised that "military force is far from the most important element in the security of the South Pacific" and went on to say:

I believe we are seeing [in the post-cold war environment] a new willingness to accept that security cannot be guaranteed solely by military means. There is an acceptance that to the extent that military preparedness consumes resources that would otherwise be available for more productive uses it limits the economic growth, which is in the long term such a crucial element in every country's security. And above all there is an acceptance that for modern society, warfare as an instrument of public policy is becoming obsolete because the costs far outweigh any potential gains.

Reports of the speech the next day created something of a furore in New Zealand and provoked much critical comment. The editor of one conservative newspaper wrote that the "continuing uncertainty about our contribution to regional defence ... is creating the impression that the Government has become dangerously slack about its handling of security matters." Opposition leader Jim Bolger declared: "This time, David Lange has gone too far. On Anzac Day of all days, he chooses to break his own pledge that the ANZUS Treaty will survive and continue under his Government. To make an announcement of this nature in the United States on this particular day is insensitive, arrogant and wrong." The Opposition spokesman for Foreign Affairs said the Prime Minister's suggestion of withdrawal was another step in New Zealand's "stop-the-world-I-want-to-get-off" mentality.

Acting Prime Minister and Deputy Leader Geoffrey Palmer summoned senior members of Cabinet to his office. Afterwards he informed the press that it would remain to be seen whether the Cabinet would endorse Mr. Lange's proposal. "It would be very premature therefore to speculate on the outcome ... and wrong to expect a quick decision. Nothing has changed very much as a result of that speech, and I don't think very much will change as a result of that speech." Palmer reminded the House that New Zealand could not

withdraw from ANZUS, only from the ANZUS Council, and the Foreign Affairs Minister pointed out that New Zealand had already been suspended from the ANZUS Council by the United States. He said he found it strange that senior American officials, including the President, could meet with Soviet leaders but refuse to hold talks with a country still described as a friend.

Across the Tasman, the Hawke Government expressed concern and regret that "New Zealand seems bent on this course, which will obviously make it more difficult at the end of the day to put the three-way pieces of the ANZUS treaty back together again". (The 'end of the day' presumably being when N.Z.'s Fourth Labour Government is defeated at the polls). Defence Minister Kim Beasley, chief negotiator for the frigate sale, said that while it had always been Australia's hope that the ANZUS arrangement had only been interrupted, not ended, it was a bi-lateral issue between New Zealand and the United States. Australia would not enter into the dispute, and the working defence relationship with New Zealand would continue. A U.S. State Department spokesman also expressed regret at the proposal for formal withdrawal. Vice-President Dan Quayle, soon to depart for an official four-day visit to Australia, declared that New Zealand would be welcomed back "with open arms" into ANZUS "if the anti-nuclear policy is reversed."

At a press conference after the speech David Lange said, "The electorate knows one thing above all others; that if we are back in, we're back in boots and all with the bomb. That is the fact". Withdrawal was a matter for the Cabinet to decide, and was not urgent. He made no apology for his choice of Anzac Day ... "It was the proper day to do that". Asked whether colleagues had been informed about the substance of his lecture, the Prime Minister said that key N.Z. Ministers, the Australian Government and the U.S. State Department had all received transcripts. (According to press reports, P.M. Hawke and Acting P.M. Palmer received copies of the speech the evening before it was delivered). He agreed with the suggestion that withdrawal from ANZUS could force the National Party into declaring its position on nuclear-ship visits. "It would be interesting to see them have to do that, because they changed their minds at the last election."

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The Prime Minister left for Ottawa the following day for talks with his Canadian counterpart, and was clearly angry at the turn of events. During a television interview that evening he said, "I don't think that in my political life I have ever seen such a consistent campaign to wilfully misrepresent what happened." He attacked "venal journalists" for their coverage of his speech, and said "gutless liars" were using "compliant journalists" for their own ends designed exclusively to have nuclear weapons come into New Zealand". Asked whether he thought some of the stories might be emanating from colleagues unhappy with his leadership, he replied, "That's a matter for proper analysis and careful thought. I don't know."⁹

If David Lange had in mind the October 1990 general election when making his speech, and if one aim was to emphasise the only widely-approved policy of the Government and improve relations with the Party and the peace movement, he had limited success. Nicky Hager told a Wellington reporter that while the 'No Frigates Campaign' welcomed the proposal to formally withdraw from ANZUS as a positive move towards an independent foreign policy, "to win public backing the Government must match its words with actions." He questioned the Prime Minister's motives for making the announcement a few weeks before the ship purchase decision, and said "withdrawing from ANZUS will only mean something if the Government gives effect to the policy through actions like not buying new frigates."

If, as most commentators suggested, the prime aim of the Yale speech was to force the Opposition to either renege on its long-established policy of accepting ship visits, or declare a policy opposed by the majority of the electorate, the Prime Minister succeeded in exposing contradiction. National's Deputy Leader Don McKinnon, in Washington for talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, said in a radio interview that "visits by American or British ships which might be nuclear-armed was not a high price to pay for security and partnership in an alliance which had served New Zealand for a long time." In Wellington, however, Opposition leader Jim Bolger told reporters that his Party would seek an agreement with the United States "which would respect New Zealand's wish to

⁹ Quotations drawn from a variety of Australian and New Zealand press statements.

remain nuclear-free." Asked about the Deputy Leader's statements, Bolger said that "Mr. McKinnon had been speaking of the previous policy of National before Labour took office in 1984." Many other countries had anti-nuclear policies while retaining ship visits and any arrangement had to be built on mutual trust. "We're not proposing to enter into any alliance with any government which we can't trust." As most New Zealanders do *not* trust the U.S. government on this issue, the Opposition policy was widely-regarded as tantamount to a return to the pre-1984 *status quo*.

Arrows Across the Tasman

Few Australians and New Zealanders would dispute David Lange's claim that a special family relationship exists between their two countries. Nevertheless, it is one which contains a good deal of sibling (or cousin) rivalry: a semi-humorous, semi-serious, mutually derisive relationship said to originate in the difference between having British convicts or British gentlemen as pioneers or forbears. The traditional negative stereotypes are of Australians as crude, brash and bossy and New Zealanders as smug, stodgy and out-of-date. The youth of New Zealand visit Australia much more often than the reverse, often combining extended travel or surfing holidays with temporary jobs, and some even contrive to receive the unemployment allowance (known in Australia as 'the dole'). Hence 'parasitic' has now been added to the traditional stereotype of New Zealanders in Australia. A new co-operative trade and immigration agreement between the two countries has resulted in a recent influx of New Zealanders to Australia, but as that country is highly unionized and highly strike-prone with its own unemployment and economic problems, their increased presence and propensity for 'scab labour' are causing resentment. Some Australian politicians are demanding an end to free entry, and the Australian Workers' Union has warned New Zealand tourists to keep out of country towns.

The frigate controversy brought to the surface the latent, always-present tensions between the two countries. An article in the *N Z Herald* (May 26, 1989) with the title: "Aussie whingeing: is it a matter of CONVICTion?" expressed the sentiments of many citizens east of the Tasman. The article began: "Well strike me, mate. The Aussies are getting downright upset over those New Zealanders who go around saying they do not

want the country to pay heaps for frigates when we can get them cheaper somewhere else, if we want them at all. This is not just unfriendly, the Aussies complain, but anti-Australian." The writer quoted a Northern Australian politician's statement that he could "understand ... Kiwis wanting to escape a country where the currency is almost useless, industry is in decline and the Government is so anti-American it wants to put the whole South Pacific at risk." The article concluded:

Down south, Victorian labour official Mr. Michael Danby painted New Zealand as a bunch of dole-bludgers seeking a free ride on Australia's back and warned of a "pitch of resentment" against the country reaching almost screaming point. The federal Opposition fumed we were a lousy bunch leaving Australia in the lurch, especially that ingrate Mr. Lange.

Not only do a bunch of back-stabbing Kiwis want to stop the Government spending good Aussie dollars on good Aussie boats to keep good Aussies in good jobs, but apparently we are not even talking about our own defence in buying boats. We are talking about Australia's defence.

Well, what can you say? Pardon us, we did not mean to sound unfriendly?¹⁰

Tempers were heating up, but the Government continued to cool its heels on the frigate decision.

New Leaders, Old Policies and People Power

On August 7, 1989, David Lange announced his resignation as Prime Minister. He stated that several factors had led to this decision, although the only one specifically mentioned was health.¹¹ His family was concerned about the toll the job had taken on his health, and his doctor had advised him that continuing in the office of prime minister would be incompatible with continuing good health. "It is important," he said, "that we have a prime minister who will be the person to lead New Zealand in the 1990's. I regret that I will not be that person. It is only fair that the new prime minister be given time to establish

¹⁰ Staff writer Greg Ansley; p.9. 'Whingeing' means complaining, and a 'dole bludger' is someone who chooses to live on the unemployment allowance.

¹¹ David Lange has separated from his wife, and publicly admitted to a long-time affair with his speech writer with whom he is now living.

himself or herself in the next fourteen months before the general election." He referred to the "invigorating changes" which had taken place in the last five years, and said he left with a sense of achievement as well as regret.

On August 8, the Labour Caucus elected Deputy P.M. Geoffrey Palmer to lead the Government, and Helen Clark (of whom David Lange has said "She's so dry she's combustible") became New Zealand's first woman Deputy Prime Minister.¹² At the press conference following the election, the new Prime Minister said in response to questions about the frigate purchase, "I have deliberately refrained from making up my mind about that matter until such time as we see what the final bids are." Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke sent his congratulations along with the message that Australia saw New Zealand's participation in the frigate project as vital for the defence relationship. Hawke told reporters: "You can't have a position where it's essentially all one-way. ... where they want to be part of a co-operative defence relationship but essentially do it on the cheap."

The 'honeymoon period' of the new leadership began. Opinion polls showed a sharp rise in Labour's popularity, and there was conjecture that the Government might even have a chance of winning the October 1990 election. The honeymoon was helped by signs of economic recovery. In the words of an Australian newspaper reporter, "With splendid timing for the government of the new Labor Prime Minister, economic news has emerged that Australia's Treasure, Mr. Keating, would kill for: New Zealand's first quarterly balance of payments surplus in 16 years, and home mortgage rates dropping below 15 percent with further falls likely." Finance Minister David Caygill said that "for the past year the New Zealand economy has had a better press internationally than locally" and that that

¹² Geoffrey Palmer holds political science and law degrees from Wellington University, and has a Doctor of Law degree from the University of Chicago. Before entering Parliament in 1979 he was a law professor at Iowa University and Virginia University, and a Visiting Fellow at Oxford. He became Deputy Prime Minister in 1983. Helen Clark has an M.A. in Political Science from Auckland University, and lectured in that university's politics department until her entry to Parliament in 1981. She is a strong supporter of the nuclear-free policies, and chaired the committee responsible for drafting the legislation. She shared with Maori activist, Hilda Halkyard, the 1986 Danish Peace Prize for promoting international peace and disarmament.

was understandable. "When you have gone through the hell of it, when you have been through the pain and agony here, you still feel miserable for a long time afterwards."¹³

On September 7, the Prime Minister announced to the House that the Government had decided to purchase two frigates from Australia as the first step in replacing the four aging frigates of the RNZN. The ships would be delivered in 1997 or 1998, with an option for the government of the day to place orders for two more in the mid-90's. Geoffrey Palmer outlined the decision process and gave reasons for its outcome. These were, in brief, that the Anzac ship is capable of meeting the full range of tasks envisaged by the 1987 Defence Review, that it would be "irresponsible in the extreme" to decide upon a ship that could not defend itself, that the highest priority in a limited defence budget was the replacement of the frigates, that the project not only stands on its own merits but has worthwhile industrial spin-off in terms of supplies and maintenance - this being the first large defence capital purchase where New Zealand suppliers have had such an opportunity - and that New Zealand's participation in the program would assure full access to defence procurement on the same basis as Australian suppliers.

The Prime Minister continued:

... The single characteristic which has predominated in the Government's approach to this complex question has been a sense of responsibility. We carry the responsibility for securing an independent foreign policy which is neither isolationist nor subservient. If we are to remain a source of assistance for our friends and neighbours in times of trouble we must have a means of discharging those responsibilities. If we are to provide properly for the protection of our region's resources and its basic security we must have the means to do so. ...

I invite the House to close ranks behind this decision and give it the support it merits. We are sending a signal about our sense of responsibility and commitment to the peace and security of the region that lies beyond our shores.¹⁴

In the snap debate which followed the Prime Minister's speech the Leader of the

¹³ "After pain, NZ's economy begins to flourish." Mark Metherell, *The Age* (Melbourne) August 29, 1989.

¹⁴ "Why N.Z. bought the frigates." Text of the Prime Minister's statement in *The Press*, Sept. 8, 1989.

Opposition described the frigates as the most expensive fisheries patrol craft in the world. He said that until the Government changed its defence and foreign policy the frigates were merely expensive white elephants, but if New Zealand rejoined the ANZUS alliance the frigate purchase made sense. The popular Mr. Winston Peters denounced the decision, and said he was "utterly and completely opposed to the frigate purchase" which he described as "economic and social lunacy." While Labour had created a growing number of poor, it had decided to spend \$1 billion on frigates. The purchase was the first step back to a nuclear policy for New Zealand, and it was being made by a Government which claimed otherwise.

An editorial in *The Press* included the full text of the Prime Minister's speech and typified the conservative media reaction. The article was headed: "Right Decision on Frigates" and the writer commended the purchase on three grounds. First, because it is "a demonstration that New Zealand is prepared to look after itself. That is an integral part of sovereignty." Second, it "maintains good relations with Australia and ensures continuing co-operation ... in a host of fields." Third, it "will reassure some of the South Pacific island countries that New Zealand treats their security as seriously as it treats its own and should help maintain stability in the region." The Government had chosen to make a decision unpopular with a great many of its supporters and this is why it could be described as "highly responsible."

"Two silly and irresponsible statements" were made during the debate, stated the editor, by "people who should have known better." The first came from Labour Party President, Ruth Dyson, who "in an eleventh hour bid to sway Caucus members ... suggested that a bad Australian reaction would create a wave of support for the Government. This is little better than a cynical attempt to exploit the feelings of one people against another." The second came from Opposition leader, Jim Bolger, "who persisted in describing the purchase of the frigates as good for nothing more than fisheries patrol unless the New Zealand Navy is co-operating with a larger unit." The article concluded:

... The decision was the first major foreign policy test for Mr. Palmer as Prime Minister. He showed himself determined not to be rushed into a decision either way, not to be prepared to sacrifice the country's overall interests for the sake of temporary political popularity, and to be prepared to allow his colleagues to think through the full implications of the decision they had to make. It augurs well for the Palmer Prime Ministership.

The Labour Party, however, thought otherwise:

The "Party Uproar"

Two days before the frigate announcement, Kate Boanas and Chris Tremewan met with the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Foreign Minister as part of the consultation process, and presented a paper dated September 5, 1989. Although confidential, aspects of the Committee's report soon began appearing in the media. On September 18, a full account was published in *The Evening Post* under the title: "INDEPENDENCE. The real Labour Party plan for foreign policy." A staff writer declared that the paper would provide "a valuable backdrop" for the foreign policy review whose terms of reference were now being considered by Cabinet following "the Party uproar over the Anzac frigate project decision."

Publication of the report revealed the large gap between the Government and the Party on the issue. The major points made by the Committee were, in sum:

(1) The nuclear-free policy of itself does not constitute a foreign policy, but was an important first step in clearing away dangerous, anachronistic defence relationships which had prevented genuine independence in both foreign and defence policy. If the Government proceeds with the frigate purchase, however, it will be the last.

(2) The anti-nuclear stance resonated through the world as a stand of enlightened principle; a small sign of hope in a hopeless time, and offered an opportunity to New Zealanders to move in new directions. "We no longer had to subscribe to the deadly militarist politics of superpower blocs ... the way was open for New Zealand to prosper as an independent nation which was respected for its beliefs and principles, and which was

not part of any grand strategy of military repression, foreign intervention or nuclear holocaust."

(3) Despite suspension from ANZUS, New Zealand's foreign and defence policy continues to be predicated on a subsidiary military role within the ANZUS relationship, whose strategy of military interventionism remains a direct derivation of 19th. century gunboat diplomacy. The militarism and arms build-up occurring in Australia is directly related to a strategy for the projection of armed force from Australian territory into its sphere of interest. By purchasing the Anzac frigates, New Zealand forms a dependent and secondary part of this strategy of interventionism, and will bear much of the odium for it. The purchase means New Zealand will not only be assenting to this policy, but will economically and politically bind itself to it for a generation.

(4) At a meeting on August 21, senior Cabinet Ministers were unable to give a clear account to Committee members of the Government's foreign policy in the South Pacific, or of the developments in the region which made the frigate purchase necessary. Their answers suggested that it was based on an historical need to associate with more powerful Western allies in order to derive political patronage, rather than a realistic assessment of New Zealand's needs as an independent country.¹⁵

The Report accused the New Zealand armed forces, particularly the Navy and Chiefs of Staff, of playing a political role in lobbying for the frigate purchase, and said there were "ominous implications in this for the future role of the military in New Zealand politics." Another questionable aspect noted was the lack of independent expert advice to the Government both in foreign policy and technical areas, and the failure to investigate other policy options to the frigate purchase such as the establishment of a co-operative network of facilities for disaster relief, search and rescue operations, fisheries protection, resource management and security. The report recommended that New Zealand:

- formally withdraw from all military alliances and agreements with any nuclear-armed nation,

¹⁵ Article by staff writer Roger Foley, p. 8

and from all agreements which may contribute to the targeting, maintenance, deployment or transit of nuclear weapons;

- stop foreign military and intelligence use of bases such as Harewood, Black Birch, Tangmoana and Waihopai;
- ensure that armed forces will be used abroad only in response to U.N. requests, disaster relief, safe evacuation of New Zealand citizens or aid to Pacific Island states for whom New Zealand has a constitutional responsibility;
- integrate the armed forces, Economic Zone protection and civil defence organization;
- review equipment needs, both military and non-military, for a genuinely independent foreign policy.

The final section of the report urged the Government to formally review N.Z. foreign policy and its policy instruments and legislate for annual funding equivalent to at least one day's defence spending to be used for the establishment of peace and disarmament education and research, training programmes for conflict resolution and mediation and investigating ways of promoting positive peacemaking and genuine independence. The Committee favoured an increase in foreign aid to an amount equal to 0.7 of the GNP, and asked that the Government speak out in support of issues relating to sovereignty and self-determination. Soon after the parliamentary vote on the frigate purchase, press reports declared that Labour policy groups were "bitter" at the Government's "rejection" of their advice, and were branding the consultation process a farce. The security and foreign policy committee said it had not been consulted officially on the decision to buy the frigates until late August, "too late to have much influence on the process." Other committees had similar complaints. A member of the education, health and social welfare group said, "We have to go back to the Labour Party conference and say to them that the consultative process is obviously not working. We need stronger measures to hold the parliamentary caucus accountable."¹⁶

The Prime Minister's statement concerning the need for a fresh South Pacific policy showing some "vision" and the promise of a foreign policy review was generally interpreted by commentators as "a sop" to the Party to ease the pains of defeat. Members of the Policy Committee declared that to make the decision before holding the review was

¹⁶ *The Herald*, Sept. 9, 1989.

to pre-empt its conclusions, and was like "putting the cart before the horse." There were reverberations across the Tasman. Aspects of the report appeared on the front page of the highly-conservative national newspaper *The Australian* under the headline: "Now we are warmongers," and Defence Minister Kim Beasley described the charge of militarism as "unmitigated baloney." Chris Tremewan and Kate Boanas were interviewed on Australia's national radio, and their statements on the subject were broadcast throughout the country.

An elder N.Z. journalist, E. P. Reeves, expressed - if with some hyperbole - the sentiments of many frigate opponents. In an article called "Courage sunk by the frigates" he declared that the Government's "international standing and courage had run out after lowering the boom on nuclear warship visits; ... a brave, some would say foolhardy, stroke with political repercussions ... predictable to most people though not, surprisingly, to the Government itself." The reason we are buying the frigates, said the writer, is "because we are frightened. ...It is not a foe or a potential foe that makes us afraid, ... but our friends. We are scared of what they will do to us if we refuse to play in their league. The most powerful leverage in purchasing these Australian-built ships at unaffordable cost has been the fear of the consequences of not buying."

Furthermore, he argued, the "conscienceless argument that participation in the programme will boost the economy has exerted greater force within the Government Caucus than the paramount question of whether the frigates advance New Zealand's defence needs or whether they are affordable." The article concluded:

The price of the frigates to the country's purse-strings is steep enough. The cost of the nation's independence, standing and ultimate security will be much more. We are to become a pliant junior partner in the new militarism which Mr. Beasley unabashedly fashions for Australia. These frigates cost us our soul. We surrender the high moral ground and the goodwill that walking away from the bomb gifted us. We bloody our hands in the armaments industry like any merchant of death. We commit ourselves to go where Australia takes us, and the path leads unheroically back into the nuclear embrace of ANZUS.¹⁷

¹⁷ E. P. Reeves. Source not known.

The dire prophecy was almost immediately fulfilled. In the first week of November, 1989, U.S. Secretary of State Jim Baker was in Canberra for the now bi-partite ANZUS talks. The Australian Government, which up until this time had refused to play a mediatory role in the ANZUS dispute, asked that New Zealand be readmitted to the alliance (a request made, one presumes, with the knowledge if not at the behest of the New Zealand Government). The United States refused. Until such time as New Zealand changed its policy on the acceptance of nuclear ship visits, said Secy. Baker, no alliance was possible. Once again, Washington had performed a service to the N.Z. peace movement. Where the new Administration did shift ground, however, was to indicate that the United States would drop its opposition to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty when the issue was raised at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations.

The Evening Post editorial quoted above declared that "...the frigates became a symbol for the anti-defence lobby." This appears to be the case, although not all who opposed them were opposed to defence *per se*. While the primary goal was not achieved, the number of frigates purchased at this time was halved, and it seems the Campaign almost scored a victory. Kate Boanas writes, "I have just discovered we stood a very good chance of winning the frigates if Lange had not decided to resign ... We lost by only a few votes, and a few MP's on our side were out of the country. If there had not been a block vote for the Cabinet, we would have won."¹⁸

She said of the consultative meetings with Cabinet members preceding the vote on the frigates:

Of course they weren't interested in listening to us - they had made up their minds years ago to proceed. However, we have certainly won the public education side, and the Defence will never again be able to try and push through expensive, over-sophisticated, state-of-the-art high-tech gear. ... I think that, come 1995, when we are to decide whether to proceed with the option of another 2 ships, no Government - right or left, will take on the population again. ... There are very few women who support the purchase. The debate about foreign policy and what constitutes security has been opened up, and life will never be the same on that front either.¹⁹

¹⁸ Private correspondence; Sept. 27, 1989. Deputy P.M. Helen Clark, an opponent of the frigate purchase, was on holiday and out of the country when the vote was taken.

When the political elites of New Zealand created structures for the input of the political will of ordinary - often 'ornery' - citizens into the decision-making process they probably had little notion they were fashioning the outlines of a Pandora's Box. It seems clear that the ten Conflict Committees and PACDAC are not working as either side intended - too much interference for the Government, too little influence for the citizens. Nevertheless, Kate Boanas may well be right that life in New Zealand after the great battle of the frigates "will never be the same."

The Triumph of People Power

The peace activists of New Zealand so far have been unable to prevent an increase in defence expenditure (from 2 percent to 3 percent of the budget) and the purchase of conventional weaponry, and have failed to steer the policy-makers in the direction of new thinking about national security. The contentious bases remain intact, the Waihopai satellite is finished and functioning and the frigates will be purchased. Nevertheless, March 8, 1990 was for the peace movement and its supporters a day of triumph, although it very likely signalled the defeat of the Government at the October election. One week earlier, U.S. Secretary of State, Jim Baker, had agreed to meet with N.Z. Foreign Minister Mike Moore in Washington, the first high-level Government contact between the two countries since the rejection of the *Buchanan*. In announcing the meeting, the Prime Minister stressed that "Our nuclear policy is non-negotiable ... there has been no change of that sort and there will be none." The U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Della Newman, similarly stressed that the meeting did not mean "that the U.S. is in any way abandoning its position on the basic differences over security matters."²⁰

One week after the Washington meeting, in what the *Dominion* next day called "a staggering policy reversal," the National Party adopted the Government's policy of banning nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships from New Zealand's ports. In explaining the reason for the policy reversal, Jim Bolger said that "National's old policy could have

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ "U.S. change of heart won't alter policy." *Herald* (Aust.), March 2, 1990.

divided Caucus and thrown the country into Springbok tour-like chaos." Deputy Opposition leader Don McKinnon immediately resigned as his Party's Defence spokesman, saying "he could not with any credibility sell such a policy switch to allies like Australia or America, or to the defence forces." Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer described the decision as "[o]ne of the greatest political somersaults in New Zealand's history." Chief of Defence Staff Sir Ewan Jamieson said, "I'm saddened by it, not embittered by it. ... We are going to repent at leisure." American Embassy officials refused to comment.

When announcing the new policy, Jim Bolger said that "while guaranteeing that under a National Government no nuclear weapons would be brought into New Zealand," the Party "would still seek to return the country to membership in ANZUS or ANZUS-type security arrangements." Don McKinnon said that National would not be able to rejoin the alliance under these terms, and that "ANZUS is, in effect, a dead issue for the National Party." Two days later he was interviewed on Australian national radio and stated:

New Zealand must have the most powerful and well-organized peace movement in the world. I fought against it, but I don't mind being beaten on this issue because ultimately the will of the people will prevail.²¹

The cover of the April 1990 issue of *Peacelink* featured a cartoon of the 'marriage' of Jim Bolger, dressed as a bride, to Geoffrey Palmer. Both wear large CND badges, and a balloon caption reveals that the 'bride' is thinking: "IF YOU CAN'T BEAT 'EM" Inside the magazine is an article by Nicky Hager entitled, "One of the Greatest Political Somersaults in NZ's History." He writes:

After the Labour Government's disgraceful frigate decision it was easy to feel a little discouraged about the democratic process. If so, then the remarkable decision by the National Party to go nuclear-free reminds us just how effective a public movement can be. ... Thanks to the work of peace groups since 1984, keeping the issue alive and before the public, National's policy was becoming more and more of an embarrassment to them. Nevertheless, it was a remarkable change which none of us really expected to happen so quickly.

²² "What the Nats Said", *Peacelink*, April 1990, No. 80. (Quotes from *The Dominion* reprinted in *Peacelink*).

The significance of this decision is enormous. Not long ago New Zealand's nuclear stand was regarded as extreme and temporary. It is now being described as a consensus foreign policy position and we have every reason to expect it to be permanent. Internationally, the example of an uncompromising bi-partisan nuclear-free policy is almost as important for influencing other countries as the nuclear ship ban itself was in 1985.

As the push comes around the world for serious naval disarmament, the example of a conservative party challenging the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy and supporting a strong peace initiative should be very potent. It can't help but be noticed in countries such as Sweden where there is a possibility of adopting a nuclear ship ban later this year and all that is needed is a bit more courage from the politicians concerned. ...

The article concludes with the contention that the decision raises two challenges for the N.Z. peace movement. One is to consolidate National's decision "so that whenever it is next in government, the policy will survive the overseas pressures and inducements to back down." The other is "to decide where best to focus our efforts in the years ahead" now that the nuclear-free policy "is ... much more secure" and "public opinion, ... as expressed resoundingly in the frigates campaign, is behind us to work in all sorts of new directions."

Whether the adoption of a bi-partisan nuclear-free policy marks the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning for peace activism in New Zealand remains to be seen. Time and events do not stand still, but for the moment and for the peace movement at least, the long odyssey of Nuclear Free New Zealand has a happy ending.

CHAPTER 15

"WHY THE KIWI DISEASE?" (AND WHY NOT THE AUSSIE?)

... It is my conviction that there is no moral case for nuclear weapons. The best defence which can be made of their existence and the threat of their use is ... that they are a necessary evil, an abhorrent means to a desirable end. I hold that the character of nuclear weapons is such that their very existence corrupts the best of intentions, that the means, in fact, perverts the end. And I hold that their character is such that they have brought us to the greatest of all perversers, the belief that this evil is necessary ... when, in fact, it is not.

The appalling character of these weapons has robbed us of our right to determine our destiny and subordinated our humanity to their manic logic. They have subordinated reason to irrationality, and placed our will to live in hostage. Rejecting the logic of nuclear weapons does not mean surrendering to evil. Evil must still be guarded against. Rejecting nuclear weapons is to assert what is human over the evil nature of the weapons. It is to restore to humanity the power of decision; it is to allow a moral force to reign supreme; it stops the macho lurch into mutual madness. And for me, the position of my country is a genuine long-term affirmation of this proposition "that nuclear weapons are morally indefensible" and I support that proposition.

- David Lange, "That Nuclear Weapons are Morally Indefensible."

Oxford Debate, 1985

New Zealand is so far the only sovereign state to legislate against any involvement with nuclear weapons by the state or its citizens, and to formally reject the concept and strategy of nuclear deterrence. The time has come to confront the question of why this should be so; why this outcome to the battle between the truth of nuclearism and the truth of anti-nuclearism in this small country down under? The answer which immediately comes to mind is New Zealand's remoteness from the theatres of war, but Australia is almost as remote, and yet its major political parties have bi-partisan policies on the acceptance of nuclear ship visits, the presence of the U.S. bases, uranium mining and the ANZUS alliance, while the peace movement has achieved none of its oppositional goals.

The success or failure of peace movements cannot, of course, be measured solely in quantifiable or instrumental terms. As well as seeking to increase membership and persuade governments to change their policies, such movements typically have qualitative, universalistic, long-term goals which may or may not be realized as a consequence of today's seemingly failed actions. But if success *is* measured in terms of a small group's ability to turn pervasive anti-nuclear sentiments within a society into a mass social movement and have a new government stand by its anti-nuclear policies when put to the test by the superpower, then the success of the N.Z. peace movement is indubitable.

Equally without doubt, the immediate cause of the success of anti-nuclearism in New Zealand was this existence of a major political party with a history of strong anti-nuclear policies, and, even more important, continued adherence to them when the Party came to power. In all other western countries, such parties either do not succeed at the polls, or their leaders circumvent or reverse the policies if they do - as was the case with the Australian Labor Party in 1983. The point was emphasised by Helen Clark during a speech at the University of Denver in 1987:

There seems to be a tacit expectation on the part of the United States that when a new allied government takes office it will 'talk down' the country's peace movement, regardless of any pre-election policies or campaign promises. What happened in New Zealand was that the Labour Party not only stood by its policies when it came to power; it 'talked up' the peace movement, as it were, by turning the policies into law.

West German academic Josef Joffe has addressed the question of the failure of the second European anti-nuclear movement. He writes:

At the threshold of the 1980's, an old specter returned to haunt Europe - the specter of neutralism and nuclear pacifism. A thriving peace movement ... set out to batter the foundations of established security policy. In terms of noise and numbers, the domestic war over the "Euromissiles" was the most ... impressive display of populist muscle in the postwar era. ... Suddenly, Western Europe seemed poised at a historical double-divide. One was a crisis of belief which found its outlet in the impulse of neutralism ... The other divide was marked by a crisis of

political institutions.

Observers were quick to surmise that the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980's presaged something more fundamental than yet another cycle of nuclear anxiety akin to its forebear in the late 1950's. ... Western Europe was allegedly caught in the midst of a true sea change, and the new nuclear politics, far from merely echoing the revolt of the late 1950's, betrayed a secular transformation that was here to stay. ... [T]he people, spearheaded by a militant protest movement, were about to outflank the institutional routines of representative government and gain a permanent veto power over their nation's security policy (Joffe, 1987:3-4).

The scenario was wrong, although it bears a striking resemblance to the events in Eastern Europe at the close of that decade. Joffe argues that the reason for the 1980's "inverted Arc of *Angst*" that stretched from Britain *via* the Low Countries and Germany into Scandinavia, and the causes of the protest itself, cannot be adequately explained by the variables of age, religion, geography or nuclear possession. Rather, the key factor appears to have been the role of Western Europe's Socialist/Social Democratic Parties and "... the reasons that did, or did not, lead them to take up the anti-nuclear cause. Where the Socialists, as in France and Italy, remained passive the movement remained insignificant. Where they took to the vanguard, as in the "Northern Tier", the forces of protest flourished."¹ Nevertheless, states Joffe:

[T]he offensive ground to an abrupt halt at the polling booths. At the end of the day, every Labour (or Liberal) party that had sought to absorb or outflank the protest movement ended up not in power but on the opposition benches. ... Large majorities continued to favor membership in NATO, and the strength of devotion was .. highest in the Arc of *Angst* where "Hollanditis" had allegedly taken its largest toll. ...

... [I]n 1983, as the West German parliament delivered a solid vote in favor of the Government's nuclear choice, only a few hundred demonstrators ... gathered to mount a last-minute vigil around the Bundestag. It was a far cry from the hundreds of thousands who had beleaguered Bonn in the fall of 1981 and the summer of 1982. Powerless to affect the vote inside, the protestors managed to score but one noisy point when, in desperation, they set off an air-raid siren somewhere in the neighbourhood. Unwittingly though, the helpless screech of the siren did make

¹ Joffe argues that where a strong Communist Party existed - as in France, Spain and Italy - the Socialist/Social Democratic parties did not take up the anti-nuclear cause.

a point about the nature of Western politics that was all too often forgotten during the headier days of the peace movement: the distinction between moods and majorities, between the "input" of populist politics and the "output" of representative government.

Though shaken and occasionally demoralized, the established political institutions of Western Europe would hold their own because they were facing populist movements, not popular majorities (Joffe, 1987:6-10).

Joffe makes no mention in this 1987 paper of the exceptional case of New Zealand, where two years earlier the "input" of populist politics had matched the "output" of representative government, and when *not* living with the sober realities of nuclear weapons became the normal condition of existence. Political parties, however, by definition act not out of commitment but out of interest - as demonstrated by the British Labour Party's abandonment of nuclear disarmament policies in the late 1980's, and the National Party's "somersault" in early 1990. While some senior members of New Zealand's Fourth Labour Government may (or may not) have been tempted to follow in the steps of other western governments who circumvent nuclear-ship bans, the strength of anti-nuclearism in the Caucus, the Party and the population ensured the phenomenon of 'Kiwi disease.'

Hence the basic question to be answered is, "Why the strength of nuclear allergy in New Zealand?" Nicky Hager remarked that if I asked peace people to account for the success of the peace movement in their country I would get as many different answers as there were people, and that indeed proved to be the case. Most emphasised the aspect in which they were most involved, or made the general observation that anti-nuclearism "was an idea whose time had come." If I have been adequate to the task of presenting the data my readers no doubt also have their own ideas on the subject. In this penultimate chapter I offer my suggestions, and in doing so summarize much of what has gone before. Although I have not studied the situation in Australia I do have some familiarity with it, and will attempt to shed some light on the parenthetical portion of the chapter title. The list of factors presented below is unranked and far from exhaustive, but I believe each made a significant contribution to the emergence of the world's first legally nuclear-free nation.

Before I begin laying out my laundry list, let me state my conviction that if the peace movement is going to succeed anywhere it will succeed in a New Zealand-type situation. George Armstrong was referring to the early Peace Squadron actions when he said, "Everything was for us; everything was on our side" but I believe the statement equally applies to the peace movement as a whole. This is definitely *not* to say that its members did not fight a long, hard, one-sided and often exhausting battle against the truth and consequences of nuclearism. But so, too, do the activists of other countries - including Australia - with little, if any, visible results. What made the outcome of the N.Z. struggle likely - although by no means inevitable - was, I believe, a particular confluence of time, place, conditions, circumstances, contingencies, commitment - and luck.

Geo-strategic Conditions

New Zealand *is* a remote country, and the Defence Review polls revealed that its people fear a nuclear war much more than they fear an enemy attack or invasion. This sense of security is new. Like Australia, white New Zealand began life as an isolated outpost of the British Empire and has felt it imperative to have the protection of a great and powerful friend against the perceived menace of the "Asian hordes". A 1974 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report described New Zealand as "a small, developed and vulnerable nation in the Pacific area ... on the extreme fringes of Asia" but isolation and the lack of foreign borders have not been equated with security. Rather, the borders have been drawn elsewhere. As one student of international relations writes:

New Zealand's defence throughout its history has been built upon a forward policy. ... The forward emphasis resulted from the geostrategic facts of military weakness and physical isolation. .. Shortly after the First World War, while Europe remained New Zealand's first line of defence, a second regional line was created with a British base in Singapore. ... This contrasts sharply with the strategic perspectives of most countries, which draw their lines of defence primarily around their own borders (Thakur, 1984:65-6).

While the strengthening of the military alliance with Australia is a continuation of the tradition of dependence on a more powerful nation, there are many New Zealanders

who now oppose this or any military alliance, or who, like the people of other countries, wish to draw the line of defence around their own borders. There are also some who wish to do away with it altogether. Nuclear weapons are a major cause of this change in consciousness. Isolation *has* become associated with security, and a great and powerful friend armed with nuclear weapons is perceived as more of a threat than a protection. David Lange stated in the Oxford debate:

... Europe and the United States are ringed about with nuclear weapons, and ... people have never been more at risk. There is simply only one thing more terrifying than nuclear weapons pointed in your direction, and that is nuclear weapons pointed in your enemy's direction. The outcome of their use would be the same in either case. ... And that is a defence which is no defence, a defence which disturbs far more than it reassures.

While distance from the theatres of war could lead to complacency, the global nature of radioactivity and the nuclear winter scenario inhibits this response. The Prime Minister went on to say:

We in New Zealand ... used to be able to relax a bit; to be able to think that we would sit comfortably while the rest of the world scared, singed, withered. ... And the fact is that we used to have this vision of our being some kind of antipodian Noah's Ark which would, from within its quite isolated preserves, spawn a whole new world of realistic humankind. Now the fact is that we know that that is not achievable. We know that if the nuclear winter comes we freeze, we join the rest of you.

Whereas New Zealanders more and more are perceiving their country as a nation of the South Pacific, Australians continue to perceive their country as a Western nation bordering on Asia, a much more war-prone, potentially-threatening part of the world. With its small population and rural-based economy, New Zealand cannot hope to play the role of regional superpower. (A cynic might remark that if you can't be rich and powerful you might as well be righteous). Australia can - and shows every sign of doing so. It has a much larger population (just over 16 million), much larger and better-equipped military forces, many more natural resources and an industrial base. In contrast to New Zealand's leaders a decade earlier, Australia's policy-makers in 1984 described their country as "a

significant middle-level power ... a relatively affluent and resource rich country in a populous and rapidly-developing region."² This image is helped by close association with the Western superpower, and ANZUS ensures Australia's access to U.S. 'state of the art' military hardware and technical 'know-how', so-called.

New Zealand is physically closer to Moruroa than is Australia, and New Zealanders are angrier and more worried than Australians about the French tests. The actions of the Third Labour Government in the early 1970's legitimated this concern, and brought the issue into mainstream politics. Identification with the South Pacific and empathy with small Pacific Island countries fuels this sentiment, while the destruction of the *Rainbow Warrior* by French agents in mid-1985 unified and reinforced it. Anger about the tests was the reason David Lange gave during his Yale lecture for why anti-nuclearism is a mainstream issue in his country. He told his audience that anti-nuclearism in new Zealand began as an environmental issue, and remains the most important of all environmental issues. He went on to say:

I cannot overstate the resentment caused in the South Pacific by the arrogance and selfishness of this nuclear vandalism. I am sure that it fuels much of the feeling which grew in New Zealand against the presence of nuclear weapons. The sense of violation has extended to the introduction of nuclear strategies to a region which has largely been free of them. Growing opposition to nuclear weapons then ran smack into an alliance relationship which from time to time required their presence. ... We had in the end to construct an alternative strategy for our own defence.³

New Zealand has no strategic importance for the Western alliance. Had Australia taken action against nuclear-capable ship visits the United States may well have proved more accommodating. Iceland, a country which *is* strategically important to the United States, now has a similar ship policy to New Zealand, but little has been said about it and Iceland is still a member of NATO. The Reagan Administration could afford to come down hard on New Zealand in attempting to prevent the feared domino effect of nuclear allergy

² Quoted in "International Relations." *Year Book Australia 1984*. No. 68, Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

³ "Mr. Lange's lecture on the nuclear issue." *Otago Daily Times*, April 28, 1989.

and nuclear-free zones, but in doing so it hardened public opinion against ANZUS and reinforced the David and Goliath image of the conflict. New Zealanders are unlikely to be persuaded by strong arm tactics, or by visiting Congressmen and British Ministers of the Crown. As one of my interviewees remarked somewhat indelicately, "It makes the man-in-the-street say, 'Up your arse!' We're not going to be pushed around by any big shots."

The Goals

Because of New Zealand's minimal tie to the strategies of forward nuclear deterrence, anti-nuclear opposition could focus upon a few related issues: keeping the ships out of the harbours, getting the country out of ANZUS and having the South Pacific declared a nuclear free zone. The latter aim was not difficult to achieve. The Treaty of Rarotonga suited both the National Party and the conservative Labour Government of Australia, as it served to mollify general anti-nuclear sentiments and support the popular opposition to the French tests without disturbing the U.S. military *status quo* in the region (although the Reagan Administration took a different, and unpredicted, view). Getting out of ANZUS and creating Nuclear Free New Zealand was another matter, as the electorate was split on the issue of ship visits and mostly in favour of ANZUS. Nevertheless, limited goals made a highly-concentrated campaign possible, and focused public attention on the nuclear issue. As the ships came into major population centres of the North and South Islands - mainly Auckland and Wellington - the protests also had high visibility.

The situation is very different in Australia. There the peace movement must fight its battles on several different fronts - the bases, the ships, the alliance and uranium mining. The submarine communication base at North West Cape is so remote as to be inaccessible, and the satellite bases at Pine Gap and Nurrungar are not only isolated but in a desert area where the logistics of mounting a demonstration pose extreme difficulty. The mines are similarly remote. While Australia has many more visits by U.S. nuclear-capable warships than was the case in New Zealand, the great majority come in at ports on the largely unpopulated south-west coast. As the population concentration is on the east or south-east coasts with virtually nothing in between but the vast and empty Nullabor plain, the presence of the vessels and the local demonstrations against them have made little, if any

impact on most Australians (although the tide of public opinion appears to be turning in response to peace movement persistence and the high visibility of protests against the 40-odd visiting warships during the recent bi-centennial celebrations).

The Economy

While Australia's early settlers mostly fought a losing battle against drought, fires, floods and rabbits, New Zealand's farmers mostly prospered in their green and pleasant land. A modern economist has estimated that in 1865 N.Z. settlers had the highest average income of any people in the world, and spent more on food, clothing and drink than any other people. The country remains largely rural, and economic growth is dependent on expanding and diversifying overseas markets for agricultural products. Manufactured goods are mainly pastoral products, and tourism has become a major industry - typical characteristics of developing, not developed countries. In purely economic terms, anti-nuclear opposition makes sense. Any significant release of radio-activity through a nuclear accident in the harbours of this small, rural, island country would spell disaster. While Australia is an industrialized, resource-rich country, New Zealand lacks mineral and oil resources. Over 80 percent of its imports are raw materials, goods needed for production and transport fuels, and this dependence makes the economy highly vulnerable to the fluctuations of the international market.

Thirty years ago New Zealand vied with Switzerland for third place on the table of the world's wealthiest countries. By the late 1980's, New Zealand ranked twenty-fifth. Between 1965 and 1981 the proportion of export earnings derived from the European community dropped from 67 percent to just under 30 percent. The need to find new trading partners after ceasing to be primarily "Britain's farm" points to the desirability of flexible foreign policies and transcendence of East-West hostilities. The Third Labour Government was one of the first governments to extend diplomatic recognition to China in the mid-1970's, and new markets have been opened up in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. Nevertheless, as we have seen, New Zealand has severe economic and financial problems and is struggling to maintain its traditional place among the developed nations.

In New Zealand no jobs were threatened by anti-nuclear opposition, and the country has no arms industry. Neither worker nor entrepreneur had anything to gain by the country's involvement in the alliance or (at least until the 'frigate deal') defence spending. Hence the highly-unusual anti-nuclear, anti-defence stance of the business sector. This is not the case in Australia - or in any other alliance country for that matter. Australia has a thriving and expanding arms industry and trade, the bases are jointly operated and workers are employed in the mines. Uranium is an important export, and although the present Labor Government initially placed a moratorium on its sale to France, this was lifted in 1986 on the grounds that the ban was not having an impact on French Government policies, and \$6 million annual income was being lost to no good purpose. The frequent port calls, too, are a source of income to Perth, Australia's most isolated capital city, and are particularly important for the few other small and remote south-west coast towns, whose economies are now bound up with the ship visits.

The Political System

Wellington is the seat of Government, and New Zealand's third largest city. As it is situated at the southern tip of the North Island, access is easy for the people of both islands. Parliament consists of a single chamber, and voters in each of New Zealand's 95 electorates must select one candidate only; a 'first past the post' system borrowed from Britain which favours the two-party system. While the law-making process can be long drawn-out and hotly-debated, there is no Upper House to obstruct the process, and no state parliaments to contend with. The practice of referring proposed laws in the form of Bills to a Select Committee after the first reading for two-party comment and, usually, for public comment and input, provides citizens with a direct point of access to the decision-making process. Furthermore, all mail and telephone calls to Parliament House are free. As one woman interviewee remarked, "The access of politicians to ordinary people is much more straightforward than in other countries. I often ring up my representative, and if I wrote and didn't get a reply I'd be most annoyed."

Australia is a federation with Upper and Lower Houses at both the state and the

national levels. The preferential voting system often means that a small party holds the balance of power in Parliament, and conflict between state and national governments when different parties hold office is the norm. Canberra, the capital city, is an artificially-created seat of government set in the midst of the Australian bush. Its population of around 260,000 is dominated by politicians, public servants, diplomats and members of the Fourth Estate. The city is several hundred miles from the nearest large cities of Melbourne and Sydney, and *en route* to nowhere. The vast distances of Australia (and rivalry between the states) make co-ordinated political lobbying at the national level difficult, and social activism in Canberra tends to be confined to small local groups.

In New Zealand, Labour Party decisions at annual conferences are not binding on the parliamentary party. In Australia they are. Hence the N.Z. Party can afford to be more radical, challenging and innovative than its Australian counterpart. The latter is dominated by right-wing elements, and so, too, is the Government. The memory of the unprecedented sacking in the mid-seventies of the previous Labor Government by the Governor-General when a political crisis followed a shift to the left, and the Party's subsequent defeat at the polls, is both strong and salient.

Herbert Kitschelt is a political sociologist who has compared the differing outcomes of the anti-nuclear power movements in France, Sweden, the United States and Germany (Kitschelt, 1985). He argues that the most useful variable for explaining these differences is a nation's political opportunity structures. These affect both mobilization and impact, and vary along two dimensions: (1) the degree of openness (very closed regimes repress movements, open and responsive ones assimilate them and moderately repressive ones allow for their broad articulation, but do not readily accede to their demands), and (2) the capacity of political systems to convert demands into public policy. The case of anti-nuclear opposition in Australia and New Zealand provides support for this hypothesis. New Zealand is an open political system and a government's capacity for converting demands into policy and policy into law is high. Conditions in Australia combine to inhibit public access to decision-making at the national level, while the mechanisms of federation, the 2-House parliamentary system and the frequent existence of a power-balancing small

party make the translation of social demands into official policy, and the process of law-making itself, much more difficult.

Democracy in New Zealand

Former U.S. Ambassador Anne Martindale has declared that "New Zealand is a profoundly democratic country, one where the opinions of the citizens are given high importance" (quoted Hanly *et. al.*, 1986:59). When I asked one woman interviewee why this should be so, she replied:

We have unbelievably high expectations that people will be listened to, and that they have rights. You don't feel cut-off from the people who are making the decisions - here anyway. You know people overseas are making decisions you can't do anything about.

Even if you come from any kind of background, you can actually get into groups which are politicised. Which politicise you about other things in turn. And it's a small enough country that you can see the people involved; be at meetings with them. I'm not aggressively political, but I know people in decision-making places; whether they're timid or blustery, or go off half-cocked. ... There is a lot of political pressure put on parties.

The ex-wife of an M.P. told me:

It's still so in New Zealand that if you're a committed person and politicised and good at your job and keen about going into politics, you can be part of a party machine without having a great deal of money. It's not a privilege thing to go into politics. The system that we've got here means that you're not expected to spend a great deal of money. The emphasis is on the best person; it's not about money. ...

People used to ring [my husband] - because the name was in the phone book - at all hours. I used to take the messages because we never had an answering machine - on principle. And he would ring people back. His attitude was that if you'd made a decision to enter public life you had to be available to people, and that was one of the penalties. And I actually believe that.

The democratic process in New Zealand calls to mind Alexis de Tocqueville's

classic study, *Democracy in America* (Tocqueville, 1969). Although the contemporary world is far removed from the world of the 1830's, I believe there are essential congruities between present-day New Zealand with its remoteness, small population and rural/manufacture-based economy, and Tocqueville's America with its maritime isolation, 13 million inhabitants and not-yet-industrialized economy. Just as America was engaged in creating a New World identity after irrevocably breaking with the Old World, so New Zealand in the late 20th. Century is shedding its colonial past, and constructing a new non-European identity.

Tocqueville's observations led him to believe that "... it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government among a people whose social conditions are equal than among any other" (Tocqueville, 1969:695). The foundation for this assertion was that while Americans value both freedom and equality highly, they will always sacrifice the former for the sake of the latter. Their unwillingness to bestow power upon persons means that power more and more becomes concentrated in a central bureaucratic government, with a consequent surrendering of individual or local autonomy. His description of this modern type of despotism seems pertinent to the so-called programmed societies of the late 20th. Century:

Having thus taken each citizen in turn into its powerful grasp and shaped him to its will, government then extends its embrace to include the whole of society. It covers the whole of social life with a network of petty, complicated rules that are both minute and uniform, through which even men of the greatest originality and most vigorous temperament cannot force their heads above the crowd. It does not break men's wills, but softens, bends, and guides it; it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits, action; it does not destroy anything, but prevents much being born; it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, enervates, stifles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd.⁴

Tocqueville's observations also led him to believe that certain aspects of social and political life in America would prevent the new phenomenon of individualism from degenerating into the old-world forms of egoism, and counter the inherent slide of the new

⁴ The description seems particularly apt for 'Democracy in Japan.'

societies based on freedom and equality towards democratic despotism and the tyranny of the majority. The factors he believed would contribute most to the maintenance of a democratic republic in the new United States of America were:

- (1) the federal form of organization "which allows the Union to enjoy the power of a great republic and the security of a small one";
- (2) the free and communal institutions "which moderate the tyranny of the majority, and give the people both a taste for freedom and the skill to be free";
- (3) the judicial system in which "the courts correct the aberrations of democracy" and protect minorities;
- (4) the devotion to religion, customs and mores, the "habits of the heart" which combat excessive self-interest and the effects of majority rule;
- (5) the people's propensity for political participation;
- (6) the existence of a free press.

With the exception of the first, all these factors are present in good measure in New Zealand society, which has retained many of the characteristics and values of traditional societies. Furthermore, a system of federation is unnecessary in a nation of its size, which in its political organization and social interaction is more like a large geographically-diverse state than a regionally-divided country.

One of the paradoxes of representative democracy is that its diffusion leads to perceptions of powerlessness. The greater the number of voters, the smaller the weight of influence each vote carries, and the less an individual feels able to affect the outcome. Thus small democratic states are likely to have more political participation than large democratic states. The United States and New Zealand are both highly-democratized societies, but whereas less than half of the American population typically go to the polls, the typical turnout in New Zealand is around 93 percent. Australia is one of the few countries where voting is compulsory, so the situation is not comparable. Nevertheless, the complexity of the preferential voting system and Australians traditional dislike of all leaders,⁵ political

or otherwise, ensures a large proportion of invalid returns, the so-called 'donkey vote.'

The authors of the seminal study and best seller, *Habits of the Heart*, carried on the work of Tocqueville in assessing the customs and mores of contemporary American society. They state that a common theme in his writings and those of other classical theorists is the belief "that the survival of a free people depends on the revival of a public virtue that is able to find political expression" (Bellah *et. al*, 1985:271). The book ends with the question, "Is it possible that we could become citizens again and together seek the common good in the post-industrial, post-modern age?" Perhaps the forms of collective action and the new mechanisms for political expression in New Zealand, the feisty little mouse - or sheep - that roared, can help illumine this sixty-four dollar question for the survival of democracy, or, as the ecologists now say, bio-democracy.

The Society

In comparison to Australia, New Zealand is a tight little island. Many people know or are related to each other, there are no great distances between cities and towns and communication is rapid. In the words of one interviewee, "That's one of the advantages of having a small literate [99 percent] population. And the same media goes right through the country. TV 1 and 2 goes to practically every N.Z. home, and so does National Radio. [In Auckland] there's one morning newspaper, one evening newspaper. We're all reading the same thing." New Zealand is also one of the most culturally homogeneous societies of any developed country and English is the first language for almost everybody, although the Polynesian presence and the use of Maori is increasing.⁶ Tokelauans, Cook Islanders and Niueans as citizens of New Zealand have free access to the country, and more Niueans and Tokelauans now live in New Zealand than in their home countries. There has been an influx of immigrants (legal and illegal) from other Pacific Island countries as their economies worsen,⁷ but little immigration from outside the region.

⁵ This is said to be the reason why a bushranger, Ned Kelly, is the country's only folk hero, although Paul Hogan of "Crocodile Dundee" fame seems to be in the process of becoming the second.

⁶ The current proportion is approximately 9 percent Maori and 1 percent Pacific Islanders.

⁷ Fiji is the only South Pacific Island country that does not have a negative GNP.

Australia, by contrast, is said to have replaced the United States as the world's largest melting pot. A huge, post-war immigration program aimed at facilitating industrialization and expanding the population has more than doubled the pre-war population, with the bulk of the immigrants coming from southern Europe. English is a second language for many New Australians (the official term) and some do not speak it at all. While Auckland has become the largest Polynesian city in the world, Melbourne is second only to Athens as the largest Greek city. As N.Z. historian Sir Keith Sinclair puts it, in the post-war period New Zealand has become less British and more Polynesian, while Australia has become less British and more European. It is homogeneity and proximity, not heterogeneity and distance, which fosters concerted social activism. Local telephone calls, too, are free in New Zealand but not in Australia. Operating a telephone tree for purposes of recruitment, contact or mobilization is costly for grassroots organizations, and hence more difficult to establish. On such small things may hang the fate of nations.

While the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches are the major religious bodies in both countries, because of the disproportionate numbers of Irish convicts, Australia has a much larger Irish-Catholic population than has New Zealand.⁸ Australia also has a substantial number of East European immigrants, and elements within both segments combine to create a strong anti-Communist strain in the society. In the 1950's, the (mainly Catholic) Democratic Labour Party (DLP) split off from the Australian Labour Party on the Communist issue, and for many years held the balance of power in the Federal Parliament. There is no comparable far-right reactionary group in New Zealand, and this political centering makes it easier for the N.Z. Labour Party to lean further to the left than is the case for its Australian counterpart.

A consideration of the characteristics of New Zealand society bring to mind Emile Durkheim's concepts of the so-called social currents of egoism, anomie, altruism and fatalism. Nineteenth century thinkers were both concerned and puzzled by the fact that as

⁸ In Australia the proportions are Anglican 26 percent; other Protestant 25 percent; Roman Catholic 25 percent. In New Zealand the figures are Anglican 29 percent; Presbyterian 18 percent; Roman Catholic 15 percent. (Source: *The World Almanac 1989*; Pharos Books, New York).

the material prosperity of Europe increased the suicide rate increased with it, although it was high in some countries and lower in other. In his classic study, *Suicide*, Durkheim set out to show why this was so, and why the suicide rates of European societies were even more constant than the death rates. He argued that this seemingly most individual act of all human acts was, in fact, a social phenomenon *par excellence* caused by varying degrees of the currents of egoism, anomie and altruism within each society.⁹

No moral idea exists which does not combine in proportions varying with the society involved, egoism, altruism and a certain anomy. For social life assumes both that the individual has a certain personality, that he is ready to surrender it if the community requires, and finally, that he is to a certain degree sensitive to ideas of progress. This is why there is no people among whom these three currents of opinion do not co-exist, bending men's inclinations in three different and even opposing directions. Where they offset one another, the moral agent is in a state of equilibrium which shelters him against any thought of suicide. But let one of them exceed a certain strength to the detriment of the others, and as it becomes individualized, it also becomes suicidogenetic ... (Durkheim 1951:321).

Like fatalistic suicide, Durkheim regarded altruistic suicide as a mark of so-called primitive societies, although it persisted in pockets such as the elite corps of the army. The real dangers in modern societies, he argued, were the new and powerful currents of egoism and anomie. If these could be kept in check, so too could individuals' propensity for doing away with themselves.

I suspect that Durkheim would place New Zealand high on the list of non-pathogenic First World societies, if not at the top, and would not be at all surprised that this small country has been awarded the epithet, "Moral Leader of the World." Within his theoretical paradigm, the strong system of community networks, high social visibility and tendency for group actions work to check the current of egoism; the lack of affluence, limited choices and the history of protectionism and social welfare have curbed the current of anomie, while altruism, the weak force in modern societies, has been present in good measure in the anti-nuclear struggle. Whether or not this hypothesis would be supported

⁹ Fatalism, or so Durkheim believed, was characteristic of despotic or slave-owning societies, not modern societies, and so he relegated it to a footnote.

by a study of the divorce, suicide and crime rates in that country is a question for further investigation.

A Changing Identity

New Zealand's rapid slide down the ladder of prosperity and loss of its assured market has affected New Zealanders' sense of their place in the world, but the breaking of the psychological and emotional tie to the Mother Country has been even more salient. The Pakeha of New Zealand no longer proudly refer to their country as "the Britain of the South", call Britain "home" or "the Old Country", boast of being more British than the British or behave as if their country was in the English channel instead of on the other side of the world. Nor do they continue to take for granted that the interests of their traditional Northern hemisphere friends or relations are identical with their own. The beautiful baby of the British Empire has come of age, and is acquiring a new name and identity. The widespread use by white Europeans of 'Pakeha' and the reversion (or part reversion) to 'Aotearoa' symbolizes this shift in consciousness and interests from Europe to the Pacific, and carries with it a very different national and international image.¹⁰

The Maori resurgence or renaissance, as it is called, is one more manifestation of the ethnic movements and conflicts endemic throughout the world today, and is fueled by demographic change (see Appendix 4). Nevertheless, it fits well with the emergent image of New Zealand as a pacific nation of the South Pacific. The so-called 'Polynesian turn' is not confined to social activists. Maori antecedents are being claimed by many prominent white New Zealanders (including Sir Paul Reeves, Anglican Primate and immediate past Governor-General), place names are reverting to the original Maori, interest in indigeneous

¹⁰ A group in Amsterdam called the Working Group for Indigeneous Peoples (WIP) recently invited two Maori women to the town of Middleburg in the province of Zeeland in the Netherlands. On February 6, 1990, the two representatives were received by the Council and Mayor who said he welcomed the opportunity to receive a flag with the name New Zealand written on it. The aim of the ceremony was to make it clear to people in the Netherlands that they have a responsibility to withdraw the name of New Zealand which they gave in the 1640's to the islands which were inhabited by the Maori people. Taking back the name is said to be the first step in support of Maori independence, and a symbolic means of urging the New Zealand Government to honour the Treaty of Waitangi.

art and culture is soaring and Maori-English dictionaries fill shelves in every bookshop as the once forbidden language is taught, learned or relearned by Maori and Pakeha alike, children and adults.

Australia has no such identity crisis. While historically there has been a strong attachment to Britain, there has also been a strong anti-English streak in Australian society as a result of the colony's beginnings and the large Irish presence (many Irish convicts were political prisoners). The United States, rather than Britain, has been Australia's reference nation during most of the 20th. Century, although always with a good deal of ambivalence. Far from experiencing a crisis of identity, Australians are in the midst of an 'identity surge'. Although both New Zealanders and Australians have suffered from a sense of isolation, the latter also suffered from a sense of cultural inferiority - partly because of the convict origins, partly because of the harsh environment and the settlers' constant defeat by Nature. This is no longer the case. Australians now define themselves as inhabitants of "the Lucky Country," a rising star of Western society, and the so-called cultural cringe is rapidly giving way to the so-called cultural strut. Although there is a growing interest in aboriginal art and culture, and increasing guilt about the white man's genocidal treatment of the people of the Dreamtime, there is no comparable 'Melanesian turn' underway in Australia. Aborigines are beginning to assert themselves, and they with social activists are pushing for land rights, but on the whole the indigeneous population is still a dispossessed, culturally-ravaged, largely inarticulate, frequently despised or ignored tiny minority within a very Western-oriented society.¹¹ While Asian faces are appearing among the population, the extreme racism of the White Australia Policy still lurks below the surface (and frequently surfaces), and there is no sense that Australia is culturally or geographically a part of Asia.

The National Character

Whether or not such a thing as 'national character' exists, it certainly exists inside people's heads, and therefore influences both behaviour and expectations. As the

¹¹ Aborigines including mixed-race (and there are few full-blood aborigines) comprise 1.5 percent of the population.

sociological axiom asserts, if a thing is defined as real, it will have real consequences. According to N.Z. writer and political journalist Colin James, European New Zealanders typically see themselves as "self-reliant achievers descended from forbears who came to a new frontier with a pioneer spirit that still survives in our love of the outdoors, our inventiveness and our do-it-yourself qualities." In this myth, ... "The typical frontiersmen were strong, courageous, independent, enterprising, hospitable, casual and down-to-earth. ... Their utopia was rural, agrarian, democratic, egalitarian and respectable." New Zealanders, on the whole, are seen as "an independent, small-business operating, property-owning lot making their own way in the world", and a 'fair go' for oneself and others in doing so is a prime value.

A different and more scholarly view, says James, sees European New Zealand history as largely a quest for security. New Zealand and Australian settlers were not rugged individualists like Americans; rather they looked to their mates and to the state for help and sustenance. The colonists did not so much strike out boldly for New Zealand as flee from the social disaster of nineteenth-century England, and once here they turned to each other and the state for mutual sustenance. In support of the latter view, James argues that "government policy and economic behaviour has been geared to the secure life. A comprehensive set of bulwarks against outside attack, business failure and personal destitution has been progressively set in place". The democracy of individualism in New Zealand "has not been a democracy of diversity, choice and risk, ... of competition in ideas, energy and enterprise, ... but the protector of the ordinary individual [Sir Robert's "ordinary bloke"] by limiting ideas, energy and enterprise - and the potential damage they can cause" (James, 1986:11-15).

While this may account for "the unbelievably high expectations" of New Zealanders concerning their rights, and the lesser presence of the social forces of 'anomie' and 'egoism,' the popular myth is the more pervasive and the more empowering. Kate Boanas probably expressed the feelings of most peace people when she said that a major reason for the success of anti-nuclearism in New Zealand was the history and character of New Zealanders and "a growing sense of new 'identity' in Aotearoa and the Pacific." She

continued:

Our Pakeha ancestors (most of them) left a culture they were not entirely happy with. They worked incredibly hard forging a new life and identity here alongside Maori people. My great grandmother had to learn Maori to survive there was a real sense of partnership in the 'wilderness' the Pakeha had been promised cheap land, security etc. by the Land Hawk companies, and were ripped off in many ways by them. There has been a degree of mixing and sharing of cultures, although undoubtedly the white one has dominated to the detriment of the spiritual and communal values of the Maori. Still, as Pakeha, we cannot deny absorbing some of these values. And I, as one white coloniser offspring, am eternally grateful for what I have received and continue to absorb from my Maori sisters and brothers.

There is something in our (Pakeha) psyche which questions authority, a sense of individualism we don't have to do as everyone everywhere tells us to do. Especially among the women we were the first to gain the vote for women. We have a herstory (history) of protest actions which have been successful something there to build on and give us hope for any struggle which may come our way. Also a strong sense of survival instinct not just for us, but for our beautiful country, its flora and fauna our surrounding "Ocean of Peace." We fight hard for the underdog we feel a sense of responsibility for our smaller Pacific neighbours, and we abhor being dictated to. Maybe some of these factors have given us the 'fighting spirit' the audacity to challenge what has always been the *status quo*.¹²

The Springbok Tour and 'Muldoonism'

The traumatic events of the Springbok tour of 1981, like the civil rights' struggles in the United States, appear to have exploded from a build-up of tensions and pressures within the society, and to have created similar shock and after-shock waves. As John Boanas said of the tour, "It pulled in the middle-class. You saw a lot of mobilization because they were frightened of this thing." To some observers, the emotional intensity of the conflict had much to do with the crisis of national identity. N.Z. sociologist Geoff Fougere writes, "Clearly something important was at stake. Something so important that its unprecedented defence by barbed wire and batons could be justified in the minds of many New Zealanders. But what was it exactly?" (in Nevitz and Willmott, 1988).

¹² Private correspondence.

Fougere argues that the usual explanations - opposition to racism, the freedom of sporting bodies from political interference, the need to uphold law and order against the demonstrators - do not satisfactorily account for "why people should have been so polarised, so mobilised and, especially, so personally affected by the issues. ... Few people really approved of apartheid, were against the rights of sportsmen and women, or dedicated to lawlessness and anarchy." A deeper understanding of what was at stake, he argues, requires an understanding of rugby's place in New Zealand society.

Rugby served from the end of last century as a mirror to New Zealand society. It symbolised a pattern of social relationships, that, in New Zealand eyes, made New Zealand both distinctive and admirable. As such, it provided an important basis for the construction of a sense of national unity and individual identity. But changes in New Zealand society and the world context into which it fitted made this role increasingly difficult. The 1965 Springbok Tour still served to unite most New Zealanders around the synonomous ideals of rugby and nation, marginalising protest. Less than twenty years later, the events of the 1981 tour signalled the disintegration of the linkage. Starkly revealed was a transition toward new, more diverse and complex ways of constructing individual and collective identities. That transition, variously accompanied by disquiet, unease, opposition and celebration, continues.

[T]he place of rugby in New Zealand society has changed. Increasingly, it is just another sport, important, but no longer central. In a more sophisticated, more diverse society, it no longer serves as a mirror, reflecting its particular image of New Zealand society. That mirror, and the pattern of relations it encoded and refracted, has been shattered irretrievably.

Whether or not this is the case, what *is* certain is that, like the large 'Vietnam mobs' of the previous decade, the tour politicized large segments of the population. Thus taking to the streets or the harbours in protest at perceived injustice or evils was for many New Zealanders a legitimate and already-experienced activity. Australia also had its Vietnam protests, but they were not as passionate as those in New Zealand, and the population was not politicised to the same extent. While there have been important environmental battles, these have been mainly between officials and activists. There has been no social conflict comparable to the Springbok tour; nothing which has torn the country apart or shaken its taken-for-granted foundations.

The cause of peace movement protest in New Zealand was also helped by the growing disenchantment of the middle-class with Sir Robert Muldoon in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Even if anti-nuclear sentiments were not strong, participating in demonstrations against the ships was one way of expressing this opposition, which was often deeply-felt.¹³ I recall, for instance, a conversation in 1987 with a quietly-spoken woman history professor who suddenly said with great vehemence, "I can't *stand* the man, I just hate him. Whenever I hear his voice on radio or see him on television I feel sick." Her statement supports John Boanas's assertion that ...

Muldoon *really* angered the liberals. He was seen as the devil incarnate. Middle New Zealand is pretty conservative - working-class, petty/middle bourgeois, racist. Muldoon brought out every worst attitude that you could find. Social hatred, religious hatred There was great hatred and antagonism on both sides.

One response to 'Muldoonism' was the political phenomenon of the New Zealand Party, and its sudden emergence on the political scene in 1984 was a stroke of good fortune for the peace movement and the present Government. The new Party not only took anti-nuclearism and anti-defence policies into the right-wing big-business camp, but also drained votes from the National Party, and thus was a significant ingredient in Labour's success at the polls. The rapid demise of the Party as a political entity also meant that it was not around to challenge the Government at the 1987 election. It is doubtful if many peace people campaigned or voted for National Party candidate Marilyn Waring in 1984, but her election to Parliament and subsequent stand against the nuclear-ship policy also proved fortuitous for the Party and the peace movement. A similar stroke of luck was the suspension of New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance by the United States, as it is highly unlikely that this contentious goal of the peace movement would have been achieved by democratic means.

The Convergence of Social Movements and 'Women Power'

New Zealand is surely one of the most beautiful countries in the world, possessing

¹³ Frank Parkin similarly argues in *Middle Class Radicalism* that membership in the British CND provided an outlet for political discontents, and attracted people who had axes other than the bomb to grind.

every geological formation from the snowy alps and glaciers of the South Island, to the hot springs and boiling mud-holes of the North. It has also been one of the most abused. The early Pakeha settlers talked of "breaking in the land" and they cleared it with fire, axe and 'tree drives,' where giant trees fell like nine-pins down mountain sides. Most of the ancient and unique New Zealand forests, survivors from the vanished continent of Gondwanaland, were destroyed forever by these methods. Farmers, too, have been prodigal in their use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, and New Zealand is a contaminated country. Given this combination of love and guilt it is not surprising that an environmental consciousness emerged early in New Zealand, or that the country should be the first to produce a green-style political party whose 'small is beautiful' policies were in direct opposition to the potentially environmentally-damaging 'think big' policies of Sir Robert and the National Party Government.

The feminist movement came somewhat later to New Zealand than to the United States and Australia (from whence came Germaine Greer), but it, too, found fertile ground. Activist clergyman and writer Rinny Westra has described the Rugby Union, the Rotary Club and the Returned Servicemen's Association (RSA) as the three R's of New Zealand life, "indicative of the celebration of rugged militarism and the racist, sexist and male-dominated character of the society; a situation increasingly coming under challenge from the strong feminist and indigeneous movements" (Westra, 1986:Ch.2). As stated earlier, opposition to militarism and nuclearism provides both a vehicle and a forum for challenging "the white patriarchal male system", and feminists are prominent in the N.Z. peace movement. So, too, are lesbians. One said:

Many non-political lesbians are very right-wing and conservative, but all other feminist lesbians assign to the peace movement the same importance as other issues. I often feel very ferocious and anti-American. America blew it when it leaned on New Zealand. The Rainbow Warror consolidated it all beautifully; the U.S. didn't say a word about the French. New Zealand is "the sheep that roared." Angry ewes can be pretty terrible.

The exercise of women power is not, however, limited to the radical women's

movements or official organizations such as the National Council of Women. The proliferating neighbourhood peace groups and the nuclear-free zone campaign proved perfect vehicles for politicising more traditionally-inclined women. IPPNW member Joan Chapple said:

Women are not in positions of power, but they're well aware of their power in the family, and power to change things by their collective actions. They're much more aware than they used to be, and that's affected the anti-nuclear thing as well. ... People are continually trying to say the peace movement is a fly-by-night thing of women simply flexing their muscles because they don't have any power. But it doesn't work like that. It's coming from the ground; very low-key and integrated with people.

If you look at boroughs and councils that have transformed themselves into nuclear-free zones and think how many people that affects, and how its trickled out to every part of the country It's not imposed from above. It's come trickling out from the women's work, and finally the government has had to listen.

One woman gave the following example of how N.Z. mothers are recognizing and using their potential for initiating social change:

There's a tremendous interest in soccer throughout New Zealand as against rugby, our national game. Its really been brought about by television, but women are deciding (and even men acknowledge this) that their sons are not going to play this terrible rough game. And because its women who take their children to music lessons and sporting occasions - they're terribly community-oriented and involved in all their children's activities - against men's wishes they've enrolled their sons in soccer. And the men say "Poofers' game." ... But the most conservative boy's school, the cradle of rugby, last year actually had more boys playing soccer than rugby. And I think women are defying it; rejecting that sort of violence for their sons.

Women have played an important role in New Zealand history (more so than in Australia) and this tradition is helpful to the feminist and peace movement causes. The most radical aspect of the Maori resurgence, the campaign for Maori Sovereignty, is headed by young Maori women, and women are at the forefront of the indigeneous land rights' actions and of PPANAC (Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Committee). All these

radical social movements - feminism, the environmental/communitarian movement, gay and lesbian rights, the indigeneous movement, anti-nuclear opposition - surfaced or strengthened in New Zealand during the 1970's, and meshed into the 1980's peace movement. While a similar phenomenon occurred in Australia, for all the reasons noted above the task of spreading nuclear allergy was and remains far more difficult than in New Zealand, and women, for whatever reason, are less conspicuous in the peace movement.

Peace Movement Organization, Social History and Peace People

Finally, the structure of the N.Z. peace movement - high decentralization and autonomy, high co-ordination and communication - seems optimal for goal attainment and promoting all three key concepts of peace activism: 'empowerment', 'networking' and 'pre-figurative practices'. Added to this is the high propensity among New Zealanders for group association. In the words of one informant:

New Zealanders have had to do things in pioneering ways where they needed groups of people. We draw comfort from being in groups. When you come to wanting to change social things there's no way an individual can do it alone. The strength of the movement is the broadness of it. And it certainly couldn't be imposed from above. No way could you tell New Zealand people to be anti-nuclear.

People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND) is the Australian version of a peace umbrella, but distance makes co-ordination difficult and goals vary within states. Australia has powerful trade unions and a history of successful or strong union actions, but of failed or weak social movements (although environmentalism is rapidly becoming a major force). In New Zealand the reverse is the case. Although trade unionism is, or perhaps has been, strong, in all the major strikes of New Zealand history the strikers have been defeated irrespective of the Party in power, while populist movements have frequently succeeded. A history of successful social movements facilitates mobilization, as does the popular belief that New Zealand has led the way in social reform and acted as "the social laboratory of Europe".¹⁴ When the First Labour Government introduced the Social Security Act in

¹⁴ New Zealand became the first country to give women the vote (although preceded by the U.S. states of Wyoming and Utah) in 1873, for instance, and in 1898 was the third (after Germany and Denmark) to

1935, the Minister in charge declared, "Once more, this country will be God's Own Country."

All the factors listed above have combined to contribute, or so I would argue, to the success of anti-nuclearism in New Zealand, but none is a necessary condition. There was only one necessary - although not sufficient - condition for the phenomenon of the Kiwi Disease: the commitment of people within the Caucus, the Party and the peace movement to the cause of combating nuclearism, and the activists' dedication to the task of spreading nuclear allergy. The Fourth Labour Government may have been the midwife of Nuclear Free New Zealand/Aotearoa, but it was the people who conceived it, nourished it, endured the pains of labour and gave it birth.

The Battle of the Frigates: "Why this Outcome?"

That the "anti-defence lobby", to quote the editor of the *Evening Star*, failed to prevent the purchase of two of the four proposed frigates, and failed to steer the Government in the direction of non-violent strategies for national security is not surprising. Unlike Costa Rica in the late 1940's, there was no crisis of democracy in New Zealand, no *coup* which would permit some charismatic leader to abolish the military, no threat to the citizens from their armed forces, no reason, in short, why the military would permit itself - or be permitted - to disband, "wither away" or settle for the lesser role of coastal protection. Once the popular decision was made to strengthen defence ties with Australia and once the less-popular decision was made to retain a blue-water fleet, the remainder of the scenario seems inevitable. If military forces are kept they have to be kept well; otherwise their existence is pointless.

Given New Zealand's long history of dependence on a more powerful nation what *is* surprising is the apparent near-success of the anti-frigate campaign, and the extent of opposition to the purchase revealed by the opinion polls. While there is no political crisis in New Zealand, there is (or was) an economic crisis and widespread financial hardship unprecedented since the depression years. It is this unusual situation, together with the introduce the old age pension.

lack of any external threat and the country's long history of social welfare, which probably gave the 'No Frigates' campaign a chance of success or, at the very least, ensured that the battle would be intense. The costs of war or war preparations must be extracted from a society's stock of surplus value (which is one reason war has reached such extremes in the era of industrialization) and this is currently in short supply in New Zealand. But the great majority of its citizens still live well above subsistence level, and guns still come before butter (although the more this country sells of the latter, the more it can buy of the former), even if many New Zealanders are unhappy about the type of guns their butter is buying, or wish to have none at all.¹⁵

Nonetheless, the unprecedented meddling of New Zealand's citizens in this most serious affair of state may be a harbinger of change; a sign that the traditional system of representative democracy and elite decision-making is under strain. To quote a much-quoted remark by the late President Dwight Eisenhower, "Some day people are going to want peace so much that governments had better get out of their way." The exercise of people power could reveal that the seemingly ontological sequence of peace and war is not inevitable. Or, if the general will is still inclined towards politics continued by other means, that war is not inevitably followed by peace. Michel Foucault once remarked that "For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (Foucault, 1978:143). The relationship of living

¹⁵ The truism - and the history of civilizations- casts doubt on Marx's assertion that the economic system and the relations of production form the basic infrastructure of a society. Perhaps the material base is not the production of goods for consumption and profit, but the production of goods for destruction and profit, and it is warfare and war, not class struggle, which has been the motor driving human history. To quote George Bernard Shaw, "There is nothing in Man's industrial machinery but his greed and sloth; his heart is in his weapons." Nevertheless, for the first time in history it is now not in the interests of ruling elites to use all the means of violence at their disposal, and the non-violent movement vs. the violent movement rather than the conflict between capitalism and socialism, may correspond to Marx's vision of the final dialectical struggle of two conflicting forces. An end to war production could indeed herald the end of humankind's violent era of "pre-history" and class exploitation (classes now being states, rather than groups within states), and could also result in the "withering away of the state." So perhaps one might say with some temerity that "Marx almost got it right, but guns really *do* come before butter."

human beings to war as the ultimate arbiter of international affairs calls to mind the perhaps apocryphal account of Oscar Wilde's last statement as he lay dying in the bedroom of a small hotel. With eyes fixed upon the large pink cabbage roses of the wallpaper, he is said to have declared in sepulchral tones: "One of us will have to go." Perhaps there *is* an ultimate dilemma for humankind; one which, however disguised, lies at the heart of New Zealand's great battle of the frigates. The choice for all people in the very near future may not be between nuclear or conventional weapons and alliances, but, to paraphrase the opening line of a famous soliloquoy, "*To arm or not to arm; that is the question.*" It may even be synonymous with the original.

The Chief Protagonists of the Drama

The epithet "God's own Country" is usually attached to the United States and at least one of New Zealand's original settlers thought the people of these two countries had much in common. Thomas Cholmondeley wrote in 1854 that the qualities which Englishmen regard as American, "... rough and ready, free and daring, generous but dangerous, of infinite suppleness, dexterity and resource ..." were characteristics of the British colonist, and he predicted that New Zealanders would "daily Americanize" (perhaps why this member of the English gentry returned to his homeland). In 1903, the American historian Frank Parsons said of New Zealanders:

They are the Yankees of the South Pacific. In fact, New Zealand is a little America, a sort of condensed United States. If all the nations of the world were classed according to the number and importance of their points of resemblance, the United States, New Zealand and Australia stand in a group together, with England, Switzerland and France close by, and Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Scandinavia not far off (quoted Sinclair, 1959:83).

The New World countries of New Zealand and the United States of America still have much in common, but at this moment of history they occupy polar positions on the First World spectrum of economic and military power, and have made polar responses to the agonising post-Hiroshima question of what is to be done with nuclear weapons. In 1925, the editor of the *New Zealand Herald* remarked on the election of a new prime minister to office, "All is yet molten, mercurial. There are more departures to make than

precedents to follow. To have a history may be an old land's glory and safeguard; to make history is a new land's perilous employment" (quoted Sinclair, 1959:284). In the emerging global culture of the nuclear age all is again "molten, mercurial", with "more departures to make than precedents to follow." Both old lands and new lands are making history, and neither can feel confident that it will provide them with either glory or safety. What it *will* provide is the answer to which of these polar responses was the more "perilous employment" - although there is always the possibility that neither we nor our descendents will be around to note it.

**APPENDIX 1: THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
AND
THE PEOPLE'S CHARTER FOR A NUCLEAR FREE AND INDEPENDENT PACIFIC**

**THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
RARATONGA, AUGUST 6, 1985 (selections)**

PREAMBLE

THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,

UNITED in their commitment to a world at peace;

GRAVELY CONCERNED that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

CONVINCED that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

BELIEVING that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

DETERMINED to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

REAFFIRMING the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security;

NOTING, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

NOTING that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific;

NOTING also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific;

DETERMINED to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

GUIDED by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communique of that meeting;

[Then follow the 16 Articles of the Treaty. The 5 areas of nuclear activity prohibited by the

Treaty are: (1) manufacture and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons by member states; (2) permanent stationing of any nuclear device on the land, inland waters, territorial waters or seabed within the zone; testing of nuclear explosive devices within the zone; ocean dumping of radioactive waste and other radioactive matter within the zone; the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. The Treaty does *not* prohibit nuclear threats or strikes emanating from within or across the zone; the portcalls or transit of nuclear weapon platforms through seas or airspace; the port calls or transit of nuclear-powered vessels, or any elements of the nuclear fuel cycle].

PROTOCOLS

PROTOCOL 1

The Parties to this Protocol,

NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5, and 6, in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8 (2) (c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

PROTOCOL 2

The Parties to this Protocol,

NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to them.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party further undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

(a) Parties to the Treaty; or

(b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

PROTOCOL 3

The Parties to this Protocol,

NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

[The Zone includes the French Pacific territories, but not the territories of the U.S.-associated Micronesian states. Members of the South Pacific Forum are the sovereign or freely-associated states of Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (observer status until 1989), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. Nine of the South Pacific states have signed the Treaty without reservations. Tonga has not signed; the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea have signed but expressed reservations about the Treaty's effectiveness. Vanuatu has not signed on the grounds that the Treaty is neither comprehensive nor consistent and does not provide for a nuclear-free zone. Amendment to the Treaty requires the consensus of all Treaty parties.

The USSR signed Protocols 2 and 3 on December 15, 1986, stating that it refuted the clause allowing transit of nuclear weapons (Article 5), and that it would reconsider its position in the case of a violation of a major commitment or aggression by a Party supported by, or together with, a nuclear-weapon state. China signed Protocols 2 and 3 on February 10, 1987, reserving the right to reconsider its assumed obligation if other nuclear weapon states or participants took action in "gross violation" of the Treaty, thus endangering China's security interests. Both the USSR and China have since deposited instruments of ratification with the Forum secretariat. France, the United States and the U.K. have not signed the protocols].

**PEOPLE'S CHARTER FOR A NUCLEAR FREE AND INDEPENDENT PACIFIC
(Ponape, Caroline Islands, 1978 and Vanuatu, 1983)**

THE CHARTER [FOR A NUCLEAR FREE PACIFIC]

We being inhabitants of the Pacific,

CONVINCED that our peoples and our environment have been exploited enough by superpowers;

ASSERTING that nuclear powers in the Pacific are operating here against our will, from territories administered or claimed by them as colonies;

BELIEVING that the political independence of all peoples is fundamental to attaining a Nuclear Free Pacific;

BELIEVING that nuclear tests in the Pacific and the resultant radiation constitute a threat to the health, livelihood and security of the inhabitants;

BELIEVING that nuclear tests and missile tests are the major means by which the armaments race maintains its momentum;

BELIEVING that the presence of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear wastes in the Pacific endangers the lives of the inhabitants;

RECOGNIZING the urgent need for ending the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons;

DESIRING to contribute towards the ending of the armaments race;

and NOTING that a nuclear free zone is not an end in itself but only a step towards total worldwide nuclear disarmament, have agreed as follows:

[then follow the 5 Articles of the Charter. In addition to prohibiting all the nuclear activities cited in the SPNFZ Treaty, the Charter prohibits (1) a nuclear alliance of a Zone state with a nuclear weapons state; (2) nuclear threats or strikes from or across the Zone; (3) tests of nuclear weapons systems (e.g. missiles); (4) exercises of nuclear-armed forces; (5) transit of nuclear weapon platforms through seas or airspace; (6) visits of nuclear weapons platforms to ports or airfields; (7) transit of nuclear-powered vessels; (8) all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (e.g. uranium mining or transport, enrichment, fabrication of rods, nuclear power generation, dumping or storage of radioactive waste on land or at sea)].

PROTOCOLS

PROTOCOL 1

i. The undersigned plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective governments,

ii. AWARE of the desire of Pacific people to gain political independence and to remain free of risks associated with nuclear weapons, nuclear war and nuclear power,

iii. HAVE AGREED to observe all the prohibitions of activities and installations associated with nuclear war and nuclear power as established in the CHARTER FOR A NUCLEAR FREE PACIFIC zone;

iv. AND HAVE FURTHER AGREED TO take immediate steps to grant political independence to territories and peoples at present governed by them within that zone.

PROTOCOL 2

i. The undersigned plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective governments,

ii. HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

(a) TO RESPECT all the prohibitions on activities and installations associated with nuclear war and nuclear power as established in the CHARTER FOR A NUCLEAR FREE PACIFIC zone;

(b) TO PERMIT at any time inspection by representatives of governments and people within the zone, of any buildings, installations, vehicles, ships, aircraft or submarines under their control to determine that the prohibitions of the charter are being complied with;

(c) NOT TO USE or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any territory or people within the zone.

Statement added by the Vanuatu NFIP Conference, 1983 (160 delegates from 33 countries)

Given the expansion of the Nuclear Free Pacific movement into the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement, as reflected in the name of this conference,

Be it hereby resolved that the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Conference 1983 resolves to change the name of the People's Charter which defines the aims and goals of this movement to '**The People's Charter for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific.**'

PREAMBLE

1. We, the people of the Pacific, want to make our position clear. We are rapidly regaining control of our lands, and the fact that we have inherited the basic administration system imposed upon us by alien imperialistic and colonial powers does not imply that we have to perpetuate them and the preferential racist policies that went with them.

2. We, the people of the Pacific, have been victimized too long by foreign powers. The Western imperialistic and colonial powers invaded our defenceless region, they took over our lands and subjugated our people to their whims. This form of alien colonial political and military domination unfortunately persists as an evil cancer in some of our native territories such as Tahiti, New Caledonia, Australia and New Zealand. Our environment continues to be despoiled by foreign powers developing nuclear weapons for a strategy of warfare that has no winners, no liberators and imperils the survival of all humankind.

3. Our environment is further threatened by the continuing deployment of nuclear

weaponry and nuclear arsenals in the so-called strategic areas throughout the Pacific. Only one nuclear submarine has to be lost in the sea, or one nuclear warhead dumped in our ocean from a stricken bomber, and the fish and our livelihood [are] endangered for centuries. The erection of superports, military bases and nuclear testing stations may bring employment, but the price is destruction of our customs, our way of life, the pollution of our crystal clear waters, and brings [*sic*] the ever present threat of disaster by radioactive poisoning into the everyday lives of the peoples.

4. We, the people of the Pacific, reaffirm our intention to extract only those elements of Western civilization that will be of permanent benefit to us. We wish to control our destinies and protect our environment in our own ways. The customary usage by our people in the days gone past was more than adequate to ensure the balance between nature and humankind. No form of administration should ever seek to destroy that balance for the sake of brief commercial gain.

5. We note in particular the recent racist roots of the world's nuclear powers, and we call for an immediate end to the oppression, exploitation and subordination of the indigenous people of the Pacific.

6. We, the people of the Pacific, will assert ourselves and wrest control over the destiny of our nations and our environment from foreign powers, including the Trans-National Corporations.

[The Charter does not prohibit deployment of dual-capable weapons. As Tomahawk missiles are a matter of concern the omission is probably due to an oversight, but the Charter has not yet been changed to include this provision].

[The NFIP Charter has not been signed by official representatives of any state].

(Source: NFIP Conference reports; R. Westra (1986:66-70); and St. J. Kettle, "Cruising through the Treaty." *Peace Magazine Australia* August-September, 1986).

**COMPARISON OF RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE TREATY
OF TLATELOLCO, SPNFZ AND NFIP CHARTER**

Nuclear Activity	Tlatelolco	SPNFZ	NFIP
Acquisition/maufacture/possession/ storage/use of nuclear weapons by member states	No	No	No
Permanent stationing of any nuclear weapon explosive device within the territory of member states	No	No	No
Use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the member states	No	No	No
Use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from vessels/subs/aircraft or otherwise from within the territory of member states	No	Yes	No
Use or theat of use of nuclear weapons from the high seas or international airspace from within the territory of member states	Yes	Yes	No
Testing of any nuclear weapon explosive device by member states	No	No	No
Testing of any peaceful nuclear explosive device by member states	Yes	No	No
Testing of any peaceful nuclear explosive device in zone by non-members	Yes	No	No
Testing of delivery or guidance systems	Yes	Yes	No
Transit of nuclear weapons and/or nuclear-armed vessels/subs or aircraft through territory/territorial waters or air-space	Yes	Yes	No

Nuclear Activity (cont.)	Tlatelolco	SPNFZ	NFIP
Transit of nuclear-armed vessels/subs on high seas within zone	Yes	Yes	No
Transit of nuclear-armed aircraft through inter-national airspace	Yes	Yes	No
Transit of nuclear-powered vessels	Yes	Yes	No
Transit of nuclear materials (e.g. uranium)	Yes	Yes	No
Uranium extraction, processing, enrichment, fuel rod fabrication	Yes	Yes	No
Uranium export with IAEA safeguards	Yes	Yes	No
Uranium export without IAEA safeguards	No	No	No
Dumping of radioactive materials states in the sea anywhere within the zone	Yes	No	No
Nuclear waste disposal on land	Yes	Yes	No
Military alliance of a member state with a nuclear weapon state	Yes	Yes	No
Bases or installations relating to nuclear weapons	Yes	Yes	No
Military exercises involving nuclear -capable vessels or aircraft	Yes	Yes	No
Deployment of dual-capable weapons	Yes	Yes	Yes
Commercial power reactors	Yes	Yes	No

(Sources: Treaty/Charter documents, *The Arms Control Reporter* (c)1987, Brookline, MA., U.S.A. and R. Alexander (1989:271-2).

**APPENDIX 2: ANNOUNCED U.S. NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE PACIFIC
(JULY 1945-AUGUST 1958)**

Table 2:1

SITE	Japan	2			
	Pacific Ocean	4			
	Johnson Island Area	12			
	Enewetak	43			
	Bikini	23			
	Christmas Island Area	24			
	Total	108			
TYPE¹ OF OPER'N	Barge	37			
	Tower	14			
	Surface	9			
	Airdrop	6			
	Underwater	4			
	Rocket	2			
	Balloon	1			
NAME	KT.²	SITE	NAME	MT.	SITE
Little Boy	15	(J)	Mike (TND) ³	10.40	(E)
Fat Man	21	(J)	Bravo (TND)	15	(B)
Able	21	(B)	Romeo	11	(B)
Baker	21	(B)	Union	6.90	(B)
X-Ray	37	(E)	Yankee	13.50	(B)
Yoke	49	(E)	Nectar	1.69	(E)
Zebra	18	(E)	Cherokee (TND)	sev.	(B)
Easy	47	(E)	Zuni	3.05	(B)
King	500	(E)	Tewa	5	(B)
Koon	110	(E)	Koa	1.37	(E)
Wigwam	30	(P)	Oak	8.90	(E)
Lacrosse	40	(E)	Teak	meg. range	(JI)
Seminole	13.7	(E)	Orange	meg. range	(JI)
Scaevola	low	(E)			
Cactus	18	(E)			

¹ Not all individual bomb tests or explosive yields are described.

² Explosive Yield: Kt. = 1,000 tons of TNT; Mt. = 1,000 kt.;

³ Thermo-Nuclear Device = hydrogen bomb.

Source: Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945-December 1986. Office of Public affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations, Las Vegas; Jan. 1987.

APPENDIX 3: NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Table 3:1

NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Dec. 1987)

	U.S.	Soviet	U.K.	France	China
Strategic Warheads	5,632	3,447	128	256	24
Non-strategic Warheads					
Cruise missiles	150	398	0	0	0
Aircraft bombs	1,450	450	62	36 ¹	0 ²
Anti-sub weapons	1,760	1,401	136	0	0
Anti-air weapons	285	256	0	0	0
Naval artillery	0	100	0	0	0
Coastal missiles	100	0	0	0	0
Sub-total	3,645	2,705	198	36	0
Total	9,277	6,152	326	292	24

Total Strategic Warheads = 9,487

Total Non-strategic Warheads = 6,584

Total Naval Nuclear Warheads = 16,071

¹ In addition to nuclear bombs, France is deploying the ASMP surface-to-air missile, but in December 1987 there were no estimates on the total number for naval use.

² Chinese naval aircraft may be assigned nuclear bombs.

Source: Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, *Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: a Complete Inventory*. Neptune Papers, No. 2. May 1988 (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C.).

Table 3:2

NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SHIPS, SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT (Dec. 1987)

	U.S.	Soviet	U.K.	France	China
Submarines					
Ballistic Missile	36	77	4	6	2 ¹
Cruise Missile	0	63	0	0	0
Attack	692	199	0	0	0
Total	105	339	4	6	1
Surface ships					
Aircraft Carriers	19	5	3	2	0
Battleships	3	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	36	39	0	0	0
Destroyers	64	69	12	0	0
Frigates	65	118	8	0	0
Patrol Combatants	0	63	0	0	0
Support Ships	106	323	27	2	0
Total	293	323	27	2	0
Total Ships and Submarines	398	662	31	8	2
Aircraft					
Attack	1,124	555	86	36	150
Anti-submarine	662	400	185	0	0
Total	1,786	955	271	36	150
Total Force	2,184	1,617	302	44	152
Submarines	456				
Ships	1,101				
Aircraft	3,198				
Total	4,299				

¹ China has one SSB for testing and training that may be nuclear-capable.

² This number includes all possible nuclear-capable submarines. Actual number certified is probably closer to 61.

Source: Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, *Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: a Complete Inventory*. Neptune Papers No. 2., May 1988. (Institute for Policy Studies Washington D.C.)

Table 3:3

NUCLEAR REACTORS ON NAVAL VESSELS (Dec. 1987)						
Ship Type	U.S.	Soviet	U.K.	France	China	Total
Submarines						
Ballistic Missile	36	124	4	6	2	172
Cruise	0	70	0	0	0	70
Attack	98	136	15	3	3	255
Surface Ship						
Aircraft Carriers	16	0	0	0	0	16
Cruisers	18	4	0	0	0	22
Other ¹	1	8	0	0	0	9
Total	169	342	19	9	5	554

¹Icebreakers and naval research vessels

Source: Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, *Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: a Complete Inventory*, Neptune Papers No.2, May 1988. (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C.)

Table 3:4

REDUCTIONS IN U. S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SURFACE SHIPS¹ DECEMBER 1987-DECEMBER 1989

	U. S.	SOVIET
Non-Strategic Naval Nuclear Weapons		
1987	3,650	3,290
1987	2,500	2,960
Total Reductions	1,150	330
Nuclear-Capable Surface Ships		
1987	187	294
1989	49	264
Total Reductions	158	30
Non-Nuclear-Capable Surface Ships		
1987	60	189
1989	184	200
Total Increase	124	11

¹Excludes auxilliary and support ships.

Source: Greenpeace U.S.A., (Washington), February 5, 1990

APPENDIX 4: NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand lies midway between the equator and the South Pole and comprises two main islands and a small island, Stewart Island, to the south. Long and narrow, the land is similar in size to the U.K. or Japan. Eleven hundred miles separate the tip of the South Island from the tip of the North Island, and no inland area is more than 70 miles from the sea. New Zealand is said to be surrounded by "the world's biggest moat;" the nearest continental neighbours are Australia, 930 miles to the north-west, South America, 6,600 miles to the east and Antarctica, 1,500 miles south. North of New Zealand are the Pacific Island countries, with Fiji lying directly north of Auckland, New Zealand's largest city. While Western Samoa is now independent, it became a New Zealand territory after WW1. Tokelau is still under N.Z. control, while its other erstwhile territories, the Cook Islands and Niue, are self-governing in free association with New Zealand.

It is thought that the first Polynesian migration occurred around 1,000 years ago, and that the new arrivals named the land 'Aotearoa', the land of the long white cloud. From the second Maori migration over the 13th. and 14th. centuries, there emerged a well-ordered tribal society led by hereditary chiefs and a powerful priesthood but with no overall political organization. Dutch navigator, Abel Tasman, sighted the country in 1642 and called it 'Staten Landt' but it was later changed by Dutch geographers to 'Nieuw Zeeland'. There are no records of further European visits until Captain James Cook of the British Navy explored the coastline in a series of three voyages beginning in 1769. Soon afterwards came whalers, traders and missionaries. The British Government decided to extend sovereignty in 1840, and sent William Hobson to negotiate with the Maori leaders.

The result was the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi signed by most, though not all, of the Maori kings or chiefs. In it, Maori sovereignty is ceded to the British Crown in return for the recognition and honouring of Maori rights, customs and property - particularly land ownership. Although the Treaty has never been ratified in Parliament, the day of the Treaty signing, February 2, is known as 'Waitangi Day' and celebrated - although with increasing protest from both Maori and Pakeha (white European) people - as New Zealand's national day. The first British settlers emigrated in 1840 through the New Zealand Company, an association founded in England in the hope of establishing a model colony. They were overwhelmingly English, Scottish and Irish, Protestant rather than Catholic, and their identification with Britain was strong. In spite of the Treaty, land disputes with the Maoris soon led to violence and the so-called Maori Wars peaked between 1863 and 1872. As

usual, the colonists were the winners and the indigenous people the losers. When the first traders and settlers arrived, the Maori population was between 220,000 and 250,000; by 1896 it had fallen to approximately 42,000, and most of the best land was in Pakeha hands. The present Government has established a Tribunal to deal with the increasing number of Maori claims to land ownership under the terms of the Waitangi Treaty.

Of the country's total population of approximately 3.3 million, between 9 and 10 percent are Maori and approximately 1 percent Pacific Islanders. Three-quarters of the Maori population is under the age of 30, and one quarter of all children born in New Zealand has at least one Maori parent. As the Maori component of the population is increasing at a faster rate than that of the non-Maori component some demographers predict that, if the trend continues, within the span of the next century Maoris will again become the majority people. Around 70 percent of Maoris live in the northern half of the North Island, but whereas in 1945 around 15 percent were urban dwellers, the estimated number today is around 60 percent, due mainly to lack of employment in rural areas. Tokelauans, Cook Islanders and Niueans as citizens of New Zealand have free access to the country, and more Niueans and Tokelauans now live in New Zealand than in their home countries. People from Western Samoa and other independent countries of the Pacific who holiday in New Zealand and stay on illegally are termed 'overstayers'.

New Zealand is a sovereign, independent state with a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. The Crown of New Zealand, although separate from that of Britain, is vested in the same person; Queen Elizabeth II is also Queen of New Zealand. The country inherited a Westminster style of democracy but since 1950 Parliament has had only one Chamber, the House of Representatives. The parliamentary leader with a majority of seats in the House becomes the Prime Minister and he, with other Ministers (all elected Members of Parliament) form the Cabinet, which usually numbers about 20. Ministers are chosen by the Caucus (all the parliamentary members) of the ruling party, and portfolios are allocated by the Prime Minister. As there are about 40 government departments most Ministers have more than one portfolio.

The Labour Party, founded in 1916, is the oldest of New Zealand's existing political parties (Labour, National, Democratic (formerly Social Credit) and Mana Motuhake). Labour first came to power in 1935 and remained in office for 14 years. The first Labour Government introduced a number of innovative social welfare policies which were progressive for their time and still form the basis of New Zealand society. Between 1949 and 1984, Labour was elected to office only twice, and each time only for a single term (between 1957 and 1960 and between 1972 and 1975). The Party's link with the

trade unions is strong, although weakening. An oligarchy of landed gentry controlled the country up till 1890, and created a society in which the government was the largest landowner, the biggest employer, virtually the sole establisher of public facilities and the educator of nine-tenths of the colony's children. The Liberal Government of 1890 continued the trend of state ownership and regulation, and the Reform Party Government of 1912 did likewise. The First Labour Government of 1935-49 added comprehensive social security, free medical care, extension of free education, nationalization of the mines and the Bank of New Zealand, guaranteed state-fixed minimum prices for some agricultural produce and import protection for some secondary industries, compulsory unionism and state-fixed minimum wages. The National Government that followed Labour left most of this in place, as well as adding the world's first comprehensive no-fault accident compensation, a national tax-payer financed superannuation scheme, anti-discrimination human rights legislation and large subsidies for farmers and big business that fell on hard times.

Some commentators claim that New Zealand's governments also have a history of oppression. In support of this argument they point to such things as the systematic alienation of the Maori from land and property; the violent suppression of the non-violent Mau movement in Western Samoa in the 1920's and 1930's, the 1970's dawn raids on Pacific Island 'overstayers', the persecution and incarceration of pacifists and conscientious objectors in both world wars, the crushing of major periods of industrial unrest through force (irrespective of the government in power), the still-on-the-books draconian legislation of the Public Safety Act during one of these periods, the use of the army to assist with mass arrests in Maori land occupations during the 1970's, and the strong police actions in controlling protests during the 1981 Springbok tour and at the Waitangi Day celebrations.

Unlike other industrialized countries, New Zealand's economy is still largely dependent on expanding and diversifying overseas markets for agricultural products. It is among the world's largest exporters of meat, dairy products and wool, and its manufactured exports are mainly pastoral products. The country lacks mineral, oil and other resources and around 85 percent of its imports are raw materials. Before Britain's entry into the EEC, the Mother Country was the chief venue for New Zealand products, but today less than 30 percent of exports go to Western Europe. New markets have been established in Australia, North America, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. In 1965, meat, wool and dairy products represented 84 percent of New Zealand's exports; by 1981 they accounted for only 55 percent as the economy diversified into forestry and fisheries products, plants and fruits and manufactured goods and services. In spite of these efforts at diversification, however, the economy of any small and essentially rural country is fragile in today's world, and New Zealand is no exception.

AUCKLAND PEACE SQUADRON POLICY STATEMENT DECEMBER, 1976

Preamble

The Auckland Peace Squadron began in July 1975 with the signing of a telegram to Mr. Rowling, then Prime Minister of New Zealand, stating "We will actively support your saying absolutely no to nuclear powered warships in New Zealand ports. We are forming a Peace Squadron to picket New Zealand harbours against nuclear warships." From the beginning the Auckland Peace Squadron has been deeply concerned about nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors and about the undemocratic manner in which our country is in danger of becoming locked into their systematic global distribution. Our principal objective has always been the maintenance of the traditional rejection of nuclear powered warships from our ports. We now pledge ourselves to ensure a governmental re-assertion of this policy together with its extension to include all carriers of nuclear weapons and all nuclear powered ships. We invite all peace-loving persons everywhere, in New Zealand and in the U.S.A. especially, to join us in this pledge.

STATEMENT

- (1) We are committed to the Resolution - approved by the New Zealand Government in 1973, sponsored by New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji in 1973 and passed by 110 votes to nil in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1975 *in favour of a South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone* because:
 - a. It is an essential component of a realistic and moral defence policy for New Zealand.
 - b. It is a clear way for New Zealand to avoid becoming a target for nuclear weapons.
 - c. It is a positive contribution which New Zealand has made and can make to Arms Limitation, Disarmament and World Peace.
 - d. It makes possible a positive policy of non-alignment with either of the superpowers, such being the objective of the Pacific and peace-loving people everywhere.
 - e. It identifies New Zealand's collective heritage, destiny and security as belonging with the other South Pacific nations.

- (2) We oppose the presence in New Zealand territory of nuclear-weapons and hence the entry of any ship or aircraft which upon good evidence is believed to be carrying nuclear

weapons.

(3) We oppose as contrary to New Zealand's interest and self-respect the acceptance by a New Zealand Government of a superpower's refusal to "confirm or deny" the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships or aircraft. That refusal merits refusal by a New Zealand Government to harbour any such ship or aircraft.

(4) We oppose the entry into New Zealand of nuclear-powered ships because:

- a. Sea-borne nuclear reactors pose at this stage an unacceptable risk to the New Zealand environment.
- b. Their presence in New Zealand ports is prejudicial to public discussion and decision-making as to the desirability of land-based reactors.

(5) We will act to prevent the entry of any ship carrying nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered ship by filling channel entrances with small craft so that the responsible captain or pilot of such a ship will choose not to proceed.

(6) Any such captain or pilot persisting in attempting to force an entry is, with his superiors, and any New Zealand Government inviting such ships, primarily responsible for all consequences of such a forced entry.

(7) The Peace Squadron will absolutely refrain from violence at all times.

(8) We will support other groups in their non-violent actions to prevent the entry into New Zealand of nuclear weapons.

(9) We call for a fundamental public review by the Government of all the alternative defence policies available to New Zealand.

(10) We reject any defence policy which expressly or by implication requires:

- a. That a nuclear-weapon-free South Pacific Zone ceases to be a primary goal of New Zealand defence policy.
- b. That New Zealand be put at risk of becoming a nuclear target in consequence of playing host to the nuclear armaments of either superpower.
- c. That New Zealand become an accomplice in the firing of nuclear weapons.
- d. That New Zealand armed forces be a dependent component of the nuclear-armed forces of either superpower.

(Source: *The Auckland Peace Squadron Haddo Visit 1979 Newsletter*, George Armstrong, December 26, 1978).

**NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
ACT, 1986 (selections)**

Article 4. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone -

There is hereby established the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which shall comprise:

- (a) All the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of New Zealand; and
- (b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and
- (c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and
- (d) The airspace above the areas specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this section.

Article 5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices -

(1) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, -

- (a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or
- (b) Aid, abet, incite, counsel, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

(2) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, -

- (a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device
- (a) Aid, abet, incite, counsel, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device.

Article 6. Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive devices -

No person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land or inland waters or internal waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand nuclear Free Zone.

Article 7. Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices -

No person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

Article 8. Prohibition of biological weapons -

No person shall manufacture, station, acquire or possess or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

6. Entry into internal waters of New Zealand -

(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.

Article 10. Landing In New Zealand -

[(1) and (2) similar to above with respect to the landing of any foreign military aircraft].

(3) Any such approval may relate to a category or class of foreign military aircraft and may be given for such period as is specified in the approval.

Article 11. Visits by nuclear powered ships -

Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.

Savings

Article 12. Passage through territorial sea and straits -

Nothing in this Act shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the freedom of -

- (a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with international law) through the territorial sea of New Zealand; or
- (b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance with international law) through or over any strait used for international navigation, or
- (c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.

Offences

Article 14. Offences and penalties -

(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who contravenes or fails to comply with any provisions of sections 5 to 8 of this Act.

(2) Every person who commits an offence against this Act is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

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